International Relations and War Theories

A situation where one party in a negotiation has more information than the other, potentially leading to deception and conflict.

A situation where dividing a contested object reduces its value. This can lead to conflicts as both sides fight for complete control.

A situation where a state has an incentive to use force to prevent another state from becoming stronger in the future.

A situation where a state has an advantage in attacking first, making it difficult to reach a peaceful agreement.

A situation where a state cannot credibly promise to maintain its commitments in the future, leading to mistrust and conflicts.

A situation in which states feel threatened by each other's growing power, leading to a cycle of insecurity and potential conflict.

A theory that argues that the distribution of power among states in the international system influences the likelihood of war. The balance of power refers to the relative strengths and weaknesses of states compared to each other.

A system with two major powers, such as the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War.

A system with multiple powerful states, where no single state is dominant.

A system with multiple powerful states, but where one or a few states are significantly stronger than the others.

The idea that different cultures clash because they have incompatible values and goals, leading to conflict.

A theory that emphasizes the role of cultural factors, such as identities and norms, in explaining the occurrence of war. It suggests that conflict can arise when cultures perceive themselves as incompatible or threaten each other's values.

A situation where most conflicts occur within civilizations rather than between them, suggesting that other factors, such as economic disparities or political grievances, may be more important than cultural differences in explaining conflict.

The idea that war is a costly and inefficient solution to interstate disputes, suggesting states should be able to find a compromise instead of resorting to conflict.

The costs associated with waging war, including loss of life, economic damage, and political instability. These costs often outweigh any potential gains from a successful outcome.

The existing division of resources or power between states prior to any conflict. The starting point for any bargaining process over a disputed issue.

The potential outcomes of war. This includes the distribution of resources, territory, or power after a conflict.

A situation where both sides in a potential conflict can achieve outcomes that are better than the results of a war. This demonstrates that resorting to war is inefficient as peaceful solutions exist.

A model that assumes both sides in a conflict have the same level of information about the resources, capabilities, and intentions of the other side.

A scenario where negotiations for a peaceful solution are complicated by a lack of trust and uncertainties between the parties involved.

The potential for a state to exploit a weakened opponent during a conflict, further increasing the potential for war.

Autocratic leaders prioritize private goods for their close allies (cronies) over public goods that benefit everyone.

Democratic leaders focus on policies, including foreign policy, that appeal to a large winning coalition of voters.

Autocratic leaders seek to expand territory to gain resources and pay off their winning coalition.

Democratic leaders aim to achieve policy concessions from opponents or to change the opposing regime in their favor.

Losing a war can severely affect a democratic leader's chances of staying in office due to public disapproval and voter discontent.

Autocratic leaders are less vulnerable to war losses and casualties due to their control over information and reduced public pressure.

Large winning coalitions (democracies) are more likely to initiate war only when victory is virtually assured, preferring negotiation otherwise.

Small winning coalitions (autocracies) may engage in war even when victory is uncertain, driven by the need to acquire resources for their small group.

The threat of significant political consequences for backing down from a commitment, especially for democratic leaders who are accountable to the public.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a 13-day confrontation between the US and the USSR in 1962 over Soviet ballistic missiles deployed in Cuba.

In the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy faced significant pressure from the public and other politicians to take a hard stance against Soviet missiles in Cuba. Backing down would have had significant political consequences.

The fear of losing political support and credibility can lead leaders to escalate a crisis, even if doing so increases the risk of war.

Leaders who are facing high audience costs are more likely to become "locked in" to a conflict, meaning they are more willing to go to war rather than back down.

The side that becomes "locked in" first in a crisis has greater leverage in negotiations. They can take a more aggressive stance, knowing the other side is less likely to back down.

The higher the audience costs, the more confident a leader must be in their ability to win a conflict before they are willing to carry out their threat.

The theory of audience costs suggests that democratic leaders are more likely to be involved in wars than authoritarian leaders because they are more accountable to the public.

A strategy where a weaker party, despite being vulnerable, chooses to attack rather than negotiate. This approach is counterintuitive, but the model suggests that a weak dove might prefer to attack if the potential gain from negotiation is too small compared to the potential damage from surrendering.

The concept of a player's willingness to accept a negotiated settlement rather than fighting, even if the player is the stronger party and has a first-strike advantage.

The expected outcome of a player's actions, taking into account the probabilities of different outcomes.

The value a player receives from successfully negotiating a settlement.

Indicates the probability that another player (B) will negotiate after a successful negotiation by Player A.

The value a player receives from attacking and forcing the other player to back down.

Describes the point where a player prefers to attack over negotiating, based on the expected utility of each action.

A player with a higher utility from negotiation is stronger because they can potentially gain more from a settlement.

The size of the group of individuals whose support is needed to maintain a leader in power.

The theory that the size of the winning coalition influences a leader's decision-making regarding public goods provision and potential for warfare.

Benefits that are available to a smaller, select group of individuals.

Benefits that are available to all members of society.

Leaders with a small winning coalition tend to prioritize providing private goods to their supporters, while leaders with a large winning coalition are more likely to prioritize public goods to maintain support from a wider group.

Countries with a smaller winning coalition tend to be more prone to wars, as leaders can use the threat of war to motivate their small group of supporters and secure private benefits.

Countries with a larger winning coalition are less likely to engage in wars, as leaders need broader support and are more likely to prioritize public goods, which are less likely to be threatened by war.