5G PPP Phase 1 Security Landscape

5G PPP Phase1 Security Landscape

• First white paper from the 5G PPP Security Working Group
• Launched in April 2016 and led by 5G-ENSURE
• Encompasses Phase 1 projects active or interested in 5G security
• Projects with largest contributions: 5G-ENSURE and CHARISMA
• Most Phase 1 projects joined the working group and provided inputs

Purpose of the Paper

• Describe the 5G PPP Security Landscape of Phase 1 projects
• Covers the scope in Phase 1 projects with specific reference to 5G Security
• Introduce the reader to 5G Security as addressed in Phase 1
• Important for Phase 2 Projects, they can leverage achievements from Phase 1

Document Structure

• Organized into sections covering different facets of 5G security
• Each section has authors, and inputs from others, following chair/editor guidance
• Projects active in each topic are mentioned with their targeted results

Novel Business Requirements

• The challenging traits of 5G networks, which are designed to support novel and diverse business requirements render current network security approaches inadequate
• Multi-tenancy requires strict isolation
• Reliability covers ensuring connectivity, capacity, and coverage anytime, anywhere
• Demands a security makeover of confidentiality, integrity, and availability maintenance
• The introduction of SDN and NFV has scaled up the high complexity of securing a network

5G Security Risks and Requirements

• Foreseen those by Phase 1, preliminary and not exhaustive
• Includes unauthorized access or usage of assets because of the heterogeneous nature of the 5G infrastructure

AAA Evolutions

• Chapter 4 investigates potential AAA evolutions, which may induce potential heterogeneity of access control security levels to 5G
• A new list of 5G security risks and requirement will be listed in this document
• In a multi-tenant 5G infrastructure, the access controls performed at each sub-party might be heterogeneous and not easily interoperable

5G Security Risks Examples

• 5G Identity thefts or cloning
• Usages of shared resources, unauthorized access and/or modification of 5G connected devices critical data
• Exposure of the security level of 5G network access technologies to new threats
• Massive IoT 5G security protocols introduced with low security level

Weak Slices

• In the context of 5G infrastructure slicing, a weak slice isolation and connection may compromise the entire 5G security
• Sensitive data could be exposed to apps running in other slices, through side channel attacks
• Complexity arises from managing such a chain of connections among each of the security domains

Traffic Embezzlement

• Double virtualization allows traffic capture and rerouting
• Inconsistency between Orchestrator abstraction, SDN control abstraction and the physical and network resources may allow third parties to capture /embezzle/alter control plane and user plane

Insufficient Technology

• In the first steps of 5G deployments (2020), new and non-mature technologies may be put into production, allow new violations to surface
• Security by Operation (RUN) will manage delivered security levels to 5G customers and Vertical services providers
• High TRL stands for Technology Readiness Level, which the phase 3 projects will implement

Difficulties

• Vertical SLA and regulation compliance. due to multiple factors including no clear responsibility scheme

Slicing vs Neutrality

• Slicing seems not to be fully compatible with Neutrality concepts
• Both concepts are regulated by EU regulation
• BEREC in its guidelines mentions that "Network-slicing in 5G networks may be used to deliver specialized services," assumed that slicing delivers services needing optimization

Trust Management

• Trusts concepts, as understood now, are insufficient to manage complex 5G infrastructures
• Trust may also include liability, i.e., new concept of liabilities between parties should emerge
• Particularly regarding the delivery of Verticals services that may oblige delegation to third party some regulation constraints

Service changes

• Network slices are expected to span multiple administrative domains
• Tenants may be unable to migrate virtual infrastructure due to lack of security standards

Securing 5G

• 5G must provide higher or equal security and privacy than 4G.
• Must maintain SLA to verticals
• Mutually authenticate and authorize, unaffected by legacy systems

Security Automation

• 5G infrastructures' heterogeneity and complexity require security automation
• 5G security will be composed and dynamically adapted upon context

Security Monitoring

• Systems must detect advanced cyber threats
• Support coordinated monitoring between different domains
• New approaches may be beneficial, like analytics for enhanced security operations

Security Management

• End to End security management and orchestration should be in place
• Data should be correlated/coherent between Security Architecture Inter-domain interfaces
• Big Data may allow consistency evaluation (Between RAT to Verticals)

Security Awareness

• Customers, slice owners and vertical services should be aware of their technical 5G contextualization

Security for Regulations

• Should have new responsibility schemes in line with existing regulation
• Regarding distribution/allocation of responsibilities/obligations in multi-tenant softwarized telecom infrastructure
• Regulation obligation to non-regulated third parties

Slice Isolation

• Infrastructure sharing requires strict isolation to ensure required level
• Aspects of control-plane, data-plane and resource isolation must minimize correlations
• Guarantees a reliable/warranted service assurance, data and communication integrity and confidentiality

Liability in 5G

• Chain of Trust and liability of multi-tenants should be managed and auditable
• For each service, component supplier, operator and customer

Encryption

• Value-added security services in the context of encrypted traffic must comply with privacy regulations and user data protection
• End-to-end encryption (expected) may hamper the use of security services such as attack detection, QoS monitoring

Regulation Conformance

• Technology should be in compliance with current and anticipated legislation
• Include anticipated LI and Data Retention Regulations
• Difficult in the case of Slicing implementation

Introducing Architecture

• Why is a new security architecture for 5G needed?
• What are the design principles for a 5G security architecture?

Current 3G/4G

• Security architectures are currently defined
• Why is new architecture needed in 5G, that current architectures do not have the power the manage the new security concerns
• Trust Model: there is no explicit and complete trust model documented for 3G and 4G networks.
• This produces concerns of impersonation on signalling interchange networks. Virtualization: Virtualization and management is left outside current architectures scope

New threats

• Completely new threat and risk situation occurs for mission critical services such as health, transport and industrial automation

Design Principles 1

• A Logical Rather Than Physical Security Architecture for 5G that follows the design principles and must isolate resources even on shared infrastructure
• The RAN security architecture should support flexible allocation and dynamic relocation of functions including edge cloud implementations

Design Principles 2

• A distributed hierarchy will coordinate security architecture
• Probes extracting security threats/events from a tenant's data plane should be distributed across administrative domains
• Hierarchy gives trade offs between centralized and distributed functions, allows for defense in depth [Selfnet]

Design Principles 3

• The vision is to provide a secure SDN/NFV industrial network architecture, supporting coordination and orchestration
• Must Mitigate Cross-operator/domain damages, and Slices that extend across several domains must maintain a consistent security view

Design Principles 4:

• Security as a Service is presumed to lie in the ability of verticals to improve cost/efficiency by using shared infrastructure

Industry design musts

• Architecture should provide AAA mechanisms for all actors involved in intra - and inter- domain deployments.
• Appropriate interfaces should be included to provide means for the designation of access control policies
• Automation of security monitoring, analysis, and incident response These features can exploit the flexibility of SDN/NFV deployment via Service Function Chaining

SDN Control Plane

• Must be fault tolerant, additionally, architecture such as controller clustering provides reliable and consistent network control
• This even if some control fail or are compromised

Key Parts

• Securing the management (e.g. securing orchestration)
• Managing the security (e.g. preventing unwanted traffic).
• Security Management: Needs to provide a holistic system view, by monitoring/analytics, and ensure SLA security levels

Support

• DevOps
• service platforms needs to validate the services submitted to that platform. manifest describing the functional scope that permits proper authorization and liability of the supplier

Wanted Traffic

• Traffic detection in the tenant's data plane could in 5G enhanced by SDN / NFV

Flexible design

• Design must for both flexibility to provide different user groups and diversity
• Extensibility, extensible of authentication methods must be supported
• Broken cryptographic algorithms must be replaceable
• Backward compatibility must not result in a downgrade attack

Metrics

• MTC-Divided in two primary dimensions, the scale of the MTC service and the criticality.
• Have differing implications depending on MTC.

Additional needs

• Access to actuators secured, flexible choice of crypto-algo
• Regulatory compliance such Lawful Intercept and user privacy
• Level of security must be demonstrated

High level security architecture draft

• It's design principles include, architecture is multi domain support, management, with visible aspects and others need to be reviewed still

Principles

A sound principle is to not re-invent the wheel. While the current 3GPP security architecture fails to meet all the 5G needs

• It has created a huge, trusted ecosystem and provides a proven basis to build on
• 3GPP already defines and in turn builds architecture
• 5 defined strata

Domains Require Changes

• Adopt Domains requires to a 5G Context TS23.101 defines a domain to be a “physical grouping”, which we need to generalize In general define akin to ETSI

Extension summary

• Domains require more changes to be adopted to a 5G context
• Slicing is another dimension of adding special slice domains into network

Three Important Domains

• Slice Domains: Model slices that extend across access/core domains, across-domains"

• Management Domains: Management functionality that would allow even third party managment

• UE Domain has additional Identity module

• Final extension captures added (Additional) UE Domain: addition captures mode and UE domains

Providing control

• 4G Mobile Network access control is homogenous
• Secure thanks USIM hardware Card

Providing authentication

• To allow, concept of embedded Solders eUICC, on which allow and certify, operator remotely provision credentials

AAA-Central is key

• The Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA, USIM card and Core Network HSS) plays central role security parameters via provides context

Challenges

• 5G signalling data is growing faster than data traffic of 5G, should investigate this to fully support iot

More challenges to face

Two approach currently being investigate

• 1 first lightweight Authentication for mass conmmunication is SPEED-5G
• 2 two , with device Authentication in group allowing reduction group based AKA is in 5G-Ensure

Propagation

• It is seems crucial to propagate evidences of user equipment or stakeholders, that allow AAA
• Seven 5G PPP projects have anticipated for multi-tenant and trusted party, Infrastructure to allow Identity for access

Heterogeneity AAA to consider

AAA potential for security AAA could composes types

• access not be easy inter operate with RAN with the Verticals

Need to see

• In 2.25 delegation of the above from end to end in sector will have to see