Criminal Law: Complicity Part 1

What is the primary basis for D's liability in complicity?

What is the term for a person who performs or causes the AR of the substantive criminal offence with the necessary MR?

What is the requirement for MR in accessory liability, as considered in R v Jogee?

In a situation where A and B both stab C, and the combined effect of the two wounds is that C dies, what is A and B's liability?

What is the term for a principal who causes the AR of an offence through an innocent agent?

What happens when two people have different MR for the same offence?

If A gives B a knife telling him to stab C to death, which one of the following is most correct?

In R v Gianetto, what was the court's decision?

If A and B attack C simultaneously, but without intending to assist each other, what is the outcome?

If A gives B poison, telling B it is medicine for B's child, and B gives it to the child, who is guilty of murder?

What is required for A to be convicted as an accessory to robbery?

If A and B jointly commit a robbery, what is the prosecution's burden?

What is the Act that codifies complicity?

If A supplies B with a hammer, and B uses it to kill C, what is A's liability?

What is required to convict B of murder as principal offender?

If A and B jointly commit a crime, what is the general rule?

What is required for complicity liability in terms of the defendant's mens rea?

What is the circumstance AR for complicity?

What is required for ulterior MR in terms of the principal conduct?

What is the difference between aiding and abetting?

What is required for complicity by omission?

What is the MR requirement for complicity by omission?

What is the result requirement for complicity?

What is the difference between complicity and procuring?

What is the circumstance MR for complicity?

What is the requirement for encouragement in complicity?

What is the actus reus of secondary liability?

What is the mens rea required for secondary liability?

In what case was the doctrine of joint enterprise abolished?

What is the main issue with the doctrine of joint enterprise?

In what scenario can a defendant be liable for procuring an offence despite the principal not committing the offence?

What is the difference between a principal and an accessory?

What is the significance of the 'free, voluntary and informed choice' of the skeleton army in Beatty v Gillbanks?

What is the requirement for the defendant's liability in cases like Cogan and Leak and R v Millward?

What is the significance of R v Gnango?

What is the exception to the rule that innocent agents are not procured?

What is the significance of R v Powell and Daniels?

What is the mens rea required for the defendant to be liable as a secondary party?

What was the outcome of D's conviction in Cogan and Leak?

What was the issue with the tractor-trailer in R v Millward?

In what case was the defendant held liable for murder as a secondary party?

What is the significance of R v Stringer?

In order to be guilty as a secondary party, the defendant must perform the actus reus of the principal offence.

Joint principals must have the same mens rea for the principal offence.

An innocent agent is someone who intentionally assists the principal offender.

Accessory liability requires that the defendant intended to assist the principal offender.

A defendant can be guilty as a principal offender through an innocent agent.

Complicity requires that the defendant had actual knowledge of the principal offence.

In R v Gnango, D was charged with murder because he was the one who shot the innocent pedestrian.

The doctrine of joint enterprise operated to hold D liable in situations where the normal principles of aiding, abetting, or counseling apply.

In R v Jogee, the court abolished the doctrine of joint enterprise and merged it with the standard principles of aiding, abetting, etc.

The prosecution must prove that A knew the essential matters which constitute the principal offence to convict A as a secondary party.

If A and B jointly commit a robbery, the prosecution must prove that each defendant committed the actus reus of the offence and had the required mens rea.

D can be convicted as a secondary party if the prosecution proves that he aided the murder by supplying the hammer, but did not intend to supply the hammer to B.

In R v Gianetto, the court held that the defendant was not liable for murder as a secondary party.

The law requires a separate doctrine of joint enterprise in addition to aiding, abetting, etc.

If A gives B a knife, telling B to stab C to death, and B does so, A is the principal offender.

If A and B attack C simultaneously, but without intending to assist each other, they are both guilty of murder.

In R v Powell and Daniels, D was charged with murder as a principal offender.

The mens rea required for the defendant to be liable as a secondary party is intention to do the act which assisted or encouraged the principal offence.

A is guilty of murder as a principal offender if A gives B some poison, telling B it is medicine for B's child, and B gives the poison to the child, who dies.

In R v Gianetto, the court held that D was liable as a principal offender.

If A supplies B with a hammer, and B uses it to kill C, A is not liable for murder as an accessory.

A can be convicted as a secondary party if the prosecution proves that he foresaw that if B did kill, he would do so with the requisite mens rea for murder.

In order to convict B of murder as a principal offender, the prosecution must prove that B had both the actus reus and mens rea of murder.

The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 only applies to summary offences.

If A and B decide to carry out a robbery together, but A keeps a lookout while B threatens the shop attendant, A is guilty of robbery as a principal offender.

The mens rea required for accessory liability is the intention to aid or abet the principal offender.

If A gives B a knife, telling B to stab C to death, and B does so, B is not guilty of murder as a principal offender.

In R v Millward, D's conviction was upheld because P lacked the necessary mens rea for the offence.

An innocent agent is someone who lacks the necessary mens rea for the principal offence.

In Cogan and Leak, D was convicted as a principal offender.

The salvation army was held liable for procuring the offence in Beatty v Gillbanks.

To be convicted as an accomplice, the defendant must intend to assist the principal offender.

In R v Millward, P was convicted of the principal offence.

In complicity, the actus reus requirement is that the defendant's conduct must be capable of assisting or encouraging the principal offender, but it is not necessary that the defendant's conduct actually assists or encourages the principal offender.

For complicity by omission, the defendant must have breached a recognised duty to act, but it is not necessary that they have power or right to control the principal offender's conduct.

In cases of procuring, the defendant must have intended to cause the principal offender to commit the offence, but it is not necessary that they have full causation.

The mens rea requirement for complicity is that the defendant must have knowledge of the principal offender's mens rea.

In R v Clarkson, the court held that the defendant's voluntary presence was not sufficient to satisfy the actus reus of complicity.

For complicity, the defendant's conduct must be a direct cause of the principal offender's offence.

The ulterior mens rea requirement for complicity is that the defendant must intend the principal offender to commit the offence, but it is not necessary that they intend the principal offender to have the required mens rea.

In cases of aiding, abetting, or counselling, the defendant must have intended to assist or encourage the principal offender, but it is not necessary that they have knowledge of the principal offender's mens rea.

The defendant's omission can be sufficient to satisfy the actus reus of complicity, but only if they have a recognised duty to act.

For complicity, the defendant's conduct must be a substantial contribution to the principal offender's offence.