Ch. 5 Operations During Crisis

Operations During Crisis

• A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives (JP 3-0).
• A crisis may be the result of adversary actions or indicators of imminent action, or it may be the result of natural or human disasters. During a crisis, opponents are not yet using lethal force as the primary means for achieving their objectives.
• Crisis response operations are characterized by high degrees of volatility and uncertainty.
• Success during a crisis is a return to a state of competition in which the United States, its allies, and its partners are in positions of increased advantage relative to the adversary.
• Adversaries frequently act aggressively to coerce and intimidate their opponents, attempting to shape and control the situation to limit or prevent a U.S. military response.
• Adversary activities may include information warfare, precluding U.S. joint force actions, diplomatic, economic, and information means to divide opponent’s political leadership from its civilian population.
• Methods may include promoting distrust and division among groups, positioning forces to increase uncertainty, and complicating decision-making for opponents.
• Adversaries may use proxy forces for information warfare, unconventional warfare, and criminal activities, though their utility in crisis differs from competition.

Physical Advantages During Crisis

• Achieving physical advantage during crisis involves working with host-nation forces to form a credible defense and ensuring the survivability of allied forces in theater.
• If there is key or decisive terrain, Army forces and host-nation partners may seek to deter adversaries by setting a defense.
• Army forces assume conflict is imminent and take all available measures to protect against attack in every domain.
• During crisis, Army combat power might be initially limited to forward-stationed forces, forces which can draw pre-positioned stocks quickly, and forces used to threaten adversary forces.

Information Advantages During Crisis

• Two key information activities are protecting friendly information and degrading the threat's ability to communicate effectively.
• Examples include strategic messaging to undermine adversary credibility.
• Commanders prioritize refining information activities based on existing plans and procedures during competition.
• Information activities in a crisis environment include measures like establishing a mission partner environment and refining common operating procedures with allies.

Human Advantages During Crisis

• Enduring relationships with allies and coalitions are established on strategic levels, but operational and tactical level experience collaborating might be less developed and need improvement.
• Leaders must ensure understanding and efficiency in working with allied forces, while also acknowledging logistical differences in cultures.
• Training exercises with allied forces are important to establish interoperability and to demonstrate determination to adversaries.

Activities to Mitigate US Deterrence

• Adversaries consider actions that might mitigate U.S. defense efforts to ensure their operations do not significantly interfere with their interests.
• This might include conducting limited attacks, disrupting deployments, and exploiting gaps in national interests.

Operations Security

• Operations security is crucial for success in a crisis.
• Continuous employments of operations security processes limit adversary ability to discern friendly intent.
• Key preventative measures include minimizing EM emissions, careful use of personal devices, and limiting communications on C2 systems.

Relative Advantages During Crisis

• Army forces capitalize on knowledge and experience gained during competition.
• Critical factors of transition into crisis will likely include chaotic circumstances and rapid response requirements that necessitate adaptation.
• Army forces build upon competitive advantages, such as information, human, and physical advantages, and mitigate friction from these situations.

Activities to Control Escalation

• Peer adversaries may attempt to control the escalation of a crisis by preventing/countering a U.S. response using diplomatic, information, or economic instruments.
• Escalation control may involve setting fait accompli conditions on the ground, using information warfare, increasing support to proxy forces, and increasing the number of forward deployed or deploying units to a region.
• These actions might aim to discourage U.S. or allied military responses, and potentially distract from the primary crisis area.

Effective Crisis Response

• Effective crisis responses involves convincing adversaries that deployed forces can significantly reduce their chances of success.
• Adversaries measure the ability of these forces by observing how well they are prepared for large-scale combat operations and the impact they introduce into specific situations.

Force Projection

• The ability to project Army forces into an operational area is an essential aspect of conventional deterrence, relying mainly on joint lift capabilities.
• Army ground forces during a crisis can provide enduring options for JFCs over other force types.
• Army force presence and projection in a theater can create tactical and operational challenges for any potential adversarial forces.
• Proactive deployment of Army forces in a crisis can preclude the need for large force deployment later in the crisis.

Protection During Crisis

• U.S. Command Installation Management is vital in protecting active and deploying units.
• Garrison commanders ensure the protection of deploying units from home station to port of embarkation, during movement, and after arrival at ports of debarkation.
• Commanders plan protection measures for their units throughout the deployment process.

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration (RSOI)

• RSOI delivers combat power to a JFC.
• RSOI is a theater-level task demanding coordination between units, theater sustainment, host nations, and commercial entities.
• Reception focuses on receiving, offloading, marshalling forces, and transporting personnel, equipment, and materiel.
• Staging includes assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel prior to onward movement.
• Onward movement transports units from reception facilities to tactical assembly areas or operating areas.

Army Echelon Responsibilities During Crisis

• All Army echelons have significant responsibilities in crisis response and conduct reconnaissance, liaison, and troop preparation activities as required.
• Early in a crisis, units may be involved in outside planning meetings to gather intelligence and prepare for movement and combat.

Corps Roles During Crisis

• Corps headquarters initially acts as a tactical headquarters for arriving forces.
• Should crisis become armed conflict, corps headquarters could potentially function as a field army equivalent.
• Corps headquarters plans operations from mobilization through redeployment assessing threat capabilities and force advantages.
• Corps staff provides a critical interface to manage numerous time-phased force and deployment details.

Division Roles During Crisis

• Division headquarters activities mirror those of corps headquarters, including roles within operations from mobilization to redeployment, force tailoring, and training.
• Initial roles during a crisis might be focused on defense, security, and stability.
• Divisions could receive short-notice training tasks and exercises with multinational partners.

Brigade Roles During Crisis

• Brigades offer a flexible and potentially rapidly deployable tactical option for crisis management compared to corps or division roles.
• Rapidly deployable options like a BCT (for example), could be sent quickly into an area.
• During a crisis, the threat level is continually assessed to ensure any operational deployment balances security and flexibility.

Consolidating Gains/Transitioning Back to Competition

• Consolidation of gains and transition back to a period of competition requires an active defense and maintaining an enhanced force presence within a theater.
• Army forces may continue to support improvements to host nation capabilities, ensuring readiness in case of future crises or challenges to the stability.
• Transitioning back to competition involves rebuilding partner nation institutions and capacities, and supporting efforts by allied nations.