Access Control and Information Flow Models

A security model that ensures subjects (users) cannot access data that creates a conflict of interest. It separates data into different 'company datasets' and 'conflict of interest classes' to prevent unauthorized access.

A subject can only read data from either the same company datasets they've already accessed (within the wall) or from completely different conflict of interest classes.

A subject can only write to data if they can already read it according to the Simple Security Rule, and the data is within the same company dataset.

A collection of data belonging to a specific company or organization. Data within a company dataset should be considered sensitive and protected from unauthorized access.

A group of different company datasets that have potential conflicts of interest with each other.

A security control method where access restrictions are enforced based on predetermined rules set by a central authority, rather than individual ownership.

A fundamental principle of MAC where subjects (processes or users) are not trusted to avoid unauthorized access. They are assumed to potentially be compromised.

A type of MAC model that prioritizes confidentiality and prevents information from flowing from a higher security level to a lower one.

A type of MAC model that focuses on data integrity, ensuring that information is not modified by unauthorized entities.

A security principle that aims to prevent conflicts of interest by separating individuals from accessing sensitive information related to multiple, potentially competing, areas.

A method of transmitting information in a covert manner, often bypassing security controls implemented by MAC.

The study of how information flows through a system, examining the movement of data from source to destination.

Covert channels can be categorized as either storage channels or timing channels.

A covert channel that involves modifying storage locations to transmit information.

A covert channel that uses delays in packet transmission over a network to convey information.

A type of MAC where a lattice (a mathematical structure) defines security levels for subjects and objects.

MAC models focus on controlling information flow through legitimate channels but cannot prevent data leaks through covert channels.

MAC, LBAC, rule-based access control, and multilevel access control are all terms used to describe the same concept.

A security model where users are assigned security labels (e.g., Bank1, OilC1) that define their access rights to resources.

A type of security label that represents the highest level of access and is not assigned to users.

A user can access resources with a security label equal to or lower than their assigned label.

A concept in MAC where users create 'principals' with specific permissions.

This model uses security labels to control access and prevents conflicts of interest, akin to the Bell-LaPadula model, a foundational security model.

An operating system security module providing MAC capabilities and other security features.

In SELinux, subjects (processes) are assigned 'domains' and objects (resources) are assigned 'types' (classes) to control access.

Biba model is an access control model that focuses on maintaining the integrity of data. It aims to prevent unauthorized modifications to data. It assigns integrity levels to users (subjects) and data (objects).

In the Biba model, a subject is allowed to read an object only if the subject's integrity level is less than or equal to the object's integrity level. This prevents reading lower integrity data by higher integrity subjects, ensuring the data's purity.

In the Biba model, a subject is allowed to write to an object only if the subject's integrity level is greater than or equal to the object's integrity level. This ensures that only authorized users with higher integrity can modify data, preventing manipulation.

Both the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) and Biba models manage information flow in a system. BLP focuses on confidentiality and prevents information from flowing upwards. Biba focuses on integrity and prevents information from flowing downwards.

The Biba model's rules are designed to prevent unauthorized modifications to data. These rules are the opposite of the BLP model's rules, which aim to protect confidentiality.

In a system, the same label can be used to represent both confidentiality and integrity levels.

The Biba model is a core element of information security that is crucial for preventing malicious actions that disrupt the accuracy of information. It plays a vital role in securing critical systems and data and is widely implemented in various technologies.

The ∗-property prevents subjects from writing information to security classes with lower sensitivity than their security clearance. This helps to block Trojan horse attacks, where malicious code might try to move data to a less secure area.

The ∗-property helps ensure that subjects can only write information to security classes with the same or higher sensitivity than their security clearance. This is essential for maintaining information security in a system.

In the context of the Bell-LaPadula model, write access typically means both reading and writing the contents of an object. Append access is another option, allowing you to write only, but not read.

The Bell-LaPadula model is primarily explained through the read and write operations. Other operations such as creating or deleting objects might be included under the ∗-property, as they modify the state of the object.

Mandatory access control restrictions in the Bell-LaPadula model work in conjunction with discretionary access control. If the access control matrix doesn't authorize an operation, the mandatory controls won't be needed, since the operation is rejected anyway.

In the Bell-LaPadula model, users can log in using a security label that's less sensitive than their clearance. This is a common feature that doesn't contradict the model's core principles.

The strong ∗-property is a stricter version of the ∗-property, where subjects are only allowed to write to objects if their security clearance matches the object's sensitivity level precisely. This helps prevent data destruction by subjects with lower security levels.

The ∗-property, in its strong form, helps alleviate the concern about unclassified subjects destroying or damaging classified data. It prevents subjects from writing to objects with different sensitivity levels, which is crucial for data integrity.