PP-T06 Escalation and Management of the Iranian Occupation To The Three Islands PDF

Escalation and management of the dispute Topic Six Dr. Bashir AbulQaraya Escalation and management of the dispute Escalation of the dispute Attempt new methods Serious violation of the MoU Illegality of Iranian actions First round of talks Talks b...

Escalation and management of the dispute Topic Six Dr. Bashir AbulQaraya Escalation and management of the dispute Escalation of the dispute Attempt new methods Serious violation of the MoU Illegality of Iranian actions First round of talks Talks broke down Iranian intransigence The role of Federal National Council Another attempt to resume direct talks Sheikh Zayed’s offer in 1993-1994 Transform the islands into military arsenals The UAE diplomatic campaign UN mediation and good offices  Escalation of the dispute Since 1992 We will look here in detail at the dispute since the Iranian occupation of Abu Musa in 1992, and the means by which the UAE could and did respond to the abrupt change of circumstances when Iran significantly escalated the dispute. The steps undertaken continued its previous methods of negotiating the conflict, but in such a manner that allowed for the growth of relations with Iran in other areas. The UAE policy did not change markedly in character or substance, despite this second forceful takeover of a populated area.  Attempt new methods The diplomatic mechanisms which the UAE has used to manage the dispute are bilateral talks, calls for arbitration, thirdparty mediation and mobilising regional organization. Escalation of the dispute could have been ample motivation for the UAE to attempt new methods, but the UAE did not escalate the situation. Instead, it has worked to build an increasingly wide consensus on the issue in favour of its claims rather than resorting to hasty unilateral actions, even if in doing so the dispute has remained unresolved, and the three islands occupied.  Serious violation of the MoU (1/2) Until the occupation of 1992, Iran had hitherto jointly administered Abu Musa with Sharjah as part of the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding. On 24 August, Iran refused to grant access to Abu Musa to a 104 residents of the island, including the governor appointed by Sharjah, as well as citizens of the UAE, Palestine, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. The Iranian authorities refused to allow passengers to disembark at the island, and threatened to sink the ship carrying them if it did not return immediately to Sharjah.  Serious violation of the MoU (2/2) In addition, Iran seized a desalination plant and a school belonging to the UAE. It was a serious violation of the MoU, and the UAE sharply denounced the action on 1 September. Although Iran retreated somewhat from its stance and allowed the governor and twenty UAE citizens to return on 3 September, the others were still refused.  Illegality of Iranian actions Later that September, senior Emirati officials strongly condemned the actions taken by Iran on the island, in line with their established policy towards the dispute. The UAE sought to address world public opinion through the United Nations General Assembly; in a speech before the UN General Assembly, UAE Foreign Minister Rashed Abdulla Al-Nuaimi reiterated the illegality of Iranian actions in relation to Abu Musa as a violation of the MoU. Moreover, Al-Nuaimi declared that Iran acted against the principles of coexistence and good neighbourliness and outside the bounds of traditional relations between the two countries.  First round of talks (1/2) The two countries held a first round of talks in Abu Dhabi about the islands. During the talks, the UAE set up an agenda that included a comprehensive discussion of the matter and called for: 1. An end to the military occupation of the islands of Greater and Lesser Tunb 2. Iran’s commitment to the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding regarding Abu Musa  First round of talks (2/2) 3. Non-interference in the practice of the UAE full jurisdiction of the parts of Abu Musa that were under its administration, as stipulated in the Memorandum of Understanding. 4. Cancellation of all measures and procedures imposed by Iran on the UAE’s agencies, citizens and residents on Abu Musa 5. An appropriate framework with which to resolve the question of the sovereignty of Abu Musa within a specific timeframe.  Talks broke down (1/2) However, Iran refused to discuss any issue except the MoU regarding Abu Musa. It also refused to consider the status of Greater and Lesser Tunbs or refer the case to the ICJ. One UAE delegation member believes that Iran had no intention of discussing the issue, but was instead tactically expressing an apparent willingness to negotiate in order to mend relations with Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the talks broke down without reaching an agreement on the agenda.  Talks broke down (2/2) Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed recalls that in the September talks, the UAE demanded ‘that Iran remove all the measures it imposed on the island’, which included the installation of long-range and medium-range missile facilities, as well as the absorption of the island into the Iranian province of Bandar Abbas. Following the failure of these talks, the Supreme Council for National Security in Iran issued a statement saying that Iran stuck to its position on the islands, describing the islands problem as a border issue – in other words, not a matter of great importance.  Iranian intransigence When the GCC summit, held 21–23 December 1992, unanimously expressed its rejection of the Iranian occupation, Iranian media warned that if the UAE wanted to regain the islands, it would have to cross a ‘sea of blood’ in order to achieve its goal. That same month, Iran deployed additional troops from its Revolutionary Guards to the islands and declared that it was ready to defend them against any attack. With a belligerent attitude, and bellicose rhetoric, Iran reminded its Arab neighbours that it had been ready to fight Iraq for eighty years.  The role of Federal National Council Nevertheless, the UAE disregarded the threats and continued to pursue the issue, and in February 1993 the Federal National Council issued a statement condemning the occupation, and calling upon Iran to take all measures that are consistent with its commitment to the principles of good neighbourliness and respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries in the region. Moreover, FNC called on the world parliaments to support the UAE in its legitimate right which is in line with international legitimacy.’  Another attempt to resume direct talks Subsequently, the UAE made another attempt to resume direct talks and on 23 May 1993, Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed met Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati in Abu Dhabi, where they discussed bilateral relations and regional issues, and expressed ‘their willingness to hold further talks between the two countries to remove obstacles in the outstanding issues.’ On 6 June 1993, Sheikh Hamdan received a reciprocal invitation to visit Tehran and continue talks, but on 10 September it was announced that the visit was cancelled. The UAE was not convinced that Iran wished to make the trip a success, as it had refused to issue a statement indicating that it aimed to discuss the differences over the three islands.  Sheikh Zayed’s offer in 1993-1994 Despite this failure, the UAE continued its tactic of raising the issue and calling for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. On 2 December 1993, the occasion of the 22nd National Day, President Sheikh Zayed’s speech reiterated the desire for a direct dialogue with Iran and a peaceful resolution to the question of sovereignty. The UAE also continued to offer to seek international arbitration, and Sheikh Zayed reaffirmed on 20 March 1994, in a call for international arbitration, that the UAE had evidence confirming its rights of ownership of the islands.  Transform the islands into military arsenals The UAE protested on 29 September that the Iranian new air route to Abu Musa island was a violation of UAE sovereignty and contradicted the principles of friendship and good neighbourliness. On 5 October, in a speech by the foreign minister before the 49th session of the UN General Assembly, the UAE again called for the dispute to go before the ICJ. On 19 December, Sheikh Hamdan expressed his country’s concern over the possibility that Iran would transform the islands into military arsenals.  The UAE diplomatic campaign The diplomatic campaign was not constrained to purely bilateral moves and protests, however. Between September 1994 and September 1995, in a series of speeches and statements to the United Nations, the Arab League and the GCC, the UAE continued its calls for a peaceful settlement, to be achieved either through direct negotiations or by referring the dispute to the ICJ.  UN mediation and good offices In a 1994, the secretary general of the UN, Boutros Boutros- Ghali, expressed his hope that the UAE and Iran would reach a resolution of the three islands problem. He stressed that the UN was ready to play a role to resolve the dispute within the framework of diplomacy, mediation and arbitration if the two sides were to seek its help. However, any success of UN mediation and good offices remained subject to the request for action by both parties, without which the UN could not achieve any viable result.