Podcast
Questions and Answers
Managers may engage in actions optimal for the organization if compensation measures are not carefully designed.
Managers may engage in actions optimal for the organization if compensation measures are not carefully designed.
False (B)
Information overload can lead managers to rely on formal information when making decisions.
Information overload can lead managers to rely on formal information when making decisions.
False (B)
Performance measures stimulate behavior consistent with firm objectives, according to the text.
Performance measures stimulate behavior consistent with firm objectives, according to the text.
True (A)
Managers can properly assimilate all the information they receive without facing information overload.
Managers can properly assimilate all the information they receive without facing information overload.
Compensation schemes help to inappropriately assign authority and responsibility.
Compensation schemes help to inappropriately assign authority and responsibility.
Short-term measures are always more effective than long-term measures in management.
Short-term measures are always more effective than long-term measures in management.
Managers may disregard formal information if they experience information overload.
Managers may disregard formal information if they experience information overload.
Compensation schemes play no role in assigning authority and responsibility within an organization.
Compensation schemes play no role in assigning authority and responsibility within an organization.
Managers should only consider one relevant aspect when evaluating performance measures.
Managers should only consider one relevant aspect when evaluating performance measures.
Overreliance on formal information can prevent information overload.
Overreliance on formal information can prevent information overload.
