International Relations and War Theories

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Questions and Answers

How can information asymmetry lead to war between states?

Information asymmetry can lead to war when states misrepresent their intentions or capabilities, creating distrust and miscalculation.

What implications does the indivisibility of contested objects have for conflict resolution?

Indivisible contested objects can make negotiation difficult, as states may resist dividing the issue, fearing it could diminish the overall value.

What role do commitment problems play in international relations?

Commitment problems occur when states cannot ensure future compliance or prevent exploitation of power in negotiations, leading to distrust.

Explain the concept of 'salami tactics' in the context of commitment problems.

'Salami tactics' refer to the gradual erosion of concessions over time, where a state makes small, incremental demands until nothing is left. Signup and view all the answers

How might a first-strike advantage influence decisions for preventive war?

A first-strike advantage can incentivize a state to initiate preventive war to counter a perceived future threat from a potentially stronger adversary. Signup and view all the answers

What fundamental issue does the bargaining model address regarding the occurrence of wars?

The bargaining model addresses that wars are inefficient due to their high costs, suggesting that states should ideally reach a compromise instead of resorting to conflict. Signup and view all the answers

In the extreme case example presented, what is the initial value of the territory for both countries?

Both countries value the territory at 1 billion euros. Signup and view all the answers

According to the bargaining model, what is a key reason that might cause two states to fail to reach a compromise?

A key reason could be the presence of misinformation or miscalculations about the costs and benefits associated with going to war. Signup and view all the answers

What happens to the control of territory after the war in the extreme case example?

After the war, country B would control 95% of the territory while country A would control only 5%. Signup and view all the answers

What are some costs associated with war as outlined in the context provided?

Costs of war include deaths, economic destruction, and loss of resources. Signup and view all the answers

Why is the war termed as inefficient for both A and B in the example?

War is termed inefficient because Country A incurs a substantial cost of 500 million while Country B faces no costs, making a peaceful resolution more favorable for both parties. Signup and view all the answers

What is the status quo in the bargaining model before conflict arises?

The status quo is the current control of territory, where country A controls 90% and country B controls 10%. Signup and view all the answers

What implication does the bargaining model suggest about the potential for compromise between conflicting states?

The bargaining model suggests that there are numerous potential solutions that are more efficient than war for both conflicting states. Signup and view all the answers

What creates a security dilemma among states according to structuralist explanations?

The desire of states to maximize power while perceiving that their rivals are doing the same creates a security dilemma. Signup and view all the answers

How many distributions of power among states are identified as stable or unstable?

Three distributions: bipolarity (more stable), balanced multipolarity, and unbalanced multipolarity (less stable). Signup and view all the answers

Why is the occurrence of war considered difficult to explain beyond limited cases?

War is very costly, and if outcomes are predictable, states would more likely reach a compromise. Signup and view all the answers

What did Huntington's clash of civilizations theory suggest regarding conflict?

Huntington's theory suggested that the expansion of some cultures or civilizations would lead to conflict with others. Signup and view all the answers

What has been observed about most conflicts in relation to civilizations?

Most conflicts occur within civilizations rather than between them, challenging the clash of civilizations theory. Signup and view all the answers

Why was the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the West significant during the 1973 oil crisis?

Saudi Arabia cut oil supplies to the West, indicating that interests can shift despite cultural or religious affiliations. Signup and view all the answers

What is one major critique of cultural explanations for war?

Cultural explanations often fail to hold empirically, as illustrated by the lack of war between Saudi Arabia and Europe. Signup and view all the answers

How do identities and norms relate to the cause of war?

Identities and norms can incite conflict when one civilization seeks to impose its values on others. Signup and view all the answers

What was the second public Soviet demand during the Cuban Missile Crisis?

Remove US missiles from Turkey. Signup and view all the answers

How did Robert Kennedy suggest addressing the missile situation in Turkey?

He indicated that the US would take missiles out of Turkey in the future. Signup and view all the answers

What theory explains the pressures democratic leaders face during crises?

The Theory of Audience Costs. Signup and view all the answers

Why was backing down considered a politically risky move for President Kennedy during the crisis?

It could harm fellow democrats in upcoming elections and destroy his own reputation. Signup and view all the answers

What notable event in Kennedy’s career heightened the stakes of the Cuban Missile Crisis for him?

The disastrous Vienna summit with Khrushchev and the Bay of Pigs failure. Signup and view all the answers

What happens to leaders as crises escalate, according to the Theory of Audience Costs?

They become locked-in and may prefer war over the political consequences of backing down. Signup and view all the answers

What effect does audience cost have on democratic leaders during international threats?

They must be confident in their probability of winning to avoid backing down. Signup and view all the answers

How does the intensity and duration of a crisis affect the audience costs for leaders?

The longer and more intense the crisis, the higher the costs of backing down. Signup and view all the answers

What do autocrats primarily need money for?

Autocrats primarily need money to pay for private goods to their cronies. Signup and view all the answers

How do democracies decide on their foreign policies in relation to their winning coalitions?

Democrats select public goods and policies that satisfy their large winning coalitions. Signup and view all the answers

How do the sensitivities of democracies and autocracies to war outcomes differ?

Democrats are very sensitive to losing wars and casualties, while autocrats become relatively immune to losses over time. Signup and view all the answers

What condition leads large winning coalitions to allocate additional resources to a war effort?

Large winning coalitions allocate additional resources when they believe victory is essential and needed to win. Signup and view all the answers

What is the primary focus for small winning coalitions during a war?

Small winning coalitions prioritize retaining resources over winning the war. Signup and view all the answers

What trade-off do leaders face in tough wars according to selectorate theory?

Leaders must choose between retaining resources for their coalition or using them in a war effort which ensures victory. Signup and view all the answers

Why do democracies avoid fighting tough wars according to selectorate theory?

Democracies avoid tough wars because they lack the coalition resources to guarantee success in uncertain outcomes. Signup and view all the answers

What does 'V' represent in the trade-off equation in the context of war effort?

'V' represents the public good that is valued by the winning coalition if victory is achieved. Signup and view all the answers

What is the best option for A when facing B according to the Pacific Dove Hypothesis?

Using first-strike advantage and hoping B is not motivated to fight back. Signup and view all the answers

How do pacific doves typically respond when they are weak?

They are more likely to engage in violence when weak rather than strong. Signup and view all the answers

What is the expected utility (EU) of negotiating for A, given probability q that B negotiates?

EU(Negotiate) = 5Q + 2(1 − Q). Signup and view all the answers

Under what condition does A prefer to attack rather than negotiate?

A prefers to attack if $Q < \frac{2}{3}$. Signup and view all the answers

In the case of A', how much can A' extract from a negotiation?

A' can extract 20 from a negotiation. Signup and view all the answers

What change occurs in A's preference to attack as their strength increases?

As A's strength increases, the probability of attacking decreases. Signup and view all the answers

What insight does the selectorate theory provide regarding the size of the winning coalition (W)?

A small W leads to the incumbent paying off members with private benefits, while a large W necessitates public goods provision. Signup and view all the answers

What do leaders aim to provide in a large winning coalition according to selectorate theory?

Leaders aim to provide public goods. Signup and view all the answers

What is the expected outcome for A when it backs down during a conflict?

A's expected outcome when backing down is 2. Signup and view all the answers

What is the expected utility for A when it attacks and B backs down?

The expected utility for A when it attacks is 4. Signup and view all the answers

What happens to A's attacking preference if Q drops below 1/9?

A prefers to attack if $Q < \frac{1}{9}$. Signup and view all the answers

What dilemma does the Pacific Dove Hypothesis illustrate?

It illustrates the conflict between negotiation and the inclination to attack. Signup and view all the answers

How does the utility from negotiating change when A becomes stronger?

The utility from negotiating increases as A becomes stronger. Signup and view all the answers

What do A’s expected outcomes suggest about the rationality of negotiation vs. attack?

A must weigh the probabilities of B’s responses when deciding between negotiation and attack. Signup and view all the answers

Why might an incumbent prefer a small winning coalition?

An incumbent can distribute private benefits more easily to a small coalition. Signup and view all the answers

Study Notes

Why Wars?

States seek to maximize power for survival.
When rivals maximize power, states feel threatened.
This creates a security dilemma.
States conceal aims and misrepresent strength, increasing miscalculation risk.
War results from these factors.

Balance of Power Theories

Distribution of power among leading states determines war.
Number of leading states is a factor.
Power each leading state controls.

Distributions of Power

Bipolarity is the most stable distribution.
Balanced multipolarity is somewhat stable.
Unbalanced multipolarity is the least stable.

Anarchy and War

Anarchy is a constant.
War is costly, and compromise is possible in many cases.
Explaining war beyond specific cases is challenging.
Why would the US invade Afghanistan according to structural explanations?

Cultural Explanations

Identities and norms lead to conflict.
Huntington (1993) argued that clash of civilizations defines many conflicts.
Some cultures/civilizations want to expand and impose norms on others.
This leads to conflict with other civilizations.
Cultural explanations have empirical issues. Saudi Arabia and Iran have not declared war on Europe in modern history.

Issues with Cultural Explanations

How true is the 'clash of civilizations' theory?
Saudi Arabia cut oil to the West in 1973 but now seeks normalization with Israel and a defense treaty with the US. This suggests that interests change over time.

Most Conflicts within Civilizations

Most conflicts occur within civilizations.
These conflicts may arise because of identities.
Conflicts occur more commonly between competing, neighboring civilizations.
This suggests that there are more opportunities for neighbor conflicts compared to conflict between civilizations.

Bargaining Model

War is inefficient and costly.
A better solution always exists through compromise.
States fail to compromise, leading to conflict.

Extreme Case Example

Countries value territory at one billion euros.
One country controls 90% and the other 10%.
If they go to war, the second country gains 95%, and the first gains only 5%.
War costs one country 500 million but nothing for the other.
This proves war is inefficient.

Model Setup

Two countries disagree over territory.
Territory is currently divided according to a status quo.
War could lead to a different division of territory.
War is costly in terms of deaths and economic destruction.

Inefficiency of War

A's initial share is 30%.
B's initial share is 70%.
During the war, each divides the outcome 50/50 but at a loss because of the cost of the war.
A and B both lose value from their potential gain if no war occurs.

Uncertainty about Strength

Sometimes countries disagree on important factors (e.g., probability of victory).
If one country believes it has a higher capacity of victory than the other, it might not compromise.
War might occur.

Uncertainty about Costs

Uncertainty exists about costs of war.
This uncertainty can lead to disagreement on compromises.
Leaders might be forced into wars due to audience costs.

Uncertainty about Costs (Cont.)

A country might falsely estimate that their probability of victory is high.
This might lead to unnecessary war.
A country might falsely estimate the cost of war is low, and hence compromise is possible even with audience costs.

Truthfulness and Mediation

Truthfulness is a challenge because leaders have incentives to misrepresent.
Honesty is the best policy in negotiations.
Sharing information honestly is often not a strong incentive for diplomats.
Information asymmetry can be a cause for conflict.

Indivisibility of Contested Object

Sometimes things cannot be divided efficiently or values are decreased by division of an object.
Countries can claim issues are indivisible in order to justify conflict when compromise is possible
Issues like holy sites can appear non-divisible.

Hawkish Leaders

Leaders who prefer war to negotiation.
They may prioritize their own interests and potential political gains over compromise.

Commitment Problems

First-strike advantage can lead to actions even when there is a preference for peace.
Negotiations can fail since states are not certain about future commitments to agreements.

Preventive Incentives

State initiates war to prevent a future threat of becoming stronger in the future.
Nuclear weapon capability is a major factor.

Theory of Audience Costs

Leaders in democracies face audience costs when backing down from threats.
A leader is held accountable.
They have to maintain their reputation in front of the public and other leaders.
This can make backing down from a threat a dangerous strategy leading to conflict.

Fearon and Audience Costs

Leaders pay a cost for backing down in escalating crises.
Democratic leaders face higher costs because of accountability.
This can increase the chances of war or escalation.

Schultz, Audience Costs, and Selection

An incumbent leader is more careful in the face of a strong opposition.
This is because the opposition may use unfavorable foreign policies to gain political advantage over the incumbent.
The opposition could try and gain voters' support by opposing the incumbent's chosen foreign policy.

Pacific Dove Hypothesis

Weak actors may initiate military actions despite preferring peace if the alternative is too undesirable.
A weak state might be more willing to initiate a conflict against a stronger state.
This is when the potential loss during negotiation is great, or the weakness creates a sense of urgency in the weaker state leading to an inability to negotiate effectively.

Selectorate Theory and War

Leaders are more inclined to act to maintain leadership.
The size of the winning coalition may influence conflict initiation and outcomes.
This difference between democracies (larger coalition with public good) and autocracies (smaller coalitions with private payoff) can give insight to why these regimes behave differently.

Selectorate Theory and War (Cont.)

Autocracies are less likely to care about public goods than democracies.
When facing war, they may choose the option of fighting less if it is risky or difficult to win.
Democrats are more likely to use public resources toward war because achieving victory is essential to their survival.

War Effort

If war is more difficult and resource intensive than expected, democratically elected leaders have a higher incentive to support a war effort than those in autocratic regimes.
They have to retain the support of the winning coalition to stay in power.

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Description

Explore the complex dynamics of international relations and the theories surrounding war. This quiz covers concepts such as the balance of power, the security dilemma, and cultural explanations for conflict. Test your knowledge on how states interact under conditions of anarchy and the implications for global conflict.