Katz v. United States & Privacy Rights in Law (PDF)

**CHAPTER TWO ** **[KATZ V. UNITED STATES]** - **FACTS: ** - FBI agents (P) attached an electronic listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth that Katz (D) used to place what he assumed to be private calls. Over Kat's (D) objection, the trial court...

**CHAPTER TWO ** **[KATZ V. UNITED STATES]** - **FACTS: ** - FBI agents (P) attached an electronic listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth that Katz (D) used to place what he assumed to be private calls. Over Kat's (D) objection, the trial court permitted the Government (P) to introduce evidence of Katz (D)-  end of the telephone conversation, and Katz (D) was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does the Government investigative activity constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment where it intrudes upon a justifiable expectation of privacy? - **RULE: ** - Government investigative activity that intrudes upon a justifiable expectation of privacy constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Stewart) ** - Court declines to adopt Katz (D) formulation of the issues, specifically whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area, and whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary for government conduct to constitute a search within the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment is not simply a general "right to privacy." The Amendment does provide some, though no absolute, protection for individual privacy against certain kinds of Government intrusion, but it also provides other protections that have nothing to do with privacy. **The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.** What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home, is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, but what one **seeks to preserve as private, even in a public area, may be.** Government (P) states that Katz (D) was visible in the telephone booth because it was made partly of glass. However, what Katz (D) sought to exclude was not an intruding eye, but an intruding ear. **A person who steps into a telephone booth, shuts the door, and pays a toll to place a call has the right to assume that the words he utters will not be broadcasted to the world.** Government argues that the Fourth Amendment should not apply in this case because its surveillance did not involve physical penetration of the telephone booth. The absence of physical penetration into the telephone booth is constitutionally insignificant. The Government's (P) electronic surveillance and recording of Katz (D) words violated the privacy upon which Katz (D) justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and therefore constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  **[UNITED STATES V. JONES ]** - **FACTS:** - The Court of Appeals overturned Jone's (D) narcotics conviction, ruling that the installation of a GPS tracking device on Jone's (D) vehicle without first obtaining a warrant constituted an impermissible search, and that the evidence from that search was therefore inadmissible.  - **ISSUE:** - Did the attachment of the GPS device to the suspect's vehicle constitute a "search"?  - **RULE: ** - The government's installation of a GPS device on a suspect's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:**    **(J. Scalia)**  - Yes. This constitutes a search. The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. The government argues that under Katz, no search occurred here, because Jones (D) had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area of the jeep accessed by the government, nor on the public roads. But whether a search occurred does not rise or fall with Katz. **The Fourth Amendment protects persons from government trespass upon their persons, houses, papers, and effects.** "When the government physically invades personal property to gather information, a search occurs" (Sotomayor).  - Note: the parameters of the Fourth Amendment "search" ***must*** evolve with advances in technology.  **CHAPTER 3: SEARCH ** **[CALIFORNIA V. GREENWOOD ]** - **FACTS:** - The police asked a trash collector to gather opaque trash bags left outside of a private home and turn the bags over to them. Investigators searched the trash and found evidence of narcotic use, which they used as probable cause to support a search warrant for the home.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home?  - **RULE**:  - There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left outside the home for collection. Thus, the Fourth Amendment is not violated by warrantless search of that trash.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. White) ** - The warrantless search and seizure of the garbage bags left at the curb outside the curtilage of a home would violate the Fourth Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage and society accepted that expectation as objectively reasonable. Even if respondents had an expectation of privacy and did not expect police officers to examine the contents of the trash, that expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection unless society accepts that the expectation is objectively reasonable. Bags left at the curb are readily accessible to many different parties. They are played outside for the express purpose of conveying the contents to a third party, the trash collector, who could have sorted through the bags' contents or permitted others to do so.  - This case established the rule a person has no reasonable expectation in trash left at the curb for collection, further refining what is and is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  **[KYLLO V. UNITED STATES ]** - **FACTS**;  - Without a warrant, federal agents (P) used a thermal imaging device to determine whether Kyllo's (D) home was emitting enough relative heat to indicate a marijuana grow.  - **ISSUE:** - Does the Government (P) conduct a search when it uses sense-enhancing technology that is not in general public use to obtain information about the interior of a home that it could not otherwise obtain without physical intrusion into the home?  - **RULE**:  - The Government (P) conducts a search when it uses sense-enhancing technology that is not in general public use to obtain information about the interior of a home that it could not otherwise obtain without physical intrusion into the home.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Scalia) ** - Yes. Katz test for whether Government (P) activity constitutes a search is whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. Technology has expanded the scope of activity the Government (P) can use to obtain information without conducting a Fourth Amendment search. **Obtaining information about the interior by using sense-enhancing technology, where the information would not otherwise be obtainable without a physical intrusion into the home, constitutes a search**, at least where technology is not in general public use. The information the thermal imager provided was therefore the product of a search.  **[UNITED STATES V. KNOTTS ]** - **FACTS**:  - A Manufacturing company in St. Paul came under suspicion for stealing chemicals that could be used to manufacture illegal drugs. Company notified a narcotics agent, and further investigation determined that Armstrong, (employee) had been purchasing similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in St. Louis. With consent of Hawkins Chemical Company. Narcotics agents installed a radio transmitter in the container of chloroform that Armstrong would receive e. By tracking the radio transmitter, officers were able to track Armstrongs delivering the chloroform to Darryl Peschen. Petchen drove it to a cabin owned by Knotts (D) Relying on this information, the officers obtained a search warrant for the cabin and found a fully operable drug manufacturing lab.  - **ISSUE**:  - Does police planting and tracking of a radio transmitter violate the Fourth Amendment?  - **RULE: ** - Monitoring the signals of a beeper to track the movements of a car does not constitute a search requiring a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Rehnquist) ** - Court held that the use of a radio transmitter to track the movements of a suspect in a car falls under the privacy expectations for a vehicle, which are less than those of a house. Since the radiator transmitter in this case was used primarily to ascertain where the chloroform traveled and where it stopped, the surveillance did not violate Knott's right to privacy in his home. Additionally, the use of the radio transmitter did not serve any function that the police could not have performed visually; the transmitter merely made the process easier.  **[SMITH V. MARYLAND ]** - **FACTS**:  - Without a warrant, police asked a local phone company to install a pen register to monitor the numbers dial from the defendant\'s home phone, which led to the defendant\'s conviction for robbery.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does a person have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial from their phone?  - **RULE**:  - A person does not have a privacy interest in the phone numbers they call from their telephone.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Blackmun) ** - Under the Fourth Amendment, a search arises when the Gov't trespasses on a person's property, invades a constitutionally protected area, or otherwise infringes into an area in which the person has legitimate expectation of privacy. Smith (D) acknowledges that the police did not invade his property or another constitutionally protected area, since the open register was installed at the local telephone company. Rather, Smith (D) claims that the pen register infringed on an area in which he had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Numbers dialed are conveyed to a third party -- the phone company. Location of the telephone is immaterial. **Courts have held that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily provided to third parties. Once information is shared with a third party, there is no longer a reasonable expectation of privacy because third parties are free to share such information with others, including the government.** Individuals knowingly assume the risk when dealing with third parties.  **CHAPTER 4: SEARCH ** **[OLIVER V. UNITED STATES]** - **FACTS**:  - Police officers went to a farm owned by Oliver (D) to investigate claims that maijuana was being grown on the property. View of the property was obstructed by fences and woods, the entrance to the property was gated and locked, and a "No Trespassing" sign was posted. Officers did not have a search warrant or probable cause to search. Officers discovered the field of marijuana more than a mile from Oliver's (D) house. Oliver (D) was arrested for the manufacture of a controlled substance. Court held that Oliver had reasonable expectations of privacy because his farm was not an "open" field and suppressed the evidence based on Katz.  - **ISSUE**:  - Does the police search without a warrant or probable cause of a field where the owner has taken steps to establish his rights to privacy violate the Fourth Amendment?  - **RULE**:  - Under the **open fields doctrine,** a field may be entered and searched without probable cause or a warrant.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Powell) ** - No. The **open fields doctrine allows police to enter and search a field without a warrant.** Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches of an individual's house, papers, or effect. The activities that take place in open fields, like growing crops, are not entitled to privacy protections.  **[CALIFORNIA V. CIRAOLO ]** - **FACTS: ** - Acting on an anonymous tip that there was marijuana growing in the respondent's yard, police used a plane to observe a fenced yard from an altitude of 1,000 ft. Officers used the fact that they could see marijuana from the plane as probable cause to obtain a search warrant.  - **ISSUE: ** - Is the Fourth Amendment violated by aerial observation without a warrant from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a fenced-in-backyard within the curtilage of a home?  - **RULE**:  - The Fourth Amendment is not violated by aerial observation without a warrant from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a fenced-in-backyard within the curtilage of a home.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Burger) ** - Katz sets out a two-part inquiry for privacy in the Fourth Amendment context: (1) has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? (2) is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable? Here, the respondent had clearly taken precautions that showed the intent and desire to maintain privacy, and the State has not challenged the appellate court's finding that the respondent manifested such intention. With respect to the second inquiry, the test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assuredly private activity, but whether the Government's intrusion upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. Simply being within the curtilage does not bar all police observation from a reasonable vantage point where the officer has a right to be that renders the space clearly visible. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not protected by the Fourth Amendment protection. Officer's observed the yard from publicly navigable airspace in a physically non intrusive manner, and the plants were readily identifiable to the naked eye, this provided the basis for a search warrant. The respondent's expectation that the yard was protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation society will honor.  **[CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES]** - **FACTS**:  - Federal law enforcement authorities obtained a criminal defendant\'s cell phone location records placing him near the scene of several robberies.  - **ISSUE**:  - Should a warrant supported by probable cause generally be required before investigators can collect a criminal suspect's historial cell site location data?  - **RULE**:  - Cell phone location information is a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant based on probable cause before law enforcement can compel production.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Roberts) ** - Yes. The location information obtained from Carpenter's (D) wireless carriers was the product of a search under the Fourth Amendment. A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere. **Courts have recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements.** Law enforcement agents and others would not --- in the main, secretly monitor and catalog every single movement of an individual for a long period. Mapping Carpenters (D) cell phone location over the course of 127 days provided an all-encompassing record of Carpepter's (D) whereabouts.  **CHAPTER 5: SEARCH ** **[UNITED STATES V. PLACE ]** - **FACTS: ** - Airport police officers (P) became suspicious of Place (D), who was buying a ticket to NY. Officers contacted DEA agents. Agents approached Place (D) to search his bags, in which Place did not consent to. The agents seized the bag, telling him they were going to get a search warrant. Agents took the bag to another airport, and after 90 minutes, a trained dog narcotics reacted to one bag. Based on the probable cause supplied by the dog, a judge issued a warrant for that bag. The search revealed cocaine. Place was charged with possession with intent to distribute. Place moved to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that his bag had been unreasonably seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Court ruled that the agents could seize the bags because they had reasonable suspicion that the bags contained drugs.  - **ISSUE: ** - \(1) is a dog sniff of closed luggage a Fourth Amendment search that requires a warrant or probable cause  - \(2) if law enforcement officers\' seizure of property is based solely on a reasonable suspicion that the property contains contraband or evidence, must the seizure be limited to a brief investigation of the circumstances that aroused the suspicion?  - **RULE: ** - **(1)** A dog sniff of closed luggage is not a Fourth Amendment search that requires a warrant or probable cause.  - \(2) if a law-enforcement officer's seizure of property is based solely on a reasonable suspicion that the property contains contraband or evidence, the seizure must be limited to a brief investigation of the circumstances that aroused the suspicion.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. O'Connor) ** - No. (1) Here, by itself, the dog sniffing of Place's bags did not violate Place's Fourth Amendment rights. Place's Fourth Amendment rights were violated only if the bags' seizure was unreasonable.  - \(2) Yes. If a law enforcement officer's seizure of property is based solely on a reasonable suspicion that the property contains contraband or evidence, the seizure must be limited to a brief investigation of the circumstances that aroused the suspicion.  **[ILLINOIS V. CABALLES ]** - **FACTS** - Caballes (D) was pulled over for a routine traffic stop. A Narcotic dog detected drugs in the truck, and officers conducted a search and found marijuana and arrested Cabelles (D). Process took 10 minutes. Trial court denied Caballes (D) motion to suppress evidence because the stop was not unreasonably prolonged and the dog's alert gave police officers probable cause to search. The Supreme court reversed the decision on the grounds that the sniffing unfairly broadened an ordinary traffic stop and turned it into a drug investigation without "specific and articulable facts" indicating the presence of drugs.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does the use of a drug dog to perform a sniff test during a routine traffic stop without reasonable articulable suspicion violate the Fourth Amendment?  - **RULE: ** - The Fourth Amendment does not require reasonable, articulable suspicion to administer a canine sniff test during a routine traffic stop.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Stevens) ** - No. a drug dog may ordinarily be used to perform a sniff test during the course of an otherwise lawful traffic stop without violating the Fourth Amendment. A legitimate traffic stop for the purpose of giving the driver a warning ticket is a lawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. **However, that stop may not be unreasonably prolonged.** Also, police conduct must intrude upon an individual's legitimate privacy interest before it will be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.  - Sniff tests do not intrude on an individual's legitimate privacy interest. Here, the sniff test was properly performed during the course of a lawful traffic stop and did not reveal any of Caballe's (D) private information other than the presence of drugs in the trunk. (*Unlike the thermal imaging devices in Kyllo)*   **[FLORIDA V. HARRIS ]** - **FACTS: ** - Officer pulled over Harris (D) for an expired license plate. Officer noted that Harris (D) was nervous and unable to sit still. Officer walked his K-9 around the truck and the dog alerted at the driver side handle, signaling drug detection. Officer discovered drugs and Harris (D) was charged with use in manufacturing methamphetamine. Haris (D) moved to dismiss the evidence stating that the Officer did not have probable cause to search the vehicle. Harris then stated that the state must present field-performance records to establish the drug dog's reliability.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does probable cause to search exist when the totality of the circumstances cause a reasonably cautious person to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.  - **RULE: ** - Probable cause to search exists when the totality of the circumstances causes a reasonably cautious person to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Kagan) ** - Yes. Alert by qualified narcotics dog presumptively creates **probable cause** for search.  **CHAPTER 6: PROBABLE CAUSE + REASONABLE SUSPICION ** **[ILLINOIS V. GATES ]** - **FACTS: ** - Based on a contraband informant's tip regarding Gate's (D) travel plans police obtained a search warrant and discovered about 350 pounds of marijuana in Gates (D) automobile, which the trial court excluded as fruits of an illegal search.  - **ISSUE: ** - Is an informant's tip a sufficient basis to issue a search warrant when its predictions are corroborated by independent police work, even though there is nothing to indicate the veracity or reliability of the informant. Or the basis of his information? - **RULE: ** - A search warrant based on an informant's top may be properly issued if, given the totality of the circumstances set forth in the warrant application, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of the informant and any corroboration of the informant's information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence will be found in the place to be searched.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Rehnquist) ** - Yes. The language used by the Court will lead to a relaxation of the probable cause requirement. The new "totality of the circumstances" test allows a magistrate to weigh all the facts presented in support of the warrant application to decide whether there is a "fair probability" of criminal activity. This standard, by doing away with any real objective basis for conducting probable cause analysis, allows a magistrate to issue a warrant on the barest of supporting facts. The Court asserts that a contrary ruling would lead police to rely on warrantless searches in the hope that consent will be granted, or "some other exception to the warrant clause that might develop at the time of the search." **[WHREN V. UNITED STATES]** - **FACTS**:  - Officers in plain clothing pulled over a car for a traffic stop violation after witnessing the driver make a turn without signaling and speeding down the road. Before this, the police officer's observed the two men in the car from a distance and became suspicious that a drug deal was taking place. Whren (D) was a passenger in the car, and when police approached the car, they observed plastic bags of cocaine in Whren's (D) hands.  - **ISSUE**:  - If an officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred, is the Fourth Amendment violated if his primary reason for pulling over and detaining the motorist is not to enforce the traffic laws?  - **RULE: ** - Except regarding inventory searches and administrative inspections, if probable cause of illegal conduct exists, an officer's true motive for searching and detaining a person does not negate the constitutionality of the search of seizure.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Scalia)** - No. if there is probable cause that a traffic offense has occurred, the officer's subjective motives for detaining a person do not invalidate the officer's actions under the Fourth Amendment. The detention of the car was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  **[DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. WESBY ]** - **BLACK LETTER LAW ** - A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a police officer had probable cause to make an arrest.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Thomas) ** - A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a police officer had probable cause to make an arrest. An arrest is appropriate if the events leading up to it, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause. In evaluating the reasonableness of a police officer's decision to make an arrest, a court must look at the totality of the circumstances leading to the decision. These circumstances might include the actions of the arrestee, the physical conditions of the location where the arrest is made, and the officer's common-sense conclusions about human behavior. **CHAPTER 8: WARRANTS ** **[ANDRESEN V. MARYLAND ]** - **FACTS: ** - Andresen (D) came under investigation for fraud. State authorities obtained search warrants to search the defendants, Andresen (D) law office, for paper evidence of a fraudulent sale of land.  - **ISSUE: ** - \(1) Does the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination apply to incriminating papers which have been seized by law enforcement and have been subsequently admitted into evidence at trial?  - \(2) does the addition of a catchall phrase to a list of items to be searched for and seized render an otherwise valid warrant a "general" warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment?  - **RULE: ** - The Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination does not apply to information obtained from papers or other documents which are properly seized.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Blackmun) ** - The Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination protects individuals from complying with a subpoena for the production of incriminating evidence, however, it does not prevent the same materials from being properly seized by law enforcement and subsequently being admitted at trial.  **[GROH V. RAMIREZ ]** - **FACTS: ** - Groh (D) received information that Ramirez and his family (P) had a large number of weapons on their ranch in MT. Groh (D) presented an application for a warrant to search the ranch for weapons and documents. The warrant did not describe the items to be seized or incorporate the supporting documents by reference. Ramirez (P) filed a suit against Groh (D) but the court found that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. The Court of Appeals held that the warrant was invalid because it did not describe the place to be searched or the items to be seized.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does a general warrant violate the Fourth Amendment if the supporting documents contained the required specificity?  - **RULE: ** - A warrant that does not specifically describe the person or property to be searched or seized or incorporates supporting documents with those descriptions is invalid under the Fourth Amendment.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Stevens) ** - Yes. A valid warrant under the Fourth Amendment must anime and describe the person or property to be searched or seized with particularity. A warrant that fails to do this is invalid on its face. Requiring this specificity protects individuals from general searches and ensures that they are informed of the legitimacy and scope of the search. Groh (D) argues that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment even though the warrant was invalid because there was sufficient probable cause, the search was conducted reasonably and he described the property to be seized orally to the plaintiffs. Court rejects this, the warrant does not specify the property to be seized at all and therefore invalid. Officers could have acted outside the scope of the search authorized by the judge, and Ramirez (P) would have no way of knowing. **The search must be treated as a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Groh (P) search of Ramirez\'s (P) ranch without a valid warrant was unconstitutional. ** **[WILSON V. ARKANSAS]** - **FACTS: ** - Wilson (D) sold drugs to an informant for the Arkansas State Police. Wilson (D) threatened the informant with a gun. Police secured a warrant to search the home Wilson (D) shared with Jacobs (D), who had convictions for arson and firebombing. Police announced themselves as they entered the unlocked screen door and passed through the main door to the home. Wilson (D) flushed the drugs down the toilet. Police found drugs, and a gun. The two were arrested and moved to suppress the evidence found during the search claiming that the search violated the Fourth Amendment since police did not "knock and announce" before entering the property. The Supreme Court granted cert to determine whether the **knock and announce rule** is part of the reasonableness test required by the Fourth Amendment.  - **ISSUE: ** - Must courts consider whether police knocked and announced themselves before entering a home to execute a search warrant when determining whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment?  - **RULE: ** - The knock and announce rule is part of the reasonableness test required to assess whether a search was valid under the Fourth Amendment.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Thomas) ** - Yes. Generally, "knock and announce" is required before entering a place to execute a search warrant -- unless officers have reasonable suspicion that doing so "would be dangerous or futile, or would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime" --- e.g., destruction of evidence.  **[RICHARDS V. WISCONSIN ]** - **FACTS: ** - Police suspected Richards of drug possession, but failed to receive a judge\'s authorization for a "no-knock" entry into his hotel room. Rather, they obtained a conventional search warrant requiring them to knock on Richard's door and identify themselves as officers prior to restoring to forcible entry. After arriving on the scene ,an officer knocked on Richard\'s door identifying himself as a hotel custodian. When Richards opened the door, he saw a uniformed man and quickly slammed it shut. Officers broke through the door, grabbed Richard while he tried to escape and found cocaine in the bathroom. Richards challenged the constitutionality of the officer's search but was denied  - **ISSUE: ** - Did the officer's use deception and force, in order to gain entry into Richards\' hotel room, violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal search and seizures?  - **RULE: ** - The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement incorporates the common law rule that police entering a home must knock and announce their identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry, unless exigent circumstances exist and to do so would undermine law enforcement interest.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Stevens) ** - No. After noting the general importance of following the conventional "knock-and-announce" procedures the Court held that in those circumstances when police have a good reason to suspect that announcing their presence and intentions may be dangerous, futile, or result in the destruction of evidence, a "no-knock" entry is justified. The court added that by immediately closing the door after witnessing justification for breaking into his room ---especially considering the disposable nature of the substance they were seeking. - **BUT:** courts must determine whether no-knock raid was justified on a case-by-case, fact-specific basis. For example: no blanket exception to the "knock-and-announce" rule for ALL drug investigations.  **CHAPTER 9: WARRANT EXCEPTIONS - PLAIN VIEW + AUTOMOBILES ** **[COOLIDGE V. NEW HAMPSHIRE ]** - **FACTS: ** - Pamela Mason was murdered and police questioned Coolidge (D). While Coolidge was taking a lie-detector test, police arrived at his home and questioned his wife and obtained evidence from her. Polie applied to AG for arrest and search warrants, including a warrant to search Coolidge (D) Pontiac. Jury convicted Coolidge based on evidence found from his vehicle.  - **ISSUE: ** - Under the plain-view doctrine, may police conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if they expected in advance to find evidence and failed to secure a warrant.  - **RULE: ** - Under the plain-view doctrine, police may not conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if they expected in arcane to find evidence and failed to secure a warrant.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Stewart) ** - No. Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant must be issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate." A warrant must be issued by a neutral magistrate, not a government agent. Any search or seizure based on a warrant from a law enforcement officer is unconstitutional unless it falls under an exception. These exceptions include searches related to a lawful arrest, searches of automobiles with probable cause, and the plain-view doctrine, which allows police to seize evidence in plain sight if they are lawfully present. However, the plain-view doctrine only applies to evidence discovered inadvertently, not evidence expected in advance. In this case, the warrant issued by the prosecutor was invalid, the car wasn\'t in the arrest\'s vicinity, and the search didn\'t meet the exceptions, making it unconstitutional. - **Officers must have *probable cause* to believe the object is the fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of a crime. ** **[MINNESOTA V. DICKERSON ]** - **FACTS: ** - MN police spotted Dickerson (D) leaving a known crack house. When Dickerson saw the officers, he turned and walked the other direction. Based on this the officers stopped Dickerson (D) and one of them performed a patdown search. The officers did not find any weapons but did feel a small object in Dickerson's (D) pockets. Police believed it was crack cocaine wrapped in cellophane, so they reached into the pocket to remove it. Officers found crack cocaine and arrested Dickerson (D) for drug possession. At trial, Dickerson (D) moved to suppress the evidence, but the district court denied the motion. The MN Court of Appeals reversed, refusing to adopt the **"plain feel" exception** and held that the seizure of the cocaine violated the Fourth Amendment.  - **ISSUE: ** - May a police officer performing a patdown search for weapons seize other contraband detected during the search if the identity of that contraband is not immediately apparent?  - **RULE: ** - A police officer performing a patdown search for weapons may not seize other contraband detected during the search if the identity of that contraband is not immediately apparent.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. White) ** - No. A police officer with reasonable suspicion is permitted to "stop and frisk" a suspect believed to be dangerous so long as that search is limited to actions necessary to discover whether the suspect has a weapon. If contraband is found in **plain view** during a lawful search, it may be seized. However, if the officer doesn't immediately recognize an object as contraband, further manipulation to identify it is not allowed. Here, the officer had already determined that Dickerson had no weapon but continued to manipulate an object in his pocket, which exceeded the permissible scope of a *Terry* frisk. Thus, the seizure of the contraband violated the Fourth Amendment.  - **A police officer performing a patdown search for weapons may not seize other contraband detected during the search if the identity of the contraband is not immediately apparent. ** **[CALIFORNIA V. CARNEY ]** - **FACTS: ** - DEA received a tip that Carney (D) waS selling marijuana out of his mobile home. DEA kept Carney (D) under surveillance and watched as he entered the mobile home with another man. When the other man exited the home, the police questioned him and he told them that Carney (D) had given him marijuana in exchange for sex. The police officer then knocked on Carney's (D) door and when Carney (D) answered the door, the police entered the home and found evidence of drugs. Court allowed the admission of evidence found in Carney's (D) mobile home and the superior court rejected Carney's (D) claim moving to suppress the evidence  - **ISSUE: ** - Is it permissible under the Fourth Amendment for law enforcement agents to search a mobile home that can be readily moved, is licensed as a motor vehicle and is parked in a public place, based on probable cause but without a warrant?  - **RULE: ** - Under the Fourth Amendment, a vehicle that can be readily moved and that has a reduced expectation of privacy due to its use as a licensed motor vehicle may be searched without a warrant provided probable cause exists.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Burger) ** - Yes. A mobile home that can be quickly moved and that is licensed with the state as an operating vehicle can be searched without a warrant when probable cause exists. While homes have more protection under the Fourth Amendment, vehicles, including motor homes, have reduced privacy due to their mobility and the government\'s need to regulate them on public roads. In this case, Carney's motorhome was moveable, parked in a public lot, and licensed as a vehicle, so the police were justified in searching it with probable cause.  **[CALIFORNIA V. ACEVEDO ]** - **FACTS: ** - Officers who had probable cause to search a bag in the trunk of Acevedo's (D) car for drugs stopped the car, opened the trunk and the bag, and found marijuana.  - **ISSUE: ** - Must police obtain a warrant to search a container in an automobile when they have probable cause to search the container, but lack probable cause to scratch the entire automobile?  - **RULE: ** - Police may search a closed container in an automobile without a warrant if they have probable cause to search the container.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Blacmun) ** - No. In *Ross*, the Court ruled that when police have probable cause to search a vehicle, they can search any containers inside the vehicle without a warrant. This decision overruled previous cases like *Chadwick* and *Sanders*, which provided more privacy protection for containers inside vehicles. The Court rejected the need for a separate rule for containers, arguing it caused confusion and offered little privacy protection. Therefore, under *Ross*, when there\'s probable cause to search a vehicle, police can search closed containers inside it without needing a warrant. - **But:** if police have probable cause to search a container in the vehicle, that probable cause does not justify search of the entire vehicle.  **CHAPTER 10: WARRANT EXCEPTIONS: SEARCHES INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST ** **[CHIMEL V. CALIFORNIA ]** - **FACTS: ** - Police officers (P) arrived at Chimel's (D) home with a warrant for his arrest for the burglary of a coin shop. Chimel's (D) wife let the officers (P) come in and wait a short time until Chimel (D) came home from work. When Chimel (D) arrived, one of the officers (P) arrested him and asked if he could look around. Chimel (D) objected, but the officers (P) conducted a search anyway, without a search warrant "on the basis of a lawful arrest." The officers (P) thoroughly searched the entire three-bedroom house and seized numerous coins and medals.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does the arrest of a person in his home justify a warrantless search of the entire premises incident to that arrest? - **RULE: ** - A warrantless search incident to arrest may extend only to the person of the arrestee and the area within his immediate control.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Stewart) ** - No. The Court rejected the broad application of warrantless searches incident to arrest. While it\'s reasonable for officers to search the person of the arrestee and the immediate area within their control to ensure safety and prevent the destruction of evidence, searching an entire house or closed areas is not justified. Previous cases like *Rabinowitz* and *Harris* allowed broader searches, but the Court distinguished between a search of a person and their immediate area versus more extensive searches. The Court ruled that if Chimel had been arrested outside his home, officers couldn't have searched his house without a warrant. Therefore, the search of Chimel's entire house was unreasonable without a warrant. The decision was reversed. - **When the police lawfully arrest someone in a private place, the police do not require a warrant or any suspicion to search (1) the arrested person and (2) the area within the arrestee's immediate control (the lunging area) -- but a warrant is required to search beyond that (Chimel) ** **[KNOWLES V. IOWA ]** - **FACTS: ** - IA police officers pulled Knowles (D) over for speeding. Officer's issued Knowles (D) a citation and then searched the car. The officers did not have probable cause or a warrant, and Knowles (D) did not consent to the search. After finding drugs in the car, officers arrested Knowles (D) and Knowles (D) moved to suppress the evidence found during the search. The Supreme Court granted cert to consider whether the "search incident to arrest" exception under the Fourth Amendment extended to the issuance of citations.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does the "search incident to arrest" exception under the Fourth Amendment authorize the full search of a car, without probable cause or a warrant after the issuance of citation?  - **RULE: ** - The "search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment does not authorize the full search of a car after the issuance of a citation.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Rehnquist) ** - No. For traffic violations, if the suspect is not arrested, there can be **no search incident to lawful arrest.** Issuing a citation does not present the same level of danger to officer safety that taking a suspect into full custody does. **The bright line rule permitting a search incident to arrest is not extended to the issuance of citations. ** **[ARIZONA V. GANT ]** - **FACTS: ** - Police officers searched the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle after the arrestee had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a locked squad car for traffic violations, and the arrestee objected to the introduction of drug-related evidence found during the search based on his Fourth Amendment rights.  - **ISSUE: ** - Did the warrantless search of Gant's (D) vehicle after he was handcuffed and locked in a squad car violate Gant's (D) Fourth Amendment rights?  - **RULE: ** - Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Stephens) ** - Yes. Police may search a vehicle incident to an arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle's passenger compartment or if there is a reasonable belief that the vehicle contains evidence related to the offense of arrest. In *Chimel*, the Court held that searches incident to arrest can only include the person and the area within their immediate control. In *Belton*, the Court applied this rule to vehicles, allowing searches of the passenger compartment and containers. However, the Court rejected a broad application of *Belton*, clarifying that a vehicle search incident to arrest is only justified when it\'s reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence related to the arrest. Since the arrestee was not within reach of the vehicle and the offense (driving with a suspended license) didn't suggest evidence in the vehicle, the search was unconstitutional. The ruling was affirmed.** ** - Police may search a **vehicle without probable cause incident to a recent occupant's lawful arrest** only if (1) the arrestee is **unsecured** and within "reaching distance" of the passenger compartment at the time of search, OR (2) it is "reasonable" to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.  **[RILEY V. CALIFORNIA ]** - **FACTS: ** - Police search Riley (D) incident for an arrest and seized his smartphone from his pocket. Police searched the phone and used items found on it as evidence at Riley's (D) trial on shooting charges. Riley (D) was convicted. Court determined that the warrantless search was a valid search incident to arrest.  - **ISSUE: ** - Under the Fourth Amendment, may the government conduct a warrantless search of the contents of a cell phone seized incident to an arrest absent exigent circumstances?  - **RULE: ** - Under the Fourth Amendment, the government may not conduct a warrantless search of the contents of a cell phone seized incident to an arrest absent exigent circumstances.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Roberts) ** - No. Police officers generally must secure a warrant before conducting a search of the contents of a cell phone seized incident to arrest. While searches incident to arrest are exceptions to the warrant requirement, they are limited to ensuring officer safety and preventing evidence destruction. Unlike a cigarette pack or a weapon, a cell phone does not pose an immediate threat to officer safety. While there are concerns about remote wiping or encryption, these risks do not justify a warrantless search. The privacy intrusion involved in searching a cell phone's data is far greater than that of other items searched incident to an arrest. Although *Arizona v. Gant* allows warrantless searches of vehicles for evidence of the arrest, this does not extend to cell phones, as their contents cannot be reasonably limited. Therefore, police must obtain a warrant or show exigent circumstances to search a cell phone. The state court\'s decision was reversed, and the federal court\'s decision was affirmed. - **The police require a warrant to search the digital information on a cell phone seized from an arrested person. ** **CHAPTER 11: WARRANT EXCEPTION--- CONSENT ** **[SCHNECKLOTH V. BUSTAMONTE ]** - **FACTS: ** - Bustamonte (D) was a passenger in a car owned by his brother that was stopped by the police for equipment violation. Bustamonte (D) gave the police permission to search the car and now seeks to have the evidence excluded.  - **ISSUE: ** - Must the State prove that one who consents to a search had knowledge of the right to refuse in order for the search to be valid?  - **RULE: ** - For a consent search to be valid the state need only prove consent was voluntarily given and not the result of duress or coercion, either express or implied; the consent giver need not know his right to refuse consent, although such knowledge is one factor in determining if the consent was voluntary.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Stewart) ** - No. The question of whether consent to a search is \"voluntary\" is determined by examining all the surrounding circumstances, including any potential coercion. While knowing the right to refuse consent is a factor, it is not the sole criterion. The consent must not be coerced, either explicitly or implicitly, and must be given freely. The Court rejects the notion that the state must prove the suspect knew they had the right to refuse consent, as this would create significant practical challenges and potentially undermine consent searches. In cases where the individual is not in custody, the prosecution only needs to show that the consent was voluntarily given, with the knowledge of the right to refuse being one of many factors. The Court\'s decision is that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require voluntary consent, but do not demand proof that the individual knew they could refuse. - **"Voluntary:" -- Knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not required. ** **GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH ** - **FACTS: ** - Police responded to a domestic disturbance at Randolph\'s home. His wife consented to a search, but Randolph objected. The police searched and found cocaine. The trial court admitted the evidence, but the state courts reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  - **ISSUE: ** - Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a home when one occupant gives consent to search the premises while another occupant is present and is expressly refusing to consent to the search?  - **RULE: ** - The police may not enter a home without a warrant to search for evidence where they obtain consent from an occupant but not if a co-occupant is present and objects to the search.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:   (J. Souter) ** - No. When two occupants are present and one consents to a search while the other objects, the police cannot conduct a warrantless search. The ruling in *United States v. Matlock* (1974) allowing searches with the consent of one occupant does not apply when the other occupant is present and objects. *Minnesota v. Olson* (1990) also protects a co-occupant\'s privacy when they object. In this case, since Randolph was present and refused consent, the police search was unreasonable, and the state supreme court\'s judgment is affirmed.  - "**Authority:"** Police officers may search jointly occupied premises if one of the occupant's consents, unless another occupant is **physically present** and objects to the search.  **[FERNANDEZ V. CALIFORNIA ]** - **FACTS: ** - Officers who saw a robbery suspect run into an apartment and heard fighting from within the apartment knocked and saw a woman bleeding, were refused entry by the suspect, removed the suspect and returned, obtained permission from the woman to search the apartment, and found evidence.  - **ISSUE: ** - Can police officers search a residence without a warrant when the only physically present occupier consents to the search but another occupant who is no longer present because they have been arrested had previously objected to the search of the home?  - **RULE: ** - While police officers cannot search premises based on consent of one occupant when another occupant is physically present and refuses consent, they can conduct a search pursuant to consent granted when the objecting occupant is no longer there --- even if the objecting occupant was removed (lawfully) by the police.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Alito) ** - Yes. This case answers the question whether removal by the police of an occupant who objected to a warrantless search of co-occupied premises negates the objection, so that a remaining co-occupant consent to search the premises is valid. The Court held that a removal of the objecting occupant for lawful reasons does not prevent a remaining occupant from giving valid consent, adopting a formalistic rule that a co-occupant can negate another occupant's consent to a warrantless search only if the co-occupant is physically present. - **If that objector is then removed on an objectively reasonable basis (e.g., lawful arrest) --- police may search with consent of the remaining occupant. ** **CHAPTER 12: WARRANT EXCEPTIONS--- EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES ** **[WARDEN V. HAYDEN ]** - **FACTS: ** - Police in hot pursuit of a robbery suspect, entered a home without warrant and found Hayden, firearms, ammunition, and clothing matching the suspect's description. Hayden argued the search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. - **ISSUE: ** - \(1) Does exigent-circumstances exception permit officers in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon to enter and search a home without a warrant?  - \(2) Does the Fourth Amendment permit officers to seize mere evidence of a crime that is not a fruit of crime, an instrumentality of a crime, or contraband?  - **RULE: ** - **(1)** The exigent-circumstances exception permits officers in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon to enter and search home without a warrant.  - \(2) The Fourth Amendment permits officers to seize mere evidence of a crime that is not a fruit of crime, an instrumentality of a crime, or contraband.  - **DECISION AND RATIONAL:    (J. Brennan) ** - \(1) Yes. The Court held that officers in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon may enter and search a home without a warrant. The exigent-circumstances exception justifies such searches when immediate action is required to prevent harm, flight, or destruction of evidence. - \(2) Yes. The Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment now permits the seizure of mere evidence, provided there is a clear link between the item and the crime. In this case, the clothing was linked to the robbery through witness descriptions, making its seizure reasonable. The decision of the Fourth Circuit was reversed. - **Hot pursuit:** probable cause is sufficient to arrest a felon in a public **place:** no warrant is required BUT: a search warrant (or atleast arrest warrant accompanied by "reason to believe the suspect is within") is required to enter a **home** in order to make an arrest. BUT officers\' pursuit of a **fleeing felony suspect** may make a warrantless search and seizure to the extent necessary to prevent a felon's escape --- including pursuit into a home.  - **But a fleeing misdemeanor suspect** does not categorically qualify aS an exigent circumstance: "when the officer has time to get a warrant, he must do so" (Lange) (Note: regardless, still need PC that suspect committed)  **[PAYTON V. NEW YORK]** - **FACTS: ** - This involves companion cases in which police entered homes to make an arrest without arrest warrants, found evidence of crimes therein and used that evidence to convict the defendants. Both challenge the admission of such evidence Fourth Amendment grounds.  - **ISSUE: ** - Is evidence seized from a suspect's home while making a warrantless arrest, absent exigent circumstances, admissible against the suspect in criminal proceedings?  - **RULE: ** - Absent exigent circumstances, police are required to have an arrest warrant before entering a suspect\'s home to make an arrest, otherwise any evidence seized therin in inadmissible against the suspect.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE: ** - No. Warrantless searches or arrests inside a home are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, except in exigent circumstances. The distinction between a search and an arrest is minimal, as both involve an intrusion into the home. An arrest warrant, though less protective than a search warrant, still requires judicial approval of probable cause. Without a warrant or exigent circumstances, entering a home is unconstitutional, and the lower court\'s decision was reversed. - **Hot pursuit:** probable cause is sufficient to arrest a felon in a public **place:** no warrant is required BUT: a search warrant (or atleast arrest warrant accompanied by "reason to believe the suspect is within") is required to enter a **home** in order to make an arrest.  **[BRIGHAM CITY V. STUART ]** - **FACTS:** - Police responded to a party where a fight was happening and someone was injured. The officer entered the home when no one responded to his announcement and stopped the fight. Trial court said the entry violated the Fourth Amendment, but the court of appeals upheld it.  - **ISSUE: ** - Under the Fourth Amendment, may police enter a home without a warrant if an occupant is injured or in immediate danger?  - **RULE: ** - Police may enter a home without a warrant if there is an objectively reasonable basis for believing an occupant is injured or in immediate danger.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Roberts) ** - Yes. The Fourth Amendment allows warrantless entry if there is an objectively reasonable belief that an occupant is injured or in danger. In this case, the officer's entry was justified due to the ongoing fight and injury, which posed an immediate threat. The Court reversed the lower court's decision, finding the warrantless entry was reasonable. - **Public Safety Exception:** in an emergency, officers may make a warrantless entry of a home to assist a seriously injured occupant or protect an occupant from imminent serious injury if they have an "objectively reasonable basis for believing" tha a person in the home is in need of immediate aid, or that person were in danger.  **[MICHIGAN V. FISHER ]** - **FACTS:** - Police saw blood outside Jeremy Fisher's home and observed him acting erratically inside. Fisher refused entry, but an officer entered, fearing someone was in danger. Fisher later pointed a gun at the officer. Trial court ruled the entry violated the Fourth Amendment, but the Court of Appeals upheld it.  - **ISSUE: ** - Is a warrantless search of a home permissible where there is objectively reasonable basis for believing someone within the house is in need of immediate aid?  - **RULE: ** - A warrantless search of a home is permissible where there is an objectively reasonable basis for believing someone within the house is in need of immediate aid.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE: (Per Curiam) ** - Yes. A warrantless search is justified if there is an objectively reasonable belief that someone in the home needs immediate help. Given the blood, the damaged truck, and Fisher\'s behavior, it was reasonable for the officers to believe someone was in danger. The Court reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision. - **Public Safety Exception:** in an emergency, officers may make a warrantless entry of a home to assist a seriously injured occupant or protect an occupant from imminent serious injury if they have an "objectively reasonable basis for believing" tha a person in the home is in need of immediate aid, or that person were in danger.  **[KENTUCKY V. KING ]** - **FACTS: ** - Police officers entered an apartment building of a suspect, but they ended up entering the wrong apartment based on detecting marijuana smoke and then hearing what they deemed to be the possible destruction of evidence. King (D) who was not the original suspect pursued by police, was convicted of a narcotics offense based on evidence discovered during a subsequent search of the apartment.  - **ISSUE: ** - Did the Kentucky court properly enunciate the exigent-circumstances rule and the police created exigency exception thereto?  - **RULE: ** - The exigent-circumstances rule which allows the introduction of evidence obtained in a warrantless search, applies only when the police do not gain entry to the premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Alito) ** - No. The exigent-circumstances rule permits evidence from a warrantless search if the police did not create the urgency. Courts have applied different exceptions, such as a bad faith standard or a foreseeability test, but these are inconsistent with Fourth Amendment principles. The Court rejects these subjective tests and states that if police knock on a door without a warrant, it's no different than a private citizen's actions. If occupants destroy evidence, they are responsible for the resulting warrantless search. The officers\' actions in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  - **PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE:** officers may also make warrantless entry of a home to prevent the **destruction of evidence --- even** if the officers caused the exigency by knocking-- as long as their creation of their exigency did not involve an actual or threatened 4th Amendment violation.  **CHAPTER 13: WARRANT EXCEPTIONS--- EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES (DRUNK DRIVING) ** **[MISSOURI V. MCNEELY ]** - **FACTS:** - McNeely was stopped for suspected drunk driving. After refusing a breath test and blood alcohol test at the hospital, an officer ordered an involuntary blood test without a warrant. The test showed that McNeely exceeded the legal limit. McNeely was acquitted on the grounds that the officer needed a warrant.  - **ISSUE: ** - In drunk driving investigations, does the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitute an exigency that in every case is sufficient to justify conducting an involuntary blood test without a warrant?  - **RULE: ** - In a drunk driving investigation, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency that in every case is sufficient to justify conducting an involuntary blood test without a warrant.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Sotomayor) ** - No. The natural dissipation of alcohol does not create a blanket exception to the warrant requirement. While exigent circumstances may justify warrantless searches in certain cases, such as when evidence is imminent danger of destruction, there was no urgency in McNeely's case. Modern procedures for quickly obtaining warrants mitigate the need for warrantless BAC tests. The officer's failure to get a warrant was unreasonable, so the court upheld McNeely's acquittal.  - **If police can reasonably obtain a warrant, the Fourth Amendment requires them to do so before taking a on-consensual blood alcohol content test. ** **[BIRCHFIELD V. NORTH DAKOTA ]** - **FACTS: ** - Birchfield, Bernard, and Beylund were arrested for drunk driving. Birchfield and Bernard refused warrantless BAC tests (blood and breath, respectively), and were charged with crimes for refusal. Beylund agreed to a blood test after being told it was required by law. The cases were consolidated to address Fourth Amendment concerns.** ** - **ISSUE: ** - Does a law requiring motorists to submit to a blood-alcohol concentration breath test after being lawfully arrested for driving while impaired violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches?  - **RULE: ** - A law requiring motorists to submit to a blood-alcohol concentration breath test after being lawfully arrested for driving while impaired does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Alito) ** - No. A BAC breath test is minimally intrusive and does not violate the Fourth Amendment, especially given the government's compelling interest in road safety. Thus, laws penalizing refusal of a BAC breath test are constitutional. However, a law making refusal of a BAC blood test a crime violates the Fourth Amendment due to the greater privacy intrusion of blood tests. Birchfield's conviction for refusing a blood test is reversed, Bernard's refusal of a breath test conviction is upheld, and Beylund's conviction for submitting to a blood test is reversed, requiring a reassessment of his consent. - **A state cannot pass a law that makes it a crime for a suspected drunk driver to refuse a blood test, but can criminalize refusal to take a breath test. A breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving. ** **[WELSH V. WISCONSIN ]** - **FACTS: ** - Welsh was seen driving erratically and later went home. The police officer, suspecting intoxication, went to Welsh's house around 9pm, where he was let in by Welsh's stepdaughter. The officer found Welsh in bed and arrested him for driving while intoxicated. Welsh later refused a breathalyzer test.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does the exigent circumstance exception to the Fourth Amendment allow warrantless entry into a home to arrest an individual for a minor traffic offense? - **RULE: ** - The exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment does not allow warrantless entry into home to make an arrest for a minor offense.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Brennan) ** - No. The Fourth Amendment protects against warrantless entry into the home, and the exigent circumstances exception does not apply to minor offenses. Welsh was arrested for a non jailable traffic offense, was not in hot pursuit, and posed no ongoing threat. Thus, there were no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry and arrest. - **Limitations on "exigent circumstances" exception:** warrantless home arrest likely not justified by risk of lost evidence (e.g., dissipation of blood alcohol) if underlying offense is "extremely minor."  **CHAPTER 14: WARRANT EXCEPTIONS --- PORTS OF ENTRY ** **[UNITED STATES V. FLORE-MONTANO]** - **FACTS: ** - Montano's vehicle was inspected at the Otay Mesa border crossing. A custom's inspector, after tapping the gas tank and suspecting it contained contraband, had it removed. The tank contained 37 kg of marijuana. Montano moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search required reasonable suspicion.  - **ISSUE:** - Under the Fourth Amendment, is reasonable suspicion required to search the gas tank of a vehicle entering the United States?  - **RULE: ** - Reasonable suspicion is not required for the routine search of the gas tank of a vehicle attempting to enter the United States.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:     (J. Rehquist) \]** - No. Border searches are not subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonable suspicion requirement. The government has broad authority to search vehicles at the border without suspicion due to its sovereign right to control its territory. The inspection of the gas tank was reasonable, given the minimal intrusion of the government\'s interest in preventing contraband from entering the US.  - **At the border or its "functional equivalent," routine searches** do not require a warrant or any evidentiary basis (no RS or PC).  **[UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ FUERTE ]** - **FACTS: ** - Fuerte was stopped at a permanent Border Patrol checkpoint more than 25 miles from the Mexican border, sent to secondary inspection and arrested for transporting illegal immigrants. He argued the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights, but the trial court denied his motion.  - **ISSUE: ** - Do warrantless stops at permanent, internal Border patrol checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment?  - **RULE: ** - Warrantless stops at permanent, internal Border Patrol checkpoints do not violate the Fourth Amendment.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Powell) ** - No. The court held that permanent checkpoints involve minimal intrusion on driver's rights and serve significant public interest in immigration enforcement Unlike roving patrols, these checkpoints do not require reasonable suspicion. The stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  - **Away from the border -- border officials may stop a vehicle at a fixed checkpoint and briefly question occupants regarding citizenship without individualized reasonable suspicion. ** **[UNITED STATES V. RAMSEY ]** - **FACTS: ** - Customs inspectors intercepted eight suspicious envelopes from Thailand, believed to contain drugs, and opened them. The DEA conducted a sting operation, leading to the arrest of Ramsey and Kelly, who were mailing drugs into the U.S.  - **ISSUE: ** - Under the Fourth Amendment, can mail entering the country be searched without probable cause or a warrant? - **RULE: ** - Mail entering the country is subject to search without probable cause or a warrant.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE: (J. Rehquist) ** - Yes. The Court held that mail entering the country may be searched without a warrant or probable cause. Postal regulations allow searches based on "reasonable cause to suspect" contraband, which is a lower standard than probable cause. In this case, the envelopes\' unusual size, weight, and origin provided reasonable cause for the search. Border searches are generally exempt from the probable cause requirement, and mail is treated the same as other property entering the country. Therefore, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. - **At the border or its "functional equivalent," routine searches** do not require a warrant or any evidentiary basis (no RS or PC).  **[UNITED STATES V. MONTOYA DE HERNANDEZ ]** - **FACTS: ** - Hernandez, flying from a drug-source country, was flagged by customs due to suspicious travel behavior. After a strip search and observation, officials obtained a court order for an X-ray and body cavity search, revealing drugs. Hernandez was convicted, but the court of appeals reversed.  - **ISSUE: ** - May a person entering the US be subjected to a body-cavity search if there is reasonable suspicion the person is smuggling contraband?  - **RULE: ** - A person entering the US may be subjected to a body-cavity search if there is reasonable suspicion the person is smuggling contraband.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE: (J. Rehnquist) ** - Yes. The Court ruled that body-cavity searches at the border require only reasonable suspicion, not probable case. Given Hernandez\'s suspicious circumstances, the search was constitutional.  - **At the border or its "functional equivalent," routine searches** do not require a warrant or any evidentiary basis (no RS or PC).  -- Although extended detention requires at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  **CHAPTER 15: WARRANT EXCEPTIONS--- CHECKPOINTS +PROTECTIVE SWEEPS ** **[MiCHIGAN DEP'T OF STATE POLICE V. SITZ]** - **FACTS: ** - The Michigan Department of State police established a sobriety checkpoint pilot program and Michigan licensed drivers filed a complaint objecting to the sobriety checkpoints.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does Michigan's use of highway sobriety checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment?  - **RULE: ** - Although sobriety checkpoints are considered seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, they are constitutional if their level of intrusion does not outweigh the government's interest considering the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:  (J. Rehnquist) ** - No. Michigan's sobriety checkpoints involving brief 25 second stops, were challenged under the Fourth Amendment. The Court balanced the minimal intrusion on drivers with the state's interest in reducing drunk driving, finding the checkpoints effective and constitutional.  **[CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND ]** - **FACTS: ** - Indianapolis set up checkpoints to intercept drugs, stopping a set number of vehicles. Edmon and Palmer were stopped and filed a class action, claiming the checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment.  - **ISSUE: ** - Is a suspicionless roadside checkpoint established for the purpose of deterring general criminal activity unlawful under the Fourth Amendment?  - **RULE: ** - A suspicionless roadside checkpoint established for the purpose of deterring general criminal activity is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE: (J. O'Connor) ** - Yes the court ruled that checkpoints aimed at general crime prevention, like drug interdiction, violate the Fourth Amendment. Only checkpoints for specific purposes like highway safety or border control are constitutional.  - **Police may stop cars at checkpoints WITHOUT reasonable suspicion** if the "primary purpose" of checkpoints is not **general crime control. (e.g. finding narcotics) ** **[ILLINOIS V. LIDSTER ]** - **FACTS:** - After a hit and run accident, Illinois police set up a checkpoint to gather information about the crime. Lidster, who swerved to avoid the checkpoint and was suspected of DUI, was arrested after failing a sobriety test. He claimed the checkpoint violated his Fourth Amendment rights, but the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with him -- citing Edmond.  - **ISSUE: ** - A roadside vehicle checkpoint presumptively unlawful if the primary law-enforcement purpose of the stop is to ask vehicle occupants for information about crimes possibly committed by others?  - **RULE:** - A roadside vehicle checkpoint is not presumptively unlawful if the primary law-enforcement purpose of the stop is to ask vehicle occupants for information about crimes possibly committed by others.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Breyer) ** - No. Unlike *Edmond,* which dealt with general crime control, this checkpoint sought information about a specific crime. Information-seeking stops are not presumptively unconstitutional, and the minimal intrusion of a brief stop is justified by the serious public concern. The stop was brief, non-intrusive and advanced a specific law enforcement purpose, making it constitutional.  - **Police may stop cars at checkpoints WITHOUT reasonable suspicion** if the "primary purpose" of checkpoints is not **general crime control. (e.g. finding narcotics) -- but** rather certain "special needs" such as policing the border or ensuring roadway safety by combating drunk driving -- or where the police are not seeking evidence that stopped drivers committed crimes (Lidster)  **CHAPTER 18: WARRANT EXCEPTIONS: SEARCHES OF PERSON IN JAILS & PRISONS PROBATION, PAROLEES + ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES + DNA TESTS OF ARRESTEES ** **[FLORENE V. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS ]** - **FACTS: ** - Florence was arrested based on a bench warrant for a minor offense, even though he had paid the fine. Upon being booked at two correctional facilities, Florence was subjected to strip searches, including being required to lift his genitals, turn around, and cough. Florence sued, arguing that strip searches should only occur with reasonable suspicion of contraband.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does a strip search in jail for those who commit minor offenses require reasonable suspicion?  - **RULE: ** - A strip search in jail for those who commit minor offenses does not require reasonable suspicion.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Kennedy) ** - No. The court deferred to correctional officials\' judgement, stating that strip searches are necessary for jail security and health, especially when admitting large numbers of inmates. Such searches help prevent gang violence and ensure safety, and limiting them to those accused of serious crimes would be impractical. The strip search policies were found to reasonably balance inmate privacy with security needs.  - **A prisoner\'s cell and effects are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Even if someone is arrested for a minor offense, jail officials need no warrant or reasonable suspicion of contraband to strip search the person before admitting him to the general population in a jail. ** **[SOUTH DAKOTA V. OPPERMAN ]** - **FACTS: ** - Opperman's car was ticketed and towed for illegal parking. During an inventory search at the impound lot, police found drugs in the glove compartment. Opperman was arrested for maijuana possession wh3en he came to retrieve his car. He moved to suppress the evidence but the trial court denied it.  - **ISSUE: ** - Under the Fourth Amendment, may police perform an inventory search of the contents of a vehicle lawfully in police possession.  - **RULE: ** - Police may constitutionally perform inventory search of a vehicle lawfully in police possession.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE: (J. Burger) ** - Yes. Police may conduct an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle While vehicles are subject to less privacy protection than homes, the inventory search serves legitimate interest: protecting the owners property, preventing false claims of damage or loss, and ensuring officer safety. The Court held that the search did not require probable cause or a warrant, as it was a noncriminal inventory search.  - **As long as the search follows an established routine for the purpose of inventory, the police may conduct a warrantless, suspicionless inventory search of an impounded vehicle including containers in the vehicle -- even if the vehicle was only impounded for a parking violation. ** **[CAMARA V. MUNICIPAL COURT OF CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO ]** - **FACTS: ** - San Francisco housing inspectors tried to inspect Roland Camara's apartment for occupancy violations. Camara refused entry without a warrant, and he was cited and charged for non-compliance. He filed for a writ of prohibition- denied by the state court.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does a routine administrative search require a prior judicial warrant?  - **RULE: ** - Under the Fourth Amendment, routine administrative searches require consent or a warrant.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. White) ** - Yes. Routine Administrative searches require consent or a warrant. While such searches don't carry the same privacy concerns as criminal investigations, the Fourth Amendment still protects against unwarranted searches. The government must obtain a warrant based on reaSonable standards, like the condition of the building. Camara had the right to demand a warrant and could not be convicted for refusing the inspection. - **When inspectors search private residences and commercial buildings based on a reasonable, neutral plan that has the purpose of enforcing administrative regulations, a *warrant* is required, but the warrant need not be based on *individualized probable cause.* ** **MARYLAND V. KING ** - **FACTS: ** - King was arrested for assault in 2009 and police took a DNA sample from him. The DNA matched evidence from a 2003 rape, leading to his conviction. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, citing an unreasonable search.  - **ISSUE: ** - When officers make an arrest for a serious offense that is supported by probable cause and bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, is taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA a legitimate police-booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment?  - **RULE: ** - When officers make an arrest for a serious offense that is supported by probable cause and bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee\'s DNA is a legitimate police-booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE: ** - Yes. DNA swabs during booking are akin to fingerprinting and serve valid government interest, such as identification and safety, with minimal privacy intrusion. The procedure is constitutional. When officers make an arrest based on **probable cause** for a **serious offense,** police may collect a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA at the police station, without a warrant or suspicion, as part of routine booking procedure.  **CHAPTER 19: SEIZURES -- ARRESTS ** **[UNITED STATES V. MENDENHALL ]** - **FACTS: ** - Sylvia Mendenhall was approached by DEA agents at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, where they suspected her of carrying narcotics. After questioning and obtaining her consent, they searched her and found heroin in her undergarments. Mendenhall was arrested and charged, but argued the search was unconstitutional. The district court upheld the search, but the court of appeals reversed, finding her consent was not voluntary due to an improper seizure.  - **ISSUE: ** - Under the Fourth Amendment, is a person seized only if the surrounding circumstances would cause a reasonable person to believe she was not free to leave?  - **RULE: ** - Under the Fourth Amendment, a person is seized only if the surrounding circumstances would cause a reasonable person to believe she was not free to leave.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:   (J. Stewart) ** - Yes. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring objective justification such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion for a seizure to be lawful. A seizure occurs when an officer uses physical force or shows authority that restricts a person\'s freedom to leave. In Mendenhall\'s case, the DEA agents did not use coercion or force when they approached her; she was in a public space, the agents were not in uniform or armed, and she had no reason to believe she couldn't walk away. Mendenhall voluntarily followed the agents and consented to the search, making the heroin evidence admissible. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment, ruling the search was lawful. **[CALIFORNIA V. HODARI ]** - **FACTS:** - Two police officers were on patrol. As they were approaching a small car, the youths huddled around the car, saw the officers and took off running. Suspicious, the officers gave chase. Just before one officer caught up with him, Hodari D. (defendant) tossed the crack cocaine he had been carrying. Hodari D. moved to have the drug evidence excluded at trial, and the motion was denied - **ISSUE: ** - Does a Fourth Amendment seizure occur if an officer makes a show of authority but the subject does not succumb or surrender?  - **RULE: ** - A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs if the police exercise physical force over a subject or if a subject submits to an officer's show of authority.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:** - No. A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when a person submits to a show of police authority or is physically restrained. Although an arrest can be made with minimal physical force, if the person escapes, the seizure ends until the person is brought back into custody. The definition of \"seizure\" should not include situations where an officer has only made a show of authority and the subject is still fleeing. In United States v. Mendenhall, the Court ruled that a seizure occurs when a person feels they are not free to leave, but this alone does not justify a Fourth Amendment seizure. Therefore, in the case of Hodari D., who was fleeing from police, no seizure occurred, and the drugs he discarded were not the result of an illegal seizure, making the evidence admissible. **[ATWATER V. CITY OF LAGO VISTA]** - **FACTS: ** - Petitioner was pulled over when an officer observed her violating a seatbelt law, a misdemeanor. She was arrested, processed, and held for about an hour in a cell, alone, before appearing before a magistrate and being released on bail.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does the Fourth Amendment forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by fine?  - **RULE: ** - The Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt law punishable only by a fine.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Souter) ** - If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, they may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender. This case establishes that police can arrest suspects for fine-only offenses. Such arrests do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court gives substantial weight to the need for easily administrable rules that officers can apply at the moment. - **Warrantless misdemeanors arrest permissible even if misdemeanor cannot be punished by incarceration. ** **[CHAPTER 20: SEIZURES -- STOP AND FRISK]** **[TERRY V. OHIO ]** - **FACTS: ** - Police officers observed Terry (D) and two other men casing out of a stop as if planning to rob it. When confronted the men acted suspiciously so the officer frisked them and discovered Terry (D) and another were armed.  - **ISSUE:** - May an officer, lacking probable cause to seize and search, conduct a limited frisk for weapons under circumstances that would lead an officer, in light of training, experience, and all other circumstances, to have an objectively reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous?  - **RULE: ** - Where an officer observes conduct that, in light of experience and all other circumstances, would lead to an objectively reasonable belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a frisk limited in scope to searching for weapons.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Warren) ** - Yes. This case illustrates that searches and seizures can be reasonable without a warrant. It is clear that when the police arrest a suspect on probable cause it is also reasonable to search that person, incident to arrest, for any weapons in order to guard against potential danger. Police deal with individuals all the time without having probable cause to arrest and search, but one of these individuals who happens to be armed poses as much danger to the officer as an individual for whom there is probable cause to arrest. The Constitution does not call for hairsplitting in these situations.  - This case allows police to briefly detain ("stop") a person based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity  - **Once a person is lawfully stopped, the police may conduct a protective pat down ("frisk") based on reasonable suspicion that the person is *armed and dangerous*** **[UNITED STATES V. SHARPE ]** - **FACTS: ** - Federal agents patrolling a highway suspected that a truck and car driving together were trafficking drugs. Agent radioed a highway patrolman and attempted to pull over both vehicles. Agent smelled marijana, searched the truck and found marijuana there. Defendant was detained for approximately 20 minutes from when he was pulled over to when the drugs were found.  - **ISSUE: ** - Is a detention justified as an investigation stop if police diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.  - **RULE: ** - A detention is not too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop if police diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it is necessary to detain the suspect.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Burger) ** - Yes. A detention is not too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop if police diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it is necessary to detain the suspect. Could not engage in "unrealistic second guessing" -- the question is whether police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it. Here, the detention of the defendant on the side of the road was not unreasonable. Federal agents acted as quickly as could be expected to perform the search that uncovered marijuana. (and the defendant caused most of the delay in his 20-minute detention as he failed to pull over immediately.  - **The detention did not violate Defendant\'s Fourth Amendment rights. ** **[HIIBEL V. SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF NEVADA ]** - **FACTS: ** - Hibel (D) repeatedly refused to identify himself to a police officer investigating a reported assault. The officer arrested Hibel (D) and charged him with obstructing a police officer from performing his duty in violation of Nevada law. Hibel was found guilty.  - **ISSUE: ** - Does an arrest for failure to provide identification violate the Fourth Amendment?  - **RULE: ** - An arrest for failure to provide identification does not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the request was reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop.  - **DECISION AND RATIONALE:    (J. Kennedy) ** - No. An arrest for failure to provide identification does not violate the Fourth Amendment If the request was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the stop. Under *Terry,* a police officer with reasonable suspicion that a suspect is or has been engaged in criminal behavior may briefly detain that person to investigate without violating the Fourth Amendment. The stop must be valid at the outset, reasonably related to the facts giving rise to the stop reasonable in length, and less than a full custodial arrest. Requests for identification during Terry stops are constitutional and serve important governmental interest in effectively investigating crimes and protecting police and others from dangerous suspects.  - **The request for identification is properly related to the legitimate needs of a *Terry* stop. ** **CHAPTER 21: REASONABLE SUSPICION ** **[UNITED STATES V. ARVIZU ]** - **FACTS: ** - Border patrol agents working in an area of AZ often travelled by smugglers received an alert that a traffic sensor had been triggered. The agent went, based on his experience, the agent became suspicious that Arvizu (D) might be smuggling contraband. The agent based this suspicion on numerous facts including the van occupant's behavior, their effort to avoid checkpoints, and elevation of the back passenger's knees, and that the van's registered address was in an area populated by smugglers and minivans are used for smuggling. Agents pulled over the an and (D) consented to a se4arch of the vehicle. Agent found over 100Ib of marijuana. (D) was arrested for possession with the intent to distribute maijuana. (D) moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop on the basis that the stop was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  - **ISSUE:** - Does an officer's stop of a car violate the Fourth Amendment if the totality of the circumsta