Podcast
Questions and Answers
What was the main reason for the Platform Supply Vessel (PSV) contacting the offshore installation?
What was the main reason for the Platform Supply Vessel (PSV) contacting the offshore installation?
What was the status of the DGNSS signal during the operation before the vessel approached the installation?
What was the status of the DGNSS signal during the operation before the vessel approached the installation?
What mode did the Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) enter after losing both DGNSS and RadaScan signals?
What mode did the Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) enter after losing both DGNSS and RadaScan signals?
What action did the Vessel's Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) take to correct the position deviation after it calculated a 'jump'?
What action did the Vessel's Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) take to correct the position deviation after it calculated a 'jump'?
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What was the consequence of the Master not being informed of the developing situation during the PSV operation?
What was the consequence of the Master not being informed of the developing situation during the PSV operation?
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Study Notes
Vessel Allision with Installation
- A PSV experienced a loss of DP position reference systems (PRS) during a cargo operation, resulting in contact with an offshore installation, causing minor vessel and installation damage.
- No injuries or environmental damage occurred.
- The vessel's DPS and PMS were operational for DP Class 2 operations.
- One PRS (CyScan) was unavailable.
- The vessel was operating under an amended Activity Specific Operating Guideline (ASOG) and an Operational Risk Assessment (ORA).
- Initial issue: Differential Global Navigation Satellite System (DGNSS) PRS signal instability.
- A RadaScan PRS responder was deployed as a backup.
- The master was not informed of the developing situation, violating ASOG.
- Both DGNSS and RadaScan signals were lost during approach to the installation.
- The DPS transitioned to Dead Reckoning (DR) mode, calculating a position 3.4m off and moving further, up to 8m deviation.
- The DPO intervened, taking control of the vessel's DPS in joystick mode.
- Vessel contacted a jacket leg on the installation due to momentum, swell direction, and reduced thrust allocation.
- Vessel exited the 500m zone to assess damage.
Cause Analysis
- DGNSS 1 and 2 position references were significantly degraded close to the installation due to platform elevation blocking signals.
- Differential corrections for both DGNSS systems were broadcast from the same satellite, impeding reliability.
- The RadaScan system failed due to an unknown software sensor error in multi-target mode.
- The DPOs did not recognise the increased risk of collision.
- The vessel had been operating without CyScan for 5 months due to long lead time for spare parts after a failure.
- The master wasn't informed of PRS degradation as per ASOG.
Key Learnings
- Importance of having multiple, independent position reference systems based on different principles.
- Critical to maintain awareness of any degraded PRS conditions in DP Class 3 situations. A change in positioning mode requires the vessel to return to the final set-up area and a final assessment before making any changes.
- Importance of timely reporting of PRS issues as per activity-specific guidelines.
- Proper training, familiarization, and competency assessment for DP personnel (especially handling DP failures).
- Drifting assessment procedures and adherence to guidelines during offshore work.
- The implications of relying on dead reckoning.
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