Philosophy of Mind and Intelligence

Descartes' approach to knowledge, where he systematically doubts everything he can, until he arrives at a foundational truth that cannot be doubted.

The famous phrase by Descartes, meaning 'I think, therefore I am,' which he considers the one truth that cannot be doubted, proving the existence of the self.

The idea that the mind (or soul) and the body are two distinct substances, separate and independent of each other.

How Descartes sees the mind and body interacting. He believes the mind influences the body through volition (will), while the body can affect the mind through sensory experiences.

Elisabeth questions Descartes' explanation of volition, finding it hard to understand how the immaterial mind can move the physical body.

Descartes argues that the mind influences the body through a union between the soul and the body, but Elisabeth finds his explanation inadequate and unclear.

A fictional scenario where Dennett's body is replaced with a new one, and his brain is connected to a computer, raising questions about where 'he' is located.

After Dennett's operation, the term 'here' becomes ambiguous. Does it refer to the physical location of the body, the brain, or the computer?

The philosophical view that everything in the universe, including the mind, can be explained by physical processes.

Dennett likely adopts a functionalist view, believing that mental states are defined by their functional roles, not their material composition.

A test proposed by Alan Turing to determine if a machine can exhibit intelligent behavior indistinguishable from a human.

The name for the Turing Test, where a human evaluator interacts with a human and a machine, attempting to determine which is which.

The theory that mental states are defined by their functional roles, or how they interact with other states and inputs and outputs.

The view that behavior is the only observable and measurable aspect of a person, and that mental states are simply internal explanations for behavior.

Turing rejects the objection that machines cannot be intelligent because they lack a soul or spiritual essence, arguing that intelligence is not dependent on religious beliefs.

Turing dismisses the objection that machines cannot be conscious because they lack subjective experience, arguing that consciousness is not a requirement for intelligence.

Turing counters the argument that machines cannot be truly creative because they only follow pre-programmed rules, by pointing out that humans are also bound by rules (laws of nature).

Turing acknowledges that human behavior is often unpredictable and informal, but argues that this doesn't mean machines can't be intelligent, as they can model this informality too.

The idea that machines can be programmed to simulate human intelligence, but lack true understanding or consciousness.

The belief that machines can achieve genuine intelligence and consciousness, capable of understanding and thinking like humans.

An experiment by John Searle, where a person inside a room follows instructions in a language they don't understand, manipulating symbols to create a response that simulates understanding, arguing against strong AI.

An argument against Searle's Chinese room, claiming that the system (person and rules) as a whole understands the language, even if the person inside doesn't.

An attempt to counter Searle's argument by suggesting that if the person in the Chinese room was embodied as a robot interacting with the world, they would genuinely understand.

Syntax refers to the structure and rules of a language, while semantics deals with the meaning and interpretation of language.

Searle argues that machines can never replicate the true understanding of human minds, as they can only manipulate symbols according to programmed rules, lacking genuine meaning.

Functionalists might argue that Searle's Chinese room isn't a valid objection, as it ignores the importance of the functional role of mental states and the interaction with the world.

Explaining something in terms of simpler, more basic elements or principles.

Nagel uses the example of bat perception to demonstrate the limitations of reductionist theories of the mind, arguing that we can never fully know what it's like to be a bat.

Subjective descriptions are based on personal experiences and perspectives, while objective descriptions are based on facts and independent of individual viewpoints.

The subjective, qualitative aspects of our experiences, such as the feeling of redness or the taste of chocolate.

Jackson argues that even with complete knowledge of the physical world and the brain, we can't know what it's like to have certain experiences, highlighting the problem of qualia and the limitations of physicalism.

The difficulty of explaining how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experiences, or how the brain produces qualia.

While both Nagel and Jackson acknowledge the limitations of reductive theories of the mind, Jackson's Knowledge Argument focuses on the specific issue of qualia, while Nagel's bat argument emphasizes the irreducibly subjective nature of consciousness.