Readings in Philippine History PDF

Topic 11 GE 2 Readings in Philippine History College of Arts & Sciences Filamer Christian University Course Description The course aims to expose students to different face...

Topic 11 GE 2 Readings in Philippine History College of Arts & Sciences Filamer Christian University Course Description The course aims to expose students to different facets of Philippine History through the lens of eyewitnesses. Rather than rely on the secondary materials such as textbooks, which is the usual approach in Philippine History, different types of primary sources will be used – written (qualitative & quantitative), orall, visual, audio-visual, digital – covering various aspects of Philippine life(political, economic, cultural). Students are expected to analyze the selected readings contextually and in terms of content(stated and implied). The end goal is to enable students to understand and appreciate our rich past by deriving insights from those who were actually present at the time of the event. Learning Objectives: 1. Expose to the students selected documents that provide correct perspectives that shed light to certain historical events leading the fall of a dictatorial rule. 2. Understand the content of the Majority Opinion of the Agrava Fact-finding Board on the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. in 1983; a decision that led to the indictment of Chief of Staff General Fabian C. Ver, et. al. 3. Evaluate, in a proper context, the separate documents released by the International Observer Delegation and an official statement of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) regarding the outcome of the 1986 Snap Election. 1986 People Power Revolution Introduction Martial Law was terminated by President E. Marcos on January 17, 1981 through Proclamation No. 2045. The president’s decision was based on several factors: (1) peace and order was restored in the country after the “leftist-rightist rebellion” had been contained by the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP); (2) political reforms were instituted after the ratification of the 1973 Constitution which gave way to the reorganization of the local government; (3) economic growth was achieved because of land 1 reform, reliable infrastructures, increased Gross National Product, and improved credit standing, among others; and (4) educational reforms were accomplished through a reorientation of the curriculum to cater to the need of the economy. In essence, the proclamation affirmed the success of President Marcos who steered the nation towards New Society. However, amidst claims of progress, the Martial Law period became a tool to silence the administration’s critics and political opponents. According to Amnesty International, around 70,000 people were detained for being “enemies of the state”, 34,000 people were tortured in various military facilities, and 3,240 people became victims of “salvage” or extrajudicial killings. Although the president declared economic success during that period, data from the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) presented the drawbacks of his government’s expenditures. At the end of Martial Law in 1981, national debt grew to Php 395.51 billion primarily because the government relied on foreign loans to fund for its agricultural and industrial projects. Moreover, claims of electoral fraud in the 1978 parliamentary elections which favored President Marcos’ party, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), convinced the opposition to take drastic measures for political reform. These, among others, could probably explain why dissent against Marcos administration continued even after Martial Law was lifted. The following are extracts from relevant documents as primary sources linked to certain events that led to the fall of Marcos from office precipitated by the non-violent People Power Uprising in February 1986. Assassination of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, JR. On Augus 21, 1983 at the Manila International Airport Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. Was one of the staunch critics of President Marcos. When the president declared Martial Law in 1972, he ordered the arrest of his political opponents which included Senators Aquino, Jovito R. Salonga, and Jose W. Diokno. Aquino was sentenced to death by firing squad in 1977 because of his alleged ties with the NPA and the communists. In 1980, the senator was allowed by the president to travel to the US for a bypass surgery after suffering a hear attack in his prison cell. Senator Aquino and his family stayed in the US for three years where, far from the threats of imprisonment and persecution, he continue his political tirades against the Marcos administration. In 1983, the senator decided to return to the Philippines due to the worsening political situation in his homeland. On August 21 of the same year, Senator Aquino was shot shortly after aligthing from China Airlines flight no. 811. On the tarmac of the Manila International Airport, the senator’s body lay dead together with another who was identified as Rolando Galman, an alleged Communist/NPA agent declared by the government later on as the assassin. Public outrage due to the assassination pushed President Marcos to create a commission that conducted a formal investigation about the incident – the “Fernando Commission”, formed on August 24, 1983. Its members were Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, 2 former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion (who refused the appointment), and retired justices Ruperto Martin, Guillermo Santos and Felix Antonio. However, the commission was dissolved after receiving public disapproval and criticism. Thereafter, President Marcos created an independent and multi-sectoral fact-finding board on October 14, 1983 through Presidential Decree No. 1886. The “Agrava Fact-Finding Board” (or simply the “Agrava Board/Commission”) was “composed of Justice Corazon G. Agrava, representing the judiciary and the women sector; Hon. Amado C. Dizon, representing education; Hon. Ernesto Herrera, representing labor; Hon. Dante Santos, representing business; and Hon. Luciano Salazar, representing the bar, as well as the professional sector.” Report of the Fact-Finding Board created Under PD 1886 (“The Majority Opinion”), Quezon City, October 22, 1984 In October 1984, the Agrava Board submitted two separate report – a minority opinion prepared by Justice Agrava and a majority opinion prepared by the other four members of the investigative body, with the latter’s only difference was the implication of more military officers including Chief of Staff Fabian C. Ver. Nevertheless, both reports concluded that the Aquino assassination was a military conspiracy, thereby rejecting the military’s version which involved Galman as a Communist /NPA perpetrator. Excerpts below are from the majority report of the Agrava Board’s findings. PRIMARY SOURCE: “We are also satisfied that the evidence proves the complicity of Gen. Fabian C. Ver in this tragic affair, in attempting, like Gen. Olivas, to cover up the crime, or hide the corpus or effects of the crime. 1. As the highest ranking officer of the armed forces of the Philippines, next only to the Commander in Chief, the President, and fully realizing that were Aquino to return to the Philippines and the injured while in the custody of the military, grievous embarassment would be caused to the Government and hence he should assure the taking of the utmost precautions to prevent this eventuality, common sense ordinary prudence most peremptorily demanded that intensive efforts should be exerted to find out, with as much certainty and accuracy as possible, the plans of Senator Aquino and his whereabouts at any given moment. These propositions Ver had occasion to concede at one point or another in the course of his testimony before us. Indeed, in one instance he said that, as regards a person of comparative lesser importance, Atty. Ernesto Maceda, “we know where he is every moment of his life.” This notwithstanding: a. Ver at first denied any “monitoring” of Aquino’s activities in the USA. It was only after intensive questioning that he finally admitted to “following up” Aquino’s movements in America. He had to admit he was being regularly informed of the messages from the Philippine Consul General in New York, and later, from the Philippine Ambassador at Singapore. Those messages leave no doubt about the close monitoring or surveillance of Senator Aquino’s activities. b. Still he gave the impression that he was a mere passive receiver of news and was not soliciting the same. 3  c. He denied asking the Singapore authorities to make inquiries. The Singapore messages show otherwise. d. Ver also denied making inquiries about Aquino in Taipeh. This, despite the fact that the Singapore messages had narrowed down the probable “jumping off” points of Aquino to either Hongkong or Taipeh. 2. The evidence shows the military authorities knew that Aquino was coming via CAL Ci-811. Yet Ver denied awareness of this fact. 3. Ver’s alternatives in his diective to General Custodio, dated August 21, 1983 made no sense. The directive spoke of Aquino’s coming without travel papers, via JAL or other carrier, a manifest impossibility, or with travel papers. 4. Ver tried to amend his directive of August 19 by eliminating the inoperative alternatives, but he gave evidently implausible reasons for the amendment: the reaffirmation of Aquino’s death sentence and the issuance of a new warrant of arrest for him on the other charges, events which had taken place more than a year earlier and which already known to him before he issued his August 19 directive. 5. We can assume Ver read OPLAN BALIKBAYAN. He must have noted the assumption that Aquino might come via JAL. This clearly erroneous since he knew Aquino was coming via CAL, and could not possibly come via JAL since the latter had given assurances it would not board Aquino. 6. Ver said it is usual to give an INSUM to the commander of of a mission, and INSUM being SUMMARY of INTELLIGENCE information already gathered, relevant to a mission. 7. Ver also said he did not give General Custodio the intelligence information obtained from the Singapore authorities, this, despite thee fact that the information narrowed down the probable “jumping-off” points of Senator Aquino to only Hongkong and Taipeh. 8. At another point Gen. Ver said his directive to Gen. Custodio contained intelligence information. This was not true, as he had to admit when shown the directive. 9. Gen. Custodio, Col. Ontog, Col. Ochoco, and Captain Valerio testified that there were only four (4) IMPLANs to carry out OPLAN BALIKBAYAN, and there was no medical IMPLAN, simply being no need for it , since the matter was sufficiently covered by the bare clause, “EVACUATION; as demand,’ a clearly nonsensical claim. 10. There were seven (7) lawyers who were at the session hall when General Ver testified before us, on whom he could call for legal representation. Yet before the hearing he sounded out Public Coordinator Bien Tan Jr. About the possibility of the latter’s representing him, and at the start of the hearing declared he had no lawyer and actually asked Atty. Tan to so represent him. 11. Ver said that it was usual procedure for a commander, after a mission, to submit a command (post-incident) report; but in Custodio’s case this was dispensed with because an investigating committee had been formed. This does not seem to follow; but what is stranger still is that Custodio did file a command or incident report. 12. Ver said the function of military attaches (AFAs) is to relay ‘essential elements of information’ to the home country; but they would do so only if so directed by the head of mission. Here again is a misleading answer, implying that the head mission would ever direct AFA not to transmit ‘essential elements of information’. 13. Ver tried to qualify his answer further by declaring that what should be relayed to the home Government were only matters “of military interest”. This contrary to his 4  prior statement that embassies and consulates should relay matters of general interest, such as changes in government, financial affairs, bank runs, etc., aside from the fact that the Aquino affair was clearly a matter “of military interest.” 14. Ver had publicly asserted the reality of the threats against Aquino emanating from the NPA elements. Yet, he failed to give specific orders to assure that, in the event that should such a threatened assault actually occur, the assassins should be captured alive and made to reveal vital information. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, we find the following to be indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983: 1) General Fabian C. Ver, 2) Major Gen. Prospero A. Olivas, 3) Brig. Gen. Luther Custodio, 4) Col. Arturo Custodio, 5) Col. Vicente Tigas, 6) Capt. Felipe Valerio, 7) Capt. Liewelyn Kavinta, 8) Capt. Romeo Bautista, 9) 2Lt. Jesus Castro, 10) Sgt. Pablo Martirez, 11) Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, 12) Sgt. Arnulfo De Mesa, 13) Sgt. Claro Lat, 14) Sgt. Filomeno Miranda, 15) Sgt. Rolando de Guzman, 16) Sgt. Ernesto MAteo, 17) Sgt. Rodolfo Desolong, 18) Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, 19) Sgt. Pepito Torio, 20) Sgt. Armando de la Cruz, 21) Sgt. Prospero Bona, 22) CIC Rogelio Moreno, 23) CIC Mario Lazaga, 24) AIC Cordova Estelo, 25) AIC Aniceto Acupido, 26) Hermilo Gosuico. Source: Camagay, Maria Luisa T., et. al., eds., Unraveling the Past: Readings in Philippine History. Vibal Group, Inc., 2018, pp. 308-312. Excerpt from “A Path to Democratic Renewal: A Report on the February 7, 1986 Presidential Election in the Philippines” by the International Observer Delegation Background: On election day – February 7, 1986, incumbent President Ferdinad E. Marcos of Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) faced Corazon C. Aquino of Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban). After several days of tabulating votes, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the National Citizen’s Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) presented different results. The former proclaimed Marcos as the victor while the latter declared Aquino the winner. In the end, Marcos had the upper hand because the COMELEC results were affirmed by the KBL-dominated Batasang Pambansa (a legislative body, Congress). In retrospect, the 1986 elections proved to be one of the most controversial in Philippine History primarily because it had widespread incidents of vote buying and electoral fraud. The following excerpts are from the reports of the International Observer Delegation and Center for Democracy, two of the various foreign groups that visited the Philippines to observe the 1986 snap election. Interestingly, the cited reports below documented several cases of electoral fraud and voter disenfranchisement during the said elections. PRIMARY SOURCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 “The International Delegation which observed the February 7 presidential election in the Philippines was sponsored by the National Democratic and Republican Institutes for International Affairs and included forty-four individuals from nineteen countries. The co- leaders of the delegation were the former President of Colombia, the Honorable Missael Pastrana, and the Honorable John Hume, a member of the British and European Parliaments from Northern Ireland. 1. The delegation concludes that the election of February 7 was not conducted in a free and fair manner. It is our belief that the Government of Ferdinand Marcos and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) bear responsibility for this failure. 2. The delegation finds that the National Assembly, the Batasang Pambansa, ignored explicit provisions of the Philippine Electoral Code requiring that tampered or altered Election Returns be set aside during the final counting process – despite protests by representatives of the opposition party. For this reason, and because of numerous other violations of the Code, the delegation concludes that the February 15 Batasang Pambansa proclamation naming Ferdinand Marcos and Arturo Tolentino the winners of the February 7 election was invalid. 3. At the same time, we observed millions of Filipino who were committed to making the electoral process work. Principally because of their commitment, the election succeeded in providing a vehicle through which the national will of the Philippines was ultimately expressed. 4. There is no single piece of “smoking-gun” evidence which leads to our determination that the election failed to meet a “free-and-fair” standard, there are instead many “smoking-guns.” They include the following: The campaign period was mark by numerous violations of the provisions designed to curb improper campaign practices and to limit the Government use of its power to influence the election; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did not carry out its responsibility under the election code to provide equal access to the television media during the campaign period. As a result, Marcos benefitted greatly from the partisan-owned and influenced television and radio media, though the opposition had reasonable access to alternative (radio and print) media. COMELEC officials were unable or unwilling to deal with the problem of fraudulent registration … An estimated 3.5 million voters were disenfranchised on election day, when they could not find their names on the voting register. This resulted in a voter turn-out of only 76% in this important presidential election, as compared to 89% in the 1984 Batasang election… Disenfranchisement appears to have occurred in opposition-oriented provinces or cities … Virtually all members of the delegation observed or were told by credible sources that that voters were being paid on election day to vote for the Marcos- Tolentino ticket. In many areas, carbonized sample ballots were used as proof of an individual’s vote and as a receipt for payments ranging between 25 to 500 pesos. Numerous instances of intimation of voters were recorded by the delegation; members of the military, Civil Home Defense Forces, and Barangay officials were commonly implicated. 6  Poll watchers from the designated opposition UNIDO party and the accredited citizen’s arm, NAMFREL, were not permitted access to polling places in many provinces.  Problems relating to the counting of votes occurred during all phases of the process. Major discrepancies between the count kept by NAMFREL-based on hard copies of precinct forms signed by all members of the Board of Election inspectors- and COMELEC recurred throughout the week following the election, evidencing attempts to manipulate the vote count.  Delegation members reported numerous instances wherein precincts recorded zero votes for Aquino despite the claim of UNIDO pollwatchers present at the precinct that they voted for Aquino.  Hard evidence was uncovered of “ghost” precincts, or fictional polling places, wherein the vote was completely fabricated. In one municipality of Southern Leyte, three such precincts were discovered over and above the 55 authorized. In the 55 legitimate precincts, the vote was 6,876 for Aquino. In three ghost precincts, the vote was 900 for Marcos and 9 for Aquino.  While we have no direct evidence, we believe that the interference with the counting process which occurred after election day was not simply a dispute between COMELEC and NAMFREL over their “quick count” agreement, rather we believe this was part of an effort by the Government and its supporters to buy time so that the above mentioned fraud could be undertaken.  The above-listed violations were perpetrated by national and local officials who supported the Marcos-Tolentino ticket. While we cannot exclude the possibility, our delegation did not observe a single election code violation by supporters of the opposition party despite efforts undertaken to monitor their activities.” (Source: G.R. No. 72670 in Camagay et. al., 2018) “As of now, I cannot in conscience recognize the President (Marcos) as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. And I am appealing to my brother-members of the Cabinet to heed the will of the people expressed during the last election. Because in my own region, I know that we cheated the elections to the extent of 350,000 votes.” By Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile February 22, 1986 CBCP Statement by Archbishop Ricardo J. Cardinal Vidal on February 13, 1986 Background: 7 One of the most important sectors that opposed the Marcos administration were the religious groups. In fact, different formations of the Church composed of the laity, seminarians, priests, and nuns were already vocal critics of the government even before the assassination of Senator Aquino in 1983. By the time of the 1986 snap election, the likes of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin of the Archdiocese of Manila and Archbishop Ricardo J. Cardinal Vidal of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) were considered as opposition leaders who represented the Catholic faith. The document (a primary source) that follows is the post-election statement released by the CBCP on February 13, 1986. It was written by Cardinal Vidal who, at that time, was the head of the Archdiocese of Cebu (1982-2010) and the CBCP president (1985-1987). Primary Source POST-ELECTION STATEMENT CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES “Introduction. The people have spoken. Or have tried to. Despite the obstacles thrown in the way their speaking freely, we, the bishops, believe that on the basis of our assessment as pastors of the recently concluded polls, what they attempted to say is clear enough. “The conduct of the Polls. In our considered judgment, the polls were unparalleled in the fraudulence of their conduct. And we condemn especially the following modes of fraudulence and irregularities. 1. The systematic disenfranchisement of voters. The sheer scrambling of the voters’ lists made it impossible for vast number of our people to express their proper preference of candidates. 2. The widespread and massive vote-buying. The vote-buyers in their cynical exploiting of the people’s poverty and deep, if misguided, sense of utang na loob deprived a great many of any real freedom of choice. 3. The deliberate tampering with the election returns. The votes of the people, even when already duly expressed and counted were altered to register choices other than their own. 4. Intimidation, harassment, terrorism, and murder. These made naked fear the decisive factor in people not participating in the polls or making their final choice. These and many other irregularities point to a criminal use of power to thwart the sovereign will of the people. Yet, despite these evil acts, we are morally certain the people’s real will for change has been truly manifested. “Government Based on the Polls. According to moral principles, a government that assumes or retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis. For such an access to power is tantamount to a forcible seizure and cannot command the allegiance of the citizenry. The most we can say then, about such a government, is that it is a government in possession of power. But admitting that, we hasten to add. Because of that very fact, that same government itself has the obligation to right the wrong it is founded on. It must respect the mandate of the people. This is precondition for any reconciliation. “Response in Faith. If such a government does not of itself freely correct the evil it has inflicted on the people then it is our serious moral obligation as a people to make it do so. 8  “We are not going to effect the change we seek by doing nothing, by sheer apathy. If we did nothing we would be party to our own destruction as a people. We would be jointly guilty with the perpetrators of the wrong we want righted. “Neither do we advocate a bloody, violent meant of righting this wrong. If we did, we would be sanctioning the enormous sin of fratricidal strife. Killing to achieve justice is not within the purview of our Christian vision in our present context. “The way indicated to us now is the way of non-violent struggle for justice. “This means active resistance of evil by peaceful means – in the manner of Christ. And its one end for now is that the will of the people be done through ways and means proper to the Gospel. “We therefore ask every loyal member of the Church, every community of the faithful, to form their judgment about the February 7 polls. And if in faith they see things as we the bishops do, we must come together and discern what appropriate actions to take that will be according to the mind of Christ. In a creative, imaginative way, under the guidance of Christ’s Spirit, let us pray together, reason together, decide together, act together, always to the end that the truth prevail, that the will of the people be fully respected. “Conclusion. These last few days have given us shining examples of the non-violent struggle for justice we advocate here: “The thousands of NAMFREL workers and volunteers who risked their very lives to ensure clean and honest elections: The COMELEC computer technicians who refused to degrade themselves by participating in election frauds. The poll officials-registrars, teachers, government workers who did their duty without fear or favor: The millions of ordinary voters who kept the sanctity of their ballot untarnished, their dignity intact. Radio Veritas and fearless press people who spoke and reported the truth at all times. “Men and women of conscience, all. We cannot commend them highly enough. “There are thousands of their kind among government officials in the Batasan, the military, the COMELEC, among the millions of our people who in the face of overwhelming odds voted and acted as their conscience dictated. Are there other men and women of conscience who will stand up like them and courageously confess their Christianity? “Now is the time to speak up. Now is the time to repair the wrong. The wrong was systematically organized. So must its correction be. But as in the election itself, that depends fully on the people; on what they are willing and ready to do. We, the bishops, stand in solidarity with them in the common discernment for the good of the nation. But we insist: Our acting must always be according to the Gospel of Christ, that is, in a peaceful, non- violent way. “May He, the Lord of Justice, the Lord of peace, be with us in our striving for that good. And may the Blessed Virgin Mary, the Queen of Peace, and patroness of our country, assist us in this time of need. “For the Catholic Bishopps’ Conference of the Philippines: “(Sgd)+RICARDO J. CARDINAL VIDAL Archbishop of Cebu President, CBCP February 13, 1986 Manila” 9  (Source Post-Election Statement, CBCP Documents in Camagay, et. al., 2018.) Graded Activity: 1. Create a timeline that exhibits series of unfolding of events that led to the historic EDSA Uprising and marked the collapse of President Ferdinand Marcos’ Dictatorial Rule. 2. Write an essay reflecting your opinion or views about the conduct of the 1986 Snap Election based on the available three documents. (You are also encouraged to read additional materials - books, newspaper items like articles and news stories - relevant to the subject.) Instructions: (for the essay) 1. Four-page essay including cover page containing its title and your full name 2. 1.5 spacing and must paginated. 3. Font size is 12; font style is Times New Roman 4. You may write either in English or Filipino 5. Send your essay to: [email protected] Instructions: (for Timeline) 1. Page layout is equivalent to long bond paper. 2. Page orientation: Landscape lay-out 3. Write your full name and course on top and at the left side of the first page. 10