MP Final Exam Study Doc PDF

Private Military Companies (1)​ History (a)​ Medieval & Early Modern Europe (i)​ Condottieri (“Contractors”) (ii)​ Maritime Privateers (b)​ 20th C. : After WWII (i)​ Fighting Anti-colonial movements...

Private Military Companies (1)​ History (a)​ Medieval & Early Modern Europe (i)​ Condottieri (“Contractors”) (ii)​ Maritime Privateers (b)​ 20th C. : After WWII (i)​ Fighting Anti-colonial movements (ii)​ Intervention in civil wars 1960s and 1970s (c)​ After the cold war (i)​ “Executive Outcomes” in Sierra Leone & Angola (2)​ Contemporary PMSc (a)​ Structure, activities, and clients (i)​ From large and publicly traded to small and secretive (ii)​ Largest PMCs offer “bundled services” (From catering and cleaning, to troop training, surveillance, and combat) (iii)​ Public relations : shake off the mercenary label (iv)​ Diverse clients : Govs, corps, IGOz, media, NGOs (v)​ Close ties with host govs esp U.S (3)​ World’s largest PMCs (a)​ Academi (Blackwater) : Main client us gov, personal security, transportation, army support, maritime security (b)​ G4S : UK -based: 600,000 + employees in 125 countries ; personal protection ; mine clearance; detention; mil training (c)​ DynCorp : Embassy protection, counter-narcotics, military training, child pornography and sex trafficking accusations (d)​ MPRI : V. close to U.S. military , military training for U.S partner governments (Colombia, liberia, croatia, Afgh) (4)​ Political & Ethical Challenges (a)​ General Problems (i)​ Too close to host governments (ii)​ Strengthen autocratic regimes (iii)​ Excessive violence ; sex trafficking ; plunder (iv)​ Lack of regulation , oversight, accountability (5)​ Questions for Just War Theory (a)​ Right Authority : break State’s monopoly ? (i)​ U.S ITAR licensing (ii)​ Once and for all approval, no continuing oversight (b)​ Just cause : adequate deliberation ? (c)​ In bello : Discrimination and proportionality Reading Questions  Avant and de Nevers , “Military contractors & The American Way of War” 1.​ What are the three most common services that PMCs provide, according to the authors ? Logistics services, security services, and reconstruction services 2.​ How have PMCs supported U.S foreign policy toward Latin America ? They provide personnel that cannot be limited by congress which has improved security conditions in Plan Colombia 3.​ In what ways, according to the article, can using private contractors strengthen but potentially also weaken military effectiveness? They strengthen through speed and flexibility and weaken through questionable behavior 4.​ What are some of the accountability issues related to employing PMCs that the article discusses? Accountability is based on private contracts and reduced transparency lack of oversight 5.​ In what ways can the use of contractors allow U.S policymakers to be less constrained by public opinion? (is this development to be welcomed ?) It allows them to do what they want because PMCs are accountable to leaders / employers not publics Sean McFate, The Modern Mercenary 1.​ Why does McFate believe that the “market for force” is likely to increasingly resemble a genuine free market? Because firms pattern themselves after their biggest client to attract more business 2.​ What is the difference between mercenaries and private military enterprises, according to McFate? Military enterprises raise armies rather than command them. 3.​ McFate claims that in 2008, the PMC Blackwater was approached about staging a humanitarian intervention in Darfur. Setting aside the fact that such an operation would have violated international law, do you think the use of PMCs for humanitarian interventions would be politically wise ? It could reduce loss of American life but our lower stakes could risk sloppy work which may be costly 4.​ In what sense were military enterprisers (mercenary entrepreneurs) and political rulers in early modern Europe “codependent” according to McFate? Without them it was hard to wage war but with them it was hard to win. Leased entire regiments 5.​ What were the main characteristics of private military actors in the 1960s and 1970s, and how did they differ from present-day PMCs? They were more loosely organized and were focused on direct combat rules than they are now. James Pattinson, “Just War Theory and the Privatization of Military Force” 1.​ Why does Pattison think that we should focus on the intentions, rather than the motives, of PMCs? Because it is intentions rather than motivations that are the subject of JWT purpose vs drive 2.​ According to Pattison, it “is vital that those undertaking the use of force should possess right intention.” Do you agree that the intentions of PMCs and their individual members are morally relevant, or do only the intentions of the authorities/states that hire them matter? A bit of both  3.​ Why does reliance on PMCs increase the likelihood of international instability, according to Pattison? Capabilities of weaker govs lack of accountability and precedent of vigilantism 4.​ How, according to Pattison, might reliance on PMCs undermine democratic control over the use of military force? Removes the process of approval and evaluation within domestic spheres 5.​ Does Pattison think that private contractors are legitimate targets in war, and what is his reasoning? Spear analogy - in most cases they are considered legitimate Jus Post Bellum And Democratization (1)​ Justice After War (Theory) (a)​ Just Termination (i)​ End War before objectives fully met when : 1)​ Rightful intention no longer satisfied 2)​ Proportionality criterion no longer met 3)​ No longer any reasonable chance of success 4)​ Peaceful resort becomes available (ii)​ Justice After War 1)​ Ad bellum, in bello, post bellum a)​ All 3 phases need to be just i)​ Just reconstruction cannot redeem unjust war b)​ Declared ends impose obligations after victory i)​ Restore status quo ante ? ii)​ Punishment (to deter future aggression) ? iii)​ Human-rights vindication ? iv)​ Self-sustaining / inclusive governance ? v)​ Liberal democracy ? (b)​ Territorial Compensations ? (i)​ Kant (MM,1793) : “The victor cannot claim compensation …. Vanquished state and its subject cannot forfeit their civil freedom through the conquest of the country” (ii)​ E-G Alsace-Lorraine: 1648 to France; to Ger. 1871; France in 1918; Germany 1940; France 1945 (iii)​ Outlawed post-1945 ; “territorial integrity norm” UN charter , Art. 2.4 Iraq in 1990, russia in 2014 (iv)​ Bass : Victorious states have no right of conquest (2)​ How Much Domestic Political change (a)​ Bass : presumption against transformation/regime change (b)​ Centrality of self-determination in liberal thought (i)​ Kant [PP, 1795] : “No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state.”  (ii)​ Laws of Occupation : preserve the status quo [1907 Hague convention; 1949 Geneva convention] (c)​ Democratizing ‘genocidal states’? (i)​ Genocidal states have committed supreme evil ; have no international standing (ii)​ Humanitarian interveners have a jus post bellum duty to reconstruct 1)​ Change [political regime a)​ Form of punishment b)​ Enable peaceful domestic self-determination & protection of ethnic minority rights (iii)​ Can democracy be imposed ? 1)​ J.S. Mill : “liberty bestowed on a people from the outside will have nothing real, nothing permanent.” a)​ Love for liberty developed through arduous struggle 2)​ Regime change inevitably privileges some, alienates others. (interveners may not understand local politics) 3)​ Social and economic preconditions for democracy 4)​ Intervention weakens / destroys local institutions ; outsiders lack will to remain ; civil war (or nationalist resistance). Gary Bass, “Jus Post Bellum” 1. What are the key policy measures required by jus post bellum, according to Bass? No imposition of puppet regimes, restraint in transforming society, no right of cultural reconstruction 2. What exactly does Bass mean when he writes that there should be a “presumption against reconstruction” by victorious powers? That there should be no assumption to reconstruct set as the norm 3. What counts as a “genocidal state,” according to Bass? Do you agree that such states should be treated differently during the post-bellum phase? The state that has lost the moral personality that normal states have; it has lost its claim to be recognized and respected as a state 4. What are the arguments for war crimes trials, according to Bass? They are morally mandated because they are individual , remove dangerous leaders 5. What are some arguments against war crimes trials that Bass notes? The duty of peace must outweigh the duty of justice 6. Should vanquished aggressor states have to pay reparations, according to Bass? What are some of the trade-offs involved? Yes but the trade-off is that the people who suffered are punished by the burden instead of compensated Alex Bellamy, “The RTP and the problem of regime change” 1. Bellamy argues that regime change is sometimes necessary as part of a humanitarian intervention to stop mass atrocities. What are the different types of regime change that Bellamy identifies? As a response to genocide, foreign-imposed, negotiated settlements, coups, deaths 2. How have most instances of genocide and mass atrocities ended, according to Bellamy? A little over half had ended only when the perpetrators themselves decided to terminate or reduce the killing, in all the decision to terminate mass atrocities was voluntary tended to involve some degree of regime change 3. What are the principal objections to foreign-imposed regime change that Bellamy discusses? Violation of state sovereignty, and self-determination 4. Can the UN Security Council legitimately authorize forcible regime change? Yes in order to maintain peace 5. Bellamy proposes “five tests” for legitimate regime change. What are they? Must have a mandate, must demonstrate duty through effective response, show known facts, calibration of means and ends 6. What is the purpose of these five checks? What do they guard against,according to Bellamy? (And do you agree?) To ensure motivations are those of integrity and guard against self-interest Steven Lee, “Justice at the end of war” 1. Can punishment be the legitimate goal of a just war, according to Lee? Thus, aggressor states can be punished if the goal is deterrence, and that can be a justification for the use of force beyond the restoration of the status quo ante. But note that the impermissibility of preventive war implies that deterrent punishment by itself is not a justification for war, though it may be an acceptable justification in conjunction with immediate self-defense. 28 2. To what extent does force still apply in the post-bellum phase? in the immediate aftermath of a war, the victorious side exercises the threat of force for the sake of compellence in achieving its aims. Compellence is the threat of force to exact positive concessions from an opponent, that is, to get the opponent to give up something it values; in contrast, deterrence is a state’s threat of force to get an opponent to refrain from positive action against the interests of the state. 46 Deterrence seeks only something negative from the opponent, to stop it from aggression, while compellence seeks something positive 3. Can military occupation be justified under the national defense paradigm? Yes if it is necessary to get the aggressor to demobilize and partially disarm. 4. How do the national defense paradigm and the human rights paradigm differ on the question of post-bellum political regime change? The human rights paradigm has a closer link to the concept of good governance. 5. What is the “pottery barn rule” in the context of jus post bellum? If you break a regime you have an obligation to bear the cost of building another Leslie Vinjamuri, “The Distant Promise of a Negotiated Justice” 1. When did the idea of international prosecutions for war crimes become widely accepted, as explained by Vinjamuri? Post WWII 2. How, according to Vinjamuri, has the emergence of the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC) in 2002 changed expectations for peace negotiations aimed at ending civil conflicts? Still handled more internally 3. Vinjamuri identifies a “gap between principles and practice” when it comes to international criminal justice. What does she mean by that, and what are some of the examples she gives? Pragmatic incentive, concern that US service members will need to appear before ICC, domestic politics creates a conflict of interest, not going after universal targets, unequal enforcement 4. What are “sequencing proposals” in the context of international criminal justice? An emphasis on timing and order of events, when is the right time to go for justice? 5. Vinjamuri argues that a do-no-harm standard should guide decisions about justice and accountability in postwar transitions. What exactly does he mean by that? Avoid inciting civil conflicts and or violence, establishment of traditional forces needed to prioritize civilian safety U.S Decision making on the Use of Force (1)​ The President and Key Advisors (a)​ The president as commander in chief (b)​ Secretaries of state , defense (c)​ National security advisor (d)​ Chairman of the joint chiefs of staff (e)​ Vice president (3)​ The bureaucracy (a)​ Different agencies and departments compete to shape national preferences and policy. (i)​ Bureaucracies want to maximize their own influence (ii)​ Bureaucrats reflect interests of agency they represent (“where you stand depends on where you sit”) (iii)​ Top-ranking generals & admirals THE most parochial senior gov officials (4)​ The U.S Military (Weinberger-Powell Doctrine) (a)​ Intervene military only when: (i)​ Vital national interests are threatened (ii)​ Objective (political and military) are clearly defined (iii)​ Congress and people are likely to support (iv)​ Alternatives have been exhausted (last resort) (v)​ Clear ‘exit strategy’ for U.S forces (vi)​ Willing to deploy “overwhelming force” (b)​ The military’s Influence (i)​ Professional expertise : present options as impractical (“this can't be done or this will cost a lot’) (ii)​ Threaten to speak out in public (press leaks) (iii)​ Threaten public resignation (5)​ Congress and the Use of Force (a)​ The 1973 War Powers Resolution (i)​ Report Troop deployment to Congress within 48hrs (ii)​ If troops “face imminent or active hostility”, congressional authorization required within 60 days (b)​ Members of congress : blame avoidance (c)​ But : congressional opposition / influence grows as interventions become protracted + costs rise  (6)​ Leaders and U.S Public Support (a)​ Framing : portray crisis as requiring decisive action (b)​ Take the initiative : rally round the flag effect (i)​ Relatively short-lived (ii)​ Weakened by lack of elite consensus (media indexing) (c)​ Public support for mil. Int. depends on objective (i)​ Repel aggression (highest support) (ii)​ Humanitarian intervention (moderate support) (iii)​ Internal political change (lowest support) Colin Deuck, Reluctant Crusaders 1. How, according to Dueck, has the classical liberal creed influenced American strategic thinking, specifically on military intervention? It supports the idea that democratic governments are inherently less warlike than authoritarian ones, democracy encourages trade, and trade, in turn, encourages peace. 2. What are the two U.S. foreign policy traditions within liberalism that Duck discusses? Limited Liability and promoting a more liberal world order 3. What is the U.S. tradition of “limited liability” in foreign affairs, and what does it mean for military intervention? Limited role and use of limited means for a limited risk. Yet they have a readiness for military intervention. Uses less leverage than it has. 4. What are the four strategic subcultures that Dueck identifies within America’s liberal creed, and what follows from each of them for military intervention? Internationalists(more willing), nationalists(only when good for us), progressives(pro diplomacy), and realists(willing to commit for strategy w more liability). 5. How, according to Dueck, does a particular subculture become dominant in any given period? The intersection of international conditions, dominant strategic cultures, domestic politics, and political leadership. Kahneman and Renshon, “Hawkish biases” 1. How does the “unrealistic optimism” bias make military intervention more likely? Through the illusion of control we think it will go our way. 2. What is the fundamental attribution error, and why does it make the use of force in international crises more likely? It reverses when distrusted or disliked actors commit positive actions and it favors hawkish actions. 3. What follows from the “illusion of transparency” bias for our ability to resolve disputes through peaceful negotiation? When the actor’s intentions are not hostile the bias increases the risk of dangerous misunderstandings. 4. How does the “endowment effect” and related status-quo bias make negotiated compromise solutions more difficult? Induces an aversion to making concessions and a reluctance to accept objectively fair exchanges. 5. How does the “certainty effect” favor risk seeking in losses, and how can this increase the likelihood of military action? Exacerbate the reluctance to make strategic concessions which then prolonged the conflict or negotiations. Murray and Tama, “US foreign policymaking and National Security” 1. Who are the members of the president’s “inner circle”? SoS, SoD, NSA, CoS, DNI, Chairman of the joint chiefs 2. How can members of the bureaucracy influence decision-making in the field of national security policy? If their wills do not align they can hold up progress 3. How does the U.S. Congress influence decision-making on the use of military force? Congress has the power to declare war and authorize use of force 4. Whose views tend to be reflected in U.S. news coverage of national security affairs? Government officials 5. What types of military intervention usually enjoy strong support among the American public? Those that protect U.S national interests or are sold as quick and easy, rally around the flag Using Force Through Multinational Coalitions (1)​ Alliances VS. Multinational coalitions (a)​ International alliance (i)​ Formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states (ii)​ Usually concluded in peacetime. Institutionalized (iii)​ Expectation that will endure beyond specific war (b)​ Multinational Coalition (i)​ Ad-hoc multinational understanding to undertake specific missions. Little or not institutionalization. (ii)​ Dissolve once the mission is complete (c)​ U.S alliance commitments (i)​ 1947 inter-american treaty of reciprocal assistance (ii)​ 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (iii)​ 1951 Australia New Zealand US Treaty (ANZUS) (iv)​ 1951 US Japan treaty of mutual cooperation and security (v)​ 1951 US philippines mutual defense treaty (vi)​ 1953 US south korea mutual defense treaty (vii)​ 1954-1977 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (viii)​ 1955-1980 Sino-American mutual defense treaty (ix)​ 1981 US-Israel strategic cooperation agreement (x)​ 2012 US Afghanistan strategic Partnership agreement (2)​ Why do states form alliances and how do they work? (a)​ Deterrence (prevent war) (b)​ Tether Adversaries to neutralize threat (e.g Ger in Nato) (c)​ Bandwagoning with threatening state (malaysia china) (d)​ Hedging for political influence (NATO PFP; SCO)  (i)​ Challenges : Burden sharing and abandonment / entrapment (e)​ Waging war through institutionalized alliances : (i)​ Pros : facilitate joint planning ; stable relations (ii)​ Cons : slow decision-making; members may not agree (f)​ The NATO experience (i)​ North atlantic treaty signed April 4, 1949 (ii)​ Decision making by consensus (iii)​ North Atlantic Council (NAC) supreme political organ (iv)​ Two strategic commands 1)​ Supreme HQ allied powers Europe (SHAPE), in belgium 2)​ Allied command transformation, in Norfolk, VA (v)​ Balkans : Coercive diplomacy + peacekeeping (vi)​ Counterterrorism : Afghanistan + anti-ISIS coalition (3)​ Why do states seek support ? (a)​ Enhance legitimacy (i)​ Domestically & Internationally (ii)​ Coalition vs. UN backing (iii)​ Value of token contributions (b)​ Facilitate bargaining / coercive diplomacy (i)​ Present a united front (c)​ Burden sharing ; landing and basing rights (i)​ Depends on capabilities of coalition partners (4)​ How do states form Multinational coalitions ? (a)​ Stress alliance commitments (b)​ Hegemonic leverage (c)​ Side-payments and issue linkage (d)​ Preference coverage Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan 1. What does NATO’s “unanimity principle” in decision-making about military intervention mean in practice? It places greater restriction which is positive and negative 2. How does NATO force generation for particular military operations work? Commanders talk to SHAPE who talk to CSJOR who then confer with member states 3. How can a NATO force commander on the ground get the maximum effort possible out of every country, according to the authors? Assign missions proportional to the effort they willingly provide 4. What do the authors mean when they claim that within NATO’s stabilization force for Afghanistan, “each country was fighting its own war”? Each country managed its own battle space with relatively little regard for how others were running their AORs 5. How does coalition warfare result in increased “agency costs,” according to the authors? Through delegation and authorizing the agent to act on behalf of the principal country Marina Henke, Constructing Allied Cooperation 1. What are “pivotal states,” according to Henke, and what type of state can become a pivotal state? These states hold the strongest preference intensity with regard to the formation of coalitions 2. Why, according to Henke, do military interveners often seek to persuade other states to join them in military coalitions? Increase legitimacy and burden sharing. 3. What does Henke mean by “diplomatic embeddedness,” and how can it increase the information available to military interveners about the preferences of potential coalition partners? The cumulative number of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic ties that connect a country dyad. 4. What are “cooperation brokers,” and how does diplomatic embeddedness multiply their number? Actors that can serve as intermediaries between pivotal states and potential coalition participants and help construct collective mobilization. 5. Why does Henke think that even superpowers like the United States cannot simply coerce other states into joining military coalitions? Because they lack Best Alternative To A Negotiated Agreement leverage and can worsen small states Sarah Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience 1. Why do military interveners benefit from legitimacy, according to Kreps? Helps with stability and domestic perceptions 2. What are the main costs of fighting together with coalition partners, according to Kreps? Opportunity costs because of time 3. How, according to Kreps, does a state’s time horizon influence the likelihood that it will seek multilateral backing before intervening? Longer means more stable expectations and time to plan and think 4. How does an intervention’s expected operational commitment influence coalition-building efforts? Low operational commitment connected to short term temptations 5. What are the two principal alternatives to her own explanation that Kreps identifies and examines? Multilateralism and Regionalism and power dynamics Jus In Bello (1)​ The Laws of War (a)​ The limitation of War (i)​ Jus ad bellum : When is it right to fight ? (ii)​ Jus in bello : How should war be fought 1)​ Protect people who are not fighting 2)​ Curb the bruta;ity of war (e.g outlaw certain weapons ) 3)​ Facilitate future peace (iii)​ Rules are the same for all - those fighting wars of aggression as well as those fighting in self-defense (b)​ The War Convention : International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (i)​ Universal moral principles vs the Law of nations 1)​ Customary law : regular practice + opinio juris  2)​ Treaty Law : formal written agreements (ii)​ Henri Dunant : 1859 founding of ICRC (iii)​ 1949 Geneva Conventions (protection of wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians) (iv)​ Conventions outlawing biological and chemical weapons; anti-personnel landmines ; cluster munitions (v)​ Key Principles of IHL 1)​ IHL conventions outlaw a)​ Targeting of civilians b)​ Torture and inhumane treatment of detainess c)​ Attacks on hospitals and aid workers 2)​ Establish obligations to a)​ Provide safe passage to civilians (‘humanitarian corridors’) b)​ Provide access to humanitarian organizations (c)​ Core Principles of Jus In Bello (i)​ Discrimination 1)​ Combatants should attack only combatants a)​ Civilians /noncombatant immunity b)​ Combatant liability (soldiers are liable to attack b/c collectively they pose a threat to the lives of others ) 2)​ Some civilians are liable to attack a)​ Those who produce what soldiers need to fight (Walzer) 3)​ Dual-Use facilities a)​ Power grids, bridges, railways (ii)​ Proportionality 1)​ Protocol 1 Geneva Conventions : “refrain from launching attacks expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life … excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” 2)​ In bello proport. Applies to particular actions, battles, attacks. 3)​ How compare civilian damage and military advantage ? (iii)​ Due Care 1)​ Unintended but foreseeable evil must be reduced as much as possible. > soldiers need to accept risk 2)​ Protocol 1 : “constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian populations; all feasible precautions shall be taken… to avoid incidental loss of civilian life.” 3)​ Protocol 1 ratified by 174 states ; but not by U.S Valentino, “Moral Character or Character of War?” 1. Some scholars argue that U.S. citizens have “internalized” the international norm of noncombatant immunity. What does Valentino think about this? He agrees that it was part of a global change in views about human rights. 2. How has the changing character of the wars that the U.S. has fought influenced the targeting of civilians, according to Valentino? There is an operation at a comparatively low cost in American lives, they don't need to target civilians. 3. Why, according to Valentino, has the US military become less supportive of bombing civilian population centers since the end of the Vietnam War? Avoiding citizens has now become an aspect of strategy to avoid labels of brutality and terrorism 4. What did Valentino and his research partner Scott Sagan find when they asked Americans to imagine a war against Iran? People were more comfortable with air raids of traditional bombs than people thought simply because they were not nuclear bombs. People would approve of the strike if the president ordered it in their scenario Nina Tannenwald, “Assessing the Effects and Effectiveness of the Geneva Conventions” 1. What are some of the main challenges in assessing the effectiveness of the laws of war (also known as “International Humanitarian Law” or IHL)? Lack of data, changing types of war and means, technology. 2. What are some challenges with the notions of “military necessity” and “collateral damage” that are central to the modern law of armed conflict? Too much left up to military advisors, loopholes, subjective nature. 3. What is the “key realist insight” regarding compliance with the laws of war? The more war cost the more willing to violate international law, in times of war the law falls silent. 4. What factors encourage compliance with the laws of war from the standpoint of liberal international relations theory? Key role of national self-interest, cooperation is key and restraint can be advantageous. 5. How can identity-based arguments explain compliance and noncompliance with the laws of war? War is a social and cultural practice, action based on cultural motivations. 6. What, according to Tannenwald, has been the “most fundamental effect” of the laws of war regime? (note: this is about something deeper than promoting compliance) Establishing shared values / framework for democratic deliberation. Insurgents and Secessionists (1)​ Insurgency as asymmetric war (a)​ Symmetric vs asymmetric warfare (i)​ Symmetric warfare: two sides are similarly organized; follow the same rules; represent recognized states. (ii)​ Asymmetric Warfare: parties are not equal; one does not represent a state; adopts unconventional methods 1)​ Insurgents can exploit civilians a)​ Targeting; indiscriminate among civilians 2)​ Geneva conventions : insurgents may hide among civilian population (iii)​ A short history of insurgency 1)​ American war of independence 2)​ Napoleonic wars; spanish guerrilla 1808-1812 3)​ 19th C. democratic insurgencies  4)​ Anti-colonial insurgencies after 1945 5)​ Ethno-national insurgencies after 1989 (iv)​ How do insurgents fight? 1)​ Mobility ; surprise; harassment; avoid frontal; assaults 2)​ Reliance on popular support; need to treat people well 3)​ How do insurgents win ? Phased guerrilla; avoid defeat. 4)​ What distinguishes insurgents from terrorists ? a)​ Significant popular support b)​ Violence typically aimed at enemy soldiers (not civs) (b)​ Ethics : terrorism vs Guerrilla Warfare (i)​ Why terrorism is always wrong 1)​ “Terrorism is random murder of innocent people” (Walzer) 2)​ Not true that “nothing else is possible (never a legitimate last resort) 3)​ But OK in principle when a group facing imminent threat of political and physical extinction (“supreme emergency”) (ii)​ Just insurgency : classic thinkers 1)​ John Locke : “appeal to heaven” against foreign occupation & tyrannical domestic rule 2)​ Mazzini : guerrilla bands as “precursors of the nation” a)​ Be careful not to alienate civilian population 3)​ Legitimate ends in liberal theory a)​ Regime change b)​ National liberation (2)​ Just Cause and Other Just War Principles (a)​ Modern JWT : Just Cause (i)​ Rebels seeking regime overthrow 1)​ Genocidal violence, crimes against humanity (ii)​ Rebels seeking secession 1)​ Colonialism / foreign occupation 2)​ Any group that views itself as a nation 3)​ Genocide and other basic rights violations (Buchanan’s “remedial rights theory”) 4)​ Violations of intrastate autonomy agreements (b)​ Other Just War Principles (i)​ Right Authority 1)​ Popular support (Walzer) : “when the people do not provide recognition and sup[port, guerrillas acquire no war rights.” 2)​ Movement itself needs to be inclusive, transparent (gross) (ii)​ Last resort (iii)​ Reasonable chance of success (iv)​ Proportionality : resisted evil greater than created evil (c)​ In bello : moral grey zone  (i)​ Assassination of civilian agents of the state (administrators,teachers, politicians) (ii)​ Walzer : legitimate targets if engages in “oppressive activities” (assassins deserve respect not due to terrorists) (iii)​ Gross: OK to intentionally harm civilians responsible for unjust occupation or grave human rights violations (iv)​ But L less than lethal force (e.g acts of sabotage, injure without killing) Lee, Ethics and War, chap. 7 1. How does “recognition of belligerency” for insurgent groups modify the national defense paradigm, according to Lee? Artificial freedom ignores moral basis 2. For Michael Walzer, secessionist groups are legitimate (and deserve international support) when they have rallied their “own people and made some headway in the arduous struggle for freedom”—thus demonstrating that they represent a separate political community. What is problematic about this view, according to Lee? Moral obligation of ending injustice 3. Lee claims that according to the human rights paradigm, which he embraces, “not all struggles for national liberation are just, as in the case where an occupying power is protecting a minority within a state that the revolutionaries would persecute.” Does the protection of national minorities indeed justify colonialism – what do you think? Eh 4. According to Lee, there are at least three different ways in which civilians“play an important role in guerrilla warfare”? What are these ways? Directly, by provoking opponents, used for protection 5. Should insurgent groups fighting for a just cause be entitled to ignore aspects of jus in bello, given that they are usually at a disadvantage when fighting against powerful states? No one is above jus in bello Allen Buchanan, “Self-Determination and Secession” 1.​ How, according to Buchanan, is self-determination possible for a people or nation, short of full political independence? Both constitutive and ongoing SD reject statehood or to be self governing but no independent. 2.​ What is Buchanan’s argument about a “remedial right” to (unilateral) secession? Precisely under what circumstances is the right activated? A right to a remedy of last resort against serious and persistent injustices 3.​ Does the right to secede also automatically entail a right to recognition of independence by other states? No because the right to establish a state and being a state are different 4.​ What does Buchanan mean when he writes that “institutional considerations” should guide theories of secession? Connections to law governed practices of recognition  5.​ What would be the advantages of requiring would-be secessionists to have their claims evaluated by an “impartial international adjudicative procedure,” according to Buchanan? Reduce non-qualified groups and reduce quick resort to secession Patterson, “Arguing the American Revolution” 1. What exactly did the British crown charters grant the American colonies? Perpetual immunity from British Taxation and freedom over internal affairs 2. What were the 1763 Stamp Acts and 1766 Townshend Acts about? Taxation without representation 3. Did the 1774 Coercive Acts provide the colonists with a just cause for war? Yes Because of the state of their affairs in terms of health and liberty acting in self defense 4. Patterson makes a good case that the British monarch had lost his legitimate authority over the American colonies; but did the colonists themselves have legitimate authority to declare a war? They were their own regional leaders but were not recognized as sovereign its like civil war 5. Which of the legitimate grounds for secession identified by Allen Buchanan were present in the American case as described by Patterson? Severe economic exploitation and lack of self-deter for christian population Military Strategy (1)​ Strategy : Meaning and Logic (a)​ Military Strategy : the link between political objectives (ends) and the use of force (means). (i)​ Does not = tactics : about employing troops in battle (ii)​ An art more than a science ; yet can be studied systematically (b)​ Clausewitz on war : (i)​ an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will (ii)​ War is a social activity -> does not exist in a vacuum (iii)​ War is shaped by a trinity of variables 1)​ Passions/Primordial violence (the people) 2)​ The play of chance & probability (the military) 3)​ Reason (The government, setting policy) (c)​ The nature of war is determined by the interaction of (i)​ Objectives of the two sides (ii)​ People, gov, mils of the belligerents (iii)​ Attitudes of allies and neutrals (d)​ Nature of war is dynamic - importance of identifying enemy's center of gravity (i)​ What is the relationship between strategy and ethics in war? (ii)​ Just war theory - jus ad bellum jus in bello jus post bellum (must be lesser evil) Core Principles and Historical Foundations  (1)​ Bosnia And Iraq - UN peacekeeping force was ineffective 1992 , large-scale ethnic cleansing (a)​ U.S wanted to strike the serbs (only air) (b)​ Europeans wanted to stick to impartial peacekeeping safe areas negotiations (c)​ NATO sends mixed messages : emboldens bothBosnian muslims and serbs -> massacre at Srebrenica (i)​ London conference july 1995 -> NATO airstrikes OK (2)​ Iraq 2003- 91 gulf war, res 687- sanctions no more WMD, 90s- policy shifts towards regime change 911- keeping saddam in a box no longer feasible (a)​ Axis of evil and anticipatory SD 2003 Invasion - limited UN effort, domestic support immense (3)​ Alternatives to Just War Theory (a)​ Realism- Flexible morality (machiavelli) well used cruelty / moral skepticism (hobbes) - in state of nature there is no right or wrong / heuristic realism - war’s consequences unpredictable costs may outweigh benefits be prudent (b)​ Pacifism and Non-intervention (i)​ War always wrong end never justifies the mean (ii)​ Two types of morality deontology and consequentialism 1)​ D- justice requires that we reject killing unconditionally 2)​ C- consequences of war are always worse than consequences of not going to war Conditional pacifists - acknowledge war is justified in exceptional circumstances (4)​ JWT - Lesser of 2 evils punish violations of the law of nature (a)​ Jus ad bellum - is it right to fight (b)​ Jus in bello - behavior in war post bellum - justice after war (5)​ Who has the authority to initiate a just war, according to Thomas Aquinas? (a)​ Given that Christianity views killing as evil, how does Aquinas justify war and the possibility of killing other humans? (6)​ Ad bellum and in bello princip-les (a)​ Just cause, right intention, legitimate authority, reasonable chance of success, last resort, discrimination, proportionality Thomas Aquinas,Summa Theologiae 1.Who has the authority to initiate a just war, according to Aquinas? Those in the position of supreme authority, it is their responsibility to overlook the wellbeing of the common. 2.What are the two other necessary conditions for a war to be just according to Aquinas, besides right authority? A just cause and rightful intention 3.Given that Christian doctrine considers killing to be evil, how does Aquinas justify war and the possibility of killing other humans? Mostly in self-defense , “it is lawful to repel force by force provided one does not exceed the limits of the blameless defense. 4.What does the principle of proportionality require, according to Aquinas? Rightful intention with no intention of cruelty Hugo Grotius,The Law of War and Peace 1.How does Grotius “prove” the existence of a universal law of nature ?(Note: Thomas Hobbes, Grotius’ famous predecessor, claimed that “necessity is the mother of morality. Grotius challenges this.) The nature of man is the mother of the law of nature 2.Grotius claims that mutual relations among states are regulated primarily by the “law of nature.” Does this law of nature differ from what he calls the “law of nations,” and if so, how? Their distinction comes from the character of the matter. 3.Grotius writes that the law that applies to relations among states, “even though without a sanction, is not entirely void of effect.”What is it, for Grotius, that keeps nations from disregarding the laws common to them? Peace of conscience,not deviating from common practices. Justice approved injustice condemned 4.What is the only admissible just cause for war, according to Grotius, And what should limit (i.e., set boundaries to) any just war? The use of force which does not violate the rights of others. The end and aim of the war being the preservation of life and limb. Steven Lee, Ethics and War, chap. 2. 1.What has been the main goal of the just war tradition, according to Steven Lee? To provide a framework for those who must distinguish just and unjust wars. 2.What did Plato’s, Aristotle’s, Cicero’s, and Augustine’s views on just war have in common? Just cause and the advancement of the greater good 3.How does Augustine justify defensive war, even after claiming that self-defense is morally questionable? The principle of due care, and that this is doe in defense of others (community) 4.Can war be just on both sides according to Francisco de Vitoria? If so, under what circumstances? Yes as long as what is permitted to one is permitted to the other. 5.What does the contemporary jus contra bellum paradigm imply, and how does it differ from the early modern just war paradigm? It implies that peace should be placed higher than justice. Emmerich de Vattel 1.What is a key feature of sovereignty, according to Vattel? A claimed and actual independence from all others. 2.Vattel does not deny the existence of a universal natural law. But he Denies that natural law should be used to determine the justice of any particular war. Because ruling on this should required within the bounds of a law whose principles are consecrated to the safety and welfare of the universal society of nations. 3.What is necessary, according to Vattel, to set bounds to the destruction caused by war? War must be accounted just on both sides 4.Could we, as 21st-century citizens, find a way of reconciling(i.e., of resolving the tension between) what Vattel calls the necessary Law of Nations and the voluntary Law of Nations? Yes, because we can rule of justness separate from ideal circumstances. Collective Security And National Defense (1)​ What is Collective Security ? (a)​ International translation of slogan “one for all & all for one” (b)​ Collective international police action (c)​ Proposition: the unlawful use of force by anyone will be met by combined force of everyone else (2)​ Requirements for Collective Security (a)​ Belief in Indivisibility of Peace (i)​ States must closely identify their own interests with the general interest of mankind (b)​ Universal membership : nobody left out (c)​ Certainty of collective action : no ifs or buts (d)​ Moral clarity no doubts as to who is the aggressor (3)​ Dilemma Of Circularity (a)​ Cannot work unless states have faith in the system (b)​ But hard to have confidence in the system without demonstration that it actually works (c)​ Further problem: most states would hardly agree to punish their close allies and friends (i)​ Collective security incompatible with permanent alliances (4)​ The UNited Nations (a)​ Primary tasks : maintenance of international peace and security (i)​ Save succeeding generations from the scourge of war (b)​ Un charter makes threat or use of force illegal, except for (i)​ Self-defense in face of armed attacks (ii)​ Collective police action authorized by security council (c)​ Principal organs (i)​ General assembly : non-binding resolutions (ii)​ Security Council : binding resolutions ; peace & security (iii)​ Secretariat executive body (d)​ UN Charter : Collective Security Provisions (i)​ Art. 39 determine the existence of any threat to the peace … or act of aggression (ii)​ Art. 41 decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed (iii)​ Art. 42 may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary (e)​ UN Standing Forces ? (i)​ U.N Charter : member states should make standing forces available to the organization (Art. 43) 1)​ SC would then decide when and where to deploy those forces (ii)​ In practice : “sub-contracting” to coalitions of states 1)​ Since 1990, SC has often authorized coalition of member states  2)​ Primarily interventions in internal wars (ethnic conflicts, civil wars) (5)​ What is Collective Defense ? (a)​ Collective Security is inclusive and inward oriented (i)​ Oppose unlawful use of force by anyone against anyone else (ii)​ Nobody knows in advance who might threaten the peace (b)​ Collective defense is outward-oriented : membership selective (i)​ Coordinate defense policy against common enemy (ii)​ Deter common threat, threat often identified in advance (iii)​ Formalized alliance (e.g NATO) (6)​ The Law of national self-defense (a)​ Art. 51 : Inherent right of individual or collective self-defence (i)​ Until the council has taken measures necessary to maintain peace and security (ii)​ Measures taken shall be immediately reported to the security council (b)​ Conditions for exercise of self-defense (i)​ Necessity : establish armed attack intentionally launched by/from a particular country (ii)​ Proportionality : Use of force should be reasonable and not excessive (iii)​ Immediacy : no undue time-lag between attack and exercise of self-defense (c)​ Two-phase rule of self - defense (i)​ Phase One : acting state unilaterally determines whether military action in self-defense is needed (ii)​ Phase Two : Security council reviews self-defense claim made by member state 1)​ The council may a)​ Give retrospective seal of approval b)​ Impose a general ceasefire c)​ Demand withdrawal of forces to the original lines d)​ Insist that the defending state cease its unilateral action e)​ Decide that the state that invokes self-defense is actually the aggressor (d)​ Modalities of armed self-defense (i)​ On the spot reaction to small attack (cross-border strike) (ii)​ Defensive armed reprisals ( In order to re-establish deterrence) (iii)​ Protection / extraction of nationals abroad (iv)​ War (all out armed conflict ) 1)​ Only 2 and 4 can be carried out collectively Steven Lee,Ethics and War, chap. 3 [B] 1.What does Lee mean when he says that just cause should be understood in deontological terms? He means that it should be assessed under moral obligations to oneself & those whom the duty is owed. Only harms that are also wrongs are concerned. 2.What does Lee mean when he writes that the legitimate authority criterion is purely procedural and lacks a moral content? He means that it fails to acknowledge the source, more how it is initiated instead of the characteristics of the conflict. 3.How does a rightful intention differ from a rightful motivation, and why does Lee suggest that we should prioritize the former over the latter? Intentions are adopted for a particular action and motivations are the underlying purpose for an action. Obligations conflict with intentions rather than motivations. 4.The (jus ad bellum) proportionality criterion, as Lee explains, is about the tradeoff between a war’s created evil and resisted evil. What exactly are the evils,or wrongs, to be considered; and is such a tradeoff actually possible? These levels include the wrongs against a state, acts of aggression, wrongs to individuals, violation of rights. No, because it's basically two wrongs that make a right. Steven Lee,Ethics and War, chap. 3 [A] 1. In what sense does the national defense paradigm compare political independence with personal liberty? What is the term we use for this analogy? The Domestic Analogy which means an attack by an individual violets liberty while aggression against a state violets independence. 2. If self-defense justifies going to war to recover occupied territory, then why was Argentina not justified in retaking the Falklands/Malvinas islands that it had previously controlled? The time-lag problem, land follows people, statute of limitations. 3. Is a hopeless war (i.e., a war that does not meet the reasonable prospects of success criterion) ever justified? Yes, because there are other means and just cause even a chance of failure. 4. What is the jus ad bellum dependence thesis, and does it make sense? A war is ad bellum just only if it is in bello just and a war is only in bello just only if it is ad bellum just. It requires judgment based on projections. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, chaps. 2, 4. [B] 1.How does Walzer justify the moral standing of states (and the related rights to territorial integrity and political sovereignty)? CHECK 2.Does an unjust territorial acquisition give rise to a permanent right on the part of the wronged party to forcibly recover that territory? CHECK 3.When does Walzer think that appeasement in the face of aggression might be justified, and who should ultimately decide the matter? When it is the only way of avoiding war when the cost of refusal or resistance than we can bear. 4.In what ways does Walzer’s legalist paradigm differ from the current UN Charter system? A system of societies, There must always be a point of enforcement. Nothing but aggression can justify war. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, chaps. 2, 4. [A] 1.What does Walzer mean when he claims that war is a form of tyranny? Force used on those who have no option but to support the military effort. 2.In what sense does Walzer disagree with General Sherman’s claim that “war is hell”? Some choose to go to war for their career. Voluntary fighting or small conflicts. 3.What justifies collective efforts to repel and punish aggression, for Walzer? Territorial integrity and political sovereignty Thomas Weiss et al.,The Theory and Practice of UN Collective Security 1.What are the main obstacles to effective collective security in the UN system, as identified by the authors? Collective security is difficult in the presence of alliances or interests. The power of the P5. can be costly to those supporting it. Based on the assumption that all victims are equally important. 2.What roles does the UN Secretary-General play in matters of international peace and security? Authority and delegation, maintaining oversight and determining the existence of a threat. 3.What is the “Uniting for Peace” resolution and why is it significant? CHECK 4.What do the authors mean when they write that the UN has resorted to a “sheriff’s posse” approach to dealing with international security crises? In that it delegates most of its authority in order to be more effective, leading from behind. 5.What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of delegating collective security enforcement to regional international organizations? CHECK Preemptive and Preventive War (1)​ Self-Defense (a)​ Current Standards : Self -Defense (i)​ Art. 51 “Inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member” (ii)​ Must be 1)​ Motivated by defensive concern 2)​ Intended to stop attacks or reverse its consequences 3)​ Directed against the responsible aggressor 4)​ Limited to necessary and proportional force 5)​ Reported to UNSC (2)​ Preemption : The Caroline Criteria (a)​ Preemptive self defense (i)​ 1837 pursuit of Canadian rebels across the border (ii)​ U.S steamboat caroline sunk on U.S territory (iii)​ Webster : Justifiable preemptive attack has to be 1)​ Overwhelming in its necessity 2)​ Leaving no choice of means 3)​ No moment of deliberation 4)​ Proportional (b)​ Are Caroline criteria too restrictive ? (i)​ Justify only defensive reactions to imminent threats (ii)​ What about anticipatory strikes when states still do have some choice of means and time to deliberate ? (iii)​ Walzer: striking first is legitimate when waiting seriously increases risk to territorial integrity and political independence (iv)​ Doyle: new risks , spread of wmds + rise of belligerent non state actors. Deterrence difficult (v)​ Is preventive action legitimate, when aggression is likely even though not imminent?  (3)​ From Preemption to Prevention ? (a)​ The Bush Doctrine (i)​ 2002 U.S National security strategy announces strategy of preemption (in fact prevention) (ii)​ Cheney’s 1% doctrue (iii)​ Pentagon’s summer 2002 documents 1)​ Deterrence no longer possible 2)​ Exceptions are needed to sovereignty rule 3)​ U.S power will still be checked internally and externally (no worries) David Rodin, “The Problem With Prevention” 1.What does Rodin mean when he says that consequentialism has severe epistemological problems when it comes to assessing whether preventive war is justified in particular cases? He means that consequentialism requires judgements of long term effects that are intrinsically unknowable. 2.What are rule-consequentialist justifications for preventive war, and why does Rodin think that these are equally flawed? Every evil is easily crushed at its birth; inveterate in it as a rule gathers strength. 3.What are the implications of Rodin’s critique of consequentialism for the proportionality criterion that is so central to just war theory? (Hint: he discusses this on pp. 154-55). It can be judged in two ways : The good will outweigh the bad & no longer justified if we underestimate this proportion 4.Why does Rodin think that a preventive war can not be justified on principled grounds, as a war of self-defense? Because one is a war of choice and one is that of necessity. 5.Do conspiracies to commit acts of aggression justify preventive war according to Rodin, and what are the reasons he gives? If wars of defense can be justified at all then this must be because those that we kill and maim have done something to make themselves liable to such treatment. Michael Doyle,Striking First, chap. 2. 1.Doyle discusses several different ways of assessing the likelihood of military aggression, which in turn might justify preventive war. What are these different ways, and what is Doyle’s own preferred way of assessing the threat? Human life, territory, political liberty , proportional defenses 2.What exactly determines the legitimacy of a preventive strike, according to Doyle? How much leverage do you think these criteria would provide for determining whether any particular preventive strike can be justified? International approval and domestic authorization / public support 3.Does Doyle consider a preventive strike without UN Security Council authorization justified, and if so under what circumstances? When waiting is simply no option and the time frame is sensible 4.How does Doyle suggest that we determine the threat stemming from nonstate actors? Past Behavior, record of attacks, ideology, to what extent are they a threat? 5.Does Doyle think that the 1998 U.S. missile strikes against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan met his four criteria for just prevention? No because there was faulty intelligence and failed to secure a legal basis for a counterterrorism strike. CHECK 4Ls legal,lethal,legit,likely.  Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, chap. 5. 1.What has historically been the prevailing justification for preventive war, according to Walzer, and what is his own rebuttal to that justification? To preserve the balance or prevent disruption to the relationship in the global community. Equilibrium no domination. 2.What are the main differences between Vattel’s justification of preventive war, as discussed by Walzer, and Walzer’s own justification of anticipatory strikes? CHECK 3.What are the three specific criteria that justify “pre-emptive” war, according to Walzer? A manifest intent to injure, a degree of active participation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing anything besides fighting, greatly magnifies the risk 4.What is the key factor that, according to Walzer, made Israel’s 1967 war against Egypt an instance of legitimate preemption? They could argue for just fear and it had been made clear the danger was intended 5.Can you think of recent situations where states would plausibly have been justified in striking first, based on Walzer’s criteria? CHECK Legitimate Authority and Multilateral Approval (1)​ Theories of Legitimacy (a)​ Normative Legitimacy (i)​ Institution / practice meets standards derived from a theory (e.g liberalism, democratic theory) 1)​ Signal that Intervention reflects “general will” of the international community (democracy). 2)​ Restrain powerful states : Make self-serving interventions less likely (checks & balances) (b)​ Sociological legitimacy (i)​ Institution/practice is accepted as appropriate by relevant audience (the “international community”) 1)​ Input : follow commonly accepted principles , rules, and procedures (factors identified beforehand) 2)​ Output : desirable result / outcomes, such as security or protection of human rights (c)​ Output legitimacy (i)​ Does use of force ? 1)​ Stop large-scale violence ? , save human lives ? , repel aggression ? , disarm the hostile state of WMD? 2)​ Question: can successful “output” compensate for lack of input legitimacy? (eg imagine WMD found in iraq 2003) (2)​ How might multilateral approval increase output legitimacy ? (a)​ Output benefits of multilateral approval (i)​ Reduced risk of major-power conflicts (ii)​ Reduced risk of self-serving interventions (iii)​ Reduced risk of accidental harm (iv)​ Increased likelihood of successful peacebuilding  (b)​ Costs of multilateral approval (i)​ Protracted negotiations (deadlock) (ii)​ Action based on lowest common denominator (compromise too little too late) (iii)​ Self-serving appeals: domestic opponents of intervention may insist on multilateralism instrumentally (iv)​ Manipulation by powerful states (esp. Regional IOs) (3)​ The Multilateral Legitimacy Continuum (a)​ 8 Reformed UNSC (b)​ 7 UNSC authorization [e.g Iraq 1991 / somalia 1992] (c)​ 6 Regional IO without dominant state [Arab league 2011] (d)​ 5 Regional IO with dominant state [OECS Grenada] (e)​ 4 Coalition of the willing without dominant state [lebanon 1980s] (f)​ 3 Coalition of the willing with dominant state [Iraq 2003] (g)​ 2 Bilateralism [US-UK against Iraq 1998] (h)​ 1 Unilateralism Recchia, “Authorizing humanitarian intervention” 1. What is the main requirement for a just humanitarian intervention, besides the existence of a just cause? Ability to limit the negative consequences of intervention and promote physical integrity rights. 2. Can any international institution legitimately authorize a humanitarian intervention? Unless there is evidence of significant international burden sharing. 3. What is the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention, and do you find the argument persuasive? Encouraging greater risk taking on the part of its intended beneficiaries. 4. How exactly can the requirement to seek multilateral approval reduce this moral hazard? More perspectives more balance 5. What should we make of the argument that the UNSC is to blame for the lack of intervention during the Rwandan genocide of 1994? CHECK Thompson, “Coercion through IOs.” 1. How does channeling military intervention through IOs generate “politically important information,” according to Thompson? Providing a neutral and legitimized platform for assessing the situation on the ground. 2. Why does Thompson believe that the UN Security Council, of all international institutions, can produce the greatest legitimation effect when it comes to military intervention? to represent a broad range of international actors, providing a neutral platform where decisions appear on behalf of the global community, less accusations of unilateralism, more support, even states not directly involved. 3. Why does Thompson think that even powerful states such as the U.S. care about reassuring foreign leaders and popular audiences? For domestic support 4. What kind of information does international organization approval send, and to what audiences? Educatory info to international audiences / citizens. 5. When should military interveners bypass the UN Security Council, based on Thompson’s theory? When the anticipated political costs of action are already low or when there is high sensitivity to the costs of constraint. Buchanan and Keohane, “Precommitment Regimes for Intervention.” 1. The authors advance what they call a “complex standard” for assessing the legitimacy of international institutions. What are the standard’s three substantive criteria, and do you find these criteria persuasive? Counting principles: Comparative benefit, accountability, and principles deliberation/ Institutional integrity, comparative benefit, minimal moral acceptability 2. Does the UN Security Council meet these substantive criteria, according to Buchanan and Keohane? Does this make the UNSC fully legitimate? Why? The UNSC does not possess exclusive legitimacy with regard to humanitarian intervention because its lacks systematic procedures for accountability, fails to discharge primary justifying functions acts as an obstacle to other parties fulfilling tahiti function, permissible to develop alternative. 3. Buchanan and Keohane discuss the possibility of establishing a new coalition/organization of liberal democracies to legitimize humanitarian interventions. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of this proposal, compared to continuing reliance on the UN Security Council? Reliable, inadequate, protected (only after), uncontroversial, accountable, lack of sociological legitimacy 4. How would the precommitment regimes proposed by Buchanan and Keohane work, and what particular crises are they intended to address? 5. Who would ultimately decide on military intervention under a precommitment regime, and what are some related problems? Humanitarian Military Intervention (1)​ Definition of Humanitarian Intervention (a)​ Deployment of military force across borders for the purpose of protecting foreign nationals from man-made violence (Finnemore 2003) (b)​ Excludes : (i)​ Intervention following natural disasters (ii)​ Intervention to rescue one’s own nationals (iii)​ Intervention by invitation (2)​ The Ethics of Military Intervention (a)​ National Defense Paradigm (i)​ Humanitarian intervention = aggression (ii)​ What goes on inside foreign states is of purely domestic concern (classic westphalian statehood) (iii)​ State sovereignty : inherently valuable (domestic analogy) or means to the following 1)​ Collective self-determination by state’s citizens (a barrier against imperial interference) 2)​ Peaceful coexistence among states (peace over justice )  a)​ We cannot / should not judge the practices of foreign societies. Different conceptions of the good (b)​ Walzer’s Communitarian Liberalism (i)​ Non-intervention protects “common life” (ii)​ Members of political community must seek their own freedom 1)​ Engage in arduous struggle to demonstrate love of liberty (iii)​ Military intervention justified only if 1)​ State includes more than one community (support secessionists) 2)​ Community disrupted by civil war; others have already intervened 3)​ Government massacres or enslaves its citizens ( no “fit” between government and community; or no self-determining community) a)​ Acts that shock the moral conscious of humanity (c)​ Cosmopolitan Liberalism (i)​ Sovereignty valuable only as means to protect human rights (ii)​ States that violate basic rights of their citizens forfeit their right to sovereignty and non-interference (iii)​ Universal duty to protect ; rescue those whose rights violated (iv)​ In principles, humanitarian intervention justified whenever the basic rights of individuals are systematically violated 1)​ Proportionality : save more lives through intervention 2)​ Problem : predicting human costs of war is very difficult. (3)​ The politics of Humanitarian Intervention (a)​ The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P) (i)​ 2001 canada sponsored international commission on intervention and states sovereignty (ICISS) 1)​ 12 eminent individuals (ii)​ Deliberate attempt to revive Just War Theory (iii)​ 2001 report : states bear primary responsibility to protect the lives and welfare of their citizens. But when state manifestly unwilling or unable, international community may step in (b)​ Why R2P? (i)​ Evaluate human rights situation from point of view of those needing support (rather than those who might intervene) (ii)​ Emphasize primary responsibility rests with the state (iii)​ More than military action : responsibility to prevent and rebuild (iv)​ RTP as paradigm shift or semantics? (c)​ Just Cause (i)​ 2001 RTP Report 1)​ Large-scale loss of life, resulting from deliberate state action, state neglect, or state failure. 2)​ Large-scale ethnic cleansing, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror, or rape.  (ii)​ Ban-Ki Moon 2009 : RTP applies to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity (iii)​ Note : other serious human rights violations do not justify intervention (d)​ Other Just War Criteria (i)​ Right intention ; last resort (ii)​ Reasonable prospects of success 1)​ Political will needed to carry it through 2)​ Strategic issues (eg chechnya) (iii)​ Proper authority (UNSC, regional IOs, no COWs) (iv)​ Proportionality (minimum force necessary) 1)​ No regime change 2)​ Comply with laws of war ; minimize collateral damage (e)​ The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (i)​ Problems for R2P after 2003 Iraq War (ii)​ China and developing countries skeptical (iii)​ 2005 : World leaders support R2P in principle, but watered down. No threshold criteria; UNSC primacy. Robert Pape, “When Duty Calls.” 1. Does Pape accurately characterize the R2P doctrine? CHECK 2. What is the central threshold criterion for humanitarian intervention that Pape proposes, and do you find it useful? The threshold of mass homicide, over thousands of citizens 3. Is Pape’s requirement that there be low-cost military plans useful, and is it realistic? I think it is useful in that its primary aim is to reduce prolonged use of time and resources to limit the destruction on both sides. 4. What are the two ways for achieving long-term security that Pape discusses, and what are their strengths and weaknesses? The larger and more concentrated the victim population, the more an intervener can expect that an enduring security solution can be reached. They are more likely to have pre existing local social,political, and economic institutions. The creation of a viable state and a negotiated political statement. The latter may require a 3rd party. 5. What are some of the potential advantages and disadvantages of humanitarian interveners relying on local allies, as suggested by Pape? By enabling the political forces to rely mainly on over the horizon military power with whom they cannot engage. Michael Doyle, “The Politics of Global Humanitarianism.” 1. How do classical humanitarian interventions differ from R2P interventions, according to Doyle? Preventive rather than reactive. 2. What does Doyle mean when he writes that the R2P is both a license and a leash? Widened the scope of legitimate armed intervention by licensing some protective interventions but restricted others. 3. Exactly what R2P crime justified the 2011 Libya intervention? Rescue against war crimes and crimes against humanity. The deprivation of resources. 4. In what sense was the 1999 Kosovo intervention a watershed event for the development of the R2P doctrine? When the UN did not provide protection NATO did CHECK 5. What are the “strategic doctrine” and “blank check” problems for R2P implementation that were highlighted by the 2011 Libya intervention? Their strategic doctrine lacking on how to design protection, distinguishing strategic scenarios and fitting remedies to harms. How van one preserve multilateral principles of impartial administration when cenforcement mist be delegated to the military component? Members might give more than they originally agreed to out of circumstance. Ben Valentino, “The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention.” 1. How does Valentino’s emphasis on “full costs” encourage us to broaden our assessments of proportionality with regard to humanitarian intervention? They encourage us to take moral costs with as much value as fiscal costs. 2. In what sense do most contemporary mass atrocity crises differ from the Holocaust, according to Valentino? The moral calculus of intervening in these conflicts was inevitably more problematic. The choice to aid these groups entailed supporting the less than upstanding armed factions on their side. 3. Identify and discuss the four moral costs of humanitarian intervention,as identified by Valentino. Aiding defenseless civilians means empowering the armed factions claiming to represent them who are frequently responsible for major human rights abuses themselves. The unavoidable consequences of military intervention , collateral damage and worse treatment of the victims as a reaction to intervention. 4. How can humanitarian intervention undermine the authority of international organizations, according to Valentino? Nations begin to insist on non UN approved strategies because they may see more effectiveness in independent acts but this then weakens the UN 5. In what sense, according to Valentino, does humanitarian military intervention involve significant opportunity costs? The forgone opportunities to which the resources for a military mission might have been put.