10th Module (1).pptx

IV REALITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE EU (BEFORE, NOW, AND FUTURE) The Migration and the Refugee Crisis; Brexit (I) 10th MODULE Marco da Costa, Ph.D Department of Political Science Saint Louis University THE MIGRATION AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS INTRODUCTION  Definition of international Migration (UN): Th...

IV REALITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE EU (BEFORE, NOW, AND FUTURE) The Migration and the Refugee Crisis; Brexit (I) 10th MODULE Marco da Costa, Ph.D Department of Political Science Saint Louis University THE MIGRATION AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS INTRODUCTION  Definition of international Migration (UN): The United Nations provides a standard definition of international migration as “movement from one country to another for more than one year”.  Since the late 1980s, EU-level cooperation has been driven by concern in key member states about the potential for large-scale and potentially uncontrollable migration.  In the 1990s, the focus was on central and eastern Europe, but since at least the 2000s has been particularly focused on migration from the Middle East and Africa. It is likely that a dominant image of migration is of people crossing by boat trying to get to Greece, Spain or Italy. BUT…  … as a way of understanding migration to Europe, this is a very distorted image. Most people entering Europe do so via regular channels to work, study, or for family reasons: 41 per cent of these permits were issued for employment reasons 27 per cent for family reasons; 14 per cent for education; 18 per cent for international protection (e.g., refugees)  However, the EU response to migration and asylum has been very focused on… Asylum seekers refugees, and ‘irregular' migrants 2 QUESTIONS TO MIGRATION AND ASYLUM 1) Theoretical Approaches? A) Liberal approach: Liberal in this context means approaches that are more accommodating of the arrival of migrants and of the rights that are extended to migrants B) Restrictive approach:  The EU has tended to focus on restricting rather than facilitating migration, particularly from the Middle East and Africa.  This has meant a strong focus on border security and cooperation with non-EU What happened on June 24th, 2022: VIDEO – REPORT (Discussion Board 10th) 2) Who is in charge? Are supranational institutions such as the Commission in the driving seat or do the member states retain control? Behind these questions are these theories again: Intergovernmentalism Supranationalism A) Intergovernmentalism? The EU Treaty makes it very clear that the number of migrants to be admitted is a matter for the member states. EU member states play a very powerful role in defining the migration issue because it is at their borders (territorial, organizational, and conceptual) that decisions are made about who can enter, for what purpose, and for what duration. So… The member states, not the EU, have competence over the numbers of migrants to be admitted. B) Supranationalism?  The balance of responsibility between the member states and EU institutions is also complex. There has been a growth in the role of supranational institutions (Commission, Court of Justice, etc.) BUT, again, EU governments seem not to want to be seen by their citizens to ‘lose control’ of migration. C) Transgovernmentalism?  After 2015 is a ‘transgovernmental’ dynamic: This means regular interactions between national level political leaders and officials at the EU level where engagement also occurs with EU institutions and important EU agencies such as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (known as Frontex, founded in 2006) and the Europen Asylum Agency.  Transgovernmentalism creates habits of working together but does not necessarily mean a common and shared viewpoint on the issues between the member states. What is the problem? Dispute over competences: Frontex is demanding more command authority in the missions. Spain does not want to accept that the border agency wants to access personal data from interviews with migrants. AGAIN… (as we said in the Module 1st: “competition”) The disputes between the European institutions (EU agencies in this case) and the national interests of the member states.  FEBRUARY 2024: Marine Le Pen hired Fabrice Leggeri, former executive director of the European border agency (Frontex), who resigned from the position in 2020 surrounded by various scandals related to the sudden returns of migrants.  Leggeri will occupy third place on the RN list for the European elections. And what else?  REMEMBER: The new objective of the eurosceptic parties: changing the European Union from within (the “Trojan Horse”). Leggeri, as a senior official of a European agency, knows EU migration policies very well. EU MIGRATION CRISIS IN 2015 Causes of the migration, in general? The effects of military interventions (EU, USA, NATO, etc.) have exacerbated the underlying conditions that can cause refugee flows. Legacies of colonization and decolonization continue to shape migration in several ways. The broader patterns of economic inequality and unequal development can also cause Causes of the migration in 2015 to the EU First, remember: These flows did not start in 2015. There had been irregular movement by sea towards Europe before then and also terrible losses of life. This was the case in October 2013 when a boat sailing from Libya towards Italy sank just off the coast of the island of Lampedusa. The exact death toll More than 1 million people entered the EU in 2015, mainly from Syria (the civil war started in 2011), seeking refuge from civil war and conflict. Mostly Syrians made crossings by boat across the Aegean Sea Divisions in the EU after 2015  GERMANY: The immediate, unilateral response in August 2015 by the German government led by Angela Merkel was to open German borders to Syrian refugees.  OTHER MEMBER STATES were not prepared to adopt the same stance as the German government and share responsibility for asylum seekers and refugees.  In September 2015, EU leaders did agree to a system, in the form of two EU Council decisions, whereby there would be a relocation of up to 160,000 asylum applicants between the member states; fewer than 28,000 were relocated.  Particular opposition came from the Visegrad (the name of the cultural and political alliance) governments of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. EU POLICIES AFTER 2015 After 2015, the European Agenda on Migration (EAM) was published by the European Commission with some proposals (3 PILLARS) for further development of the migration/asylum framework in the wake of the ‘refugee crisis'. It was NOT successful: 1) Reducing the incentives for irregular migration with a focus on ‘root causes behind irregular migration in non-EU countries’ on ‘dismantling smuggling and trafficking networks’ and on ‘the better application of return policies’. PROBLEMS: The basic issue here is that smugglers and traffickers are a symptom of border controls (FRONTEX) and not the cause of irregular migration. Making border controls stricter can mean that more migrants seek to 2) Cooperation with non-EU member states: The EU sought agreement with the Turkish government which resulted in the EU-Turkey Statement of April 2016. The Statement provided for:  The numbers of migrants moving along the the return of all irregularly arriving Syrian 'Eastern Mediterranean' route from Turkey to nationals from the Greek Islands to Greece fell from 176,000 in 2016 to 35,000 Turkey; in 2017.  The agreement also increased the importance of EU-Turkish relations while a mechanism for one vulnerable Syrian to move to the EU for every Syrian giving Turkish President Erdogan leverage returned to Turkey; over the EU. PROBLEMS: Increase in racism against Syrians. It has been seen in the Turkish presidential elections of May 2023. VIDEO 3) The EAM’s third pillar was a strengthening of the EU’s common asylum policy (“solidarity”). PROBLEMS: Rather than solidarity, an effect of the crisis of 2015 was a ‘reverse domino effect’ with new fencing and border controls introduced within the EU’s Schengen area of free movement that was designed to stop the onward movement of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers and migrants found themselves consigned to camps either on After the failure of the EAM in 2015… In 2020, the New Pact on Migration and Asylum was proposed by the European Commission after failure to secure an agreement on European Agenda on Migration and with a focus on asylum, border controls, irregular migration, and cooperation This new pact tries to promote more solidarity between the member states for relocating migrants and asylum seekers. HOW? The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is the EU’s response to its international obligations to provide humanitarian protection to refugees and a functioning asylum system across the EU. Mainly, it addresses the practice which leads asylum seekers whose application for asylum is denied in one member state to apply for asylum in another EU country. Module 12th: We will talk about the disproportionate pressure placed on countries of the South of Europe such as Italy, Spain and Greece and its “solutions” about that question (the “new” INTRO 2015) AND THE “PRE-BREXIT” (1958-  By 1958, the European Economic Community (EEC) was up-andrunning. The British government was invited to participate but declined: There was little enthusiasm in the UK for supranational integration because of concerns over its implications for national sovereignty.  The UK government applied to join the EEC in 1961.  It was French president Charles de Gaulle who created the biggest barrier to the UK’s EEC membership, vetoing British membership twice, in 1963 and 1967.  After De Gaulle left office in 1969, the negotiations were completed quickly, and the UK joined the EEC on 1 January 1973 (“Northern enlargement”).  A post-membership referendum in 1975 resulted in 67 per cent of the electorate voting to stay in the Community. REFERENDUM  The Conservative Party (David Cameron) won the 2015 general election based on this promise to change the UK’s relationship with the EU and to reclaim power from Brussels; and with a commitment to hold an in/ out referendum before the end of 2017.  David Cameron confirmed that an in / out referendum would take place in 23rd June 2016 with that generic question: ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Ideologically, the country was divided into two tribes: Leavers Remainers THE REMAIN SIDE Remainers: younger, urban, university-educated voters. The Remain campaign made the economy its key theme, arguing that Brexit would have a devastating effect on UK growth. The Remain campaign avoided confronting the immigration and border control issue. THE LEAVE SIDE  Leavers: older socially conservative voters living in villages, towns, and smaller cities; Leave voter is typically male, is 65 years old or older, belongs to a lower social status, and is likely to live in the Midlands, Wales, or the North of England.  The key message put forward by the Leave campaign was 'take back control': This slogan referred to control over borders and immigration and the reinstatement of British sovereignty in key policy areas.  The call for referendum day to become 'independence day’ and the promise that the country would be made 'great again’, reflected the ability of the Leave - On 23rd June 2016, the UK electorate voted to leave the EU. In total 17,410,742 people voted to leave and 16,141,241 voted to remain. That amounted to 51.9 per cent for Leave and 48.1 per cent for Remain, on a turnout of 72.16 per cent. Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to stay in the EU, while England and Wales voted to leave.