Moral Responsibility & Coercion

• The principle of alternate possibilities states that a person is morally responsible for their actions only if they could have acted differently.
• It is commonly believed to be true, and is accepted amongst philosophers with differing views of free will.
• Frankfurt argues that the principle of alternate possibilities is actually false.

Alternate Possibilities

• It is natural to think of circumstances in which someone does something, and it's impossible for them to avoid doing it.
• Circumstances may constitute sufficient conditions for someone to perform a certain action, making it impossible for the person to do otherwise.
• It casts doubt on the relevance of alternate possibilities to moral questions.
• It will then discuss the principle in general terms, explain what is wrong with it and revise it.

Coercion and moral responsibility

• It is generally agreed that a person who has been coerced to do something did not do it freely and is not morally responsible for having done it
• The doctrine that coercion and moral responsibility are mutually exclusive appears to be a particular version of the principle of alternate possibilities.
• Being coerced deprives a person of freedom and moral responsibility because it is a special case of being unable to do otherwise.
• The fact that a person was coerced to act a certain way may entail that they could not have done otherwise and bear no moral responsibility for the action.
• Lack of moral responsibility is not entailed by having been unable to do otherwise.

Jones Example 1

• Jones decides for his own reasons to do something, then someone threatens him with a very harsh penalty if he does not perform the action, and he then does it.
• If Jones is not reasonable, and is a man who does what he has decided to do no matter what happens, the threat has no coercive effect upon him.
• The threat does not lead Jones to do what he did, nor was it sufficient to prevent him from doing otherwise.
• The fact that Jones was threatened does not reduce the moral responsibility he'd otherwise bear for his act.

Jones Example 2

• Jones was stampeded by the threat, and would have performed the action regardless of his decision.
• The threat upset him and he forgot his earlier decision, doing what he was demanded entirely because he was terrified of the penalty.
• It is not relevant to his action to have already decided on his own to perform it.
• As Jones performed the action simply as a result of coercion, he is not morally responsible for the action.

Jones Example 3

• Jones was neither stampeded by the threat nor indifferent to it.
• The threat impressed him as it would any reasonable man, and he would have submitted to it had he not already made a decision which coincided with the threat
• When he acted, he was not actually motivated by the threat, but instead the considerations which originally commended his action to him.

Further Analysis of the Jones Examples

• If Jones3 performs the action without coercion then his moral responsibility for what he did is unaffected by the threat.
• It would be reasonable to make the same judgement concerning his moral responsibility that would have been made if there was no threat.
• The threat did not influence the performance of his action, it was as if there was no threat at all

Continuing Analysis of the Jones3 Example

• The case of Jones3 may appear at first glance to combine coercion and moral responsibility.
• It is unclear whether the example constitutes a genuine instance of coercion.
• The murkiness of the example does not interfere with the moral to be drawn from its examination.
• It is incorrect to suppose the irresistable threat entails the person who receives it is coerced to do what he does- it is also necessary that the threat accounts for them doing it
• It has to be admitted therefore being coerced does not exclude moral responsibility

Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility

• Situations in which someone cannot do otherwise because they are subject to coercive power are not instances of coercion at all. Or they are situations in which the person can still be morally responsible.
• Even though a person is subject to a coercive force that precludes them from performing any action but one, they can still bear full moral responsibility

Deeper analysis of the example

• The irresistibility of the threat to which Jones is subjected might well be taken to mean that he cannot but perform the action he performs.
• Since he acts without regard to the threat it does not reduce his responsibility for what he does.
• It is still open to him to defy the treat and accept his punishment, "Jones's inability to resist the threat does not mean that he cannot do otherwise than perform the action he performs."
• The case of Jones does not constitute an instance contrary to the principle because he does not perform any action but the one he does perform.

Introducing "Black"

• Black wants Jones4 to perform a certain action, and he is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way- but doesn't want to show his had unnecessarily.
• Black waits until Jones4 is about to make up his mind what to do, does nothing unless it's clear that Jones is going to decide to do something other than what he wants him to do
• If this happens, Black ensure's Jones decides and acts as he wishes.
• Black could pronounce a terrible threat, give a potion, put Jones under hypnosis. Black manipulates the processes of Jones's brain and nervous system

Further analysis of "Black"

• Supposing Black never has to show his hand because Jones4 decides to perform the action he wants him to perform
• It seems clear that Jones4 will bear the responsibility for what he has done as if Black hasn't been ready to take the next step
• In this example what action Jones4 performs is not up to Jones
• If he acts on his own, however, his moral responsibility for doing it is not affected by the fact that Black was lurking in the background

The Implications

• The fact that a person could not have avoided doing something is a sufficient condition of him having done it.
• This fact may not figure at all among the circumstances that brought it about that he did what he did
• If someone has no alternative to performing a certain action but did not perform it because he was unable to do otherwise he would have been able to have performed exactly the same action even he he could have done otherwise.
• The circumstances that made it impossible could have been subtracted from the situation without affecting what followed

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities

• It asserts a person bears no moral repsonsibilty(he is to Be excused for it) for performing some actions if there were circumstances that made it impossible for him to avoid performing it
• There may however be circumstances that make it impossible for a person to avoid performing an action bringing it about that they perform the action
• People often claim they could not have done otherwise
• But this is because we assume that what they tell serve to explain why they they did what they did

A look at revision

• I have said may suggest that the principle of alternate possibilities should be revised so as to assert that a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it because he could not have done otherwise.
• He did what he did only because he was unable to do otherwise
• A person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise
• This remains in conflict with the view that moral responsibility compatible with determinism.

Explore moral responsibility under coercion. We examine scenarios like Jones, who acts after being threatened, and how his character affects our judgment. Also discussed is the nature of coercive threats and their impact on the freedom of will.