POL2.2 Case Study: Sovereignty and National Interest - Russia's Invasion of Ukraine PDF

2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW Case study: Sovereignty and the national interest How might ‘sovereignty and the national interest’ challenge democracy? As discussed in the first section of the textbook, sovereignty is considered the principal ‘aim’ of states. States maintain sover...

2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW Case study: Sovereignty and the national interest How might ‘sovereignty and the national interest’ challenge democracy? As discussed in the first section of the textbook, sovereignty is considered the principal ‘aim’ of states. States maintain sovereignty by securing their borders, establishing effective autonomous control of their internal affairs, and through receiving international recognition of their sovereignty. This allows states to pursue their ‘national interests’, meet the needs of their citizens, and represent their interests in international forums of diplomacy. Put simply, the national interest can be described as being ‘what a state wants’. This concept is in some ways deliberately vague and changeable to allow for the variety of ways that states can interpret their national interests (which can depend, in part, on the interests of groups that are most influential in determining state policies). The ambiguity of this concept allows leaders to manipulate their state’s national interests to fulfill a particular political aim or agenda, so much so that the national interest can often be characterised as more or less whatever a state’s political leader says it is. The following tables lists some common national interests (the ones our study design asks us to prioritise): Security Economic prosperity A state’s ability to defend its sovereignty, A state’s ability to develop and grow its economy, particularly the defence of its physical borders. often through the pursuit of trade agreements. Protect citizens against internal and external Meet the needs of citizens by providing services, threats. generating wealth and material gains, and In modern terms can include other concerns, such investing in security. as resource, humanitarian and environmental The ability to weather economic instability within security. an increasingly interconnected global economy. Regional relationships Regional and international standing The way in which a state interacts with its A state’s reputation among the broader geographic neighbours. international community. Positive relationships often develop due to The national brand a state promotes through its cultural or historical links, or through common actions on the global stage through the transfer of interests. its culture, values, beliefs and ideals to the rest of Negative relationships often stem from the world. competition for resources or regional dominance A state can use positive standing within the and can threaten security and economic international community to assist in achieving prosperity. other aims. Most democratic states believe that promoting the spread and legitimacy of democracy is a crucial part of pursuing their national interests. This corresponds with Kant’s democratic peace thesis discussed earlier in the chapter. Conversely, many illiberal democracies and authoritarian regimes perceive democracy as a barrier to their pursuit of their national interests. There are two key reasons for this: Internally, decision-makers in less democratic states recognise that the nature of representative democracy — with its regular elections, rule of law, checks on political power, and the constant debating of issues associated with pluralist multiparty systems — can challenge the legitimacy and survival of undemocratic regimes. Externally, decision-makers in less democratic states recognise that the international rules-based order that was established by western democratic states does not put their interests first. The laws, 1 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW agreements and protocols that the rules-based order establishes can at times help those states pursue their interests, but often are seen to favour the US and its allies, who are seen as the main beneficiaries and enforcers of that order’. 💡 This situation is developing – proceed with caution The bulk of this case study was authored in late-2023 – since then there have been a number of significant developments, even if the major currents remain the same. We strongly encourage students to read widely in order to develop their familiarity with this crisis. Teachers: we’ll be looking to refine and update this crisis study supplement ready for your use in 2025. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine Russia invaded the Ukrainian territory of Crimea in 2014. Later, in early 2022, it attempted a full-scale invasion of the remainder of Ukraine. This invasion forms the principal case study for this chapter’s analysis of the challenge to democracy posed by sovereignty and the national interest. Throughout this analysis, be on the lookout for the following ways in which Russia’s actions impact the legitimacy and Russian tanks preparing for the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. spread of democratic principles: Russia’s attempt to annex Ukrainian territory directly challenges the liberal democratic rules-based international order and the democratic notion of non-interference, which implies that sovereign states will respect the independence of fellow sovereign states. Russia’s invasion has also increased the rate by which democratic principles are being gradually eroded within Russia, such as the effective outlawing of opposition political parties and the silencing of independent media. Russia’s invasion has prompted a large-scale effort to support Ukraine’s defence of its sovereignty. In turn, this has spurred renewed efforts by democratic states to revitalise the liberal democratic rules- based international order. Recommended introductory reading for this case study:  ‘Ukraine: Conflict at the crossroads of Europe and Russia’. Council on Foreign Relations, 2023. cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia  ‘The precarious future of Russian democracy’. Council on Foreign Relations, 2023. cfr.org/article/precarious-future-russian-democracy 2  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW Credit: Kyiv Post, 2018. archive.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/honest-history-russia-uses-one-nation-myth-justify-imperialism.html Causes The belief that Ukrainian territory is part of Russia The core territory of modern-day Russia, Ukraine and Belarus was once part of a medieval kingdom known as Kievan Rus, founded by a Viking group the 9th century. Following approximately 300 years as part of the Mongol Empire, descendants of Kyivan Rus royalty founded the Russian Empire, which again included most of modern-day Russia and Ukraine, which in one form or another lasted through to 1917. At this point, heavy losses from World War I at the hands of the German Empire and profound internal tensions led to the collapse of the monarchy, which was succeeded by a short-lived parliamentary republic, then in turn overthrown by Bolshevik revolutionaries. Bolshevik forces eventually prevailed in the ensuing civil war, and in doing quashed many independence movements in many territories of the former Empire, including in Ukraine. These territories were then integrated into a new state – the Soviet Union (also known as the USSR), which faced enormous economic, social and political challenges throughout the 20th century, including: - armed intervention and occupations by foreign powers (including the United Kingdom, United States, France) between 1918 and 1925 - major famines and associated social unrest, with ethnic Ukrainians being disproportionately affected between 1930 and 1933 - invasion and partial occupation by Nazi Germany and allies (including Finland, Romania, Hungary and Italy) from 1941 to 1945, leading to the deaths of approximately 27 million people – one-seventh of the Soviet population - extreme depravation and violence in Nazi-occupied areas which included most of Ukraine, along with Germany’s cultivation and arming of local nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiments amongst Ukrainians - ruinously expensive military and geopolitical competition with the United States during the Cold War (1947-91) - compounding internal contradictions and inefficiencies creating conditions for the eventual collapse of the Soviet political ‘system’. Ukraine, being the second-largest and culturally ‘closest’ constituent republic, dealt a mortal blow to the Soviet Union when it declared independence in 1991, leading to its dissolution shortly after. Ukraine and Russia emerged as neighbouring, independent sovereign states in a vastly transformed regional and geopolitical climate. 3 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW Many Russians, including Vladimir Russian as native language amongst Ukrainians, 2001. Putin, firmly believed that while their cultures may differ significantly, their cultural proximity and shared history meant that significant portions of Ukrainian territory remained inalienably part of Russia. In an essay published in July 2021, Putin argued that their shared origins and experiences since the Middle Ages predetermined the unity of Ukraine and Russia, as well as neighbouring Belarus. In 2014, Ukraine’s pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych was ousted by a ‘pro-Europe’ movement In the 2001 census, 17.3% of Ukraine’s population identified as ethnically Russian, which culminated in the Maidan while 29.6% reported speaking Russian as their primary language. Both were revolution (‘revolution of dignity’). significantly concentrated in the southern (including Crimea) and eastern parts of Putin labelled the revolution as the country. w.wiki/6$rU illegitimate and the result of a coup d’état, which he in turn used to justify both his invasion of the Crimean Peninsula and his support of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine’s eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the ‘Donbas’). The Maidan revolution ushered in a period of closer economic and political ties with Europe and the west. This served to accelerate Putin’s desire that Ukraine be returned to Russia’s sphere of influence, lest Russia’s Ukrainian ‘brothers’ become a liberal democracy on Russia’s western border.  ‘Why did Russia invade Ukraine?’ The Conversation, 2022. theconversation.com/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine-178512 Demonstrators during the 2014 Maidan revolution in Kyiv. Ukraine’s desire to move closer to Europe, politically and economically, was portrayed by Vladimir Putin as a direct threat to Russia’s sovereignty and national interest. 4  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW Russian perceptions of NATO’s expansion During the Cold War, the US and Western European nations formed a military alliance known as NATO. The origin of this alliance was to form a collective security shield against the Soviet Union and its allies (the Warsaw Pact) to the east in the aftermath of the Second World War. The key principle of NATO (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 1949) declares ‘that an armed attack against one or more member states… shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently [all member states] agree to the use of armed force to restore and European countries by year they joined NATO. Credit: Statista, 2024. maintain the security of the North Atlantic statista.com/chart/26674/european-countries-by-year-of-joining-nato area’. The purpose of the NATO alliance is to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. First Secretary General of NATO Hastings Ismay in 1952. When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, many new states in central Europe were created, and some soon became fledgling democracies such as Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. NATO went from 16 member states in 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell, to 30 states in 2022 when Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine (see map). It is this enlargement of NATO, and Ukraine’s desire to be a member of it (and the EU), that Putin has argued threatens Russia’s security and, therefore, justifies his invasion. Further to this, Putin has continually referred to his belief in an agreement (which has never formally existed) whereby NATO promised the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War that it would not expand to the east. The following quotation from Putin (below) at the time he launched the invasion speaks to his belief that NATO expansion threatens Russian sovereignty. What causes us particular concern and anxiety [are] those fundamental threats against our country that year after year, step by step, are offensively and unceremoniously created by irresponsible politicians in the west. I am referring to the expansion of NATO to the east, moving its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders. It is well known that for 30 years we have persistently and patiently tried to reach an agreement with the leading NATO countries on the principles of equal and inviolable security in Europe. In response to our proposals, we constantly faced either cynical deception and lies, or attempts to pressure and blackmail, while NATO, despite all our protests and concerns, continued to steadily expand. Russian President Vladmir Putin speaking in 2022. 5 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW The rise and consolidation of Vladimir Putin and ‘Putinism’ in Russia 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev becomes leader of the Soviet Union. He gradually abandons the principles of authoritarianism and communism through his reformist policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness or transparency). 1989 The fall of the Berlin Wall marks the collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe. 1991 The Soviet Union disbands. Boris Yeltsin is elected President of the new Russian Federation. 1992-98 The US, International Monetary Fund and other agents of the liberal international order seek to influence the transition of Russia’s social and economic system towards a liberal democratic model, with mixed results. Competitive elections and liberalisation of the economic system occur alongside a rapid decline in living standards, and an enormous growth in economic inequality, as well-connected elites accumulate assets being sold off cheaply by the state. 1999-2000 Yeltsin steps down and is replace by his chosen successor, Vladimir Putin. Initially, Putin appears accepting of democratic principles: presiding over liberal economic reforms, somewhat competitive elections, and allowing independent media. Putin’s popularity and perception as an agent of strength and security are buoyed by his involvement in prosecuting a war against a separatist Islamic state in Chechnya in this same period. 2007 Putin signals a more assertive approach in Russia’s foreign policy in a speech given at the Munich Security Conference, in which he Vladimir Putin taking the Presidential Oath in 2000, criticises the US and NATO’s global dominance. flanked by previous president, Boris Yeltsin. 2008 Putin relinquishes the presidency to close political ally Dmitri Medvedev, in accordance with the two-term limit imposed by Russia’s 1993 constitution. Putin returns to his previous role of prime minister. In August, Russia invades neighbouring Georgia. 2008 A long-standing dispute with neighbouring Georgia over the status of border regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia leads to a brief conflict (the Russo-Georgian War), which culminates in their secession from Georgia and occupation by Russia. 2012 Putin is re-elected to the presidency, having ‘reset’ the two-term limit on holders of that office. 2014 Crimea, a Russian-majority part of Ukraine that had been transferred from the Russian to the Ukrainian component of the USSR in 1956, sees increasing agitation in favour of greater autonomy within, or outright independence from Ukraine. In the midst of political turmoil within Ukraine associated with the ousting of the pro-Russian Ukrainian president Viktor, Russia moves in to occupy and stage a referendum in Crimea, with the results favouring unification with Russia. 2014 Pro-Russian separatist movements in the Donbas region in southeastern Ukraine declare the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, sparking a conflict between Ukrainian forces and the separatists, with Russia providing covert support to the latter. 2015 Russia intervenes with military and diplomatic support to bolster hardline Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government in the context of Syria’s long-ongoing civil war. 2020 Putin initiates a constitutional referendum allowing him to remain in power until 2036. 2022 Putin launches a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, citing security concerns and the protection of Russian-speaking populations as justification for its actions. 6  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW Consequences The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been used by Vladimir Putin to justify his need to remain in absolute control of the Russian government. Since the 2022 invasion, Putin has claimed that the ‘special military operation’—he has outlawed use of the term ‘war’—requires the further consolidation of power to resist the threat posed by Ukraine and its western allies. Two methods used by Putin to erode the principles of democracy have been to disable opposition political movements, and to effectively suppress media critical of the government. Disabling opposition political movements Since 2016, when he launched an official presidential campaign, Alexey Navalny had been Russia’s most prominent opposition leader. Highly organised and adept at using the media, Navalny generated a large support base of mostly young people longing for a democratic Russia and through discontent with the large-scale government corruption. Seeing the looming threat posed to his regime, Putin had Navalny poisoned on a flight to Late Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny. Germany, and upon his return to Russia was given a long sentence in a penal colony. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Navalny’s network of opposition groups have been forcibly disbanded, and most of their members have fled Russia. A democracy can only be effective if there are multiple political parties freely able to campaign and contest elections; the prospect of that occurring in Russia now seems very distant. Outlawing media critical of the government Since the invasion, almost all media outlets that are unaligned with or critical with the state’s interests have been suppressed, whether by outright bans, blocked and/or declared ‘foreign agents’ or ‘undesirable organisations’ (Reporters Without Borders, 2024). All others are subject to military censorship. A free and independent media is a crucial principle in keeping a government accountable for its actions and preserving the legitimacy and effectiveness of democracy. This process has allowed Putin to orchestrate a highly effective media disinformation campaign focused on spreading lies about Ukraine, its President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and its military, with the purpose of increasing support for the war among the Russian people. The Economist’s podcast series Next Year in Moscow takes a comprehensive look at the consequences of the invasion for the Russian people. It is free to listen to, and episode six focuses on Putin’s effective outlawing of independent media.  ‘Next Year in Moscow 6: Remote work’. The Economist, 2023. podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/next-year-in-moscow-6-remote- work/id1670758917?i=1000607972769 open.spotify.com/episode/5S1PaUqect2IzDW0FmAsln?si=5f9d6c2ac4cd4974 Other recommended resources:  ‘Russia’. Reporters Without Borders. rsf.org/en/country/russia  ‘Ukraine war 12 months on: The role of the Russian media in reporting—and justifying—the conflict’. The Conversation, 2023. theconversation.com/ukraine-war-12-months-on-the-role-of-the- russian-media-in-reporting-and-justifying-the-conflict-199820 7 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW Ukraine reaffirms its commitment to democratic values In the first two years of the war, Ukraine’s military outperformed most expectations. With significant western support, Ukraine was able to prevent both Russia claiming victory and the seizing of many important cities such as its capital, Kyiv, and has even managed to launch counteroffensives to retake stolen territory. Further to this, Russia’s invasion served to bolster Ukrainian support for the liberal democratic norms promoted by Western backers, as well as closer ties with those power – exactly the sorts of developments that Putin’s invasion intended to prevent. Ukraine has sped up its mission to join multilateral organisations such as NATO and the EU, motivated by the immediate security threat posed by Russia, and in spite of how much more complex and difficult the war has made it to achieve these goals. This process of ‘Europeanisation’, started after the 2014 Maidan revolution, is explored further in the Interests section below. Changes in territorial control during the Russo-Ukrainian War between February 2022 and May 2024. Credit: BBC, 2024; Institute for the Study of War. bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682 8  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW Western actors reaffirm their commitment to the rules-based order The rise of populism in Europe and United States in the mid-2010s had seen many analyst question the health and durability of the liberal international rules-based order that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War (which was, incidentally, the last armed conflict where significant fighting took place in Ukrainian territory). The invasion of Ukraine provided a catalyst for Western actors to reaffirm their commitment to liberal democratic principles and the ideas of liberalism and cosmopolitanism through military, diplomatic and economic support of Ukraine. This aid, as well as a collective economic punishment of Russia through sanctions, the welcoming of Ukrainian refugees, and the promotion of multilateral organisations can all be understood as major consequence of the Russian invasion. The interests of different global actors Russia By framing Ukrainian self-determination as a threat to Russian sovereignty and, thus, its national interest, Vladimir Putin has attempted to justify his invasion. Most analysts agree that Putin’s initial aim was to assume control of all Ukrainian territory, depose its democratically elected government, and install a pro-Russian regime in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. The fact that Russia’s military only made it to the outskirts of Kyiv before being repelled by Ukrainian forces speaks partly to an underwhelming performance of Russia’s much larger military. Since then, it appeared that Putin attempted to reframe his objective to the Russian people whereby effective control of the majority Russian- speaking Donbas region could be claimed as a victory. This would allow Putin to continue the narrative of uniting the Russian people and protecting the country from the Western expansionism. By portraying that his leadership as essential to maintaining Russian sovereignty, in this way Putin may be able to consolidate power further. A secondary aim is Putin’s desire to reassert Russia’s pre-eminence and influence in global affairs. Since the end of the Cold War and the creation of the Russian Federation, Russia’s power in global politics has diminished. Despite maintaining its crucial UN Security Council veto and a large stockpile of nuclear weapons, Russia began to seem less important as the 21st century dawned. The supremacy of the United States seemed assured, and the attention of the western world was diverted to rising powers in Asia, such as China and India. To Putin, this posed a threat to Russia’s existence as a powerful state, and presiding over Russia’s downfall would weaken his rule. Beginning with his invasion of The Donetsk and Luhansk regions (collectively known as the 'Donbas', a reference to the Donets River Basin) Georgia in 2008, and then his large-scale support of have the highest rates of Russian-speakers in Ukraine Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s violent repression of his (excluding Crimea). Credit: BBC, 2022 and 2014. own people from 2015 onwards, Putin has attempted to bbc.com/news/world-europe-60938544 bbc.com/news/world-europe-26387353 refocus the world’s attention on Russian power and 9 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW prove his worth as a leader. The 2014 annexation of Crimea and 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine are seen as an extension of this policy. Ukraine The most immediate interest of the Ukrainian government is to maintain its effective sovereignty though armed defence of its territory. To this end, the Ukrainian military has performed far better than many expected despite its numerical disadvantage on the battlefield. Early in the conflict it was able to defend the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, then in late 2022 it was able to launch successful counterattacks in the eastern city of Kharkiv and the southern city of Kherson. In early 2023, the Ukrainian military was able to resist a Russian offensive on the city of Bakhmut. In 2024, Ukraine launches a surprise incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. These military victories can be understood as having denied Russia the opportunity to subvert Ukraine’s self-determination in the name of protecting the former’s national interest. The long-term objective of most influential political actors in Ukraine is to strengthen its security by joining Western multilateral organisations such as NATO and the EU; doing so is seen as the only effective way of discouraging further incursions or interference by Russia. The international rules-based order is reinforced by relatively strong institutions; that Ukraine sees joining two such institutions as a pathway to a more secure and prosperous future. However, there are significant obstacles in the way for Ukraine to achieve membership of these organisations: Membership of NATO would effectively guarantee Ukraine’s security due to Article 5, which treats any attack on one member state as an attack on all member states. However, it is this very clause that is preventing Ukraine’s NATO membership. While the Russian military is occupying Ukrainian territory, NATO members know that allowing Ukraine membership would commit them to a war with Russia. Although Ukrainian membership of NATO is not an immediate scenario, NATO has been providing Ukraine with political, military and economic support. Ukraine’s rightful place is in the Euro-Atlantic family. Ukraine’s rightful place is in NATO. And over time, our support will help you make this possible. NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg, 2023. The European Union has been a successful experiment in regional integration due to strict adherence to its founding principles of liberalism and democracy. In June 2022, the EU granted Ukraine ‘candidate’ status but made clear that full membership of the Union requires significant democratic reform to meet the standards for a European liberal democracy. Remembering that Ukrainian democracy only really began in 2014, there are significant domestic problems that President Zelenskyy must address. As such, after applying for EU membership shortly after Russia’s invasion, Zelenskyy announced sweeping anti-corruption measures to speed up his state’s EU membership status. 10  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW Ukraine has clearly demonstrated the country’s aspiration and the country’s determination to live up to European values and standards. … Yes, Ukraine deserves a European perspective. Yes, Ukraine should be welcomed as a candidate country. This is on the understanding that good work has been done, but important work also remains to be done. The entire process is merits-based. So, it goes by the book and, therefore, progress depends entirely on Ukraine.’ European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, 2022. Western powers and institutions of global governance Western powers – principally the United States and the EU, as well as institutions of global governance like the UN and the ICC – have broadly sought to support Ukraine’s defence using a variety of methods. The provision of military and economic aid Prior to the 2022 invasion, Russia’s economy was approximately nine times larger than Ukraine’s, and it spent more than 10 times the amount of money funding its military than Ukraine did. Led by significant contributions from the United States, various members of the international community have provided many resources (military, financial and otherwise) which have allowed Ukraine to defend its territory and its capacity for democratic self-determination. Value of aid provided to Ukraine, January 2022 to June 2024 (in billions of Euros). Credit: Statista, IfW Kiel and Ukraine Support Tracker, 2024. statista.com/chart/28489/ukrainian-military-humanitarian-and-financial-aid-donors Economic sanctions of Russia To complement the assistance of Ukraine, parts of the international community have simultaneously sought to weaken Russia’s economy in the hope that this would, in turn, weaken its ability to fund its military. Significant economic sanctions have been placed on wealthy individuals – sometimes termed oligarchs – banks, and exports. By cutting individuals and banks from the global financial system, the aim 11 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW has been to limit the amount of foreign currency Russia can bring in and, therefore, limit its ability to purchase goods that it cannot produce. By limiting – and in some cases outright banning – the purchase of Russian oil, liquified natural gas and coal, supporters of Ukraine have sought to blunt Russia’s ability to profit from the sale of its vast reserves of fossil fuels. The impact of these sanctions, in particular fossil fuels, is explored later in this case study. The term oligarchy simply refers to rule by a relatively small group of powerful people. In a modern context an oligarch is usually an extremely wealthy business leader who is also well-connected politically (even if not explicitly so); think Rupert Murdoch or Gina Rhinehart in Australia, or Elon Musk or Warren Buffet in the US. While oligarchs exist in most social and political systems, they have been particularly conspicuous in post-Soviet Russian politics and society – especially those related to highly lucrative mining, fossil fuel, chemicals telecommunications and finance industries. They have become synonymous with the modern Russian state due to the number of wealthy business leaders who are closely connected to and have benefitted from Vladimir Putin’s presidency (though this relationship is not uncomplicated – Putin has also demonstrated a willingness to use the power of the state to limit the wealth and influence of the oligarchs, certainly more so than his predecessor Boris Yeltsin). The concentration of power in the hands of wealthy elites has nonetheless had altogether unsurprising effects in eroding the Russia’s experiment with liberal democracy. Read more here:  Under Putin, the uber-wealthy Russians known as ‘oligarchs’ are still rich but far less powerful’. AP News, 2023. apnews.com/article/russia-putin-oligarchs-rich-ukraine-war- 9b167bb98ed050c5fbfadf0b069a0b8c Welcoming of Ukrainian refugees When Russia invaded, the Ukrainian government banned all males between the ages of 18 and 60 from leaving the country in order to ‘ensure combat and mobilisation readiness’. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN refugee agency, estimates that more than six million of the remaining women, children and elderly Ukrainian citizens fled in the months following the invasion—approximately one- quarter of Ukraine’s prewar population. Almost all of them sought refuge in European states, particularly Poland and Germany (see map right). As a response, the EU enacted its Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) for the first time since its creation, and this grants Ukrainians rights to residency and work for up to 12  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW three years. The directive has meant that Europe handled this influx much better than it did the 2015–16 migrant crisis when desperate people were feeling conflict in the Middle East and North Africa.  ‘Ukraine refugee situation’. UNHCR, 2024. data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine Promotion of multilateral organisations When Donald Trump ran for US president in 2016, he repeatedly referred to NATO as ‘obsolete’ and costing the US taxpayer ‘a fortune’. In 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron declared Temporary protection for persons fleeing Ukraine - monthly statistics’. Credit: Eurostat. that ‘we are currently ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Temporary_protection_for_ experiencing the brain death of persons_fleeing_Ukraine_-_monthly_statistics NATO [due to] the United States turning its back on us’. For many in the international community, these statements captured a broader sense of unease for the future of liberal democracy and the rules-based order. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine provided the international community with a catalyst to prove the worthiness of both concepts, as seen through the following examples: In contrast to the sentiments expressed by Trump and Macron, the war in Ukraine has prompted a renewed faith in and expansion of NATO. Aside from the political, military and economic support of Ukraine, NATO has also become a much more valued asset by its members and has seen new members wanting to join. In May 2022, the historically neutral states of Finland and Sweden applied to join the alliance. Finland officially became the 31st member of NATO in April 2023, while Sweden’s application is delayed due to its diplomatic tensions with NATO members Turkey and Hungary. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution that ‘demanded the Russian Federation immediately end its invasion of Ukraine and unconditionally withdraw all its military forces’ (Resolution ES-11/1). While these resolutions carry moral authority, they are not legally binding. Russia’s veto power meant that the UN Security Council failed to pass a draft resolution intended to end Russia’s military offensive. Both organs of the UN attempted subsequent resolutions and responses with similar outcomes. Ukraine is usually one of the world’s largest exporters of sunflower oil, wheat and grain, and is vital in providing food security to the Middle East and North Africa. When Russia invaded in February 2022 its naval vessels blockaded Ukraine’s ports, trapping 20 million tonnes of grain and sending global food prices to a record high. In July 2022, Turkey and the UN brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative between Russia and Ukraine to allow crucial grain exports to resume. In March 2023, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. Up to that point, tens of thousands of allegations of war crimes had been reported to the prosecutor general’s office in Kyiv. Many of these reportedly occurred during the early Russian offensives on the city of Mariupol and the suburb of 13 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW Bucha on the outskirts of Kyiv. Specifically, Putin’s warrant alleges he is responsible for the illegal transfer of hundreds of Ukrainian children to Russia. As Russia is not a signatory to the court’s Rome Statute, and as it can use its UN Security Council veto to block a referral through that body, it is unlikely Putin will ever answer to these allegations. The city of Zaporizhzhia in southern Ukraine is home to Europe’s largest nuclear power plant. It has also been on the frontlines of the Russian offensive, prompting fears that a direct strike could lead to a humanitarian and environmental disaster. Representatives from the UN’s nuclear agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, braved dangerous conditions to reach Zaporizhzhia in an attempt to negotiate a ‘demilitarisation’ of the area. Activity A – The role of international law Choose one of the responses by the international community to investigate further. Identify and interpret a range of sources to determine the effectiveness of the response. One resource for each response has been provided as a starting point. Response Resource  ‘How much aid has the US sent Ukraine? Here are six charts’. Council on Foreign Military and financial Relations, 2024. cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six- aid to Ukraine charts  ‘One year of war in Ukraine: Are sanctions against Russia making a difference?’. Economic sanctions Council on Foreign Relations, 2024. cfr.org/in-brief/two-years-war-ukraine-are- on Russia sanctions-against-russia-making-difference  ‘NGOs mark one year since activation of the Temporary Protection Directive and call EU Temporary for continued support to refugees from Ukraine’. ReliefWeb, 2023. Protection Directive reliefweb.int/report/world/ngos-mark-one-year-activation-temporary-protection- directive-and-call-continued-support-refugees-ukraine NATO  ‘NATO’s border with Russia doubles as Finland joins’. BBC News, 2023. expansion bbc.com/news/world-europe-65173043 UN General  ‘The UN and Ukraine: Year-long war spreads global fallout’. UN News, 2023. Assembly news.un.org/en/story/2023/03/1134122  ‘Ukraine Black Sea grain export deal extended, UN and Turkey say’. Al Jazeera, 2023. Black Sea aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/18/russia-ukraine-black-sea-grain-deal-extended-un- Grain Initiative turkey ICC arrest warrant  ‘What war crimes is Russia accused of?’. BBC News, 2023. bbc.com/news/world- for Vladimir Putin 60690688 IAEA oversight of the  ‘UN nuclear experts reach Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia power station amid heavy shelling Zaporizhzhia nuclear nearby’. ABC News, 2022. abc.net.au/news/2022-09-02/iaea-chief-visits- power plant zaporizhzhia-power-plant/101398318 1 Create a list of ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ that highlight what has and has not been effective. 2 Share these findings with your class and add to your notes as you listen to the findings from other investigations. 3 Write a short response that discusses the effectiveness of the rules-based order in promoting democratic principles. 14  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW The perspectives of different global actors Russia As early as the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin had denounced the US-led rules-based order and declared a course of confrontation with the west. Fast forward to July 2021, and Putin had released an essay that articulates his perspectives regarding Ukraine as a state, referring again to the historical unity of Russia and Ukraine and further articulating how western influence in Ukraine sought to undermine Russia. The Russians and Ukrainians were one people—a single whole. … But in 1991, all those territories [Ukraine], and, which is more important, people, found themselves abroad overnight, taken away, this time indeed, from their historical motherland. … Step by step, Ukraine was dragged into a dangerous geopolitical game aimed at turning Ukraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia. … The western authors of the anti-Russia project set up the Ukrainian political system in such a way that [the] enmity with Russia would remain. … I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia. Vladmir Putin, 2021. ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’. en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181 On the eve of 24 February 2022 invasion, Putin announced the ‘special military operation’ using similar language to justify his ordering of military intervention. He spoke of the threat posed to Russian sovereignty by Ukraine and the west, and of how Russia had been disadvantaged by the post-Cold War rules-based order and subsequently disrespected by powerful western actors.  ‘’No other option’: Excerpts of Putin’s speech declaring war’. Al Jazeera, 2022. aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/24/putins-speech-declaring-war-on-ukraine-translated-excerpts As discussed in the Interests section, the strong Ukrainian defence required Russia to scale back its likely objective of seizing effective control over all of Ukraine, to at least the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. By September 2022, Russia had military control over the majority parts of these two provinces (known as ‘oblasts’), as well as the neighbouring Zaporizhzhia and Kherson provinces. The Russian government then conducted referendums amongst the remaining populations of those provinces as to whether they wished to remain part of Ukrainian regions annexed to Russia after military occupation and referendums. Ukraine, or to join the Russian Credit: Council oon Foreign Relations, Institute for the Study of War and American Enterprise Institute, 2023. Federation. cfr.org/in-brief/does-putins-gamble-make-russias-war-ukraine-more-dangerous 15 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW Significantly, those remaining following Russian occupation were altogether more likely to be either pro- Russian, or otherwise intimidated by the Russian military presence. The overwhelming results in favour of joining the Russian Federation – such as the 99.2% approval registered in Donetsk – led to claims that those referendums were a ‘sham’, including US President Joe Biden. The UN General Assembly voted 143 to five in favour of condemning these referendums, and called on member states to condemn Russia’s ‘attempted illegal annexation’ of these four regions. Readers will not the apparent irony posed by the Putin government’s use of referenda to justify their actions in the context. While Putinism decries the liberal democratic rules-based order as weak and contrary to Russia’s interests, it nonetheless does rely on the legitimacy associated with the democratic principle of self-determination as a justification for annexations of foreign territory. Counterintuitively this may, in fact, have the effect of promoting the importance of democracy as a governing principle – even in spite of well-founded claims that the referendums have not been administered fairly or impartially.  ‘With 143 votes in favour, 5 against, General Assembly adopts resolution condemning Russian Federation’s annexation of four eastern Ukraine regions’. UN Press. press.un.org/en/2022/ga12458.doc.htm  ‘Ukraine ‘referendums’: Full results for annexation polls as Kremlin-backed authorities claim victory’. Euronews. euronews.com/2022/09/27/occupied-areas-of-ukraine-vote-to-join-russia-in- referendums-branded-a-sham-by-the-west  ‘Statement from President Biden on Russia’s sham referenda in Ukraine’. The White House. whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/23/statement-from-president-biden- on-russias-sham-referenda-in-ukraine/ Ukraine The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 gave Ukraine status as an independent and recognised sovereign state for the first time in the modern era. The Maidan revolution of 2014 accelerated a process of many Ukrainians gravitating more closely towards a European identity – and to some extent, greater affinity for Western liberal and democratic norms. Russia’s invasion in 2022 confirmed in the minds of many Ukrainians that their future and security was likely tied to their ability to seek integration into the EU and NATO. Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba has referred to the EU as ‘the first ever attempt to build a liberal empire’. In February 2023, he explained how its key characteristic is keeping together very different nations and ethnic groups ‘not by force but by the rule of law’. Seeing this model as the pathway to securing Ukraine’s future, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly asked for not only weapons and sanctions, but also NATO and EU membership. [The] European way of life [is when] each and every person matters. When the rule of law exists, when states strive to be social and societies strive to be open. When diversity is a value and the values of different people are united by fair equality. When borders are not violated. … This is our Europe. These are rules. This is our way of life. And for Ukraine, it’s a way home. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressing the European Parliament in 2023. 16  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW The defence of Ukraine has been personified by the perspectives and leadership of President Zelenskyy. Previously an entertainer, comedian and actor rather than career politician, he has quickly adapted to the role of a wartime leader. TIME magazine named President Zelenskyy its Person of the Year in 2022 for his galvanising leadership of Ukraine and for his determination to secure support for its independence from the broader international community. The following documentary provided an excellent introduction to the first 12 months of the war from Zelenskyy and the Ukrainians’ perspective:  Zelenskyy: Citizens at War. SBS On Demand. sbs.com.au/ondemand/tv-program/zelenskyy-citizens-at- war/2195634755629 ‘[Ukrainians are] protecting their right to choose their own leaders against an invasion designed to undo their democracy and eliminate their society. Timothy Snyder, 2022. ‘Ukraine holds the future’. Foreign Affairs. foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraine-war-democracy-nihilism-timothy-snyder You can read more about the nature of and challenges facing Ukrainian democracy here:  ‘Democracy in Ukraine’. Chatham House, 2023. chathamhouse.org/2023/11/democracy-ukraine Western government leaders Russia’s invasion has united the majority of politicians in Europe and the United States on matters of cooperation and defence. The events of the 2010s such as the eurozone financial crisis, the 2015–16 migration crisis, and the rise in illiberal populist leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have all challenged the ‘spread’ of liberal democratic principles. Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine has refocused many Western leaders on strengthening the rules-based order in response to challenges posed by powerful critics like Russia and China. US President Joe Biden spoke of a need for unity to defend democracy in the face of autocracy, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke of a global Zeitenwende, the German word for a ‘historic turning point’, in which liberal democracies would need to unite to defend the rules-based order. Germany is doing everything it can to defend and foster an international order based on the principles of the UN Charter. Its democracy, security, and prosperity depend on binding power to common rules. … When Putin gave the order to attack, he shattered a European and international peace architecture that had taken decades to build… Freedom, equality, the rule of law, and the dignity of every human being are values not exclusive to what has been traditionally understood as the west. Rather, they are shared by citizens and governments around the world, and the UN Charter reaffirms them as fundamental human rights in its preamble. The Zeitenwende led my government to reconsider a decades-old, well-established principle of German policy on arms exports. Today, for the first time in Germany’s recent history, we are delivering weapons into a war fought between two countries… 17 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW In my exchanges with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, I have made one thing very clear: Germany will sustain its efforts to support Ukraine for as long as necessary. The world’s democracies will need to work with these countries to defend and uphold a global order that binds power to rules and that confronts revisionist acts such as Russia’s war of aggression. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, 2023. ‘The Global Zeitenwende: How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era’. Foreign Affairs. foreignaffairs.com/germany/olaf-scholz-global- zeitenwende-how-avoid-new-cold-war Effects on political stability and change New alliances When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, it ushered in a period of global supremacy for the United States. With the Soviet Union disbanded, the US possessed unrivalled military power, the largest economy, and the most comprehensive web of global diplomatic alliances, tied together by the institutions of global governance that the United States had created. Many analysts referred to this global dominance as the unipolar moment. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China’s return to being a military, economic and diplomatic power has slowly begun to unseat the unrivalled dominance of the United States. Similar to Russia, the Chinese government has often derided the rules-based order as unfairly advancing the interests of the US and the West more generally. China’s rise has been characterised by a careful balance of adherence to the rules-based order so as not to provoke conflict, as well as disregard for the rules-based order when it perceives its national or strategic interests are being unduly restricted. Chinese leaders want to preserve elements of the current order that helped their country rise, such as world trade rules that fostered their export champions and encouraged inflows of foreign capital and technology. Principles that do not suit China are undermined. Journalist David Rennie in 2022. ‘China wants to change, or break, a world order set by others’. The Economist. economist.com/special-report/2022/10/10/china-wants-to-change-or-break-a-world- order-set-by-others Shared scepticism about liberal democracy and the rules-based order have led to closer diplomatic relations between China and Russia. Both states have regularly co-sponsored UN Security Council resolutions (and vetoes), and on the eve of Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine the leaders of both states announced a ‘no limits partnership’ at the Winter Olympics, which was hosted by China. Since the invasion of Ukraine, China has abstained from a majority of the votes in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council which sought to condemn Russia’s invasion; it has also become an important purchaser of Russian natural resources now sanctioned by the west. Despite the rhetoric, China’s support of Russia has had its limits: Xi Jinping has refrained from officially supporting Russia’s invasion; it has proposed its own peace plan (one though that ignores Ukraine’s interests) and has held back from supplying Russia with military aid, despite suggestions to the contrary from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Russia and China’s 18  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW shared sense of purpose to emerge from the shadow of the United States, and to do so on their own terms, has united two powerful states. This carefully balanced alliance, supported by a collection of smaller, like- minded states, has prompted many to signal this as the end of the unipolar moment and the beginning of a multipolar world where the rules-based order only applies to those states aligned with the west.  China’s new vassal: How the war in Ukraine turned Russia into Beijing’s junior partner’. Foreign Affairs, Vladmir Putin with Chinese President Xi Xingping after 2022. foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-new-vassal announcing their ‘no limits partnership’ in early 2022. To many, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine sounded the death knell for US primacy, a sign that the United States could no longer hold back the forces of revisionism and enforce the international order it had built. According to most observers, the unipolar moment has come to a definitive end. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, 2023. ‘The Myth of Multipolarity: American Power’s Staying Power’. Foreign Affairs. foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-multipolarity-myth Another potential risk to liberal democracy is that many states on the periphery of this ideological battle may opt – for a variety of the reasons we’ve discussed – to align themselves with and/or adopt characteristics of the illiberal autocracies like Russia and China. In a Foreign Affairs article published in 2023, former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband wrote of how many developing states share a frustration with the rules-based order and the supremacy of the United States and Europe: The preferred Western framing of the war in Ukraine – as a contest between democracy and autocracy –has not resonated well outside Europe and North America. Although it is true that Ukrainians are fighting for their democracy as well as their sovereignty, for the rest of the world the invasion primarily represents a fundamental transgression of international law… In a series of UN votes since the war started, around 40 countries representing nearly 50 per cent of the world’s population have regularly abstained or voted against motions condemning the Russian invasion. Fifty-eight countries abstained from a vote, in April 2022, to expel Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, two-thirds of the world’s population live in countries that are officially neutral or supportive of Russia. These countries do not form some kind of axis of autocracy; they include several notable democracies, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa. Much of the fence-sitting is not driven by disagreements over the conflict in Ukraine but is instead a symptom of a wider syndrome: anger at perceived Western double standards and frustration at stalled reform efforts in the international system… To defend the rule of law, however, Western countries must abide by it and subscribe to it. The US condemnation of Chinese breaches of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – with respect to China’s military installations on islands in the South China Sea, for example –would be far more persuasive if the United States ratified the convention. And although US Vice President Kamala Harris made a powerful call at the recent Munich Security Conference for the prosecution of war crimes in Ukraine, it would have been much more effective had the United States ratified the Rome 19 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW Statute that created the International Criminal Court in 1998. Critics and adversaries of Western powers relentlessly cite these double standards. And it is not hard to see why. David Miliband, 2023. ‘ The World Beyond Ukraine: The Survival of the West and the Demands of the Rest’. Foreign Affairs. foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/world-beyond-ukraine-russia-west By February 2023, at least 46 countries and territories had either imposed or pledged to impose sanctions on Russia. Credit: Castellum.ai, Al Jazeera, 2023. aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/16/mapping-where-every-country-stands-on-the-russia-ukraine-war Economic shocks Western states’ desire to punish Russia economically has forced the global redistribution of supply chains to cope with the sudden reduction in Russian natural resources entering the European market. This has led to economic shocks, inflation and rising cost of living pressures as fuel prices in the western world surge without Russian fossil fuels to balance the market. Alongside this, grain prices in the Middle East and North Africa have increased due to Russia’s blockade of the Black Sea grain ports and its attacks on Ukrainian farms and infrastructure. Compare the two graphs below to observe the significant reduction in European states’ imports of Russian natural gas since the February 2022 invasion. Incidentally, Australia is one of the world largest exporters of liquified natural gas and as such has benefitted economically from the increased global demand for ‘LNG’ (see yellow bar). 20  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW Origin of gas supplied to European countries (27 EU members plus the UK) in million cubic metres, 2019 and 2022. Credit: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, in 'Russia sanctions: What impact have they had on its oil and gas exports?'. BBC News, 2023. bbc.com/news/58888451 Despite the heavy sanctions on Russian exports, the Russian economy has fared very well, with the rouble (Russia’s currency) in much the same place as it was prior to the invasion. Many analysts put this down to careful preparation of economic levers prior to the invasion and Russia’s ability to redirect exports to other markets such as China and India. Exacerbates global crises Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had a twofold effect on related global crises. Firstly, the conflict has exacerbated certain pre- existing issues and ‘crises’: The risk of nuclear conflict has increased. Credit: International Energy Agency and DataWrapper, 2024. One important reason why the United States qery.no/russian-oil-exports-pivots-towards-the-east has resisted direct conflict with Russia is the simple fact that both states possess the world’s largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The risk that direct involvement by the United States may provoke a catastrophic nuclear retaliation from Russia has been a significant factor limiting American involvement to arming Ukraine from afar instead. This risk was further enhanced in February 2023 when Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was suspending its involvement in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (or ‘New START’). This bilateral treaty between Russia and the United States is the last remaining treaty in a succession of agreements made since the end of the Cold War to restrict and monitor each state’s stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The movement of people and those fleeing conflict has further increased. The UNHCR (2022, p. 27), the UN’s refugee agency, reported that ‘the total number of refugees worldwide rose by 24 per cent from 25.7 million at the end of 2021 to 32 million by mid-2022, largely due to refugees from Ukraine fleeing the war in their country’. This translates as the largest flow of displaced people across an international border since World War II (see graph below). 21 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW Credit: ‘Mid-Year Trends’. UNHCR, 2023. unhcr.org/mid-year-trends The West’s attention has been focused on ‘defending democracy’ and the interests of the rules-based order in Ukraine, their resources and attention have been diverted away from other global issues: The redistribution of Russian oil and gas has sent fuel and food prices soaring. As many states look to replace Russian fossil fuels, the solutions—such as Germany recommissioning coal power stations— have redirected attention away from reducing emissions and addressing climate change. Other global conflicts, such as in Ethiopia, Syria, Yemen and Sudan, have seen a reduction in economic, diplomatic and humanitarian aid. The UN appeal for humanitarian aid for Ukraine has been 80–90 per cent funded. Meanwhile, the UN’s 2022 appeals for people caught in crises in Ethiopia, Syria, and Yemen have been barely half funded. Donor countries have not yet met their funding commitment of raising $100 billion a year in climate finance for developing countries. David Miliband, 2023. ‘The World Beyond Ukraine’. foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/world-beyond-ukraine-russia-west Alienated and resentful, many developing countries see the war in Ukraine and the West’s rivalry with China as distracting from urgent issues such as debt, climate change, and the effects of the pandemic. Shivshankar Menon, 2023. ‘Out of alignment: what the war in ukraine has revealed about non- Western powers’. foreignaffairs.com/world/out-alignment-war-in-ukraine-non-western-powers- shivshankar-menon 22  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW Evaluating political significance Before evaluating the significance of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the legitimacy and spread of democracy, it helps to summarise the ‘journey’ this case study has taken us. Causes Putin uses military power to justify his authoritarian rule Putin’s belief that Ukrainian territory is inalienably part of Russia Putin’s belief that the eastward expansion of NATO threatens Russian security. Consequences The end of Russia's experiment with liberal democracy Ukraine reaffirms its preference for liberal democratic values Western actors affirm their commitments to the rules-based order. Interests of global actors Russia: annex Ukrainian territory and reassert Russia’s geopolitical prominence. Ukraine: defend sovereign territory and join Western groupings (NATO and EU). Western powers and intergovernmental organistions: provide military and economic aid to Ukraine, penalise Russia through sanctions, and resettle Ukrainian refugees. Perspectives of global actors Russia: Ukrainian sovereignty is contrived / does not exist, and the liberal democratic rules-based order does not align with Russia’s interests. Ukraine: since the 2014 Maidan revolution, sees its future moreso as 'part of Europe' and the West, than as a 'satellite' of Russia. Western government leaders: liberal democracy, the rules-based order and Western security interests are threatened by Russian policy, and so must be protected. Effect on political stability and change Newer alliances, and the emergence of a more multipolar world with the interests of the US and the West seemingly more at odds with those of China, Russia, etc. Economic shocks as trade flows are interrupted and change course. Exacerbation of other crises as the West's resources are directed to support of Ukraine. The next phase of this case study is to consider how the interests and perspectives of global actors challenge the legitimacy and spread of democracy. The following graphics highlight how the actions of Russia, Ukraine and the west have simultaneously challenged and promoted the democratic principles referred to earlier in this case study. 23 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW Adherence to the rule of law war crimes have allegedly been commited by Russian Accountability of governments Human rights and freedoms forced. to the population Russian occupying forces have Putin has effectively outlawed prevented Ukrainian people critical media, which inhibits from excercising their transparency in decision-making. individual rights. Challenges liberal democratic Respect for sovereignty principles Free, fair and Russia has ignored Ukraine’s multiparty elections internationally recognised Putin has used state power to sovereign territory. hinder and make near- Checks on government power impossible the ability for The vast majority of power in genuine opposition parties to Russia rests with Putin and the compete in Russin election. oligarch class. Political liberalism Recommitment to NATO and the EU by Western powers has promoted the (Kantian) idea of democratic peace. Accountability of governments Political and legal equality to the people Promotes These have been promoted Russia has leaned on the global through the West’s commitment to legitimacy of democratic liberal provide support to Ukraine and principles in its use of democratic resettlement to Ukrainian referendums to justify its principles refugees. annexations in the Donbas. Respect for sovereignty Adherence to the rule of law The international community has invested The resettlement of Ukrainians in Europe significant economic, military and political aligns with international laws relating to capital in the defence of Ukraine's the treatment of refugees. territorial sovereignty. Remember: the evaluation of this case study must fulfill the following three criteria: Respond to the key inquiry questions of this unit: - What are the challenges to the legitimacy and spread of democracy globally? - How politically significant are the global challenges to democracy? - To what extent does democracy contribute to global stability and/or opportunities for change? Synthesise all the above evidence relating to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to develop well-supported arguments. Construct a coherent argument that is evidence-informed and balanced (in other words, one that falls to one side while acknowledging the other). 24  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW Sample evaluation argument (Introduction) Russia’s illegal invasion and annexation of Ukraine’s sovereign territory is a direct threat to the legitimacy and spread of democracy globally. Over the course of this invasion, Russian President Vladimir Putin has extinguished any hope of representative government in Russia and held back the effectiveness and impact of hard-won democracy for the citizens of Ukraine. He has also courted the support of like-minded states like China who seek to upset the role of global governance. However, ultimately, for an invasion that intended to break apart the rule-based order, it has had the exact opposite effect. Ukraine’s spirited defence of its territory and democracy has roused western support for liberalism, democracy and the rules-based order. As Putin’s invasion fails to achieve its objectives, the legitimacy and spread of democracy is looking stronger than at any time since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Activity B – Review questions 1 Explain two causes of one of the following global challenges to the legitimacy and spread of democracy: – Sovereignty and the national interest (Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) 2 Discuss two differing global actors’ perspectives of one of the following global challenges to the legitimacy and spread of democracy. – Sovereignty and the national interest (Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) 3 Analyse the significance of one global actor’s response to one of the following global challenges to the legitimacy and spread of democracy. Global challenge Suggested responses Sovereignty and the Economic and military aid to Ukraine national interest (Russia’s Sanctions aimed at Russia invasion of Ukraine) Promotion of multilateral organisations 4 Evaluate the political significance of one of the following global challenges to the legitimacy and spread of democracy. – Sovereignty and the national interest (Russia’s invasion of Ukraine). 25 2.2. Global challenges to democracy – TW Further resources Articles  David, K. 2022. ‘Why did Russia invade Ukraine?’ The Conversation. theconversation.com/why-did- russia-invade-ukraine-178512  Euronews. 2022. ‘Ukraine ‘referendums’: Full results for annexation polls as Kremlin-backed authorities claim victory’. euronews.com/2022/09/27/occupied-areas-of-ukraine-vote-to-join-russia-in- referendums-branded-a-sham-by-the-west  Graham, T. 2023. ‘The precarious future of Russian democracy’. Council on Foreign Relations. cfr.org/article/precarious-future-russian-democracy  Masters, J. 2023. ‘Ukraine: Conflict at the crossroads of Europe and Russia’. Council on Foreign Relations. cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia  Rodgers, K. 2023. ‘Ukraine war 12 months on: The role of the Russian media in reporting—and justifying—the conflict’. The Conversation. theconversation.com/ukraine-war-12-months-on-the-role- of-the-russian-media-in-reporting-and-justifying-the-conflict-199820 26  2.2. Global challenges to democracy | TW References Gabuev, A. 2022. ‘China’s new vassal: How the war in Ukraine turned Russia into Beijing’s junior partner’. Foreign Affairs. foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-new-vassal Jentleson, B.W. 2013. ‘American foreign policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century’ (5e). W.W. Norton. Kant, E. 1795. ‘Perpetual peace: A philosophical essay’. Allen & Unwin. Maizland, L. 2022. ‘China and Russia: Exploring ties between two authoritarian powers’. Council on Foreign Relations. cfr.org/backgrounder/china-russia-relationship-xi-putin-taiwan-ukraine McKernan, B. 2023. ‘What are the Israeli protests about and what happens next?’ The Guardian. Menon, S. 2023. ‘Out of alignment: What the war in Ukraine has revealed about non-western powers’. Foreign Affairs. foreignaffairs.com/world/out-alignment-war-in-ukraine-non-western-powers- shivshankar-menon Miliband, D. 2023. ‘The world beyond Ukraine: The survival of the west and the demands of the rest’. Foreign Affairs. foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/world-beyond-ukraine-russia-west Ragozin, L. 2023. ‘How Putin made himself Maidan-proof by waging war on Ukraine’. Al Jazeera. aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/1/30/how-putin-made-himself-maidan-proof-by-waging-war-on-ukraine Rennie, D. 2022. ‘China wants to change, or break, a world order set by others’. The Economist. economist.com/special-report/2022/10/10/china-wants-to-change-or-break-a-world-order-set-by- others Slaughter, A.-M. and Shapiro, I. 2022. ‘The golden arches go to war’. The Strategist. aspistrategist.org.au/the-golden-arches-go-to-war Snyder, T. 2022. ‘Ukraine holds the future’. Foreign Affairs. foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraine-war- democracy-nihilism-timothy-snyder United Nations. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of- human-rights United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2022. ‘Mid-year trends 2022’. unhcr.org/uk/media/mid- year-trends-2022 Zarakia, F. 1997. ‘The rise of illiberal democracy’. Foreign Affairs. foreignaffairs.com/world/rise-illiberal- democracy 27