Law 431 Scope PDF

[ ***LAW 431 SCOPE***] 1. ***[Principles of IHL]*** [Principle of Distinction] Definition: Requires parties to a conflict to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and between military objectives and civilian objects, ensuring that only legitimate military targets are attacked. *Geneva...

[ ***LAW 431 SCOPE***] 1. ***[Principles of IHL]*** [Principle of Distinction] Definition: Requires parties to a conflict to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and between military objectives and civilian objects, ensuring that only legitimate military targets are attacked. *Geneva Conventions (1949)*: Common Article 3 prohibits attacks on civilians in non-international armed conflicts; Additional Protocol I (Articles 48, 51) codifies this rule for international conflicts. *Prosecutor v. Tadić (ICTY, 1995)*: The Tribunal confirmed that the principle of distinction is a customary rule of international law, applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts. *Israel's Targeted Killing Case (2006):* The Israeli Supreme Court examined whether targeted killings of suspected terrorists violated the principle of distinction. It concluded that while targeted killings are not inherently unlawful, strict safeguards must be applied to ensure compliance with distinction, such as verifying the target's combatant status. [Principle of Proportionality] Prohibits attacks that cause excessive incidental harm to civilians or civilian objects in relation to the anticipated direct military advantage. *Additional Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b):* Specifically prohibits disproportionate attacks. *Article 57(2)(a)(iii):* Requires parties to consider proportionality during attack planning. *Prosecutor v. Galić (ICTY, 2003):* The shelling of civilian areas in Sarajevo was deemed disproportionate, as the harm caused to civilians far outweighed any possible military advantage. The judgment demonstrated how proportionality is applied to indiscriminate attacks. *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (ICJ, 1996):* The ICJ underscored the need to balance military necessity with proportionality. It held that even the use of nuclear weapons must comply with this principle, though it refrained from determining the legality in specific circumstances. [Principle of Military Necessity] Allows the use of force necessary to achieve a legitimate military objective, provided it does not violate other IHL principles. *Martens Clause (Hague Convention IV, 1907):* Emphasizes that even in the absence of specific rules, military necessity cannot justify violations of the principles of humanity. *Article 14 of the Lieber Code (1863):* Outlines military necessity within lawful limits. *Erdemović Case (ICTY, 1998):* The accused argued military necessity as a defense for his participation in the killing of civilians. The court held that necessity cannot justify actions that amount to war crimes or breaches of IHL, illustrating that the principle is not absolute. [Principle of Humanity] Prohibits methods and means of warfare that cause unnecessary suffering or harm beyond what is needed to achieve legitimate military objectives. *Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I:* Prohibits weapons that cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. *Chemical Weapons Case (ICJ, 1997)*: The ICJ reaffirmed the absolute prohibition of weapons causing unnecessary suffering, including chemical weapons. This case reinforced the principle by highlighting the prohibition of indiscriminate harm to combatants and civilians alike. [Principle of Non-Discrimination] Requires that all individuals affected by armed conflict be treated equally, without distinction based on race, religion, nationality, or other criteria. *Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention and Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention:* These articles ensure equal treatment for prisoners of war and civilians, respectively. * Prosecutor v. Krstić (ICTY, 2001):* The case dealt with the Srebrenica genocide. It highlighted the violation of the principle of non-discrimination, as the massacre targeted Bosnian Muslims based on their ethnicity and religion. [Principle of Precaution] Requires all feasible precautions to be taken to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects during military operations. *Article 57 of Additional Protocol I*: Obligates parties to verify targets, issue warnings where possible, and cancel attacks if proportionality cannot be maintained. *Prosecutor v. Blaškić (ICTY, 2000):* The ICTY found that inadequate precautions were taken in attacks on civilian areas. The case highlighted how commanders must ensure attacks are carefully planned to avoid unnecessary civilian harm. [Prohibition of Unnecessary Suffering] Prohibits the use of weapons or methods of warfare that cause superfluous harm or suffering beyond what is required to defeat the enemy. *Article 35 of Additional Protocol I:* Codifies this prohibition as customary IHL. *ICRC Commentary on Nuclear Weapons (1996):* The ICJ, referencing ICRC principles, stated that the use of weapons designed to cause excessive suffering violates the principle, even during lawful hostilities. [8. Principle of Neutrality] Obligates neutral states to abstain from supporting or aiding parties in armed conflict. *Hague Convention V (1907):* Codifies the duties and rights of neutral powers. *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (ICJ, 2005):* Uganda's involvement in supporting rebels in the DRC violated principles of neutrality, emphasizing that neutral states must refrain from actions that impact the balance of a conflict. 2. ***[The use of force and the right to self defence]*** the key principles surrounding the use of force and the right to self-defence, along with relevant case law and authorities. [Prohibition of the Use of Force] - *Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter* all member states must refrain from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. * UN Charter, Article 2(4):* Prohibits the use of force in international relations except in cases of self-defence or when authorized by the UN Security Council. * Nicaragua v. United States (ICJ, 1986):* The International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that the U.S. violated international law by supporting the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, noting that the prohibition on the use of force is a peremptory norm of international law, and any deviation from it must be justified under the exceptions provided by the UN Charter. [Right to Self-Defence] - *Article 51 of the UN Charter.* Under international law, a state has the right to use force in self-defence if it is subject to an armed attack, as provided by. This right is subject to the principles of necessity and proportionality. * UN Charter, Article 51*: Grants the inherent right of self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member state, pending Security Council action. * The Caroline Case (1837):* Established the principles of necessity and proportionality in self-defence. The Caroline case involved a British attack on an American vessel, which was argued to be an act of self-defence. The British government justified the attack, but the U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, set out the standard for self-defence, requiring that the response must be "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." * Nicaragua v. United States (ICJ, 1986):* The ICJ clarified that the right to self-defence only applies if there is an armed attack, and not in response to other forms of intervention. The court emphasized that the U.S.'s support for rebel forces in Nicaragua did not amount to an armed attack justifying Nicaragua's self-defence. [Pre-Emptive Self-Defence] The concept of pre-emptive self-defence refers to the use of force in anticipation of an imminent armed attack. This remains a contentious issue in international law. * UN Charter, Article 51*: Implies a right of self-defence if an armed attack occurs, but does not explicitly recognize pre-emptive self-defence. * Bush Doctrine (2002):* The United States' interpretation of self-defence post-9/11, which argued for the right to act pre-emptively in response to threats, such as the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). * The Iraq War (2003):* The U.S. and its allies justified the invasion of Iraq on the grounds of pre-emptive self-defence, claiming that Iraq's alleged possession of WMDs posed an imminent threat. However, this justification was widely criticized by the international community, and the UN Security Council did not authorize the use of force, leading to debates about the legality of pre-emptive strikes under international law. *Israel's Airstrike on Iraq's Osirak Reactor (1981):* Israel pre-emptively struck Iraq's nuclear reactor, justifying the action as necessary to prevent Iraq from developing nuclear weapons. The ICJ later found that while Israel's action could be justified on security grounds, it did not have the necessary authorization from the Security Council. [Collective Self-Defence] Collective self-defence refers to the right of states to use force to defend another state that is under armed attack. * UN Charter, Article 51*: Allows states to engage in collective self-defence in response to an armed attack on a member state. * The Gulf War (1990-1991):* The U.S.-led coalition's intervention in Kuwait to expel Iraqi forces was justified under the principle of collective self-defence, as Kuwait had been attacked by Iraq. The UN Security Council authorized the use of force, affirming the legality of collective self-defence. * The 2001 Afghanistan Invasion:* Following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. invoked collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, citing the armed attack by al-Qaeda, which was hosted by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The UN Security Council provided subsequent authorization for military action. [Necessity and Proportionality in Self-Defence] The principles of necessity and proportionality govern the right to self-defence. Self-defence must be necessary to repel an armed attack, and the force used must be proportional to the threat posed. * UN Charter, Article 51:* Imposes a duty to report measures taken in self-defence to the Security Council and mandates that force should only be used when necessary and proportional. * Nicaragua v. United States (ICJ, 1986):* The ICJ emphasized that self-defence must meet the test of necessity, meaning that force must only be used when no other means of resolution are available, and the response must be proportional. The U.S. intervention in Nicaragua was deemed excessive and not proportional to the threat posed by the Nicaraguan government's actions. * Israeli Airstrikes in Gaza (2008-2009):* Israel's military actions were scrutinized for proportionality in relation to Hamas rocket fire. The Israeli government argued that its actions were necessary to protect its civilians, but international criticism raised concerns over whether the force used was proportional to the threat posed. 3. ***[Treaty-making process, reservations]*** [The Treaty-Making Process] Here's the updated Treaty-Making Process with Approval added as the fifth stage, immediately following Consent to Be Bound. The other stages remain unchanged. Treaty-Making Process The process of making a treaty is governed by international law, primarily under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1969. It consists of the following stages: 1\. Capacity to Conclude a Treaty Definition: Capacity refers to the legal competence of a state or organization to enter into treaties. Key Authority: Article 6 of the VCLT States automatically have capacity due to their sovereignty. International organizations can conclude treaties if their constitutive instruments permit them to do so. Example: Western Sahara Advisory Opinion (ICJ, 1975)---reinforced that only entities with sovereignty or legal personality have treaty-making capacity. 2\. Negotiation and Drafting Representatives of states negotiate terms to reflect their mutual intentions and align with international legal principles. Drafts are often prepared through bilateral meetings or multilateral conferences. 3\. Authentication of the Text Definition: Authentication confirms the final, official version of the treaty text. Key Authority: Article 10 of the VCLT Done by signature, initialing, or formal adoption at a diplomatic conference. After authentication, no further amendments are permitted without mutual agreement. 4\. Consent to Be Bound Definition: States formally express agreement to be legally bound by a treaty. Key Authority: Articles 11--18 of the VCLT Consent may be expressed through: Signature: For treaties that don't require ratification. Ratification/Acceptance/Approval: For treaties requiring domestic approval. Accession: For states joining a treaty after it has entered into force. Monoist States: Treaties become part of domestic law upon ratification, without further legislative action. Dualist States: Domestic implementation requires additional legislation to transform the treaty into national law. 5\. Approval Definition: Approval refers to the domestic or internal authorization required before a treaty can bind a state internationally. Key Authority: Articles 11--15 of the VCLT In most dualist systems, approval involves legislative or parliamentary endorsement, often by passing a resolution or enabling legislation. Purpose: Approval ensures the treaty aligns with domestic law and policy goals before ratification or accession. Example: In Botswana, Parliament must approve treaties before they can bind the state, a necessary step in dualist systems. 6\. Reservations Definition: Reservations allow a state to exclude or modify the application of certain treaty provisions. Key Authority: Articles 19--23 of the VCLT Reservations are valid unless: The treaty prohibits them. They are incompatible with the treaty's object and purpose (Article 19(c)). Case Example: Belilos v. Switzerland (1988, ECtHR)---clarified that reservations affecting key provisions of a treaty may render them invalid if they undermine its purpose. 7\. Provisional Application Definition: Provisional application allows a treaty to be applied temporarily before formal ratification. Key Authority: Article 25 of the VCLT States may agree to apply the treaty provisionally if: It is specified in the treaty text. The parties mutually consent. Purpose: This ensures the treaty's provisions take effect promptly, especially in matters of urgency or global interest (e.g., environmental agreements). Example: Provisional application of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change in some countries before full ratification. 8\. Implementation Definition: This stage involves incorporating the treaty into domestic legal systems and ensuring compliance. In Monoist States, treaties automatically become part of domestic law upon ratification. In Dualist States, treaties must be enacted into domestic law through enabling legislation. Key Authority: Domestic constitutional systems govern the implementation process. Example: In Botswana (a dualist state), Parliament must pass a law incorporating an international treaty before it has domestic effect. 9\. Entry into Force Definition: A treaty enters into force according to the conditions specified in its text (e.g., after a certain number of ratifications). Key Authority: Article 24 of the VCLT 10\. Registration and Publication Treaties must be registered with the UN Secretariat under Article 102 of the UN Charter, ensuring transparency and enforceability. [2. Reservations to Treaties] A reservation is a unilateral statement made by a state when signing, ratifying, accepting, or approving a treaty that seeks to exclude or modify the legal effect of specific provisions of the treaty in their application to that state. The right to make reservations allows states to agree to a treaty while exempting themselves from certain obligations they cannot or do not wish to accept. However, reservations must be consistent with the treaty's object and purpose. [Key Principles of Reservations:] 1*. Permissibility of Reservations* *Article 19 of the Vienna Convention (VCLT)* provides that a state may make a reservation unless the treaty explicitly prohibits reservations, or the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. The treaty may allow or restrict reservations to ensure that it remains effective in achieving its core goals. *2. Types of Reservations* Allowed Reservations: A state may exclude or modify the effect of certain provisions of a treaty in ways that do not affect the treaty's fundamental objectives. Prohibited Reservations: Reservations that undermine the treaty's purpose are not allowed. For example, a reservation to a human rights treaty that permits violations of basic rights would be impermissible. *3. Acceptance of Reservations* *Article 20 of the Vienna Convention* states that a reservation must be accepted by other states parties for it to take effect. States can accept, object to, or remain silent regarding a reservation. If no objections are raised, the reservation is deemed accepted. If a state objects, it may not be bound by the provisions modified by the reservation. *Article 21 of the Vienna Convention (VCLT)* outlines that reservations to treaties only affect the relations between the reserving state and the states that have accepted the reservation. States that object to a reservation are not bound by the modified provisions. *4. Incompatibility with Object and Purpose* Reservations that conflict with the central aims or fundamental principles of the treaty are considered invalid. For instance, in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that reservations that diminish the Convention's purpose of preventing genocide are impermissible. Example: A state cannot reserve the right to engage in actions that directly contradict the treaty's purpose, such as a reservation to a treaty on environmental protection that allows for unrestricted pollution. *5. Withdrawal or Modification of Reservations* *Article 22 of the Vienna Convention* allows states to withdraw or modify their reservations at any time, subject to the consent of the other parties. Withdrawal of a reservation restores the full application of the treaty's provisions. [3. The Legal Impact of Reservations] Effect on Treaty Obligations: When a state makes a reservation, the treaty is still in force for that state, but the provisions that are the subject of the reservation are modified or excluded from the legal effect of the treaty in that state's case. Example: If a state makes a reservation to exclude provisions on capital punishment in a human rights treaty, it will still be bound by the treaty overall, but the specific provisions regarding capital punishment may not apply to that state. Objection to Reservations: States can object to a reservation. If a state objects, the reservation will not be effective between the objecting state and the reserving state. However, the treaty remains in force between all parties, with the reservation applying only to those who accept it. 4. ***[International responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and the ILC Draft Articles]*** *The International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001)* outlines the legal consequences of a state's failure to fulfill its international obligations, ensuring that states are held accountable for violations under international law. These principles, though not binding, are widely accepted as a key reference for understanding state responsibility. [1. Definition of Internationally Wrongful Acts] An internationally wrongful act is a breach of an international obligation by a state, and it must be attributable to that state. According to *Article 2 of the ILC Draft Articles*, a wrongful act must meet these two conditions: Violation of International Obligation: This can be a breach of a treaty, customary international law, or decisions made by international tribunals. The wrongful act may involve actions or omissions that violate the state's international obligations. Attribution to the State: The act must be attributable to the state, either through its organs (e.g., government, military), or because it has directed or controlled non-state actors, such as armed groups or corporations. [2. Attribution of Responsibility] For a state to be held accountable, the act must be attributable to the state. The ILC Draft Articles provide the following mechanisms of attribution: [Acts of State Organs:] Any actions by state organs (government officials, military forces, or state agents) that violate international law can be attributed to the state. - *Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania)* - Albania was held responsible for mining international waters, a violation attributable to the actions of its naval forces. [Private Individuals or Non-State Actors under State Control:] States may also be held responsible for wrongful acts carried out by private individuals or non-state actors, provided that these actors are acting under the direction or control of the state. - *LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States)* - The U.S. was held responsible for violations related to the actions of its state authorities, even though the individuals involved were not government agents. [Failure to Prevent or Protect:] A state may be held accountable for failing to prevent a violation by non-state actors or for failing to protect other states or foreign nationals from harm. - *Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v. Spain)* - Spain was held responsible for failing to protect Belgian investors from harm caused by Spanish companies. [3. Breach of International Obligation] State responsibility arises when a state breaches an international obligation. The breach may be through: [ Treaty Violations:] Failure to comply with international agreements. - *Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project* *(Hungary/Slovakia)* - Slovakia was found to have violated its treaty obligations concerning the use of the Danube River. [Violations of Customary International Law:] A breach of universally accepted legal norms, even if not codified in a treaty. - *Nicaragua v. United States* - The United States was held responsible for supporting rebel groups in Nicaragua, violating customary international law prohibiting the use of force against sovereign states. [ Human Rights Violations:] Breaching international human rights law, such as the Geneva Conventions or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia* - Serbia was held responsible for breaches of the Genocide Convention related to the actions during the Bosnian War. [4. Consequences of Internationally Wrongful Acts] Once an internationally wrongful act is established, the state must address the legal consequences, as outlined in the ILC Draft Articles: [a. Obligation to Cease the Wrongful Act] *Article 30* mandates that the state must immediately cease its wrongful conduct. If the wrongful act is continuing, the state must take all necessary measures to bring the act to an end. - *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran*) - Iran was ordered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to cease the unlawful detention of U.S. diplomats. [b. Obligation to Make Full Reparation] *Article 31* requires that the state make full reparation for the injury caused by its wrongful act. Reparation can take various forms, including: Restitution: Returning the situation to the status quo prior to the wrongful act. Compensation: Monetary payment for the injury caused. Satisfaction: Acknowledging the breach and providing a remedy for moral damage. *Corfu Channel Case* - Albania was ordered to compensate the United Kingdom for the damage caused to British ships by mines in Albanian waters. [c. Countermeasures] *Article 49* allows an injured state to take countermeasures---measures otherwise prohibited under international law, but justified in response to the wrongful act. Countermeasures must be proportional to the harm suffered and are meant to induce the responsible state to comply with its obligations. *United States v. Iran* - The U.S. imposed diplomatic sanctions and other countermeasures following the Iranian hostage crisis, as Iran failed to cease the wrongful act. [5. Serious Breaches: Erga Omnes Obligations] Some violations are so severe that they create obligations for all states, even if they are not directly affected by the breach. These are considered erga omnes obligations, which include: Prohibition of Genocide Prohibition of Slavery and Torture Prohibition of Aggressive War States have a responsibility to prevent and respond to violations of erga omnes obligations, even when they are not the injured party. *Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations* - The ICJ recognized the broader interest of all states in preventing violations of serious international obligations, such as the prohibition of genocide. 5. ***[Counter-measures for internationally wrongful acts]*** A Countermeasures for Internationally Wrongful Acts Countermeasures are actions taken by an injured state in response to an internationally wrongful act committed by another state. These measures, while typically prohibited under international law, become permissible in certain circumstances as a way to induce the offending state to comply with its obligations and remedy the wrongful act. The ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) provide a framework for countermeasures, particularly in Articles 49-54. 1\. Definition and Purpose of Countermeasures Definition: Countermeasures are acts that would normally be considered illegal under international law but are taken in response to another state's wrongful conduct. They are intended to compel the responsible state to comply with its obligations and provide reparation for the wrongful act. Purpose: The primary goal of countermeasures is to restore compliance with international law by the state committing the wrongful act. They are meant to: Stop the wrongful act if ongoing. Prompt the responsible state to remedy the harm caused by its actions. 2\. Conditions for Legitimacy of Countermeasures According to the ILC Draft Articles, countermeasures must meet specific criteria to be considered lawful: a\. Proportionality (Article 51) Countermeasures must be proportional to the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. This means the severity of the countermeasure should not exceed the harm caused by the original wrongful act. Proportionality ensures that the response is not excessive and maintains the overall goal of compliance with international law. Example: If a state is unlawfully detained, countermeasures like suspension of diplomatic relations or the imposition of economic sanctions could be proportionate responses. b\. Prior Negotiation or Discussion (Article 52) Before taking countermeasures, the injured state must attempt to resolve the dispute through peaceful means, such as negotiation, arbitration, or judicial settlement. This condition encourages diplomacy and peaceful resolution before resorting to measures that might escalate the conflict. Example: If a state violates a trade agreement, the injured state should first seek diplomatic negotiations before taking trade-related countermeasures. c\. Cessation of the Wrongful Act (Article 54) If the responsible state ceases the wrongful act, the countermeasures must end. Countermeasures are not meant to be permanent but rather to induce the offending state to stop its illegal conduct. Example: If a state removes a blockade that was unlawfully imposed, the injured state must stop its countermeasures, such as retaliatory sanctions, once the violation ceases. 3\. Types of Countermeasures Countermeasures can take various forms, depending on the nature of the wrongful act and the objectives of the injured state. These measures are typically temporary and focused on compelling the responsible state to comply with its obligations. a\. Diplomatic Countermeasures Suspension of Diplomatic Relations: A state may suspend or downgrade diplomatic relations to signal its disapproval of the wrongful act. Example: A state might expel diplomats or cease diplomatic communication to protest unlawful conduct. b\. Economic Countermeasures Trade Sanctions: The injured state may impose economic sanctions, such as tariffs or embargoes, to compel the responsible state to remedy the violation. Example: A country may suspend trade agreements or block exports as a response to unlawful actions like environmental violations or breaches of economic treaties. c\. Legal Countermeasures Initiation of Legal Proceedings: The injured state may bring the issue before an international court or tribunal, using legal avenues to hold the responsible state accountable. Example: A state may file a complaint in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or take the matter to the World Trade Organization (WTO) if the issue concerns a trade dispute. d\. Military Countermeasures Use of Force: In extreme cases, countermeasures may involve the use of force, although this is heavily constrained by international law, particularly the UN Charter. The use of force is only permissible if it falls within the context of self-defense or collective security. Example: If a state's territorial integrity is violated, it may take military action to restore its sovereignty, but this must comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality. 4\. Prohibited Countermeasures Certain acts are never permissible as countermeasures, regardless of the wrongful act committed by the other state: Use of Force: As per the UN Charter, the use of force is prohibited except in cases of self-defense or as authorized by the UN Security Council. The ILC Draft Articles reaffirm this restriction in Article 50. Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: States cannot use countermeasures to violate fundamental international law prohibitions, such as those against genocide, slavery, or torture. Interference with Human Rights: Countermeasures must not result in violations of human rights, such as unlawful detention, torture, or other inhumane treatments. 6. ***[Circumstances that justify what would otherwise be internationally wrongful acts]*** Under international law, there are specific circumstances in which an otherwise wrongful act may be justified, and the state responsible will not be held liable. These exceptions are articulated in the *ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), particularly in Chapter V (Articles 20-25)*. These circumstances are based on the recognition that certain actions may be taken by states under exceptional conditions that override the typical principles of responsibility. Below are the key circumstances under which otherwise wrongful acts may be justified: [Consent (Article 20)] If a state has consented to the conduct that would normally be considered wrongful, it cannot subsequently be held responsible for that act. Consent is a fundamental principle in international law, and it can be expressed in various ways, such as through treaties or agreements. Example: If one state agrees to another state conducting military operations on its territory, the latter's actions, which would normally be considered a violation of sovereignty, are justified by consent. [Self-Defense (Article 21]) A state may use force in self-defense against an armed attack, provided it meets the conditions set by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Under these circumstances, the use of force, which would otherwise be considered a breach of international law, is permitted. Key conditions: The armed attack must have occurred. The use of force must be proportional to the threat faced. The state must report the use of force to the UN Security Council if the attack is ongoing. Example: A state that is attacked may respond with military force as a justified act of self-defense, as seen in the Caroline Case (1837), which established the "necessity" and "proportionality" standards for self-defense. [Force Majeure (Article 23)] Force majeure refers to situations where an event beyond the control of a state makes it impossible for the state to fulfill its international obligations. These events must be unforeseeable, irresistible, and external to the state. Example: A state may be excused from fulfilling a treaty obligation due to a natural disaster, such as an earthquake or tsunami, that prevents it from meeting its commitments. Key Conditions: The event must be outside the state's control. It must make performance of the international obligation impossible (not just difficult or costly). Example: If a country's infrastructure is destroyed by a hurricane, preventing it from delivering humanitarian aid as promised in a treaty, the state may be justified in not fulfilling its obligation. [Distress (Article 24)] Distress allows a state to take actions that would otherwise be considered wrongful if they are necessary to protect essential interests from imminent danger and if there is no other reasonable way to safeguard those interests. Example: A state may seize a foreign ship in distress to prevent it from sinking, even though such a seizure would normally be an infringement of the ship's rights under international law. Key Conditions: The act must be taken to protect essential interests. The state must have no other means of protecting these interests. The distress must be immediate, and the state must not be able to avoid it by other means. Example: If a state intercepts a foreign vessel to rescue its passengers in a life-threatening situation, it may be justified even if the action involves breaching international law regarding freedom of navigation. [Necessity (Article 25)] The necessity defense permits a state to justify an act that would otherwise be internationally wrongful if it is the only way to protect an essential interest of the state against a grave and imminent peril, and the act does not significantly impair the essential interests of other states. Key Conditions: The state must be facing a grave and imminent peril. The act must be the only means of protecting that essential interest. The act must not cause disproportionate harm to other states or the international community. The state must not be in breach of a pre-existing obligation under international law. Example: A state facing an imminent threat to its national security or economic stability may impose trade restrictions or seize assets belonging to foreign nationals, if necessary to safeguard its survival. [Countermeasures (Article 49)] Countermeasures are actions taken by an injured state in response to an internationally wrongful act by another state. They are typically unlawful under international law, but are justified in response to another state's violation of international law, provided they meet specific requirements such as proportionality and necessity. Example: A state might impose sanctions or suspend diplomatic relations in response to the wrongful acts of another state. However, these measures must not exceed the scope of the wrongful act they are responding to, and they must cease once the original violation is remedied. 7. ***[The applicability of IHL to non-state actor]*** International Humanitarian Law (IHL) traditionally governs the conduct of armed conflicts between states, but it also applies to non-state actors (NSAs) in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). These actors include armed rebel groups, insurgents, and organized armed groups, who are bound by IHL principles when involved in armed conflict. This is crucial for the protection of civilians and the regulation of warfare. [Legal Framework Governing Non-State Actors] *Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949*) * Common Article 3* applies in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) and obligates all parties, including non-state actors, to follow basic humanitarian rules. These include the humane treatment of civilians, the prohibition of torture, and the protection of those who are not participating in hostilities. *Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (2012)* The ICC convicted Lubanga, the leader of an armed group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for using child soldiers. This case affirmed that non-state actors are bound by IHL and can be prosecuted for violations such as child soldier recruitment during a NIAC, underlining the applicability of Common Article 3. [Additional Protocol II (1977)] AP II builds on Common Article 3 and provides more detailed protections during NIACs. It recognizes the legal obligations of non-state actors to comply with IHL, such as distinguishing between combatants and civilians and refraining from targeting civilian objects. : *Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda (2019)* Ntaganda was convicted by the ICC for war crimes, including the recruitment of child soldiers and the targeting of civilians. This case further highlights how non-state actors involved in NIACs are accountable under IHL, particularly regarding the recruitment of children and the protection of civilians. [Customary International Law] In addition to treaty law, customary international law applies to non-state actors. These are rules that have become universally binding through widespread practice and acceptance. : *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (1986)* The ICJ ruled that the United States, by supporting the Contras (a non-state armed group in Nicaragua), violated IHL. This case illustrates that states can be held responsible for actions by non-state actors under their control or support, reinforcing that non-state actors in NIACs are bound by IHL, even if not directly accountable in court. [Accountability of Non-State Actors] Non-state actors can be held accountable for violations of IHL. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction to prosecute non-state actors for war crimes, such as recruitment of child soldiers, targeting civilians, and use of prohibited weapons. *Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (2016)* Bemba, the leader of the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC), was convicted for war crimes committed by his militia in the Central African Republic, including attacks on civilians and sexual violence. This case confirms that non-state actors, including militias, can be held liable for IHL violations. [Challenges in Enforcement] Despite the application of IHL to non-state actors, enforcement remains challenging: Non-state actors may not have formal command structures, making it difficult to ensure compliance with IHL. The lack of recognition as legitimate parties to a conflict complicates the enforcement of IHL and accountability. However, international mechanisms like the ICC have taken steps to prosecute non-state actors for serious violations.