Qatari Blockade Past Paper PDF (Fall 2024/2025)

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENTS OF GCC: QATARI BLOCKADE FALL 2024/2025 DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGH Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain announced on June 5, 2017, that they were cutting diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposing sanctions against the country. The most formidable of thes...

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENTS OF GCC: QATARI BLOCKADE FALL 2024/2025 DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGH Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain announced on June 5, 2017, that they were cutting diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposing sanctions against the country. The most formidable of these sanctions was a comprehensive blockade of Qatar, which involved the closure of the land border that Qatar has with Saudi Arabia as well as the closure of airspace. A few other countries joined the core four in cutting off diplomatic ties. DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGH The causing factors that led to the crisis: 1. Disagreements over how to deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran 2. Disagreements over how to respond to regional chaos, Islamist groups, and terrorist organizations DRIVERS AND MOTIVATIONS 1. United Arab Emirates: The UAE has accused Qatar of directly supporting, funding and training Muslim Brotherhood rebels in the country. In 2013, the UAE convicted 69 people on charges of plotting a coup on behalf of the Brotherhood. 2. Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia has accused Qatar of supporting Saudi rebels, specifically those associated with the sahwa movement, who have some ideological commonalities with the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar denied all allegations. DRIVERS AND MOTIVATIONS 3. Bahrain: Bahrain’s local Muslim Brotherhood party enjoys a good relationship with the government. The government has found it more politically practical to accuse Qatar of funding and backing the largely Shia Islamist opposition – an accusation that is levelled at Iran. 4. Egypt: Egypt has blamed Qatar for supporting the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the government of Mohammed Morsi, who was overthrown in a coup in 2013. LIST OF 13 DEMANDS Shortly after the crisis began, on July 12, 2017, the Saudis and their partners issued a list of 13 demands for Qatar. These were: 1. Limit diplomatic ties with Iran and close diplomatic missions there. Expel members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and cut off any joint military cooperations with Iran. Only trade and commerce with Iran that complies with US and international sanctions will be permitted. 2. Cut all ties to “terrorist organizations,” specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic State, al- Qaeda, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Formally declare those entities terrorist groups. 3. Shut down Al Jazeera. 4. Shut down news outlets that Qatar funds, directly and indirectly, including Arabi21, Rassd, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, and Middle East Eye.  LIST OF 13 DEMANDS 5. Immediately terminate the Turkish military presence in Qatar and end any joint military cooperation with Turkey inside Qatar. 6. Stop all means of funding for individuals, groups, or organizations that have been designated terrorists by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, the US, and other countries. 7. Hand over “terrorist figures” and wanted individuals from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain to their countries of origin. Freeze their assets, and provide any desired information about their residency, movements, and finances. 8. End interference in sovereign countries’ internal affairs. Stop granting citizenship to wanted nationals from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain. Revoke Qatari citizenship for nationals where such citizenship violates those countries’ laws. LIST OF 13 DEMANDS 9. Stop all contact with the political opposition in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain. Hand over all files detailing Qatar’s prior contacts with and support for those opposition groups. 10. Pay reparations and compensation for loss of life and other financial damages caused by Qatar’s policies in recent years. The sum will be determined in coordination with Qatar. 11. Consent to monthly audits for the first year after agreeing to the demands, then once per quarter during the second year. For the following 10 years, Qatar would be monitored annually for obedience. 12. Align with the other Gulf and Arab countries militarily, politically, socially, and economically, in line with an agreement reached with Saudi Arabia in 2014. 13. Agree to all the demands within 10 days of submission to Qatar, or the list becomes invalid. IMPACT OF THE EMBARGO ON QATAR The immediate impact of the embargo was a shock for Qatar, but its economy has since proved largely resistant and strong. Some of the impacts of the embargo: 1. Imports and flights were immediately disrupted, as the country lost access to four ports and airports. 2. In June 2017, Qatar’s imports fell by 40 per cent by value compared with June 2016. 3. Qatar Airways had to close 18 routes to neighboring states, and its CEO said in March 2018 that he expected the airline to have suffered a ‘very large loss’ for the year. 4. The four countries withdrew their capital from Qatari banks. 5. Qatari citizens living in those four Arab countries were expelled, although exceptions were subsequently made for Qataris married to their citizens, and for Qatari pilgrims to Makkah. IMPACT OF THE EMBARGO ON QATAR In response: 1. Qatar drew on its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), to inject liquidity into banks. 2. Qatar also moved to create new shipping links to compensate for the loss of access to four ports, and has ramped up imports through Turkey, Iran and Oman. 3. By the fourth quarter of 2017, imports were back up to pre-crisis levels. IMPACT OF THE EMBARGO ON QATAR 4. Qatar concluded agreements with shipping lines from key Asian markets, including China, India and South Korea, to establish new routes between Doha and their major ports. 5. Qatar Airways managed to establish new routes, and in March it acquired a 25 per cent stake in Moscow’s Vnukovo International Airport, Russia’s third largest airport. ATTITUDES TO THE CRISIS IN KUWAIT & OMAN Kuwait and Oman have sought to pursue a mediation role. However, each state has its own objections to Qatari foreign policy. Kuwait has complained that Qatar – and especially Al Jazeera – has supported the Kuwaiti opposition group. But Kuwait’s primary concern has been the damage done to the institution of the GCC. It has taken the position that, while the Arab countries have some legitimate grievances, the GCC should be capable of resolving differences between its members around a table. Kuwait’s Emir, Sheikh Sabah al-Sabah, engaged in shuttle diplomacy at the outset of the crisis, and Kuwaiti politicians and civil society have credited him with preventing the dispute from escalating further. ATTITUDES TO THE CRISIS IN KUWAIT & OMAN Meanwhile in Oman, the Muslim Brotherhood (like all political movements) does not exist. But while Oman has also had its concerns about Qatar’s foreign policy, it believes – like Kuwait – that issues can be settled through diplomacy between the GCC leaders. SOLIDARITY AND STABILITY AGREEMENT On January 5, 2021, at the annual Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in the Saudi city of Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain signed a ‘solidarity and stability agreement’ restoring diplomatic relations with Qatar. Egypt, which is not a member of the GCC but joined the other three countries in breaking relations with Qatar, also signed the agreement. SOLIDARITY AND STABILITY AGREEMENT The deal, which was mediated by the United States and Kuwait, lifted the destructive three-and-a-half- year blockade of Qatar that worsened relations in the region and restored the free movement of people and goods. Saudi Arabia was the first of the four blockading countries to open its airspace to Qatari flights, and the other three have since followed. SOLIDARITY AND STABILITY AGREEMENT Foreign minister Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud told CNBC the deal is for the good of the region’s security. “This agreement is not about Iran or about anyone else. It’s about bringing our countries together and making sure that we work together to deliver prosperity and security for our people.” The Saudi foreign minister said the Gulf nations will cooperate on security issues as well as economic integration. “The opening of airspace is helpful ahead of the Qatar 2022 World Cup, and the nations want to boost themselves economically.” QATARS NEW POLICIES Qatar has changed its policies since the rift with its neighbors. But rather than changing its foreign policy to accommodate its neighbors demands, it has instead focused on making itself a more attractive partner for Western and Asian countries. How? By liberalizing its economy and making efforts to improve its record on labor rights. DEBATE QUESTION “The Qatar blockade should be reinitiated.” GROUP F GROUP G FOR AGAINST 1. Rouda Abdulla Saif Obaid Al-ali 1. Mahra Ibrahim Saif Alratouq Alsuwaidi 2. Mahra Mohamed Mousa Alraeesi Alblooshi 2. Mariam Abdalla Abdelghafour A. Alansaari 3. Hessa Abdulla Mohammad Alhelli Alhajeri 3. Rawdha Khaled Masoud Ali Aldhaheri 4. Amira Fahad Malalla Hassan Alyassi