KD-Amateur Sports Law, 2020 AQA PDF

AMATEUR SPORTS LAW OUTLINE Chapter 2 – Contracts Coaches Contracts (p. 10) Similar to players’ contracts with added caveats of no job security, no standardized contracts, no unions, & compensation packages. Rodgers v. Georgia Tech Athletic Assoc. (p. 84)...

AMATEUR SPORTS LAW OUTLINE Chapter 2 – Contracts Coaches Contracts (p. 10) Similar to players’ contracts with added caveats of no job security, no standardized contracts, no unions, & compensation packages. Rodgers v. Georgia Tech Athletic Assoc. (p. 84) Most of Coach Rodgers’ fringe benefits should be deemed to be a part of his compensation and must be included in the severance package. Coach entitled to any fringe benefits included w/in the K, upon termination. Chapter 5 – Antitrust NCAA v. Board of Regents (p. 359) The S.Ct. declared that NCAA’s football television plan was unlawful under a rule of reason analysis. The policy was challenged by GA & OK. Deemed an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The plan restricted that total number of football games an NCAA member could televise, & also stopped member schools from selling TV rights except in accordance with the plans. The decision set the networks free to negotiate TV contracts with the major football schools. The original plan allowed a team to be on tv twice a season, blackouts on 3/10 Saturdays, one game telecast in each area per week. University of PA 1st to televise. Chapter 6 – Torts Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College (p. 369) Coaches never had a plan in case of emergencies. No trainers were at the practice. Lacrosse player died of cardiac arrest. Student was not acting as private student when he collapsed. There is a distinction between a student injured while participating in college sport for which he is recruited, and a student injured while pursuing his private interests. Distinction limits the class of students to whom a college owes a duty of care to. The school owes a duty to a deceased player based on the relationship between the athlete and the school and the foreseeability of the fact that during an event a participant could suffer a serious injury. Players are owed a duty to prompt medical care and colleges are not immune under the Good Samaritan Law. Foreseeable risk of harm must be unreasonable. Q&D: Johnny Golfer (p. 375 n. 2) Golfer advances before others hit their balls. Hit with shank shot. Should he recover? No. Here, the golfer owed no duty to the injured golfer to protect him from harm that might result from the ordinary and ever-present risks of the sport of golf, as contrasted with those injuries that might be caused by the golfer's lack of due care. The lawsuit failed because there was a lack of negligence on the part of the golfer, not because the injured golfer assumed the risk. Davidson v. U.N.C. at Chapel Hill (p. 376 n. 5) Court found that a special relationship existed between an injured JV cheerleader and the university, in that the ∆ voluntarily undertook to educate the cheerleaders on safety, which thus created a separate duty of care. Northcutt v. Sun Valley (p. 377 n. 7) Duty can arise thru §. Here, § limited liability for ski operators. Skier collided with ∏ resulting in injury. Operator had no duty to eliminate, control, or lessen the inherent risks of skiing beyond those stated in the §. § imposed duty to post signs, however, no duty to accomplish this to any standard of care; so operator was not liable for improper placement of signs. Additionally, Operator had duty only to provide a ski patrol that met the national standards. Operator’s duty was not to provide patrol members to chase down individual who caused injury. Operator not liable for failing to identify the skier who injured the ∏. 1  In Loco Parentis (p. 377 n. 9) In some instances, school held to same degree of care as player’s parents. The school is in loco parentis, & the applicable standard is that of reasonably prudent parents acting under similar and comparable circumstances. No duty, under loco, for a college & its coach to prevent adult student from becoming excessively drunk w/resulting severe bodily injury to himself while on a college sponsored expedition at an out of state resort. Krueger v. San Francisco Forty-Niners (p. 382) Injured 49ers player sued the 49ers for fraudulent concealment, because the team Dr. patched him up numerous times & allowed him to continue to play w/o revealing the true extent of his injuries. Injuries were sufficient to permanently disable player. Dr. owed player a duty of full disclosure. Dr. can’t argue that the information simply wasn’t withheld. Failure to make such disclosure constitutes not only negligence, but where the requisite intent is shown—fraud or concealment as well. Hank Gathers (p. 385 n. 4) College basketball player collapses & dies. This is ex. of interaction between athlete and Dr. b/c of the possible conflicts of interest between team & Dr. Player had arrythmia problem but was allowed to play under certain conditions. Collapsed early in season, was treated & medicated, then brought back to play. Concerns over dosage and ability to return to play arose. Dr. had a duty/responsibility towards player. Wilkinson v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (p. 390) Owners [school board] are liable if it has actual knowledge or constructive knowledge of a condition unreasonably hazardous [to the children under its supervision]. Prior knowledge of a reasonably discoverable but unreasonably dangerous condition was shown by a previous event when a visiting coach walked into the same glass panel. Kid ran into & fell through glass and bled to death. City of Atlanta v. Merritt (p. 392) The issue was whether a minor baseball spectator assumes the risk of being struck by a foul ball. Most courts find for the defendant on the grounds that the injured minor either knew or should have known of the potential for danger. However, here, the court held that a factual question existed as to whether the injured 8 y/o appreciated the risk of watching the game in the unscreened, high-risk picnic area adjacent to the right field line. Denied ∆’s sum judg. Kids under 14 assume risk of those patent, obvious, & known dangers which they’re able to appreciate & avoid. Golf Carts; Unreasonably Hazardous Conditions; Steep, Hilly Golf Cart Path (p. 394) Golf carts – Unreasonably dangerous. Uhler v. Evangeline Riding Club (p. 395 n. 8) A Horse show participant was injured when she struck a utility guywire appurtenant to the horse arena. ∏ escaped summary judgment on the grounds that the Riding Club may have been negligent in failing to remove/relocate the guywire or failing to warn participants of its location. Also, may have been negligent in failing to provide proper lighting in/near the arena. P wins if finding of strict liability. Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc. (p. 396) (Pender, Bucky Warren, Prep School playing Brown, 3 piece helmet with gaps) A Manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care to design a product that is reasonably safe for its intended use. Hockey coach’s decision to supply helmets with a design defect, when other, safer helmets were available, was sufficient (i.e. the player won) to create a product liability claim. 2  Factors if a design is reasonably safe: 1) Gravity of the danger posed by the design defect; 2) Likelihood that danger will occur; 3) Mechanical feasibility of a safer design; 4) Cost of an improved design; and 5) Adverse consequences that might result from an alternative design. Falls v. The Sporting News Publishing Co. (p. 416 n. 6) Ct. held that sportswriter was a public figure with regard to his sports writing activities. Thus, he could not prove actual malice. Actual malice requires that false comments about public figures must be knowingly & in reckless disregard of the truth to be actionable. Unprofessional terminology & an intemperate tone don’t satisfy actual malice. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal (p. 406-407) High school wrestling coach was held not to be a public figure. Held to be primarily an educator & a teacher. In contrast, professional sports is a business that requires and facilitates media coverage. Opinions are not capable of defamatory content, but, assertions of fact are unprotected and capable of a defamatory meaning. Sports commentary that carries with it a “mixed opinion” is capable of implying an underlying defamatory fact and is actionable. Woy v. Turner (p. 415 n. 4) Agent became a ltd. public figure when he thrusted himself into the forefront of a public controversy during a K dispute by using the media, through press conferences, to help make his point. Dempsey v. Times, Inc. (p. 416 n. 8) Once you obtain public figure status, you can slip back into the status of a pvt. Person through rule of repose. Here, Dempsey (boxing champion) was defamed in a Sports Illustrated article 45 yrs. after the alleged event where his manager claimed that he had loaded Dempsey’s gloves w/Plaster-of Paris. Ct. held that reaching back that far was not w/in the N.Y. Times standard, therefore, the recitation of the glove incident was not cloaked by the veil of privilege. Qualified Privilege of Fair Comment in Sports Gives writers a protection (or defense) under defamation, against writing falsehoods, so long as the writing was made in good faith. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. (p. 419 n. 2) Supreme Court gave the “human cannonball” the power to protect his publicity rights in that it did not immunize the television station from liability for televising Zacchini’s entire act. Griggas v. Clauson (p. 420) (Rockford athletic club basketball team) Participants assume the risk of unintentional injuries, but do not assume the risk of injuries that are intentional or result from a disregard for safety. However, an injured participant cannot recover from another participant if the latter did not breach a recognized duty of care. Here, liability was found when a basketball player struck an unprovoked blow to an opponent whose back was turned. Nabozny v. Barnhill (p. 421) ) (kicked in head – permanent brain damage) A participant can avoid the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence by basing her CoA on defendant violation of a safety rule. There’s a duty to follow established rules. Similarly, recovery may be allowed when a plaintiff was injured through defendant’s unsportsmanlike conduct. Here, defendant violated the safety rule that prohibits contact with the goalkeeper in soccer, when the keeper is holding the ball in the penalty area. Bourque v. Dublechin (p. 423 boo boo’s lounge, murrays steak house, jaw fractured, 3  Plaintiff filed suit to recover damages for personal injuries received in a softball game against a member of opposing team. Court held that a participant does not assume the risk of injury from players acting in an unexpected or unsportsmanlike way with a reckless lack of concern for others participating. Duty to play softball in the ordinary fashion without unsportsmanlike conduct or wanton injury to fellow players. Injury that resulted was not intended, so negligent not intentional tort. Hackbart v. Cinn. Bengals (p. 426) Injury must be result of wanton misconduct. Mere negligence is insufficient to establish a predicate for a successful c/o/a. Court allows for recovery for injuries sustained in the course of a professional football game if they result from wanton (reckless) misconduct and are not directly related to the flow of the game. Game is viscous but somethings are outside the lines. Schentzel v. Philadelphia National League Club (p. 429) Mrs. Schentzel, although aware of the game of baseball, was attending her first game. She was struck by a foul ball. Court concluded that such injuries are a matter of such common everyday practical knowledge as to be subject to judicial notice. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc. (p. 431) Minor spectator who was struck by a foul ball also assumed the risk of injury. No duty for adequate screening. Majority rule is that owner of baseball stadium has a duty to screen in the most vulnerable areas. Duty to screen area behind home plate and to provide screened seats to as many spectators as would normally request such seats on ordinary occasion. Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc. (p. 434) Minor was injured by a baseball bat fragment. Court finds there is no duty to warn spectators that a ball or bat may leave the field. No duty for protective screening other than limited duty behind home plate. Averill v. Lutrell (p. 437 n. 1) Liability was found when a catcher deliberately and without warning struck a batter. Ross v. Creighton Univ. (p. 440) Former scholarship basketball player sues his college on the theory of educational malpractice. Illinois did not recognize as c/o/a, too hard to judge, too many independent factors. Negligent admission c/o/a was also rejected. Only admit qualified students leading to marginal and diversity underrepresentation. Remanded for breach of contract on providing him an education. Student said he was not prepared for college. Brahatcek v. Millard School Dist. (p. 443) Coaches Liability Coach’s duty is to use reasonable care to avoid the creation of foreseeable risks to the athlete under supervision. Wrongful death action of a student who was hit in the head by a an accidently thrown golf club. Alleged failure to exercise reasonable care for the protection of the participant was in the nature of a failure to properly supervise ninth grade golf instruction. Instructor’s failure to properly supervise was held to be the cause of plaintiff’s death. Carabba v. Anacortes School Dist. (p. 451) Referee Liability Wrestler’s opponent used illegal and dangerous hold during a match. Hold was prolonged, causing injury. Referee has duty to properly supervise the athletic contest. A wrestling referee was held to be negligent for not properly supervising a match. School district owes its students a duty to anticipate reasonably foreseeable dangers and to take precautions protecting the children in its custody from such dangers. Referee found to be acting as an agent. Ashcroft v. Calder Racecourse, Inc. (p. 454) Quadriplegic 4  A jockey was injured when his horse veered across the racecourse toward an exit gap leaving the jockey quadriplegic. Doctrine of express assumption of risk applies where a participant volunteers to take certain chances thus waiving his right to be free from those bodily contacts inherent in the chances taken. Court found that riding on a track with a negligently placed exit gap isn’t an inherent risk in the sport of horse racing. Express assumption of risk waives only risks inherent in the sport itself. Williams v. Cox Enterprises (p. 458) Atlanta, Heat, Law Student ∏ enter a race and was required to sign a waiver. Waiver described the intense conditions. ∏ was highly educated + was aware of the intense heat in GA. ∏ admitted he understood the waiver. The court upheld a waiver in a 10,000-meter road race in which a participant suffered injuries as a result of heat prostration and exhaustion. He admitted to reading and understanding the waiver. He was not under duress to enter the race. Recreational Use Statutes (p. 459) A variation on sovereign immunity are the recreational use statutes, which substitute pvt. Landowners for gov’t entities. Both types of immunities protect from suits those entities that perform a “state-like” function. Vary from state to state. Landowners who allow free recreational use of their property do not have a duty to keep their premises in a safe condition or a duty to warn of dangerous conditions. But if a fee is paid, the immunity is inapplicable. Employer-Based Workman’s Compensation (p. 464) The issue is whether an injured student athlete is an employee. Cts tend to say no. Generally, if the continued receipt of a job, free meals, or money is contingent upon continued sports participation, then a contract to play that sport is created & recovery is allowed. Employer based injuries will receive coverage if the employer has brought the sporting activity w/in the course of employment. Indices that indicate the activity is w/in the course of employment include displayed championship trophies, equipment paid for by employer, company logo on uniforms etc... Chapter 7 – Criminal Liability State v. Shelley (p. 475) (broken jaw, consent, second degree assault) Here, a player struck another & broke his jaw in 3 places during a recreational basketball game. Damage was inflicted by intentional striking. Consent isn’t a defense if the conduct was not a reasonably foreseeable behavior in the play of the game. The injury must have occurred as a by-product of the game itself. Punching is not a foreseeable hazard of a basketball game. Consent is not just for injuries in the game, but also those outside of the rules that are reasonably foreseeable. Relying on rules of the game is too limiting. Tomjanovich (p. 479 n. 4) The NBA game, Lakers player (Kermit Washington) punched another player causing serious injuries to Rockets player. Lakers were vicariously liable b/c they knew about & encouraged his behavior. Deemed the league’s “enforcer”. Victim won a huge settlement (3 mil). Hooliganism (p. 480) The best examples are at European and Mexican soccer matches of hooliganism or spectator violence. Majority involve international fans, sanctions in the form of joint ventures such as euro conv on spectator violence. England strict, mere presence of hooligans alone could be offense; sports events act (limits alcohol, etc.); and public order act could be used to exclude hooligans from matches, arrest for alcohol consumption at match or on the way to match. In US, drunk baseball fans come closest. Game between Cubs and Dodgers had a fracas involving 25 players and fans. 5  Canada and Ice League (p. 484) The prosecutors in Canada far more often uses criminal laws against hockey players who initiate violence against opposing players. The major sticking point is the status of the consent defense. Types of consent: implied by participation, implied by specific acts, and public policy limitation on one’s ability to consent. Two Canadian cases: charge of assault causing bodily harm was dismissed. The accused were acquitted. Both players consented to the type of injuries that were inflicted. Chapter 8 – Athletic Eligibility Amateur Sports (p. 493-494) Eligibility defined as the decision by that particular sport’s governing body as to whether a particular athlete or particular team is eligible to participate in a specific sport or specific event. Take two basic forms: restricted (same groups at different levels, like NCAA) and unrestricted competition (open to all athletes, ex. Olympics). An amateur cannot also be a professional. Courts are usually reluctant to overrule an athletic organizations rules, regulations, and restrictions as regards to decisions on eligibility. Don’t interfere with internal affairs unless mistake, fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness. Hall v. Univ. of Minn. (p. 503 n. 1) Amateur sports may not really be as pure as they once were: “The ct. is not saying that athletes aren’t capable to be scholars & few persons care how the student athlete performs academics, including many of the athletes themselves. The exceptionally talented student- athlete is raised to perceive athletic programs as farm teams & proving grounds for prof. sports leagues. It may well be true that a good academic program for the athlete is made virtually impossible by the demands of their sport at the college lvl. If this situation causes harm to the university, it is b/c they’ve fostered it & the institution rather than the individual should suffer the consequences.” Hall v. Univ. of Minn. (p. 516) ∏ here became ineligible after his application for a degree plan was denied twice by the univ. Admissions office both time recommended the ∏ to be admitted but the school’s directors intervened & denied the admission. If the ∏ was allowed to continue participating in the univ.’s basketball team, he could be drafted. The pvt. Interest at stake here is the ∏’s ability to obtain a “no cut” contract w/the NBA.Court found a limited property right for a collegiate athlete to continue his athletic eligibility for another year on the basis that the extra year would determine his status for a potential NBA draft. Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ. (p. 504) An athlete’s scholarship was terminated when he decided not to play football. The court held that the scholarship was a contract and that in consideration of the award, the athlete agreed to maintain athletic eligibility, both physically and scholastically. By not attending practice he was in violation of the K. Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Board of Trustees (p. 510) (quadriplegic football player) Issue: whether an injured scholarship athlete was eligible for worker’s compensation. When injured could have been asked to help the athletic program but was not asked to help other than entertaining recruits. The court held there was intent to enter into an employee-employer relationship at the time the parties entered into the agreement. It was not casual; scholarship could be taken away so not a gift. He had to work out, it was within the usual course of business of the university because football competition is an aspect of the University’s overall occupation. Begley v. Mercer Univ. (p. 515 n. 3) 6  The school sought to terminate a scholarship agreement when it discovered that the student did not have the required GPA. The court held that since the student did not meet one of the conditions of the agreement, he could not expect the school to perform its part of the contract by allowing him to keep the scholarship. Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth (p. 515 n. 4) An injured scholarship athlete ALLOWED to recover workers’ compensation on the basis that his agreement called for him to work in and about the tennis courts on campus. Although he was injured during spring football practice, it was held that the injury arose out of and in the court of his employment. Athletic Association Rules (516): Eligibility rules cover all of the possible permutations that might control a potential athlete, including age, years of participation, academic standing, gpa, length of hair, transfer rules, redshirting rules, number of semesters enrolled, marital status. All of these have been used to restrict the ability to participate. Red-Shirting and Anti-Red-Shirting Rules (p. 520) Red-shirting refers to the process of holding back students academically so they can mature physically. Ant-Red-Shirting refers to rules limitations by athletic associations to prevent this (such as four-year-rules, age, or eight-semester-rules). Common goal of restricting eligibility to a certain time period. The goals are to prevent redshirting athletes with potential and prevent anticompetitive practices. Bell v. Lone Oak Independent School Dist. (p. 525) School prohibited married h.s. students from participating in extracurricular activities. The court held the school’s rule unconstitutional under §1983 & 14thA E.P. Clause. If the state & school provide free public edu. & an athletic program it must do so in a manner not calculated to discriminate against a class of individuals who will be treated differently from the rest, unless the school can show the rule is a necessary restraint to promote a compelling state interest. School must meet Strict Scrutiny under E.P Clause of the 14thA. NCAA v. Tarkanian (p. 528) (UNLV, winningest coach, 29/32, 3rd in tourney) The NCAA’s interactions regarding student eligibility will probably no longer be viewed as state action, eliminating protection from the 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The State Action comes from the school not the NCAA. All actions by state high school activities association will usually be construed as state action for constitutional purposes. Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary School Athletic Assoc. (p. 538) The S.Ct. held that a high school interscholastic athletic association’s rule that prohibited the use of undue influence in the recruitment of student-athletes was state action for purposes of the 14th A. because of the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the association. School officials made up more than 80% of the association, plus the State of TN acknowledged the association. No Pass, No Play (p. 544) Texas was first to do. WV leaves the responsibility with each board of education. In Texas, all extracurriculars, from football to 4-H club etc. WV only to non-academic extracurriculars. Privilege not right, constitutional based on intermediate review, rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Spring Branch Independent School Dist. v. Stamos (p. 544) HB 72, maintain 70 average, TX S.Ct. held No Pass, No Play § was constitutional on the basis that the rule was rationally related to a legitimate state interest and that participation in extracurricular activities is a privilege, not a right. Students not a suspect class alone. Extracurriculars are 7  not a fundamental right. No constitutionally protected interest is implicated by this delegation of authority to school principals, no violation of due process, substantive or procedural, results therefrom. Grube v. Bethlehem School Dist. (p. 551-552) The court upheld an injunction allowing a high school student to play football even though he has only one kidney. Plaintiff showed a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that he was discrimination against in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. No person who is otherwise qualified shall be excluded solely due to the handicap. “Otherwise qualified” means a person who is able to meet all of the programs criteria in spite of the handicap. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (p. 557) The Supreme Court held that the PGA’s “no cart” rule violated the ADA as regards the rights of a challenged golfer. Disabled golfer allowed to use a cart. PGA Tour argued allowing cart would fundamentally alter the nature of the game. ADA forbids discrimination against disabled individuals, public accommodation in title III. The walking rule’s purpose is to subject players to fatigue which may influence the tournament’s outcome. Martin’s use of golf cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of tournament b/c its uncontested that even with a golf cart Martin endures greater fatigue. Pistorius v. IAAF (p. 562) Double amputee runner was allowed the opportunity to run against able-bodied athletes. Disability laws only require that an athlete be permitted to compete on the same footing as others. BOP is balance of probability. Malcolm W. v. Novato Unified School Dist. (p. 579) Black h.s. basketball players were subjected to racial harassment by students. For the school districts or administrators to incur liability, they must acquiesce, condone, or encourage student behavior. School tried to stop the student body, but honkies were just racist. No liability. Ct held that: (1) players failed to establish that school district was liable for race discrimination in violation of Title VI, which prohibits discrimination in programs receiving federal financial assistance, and (2) principal, assistant principal, athletic director, and coach were not deliberately indifferent to students' racial harassment of players and did not acquiesce in such harassment, and thus, players could not establish §1983 claim based on deprivation of equal protection. Wilson v. Lock Haven Univ. (p. 594) A black basketball coach’s contract was not renewed at a state university. The coach alleged a hostile work environment, racial discrimination, and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. School had plenty of reasons to fire the coach because of record, behavioral issues, and allowing ineligible students to play. Coach unable to show pretext – evidence that would allow a factfinder to reasonably 1. Disbelieve the employer’s legitimate reasons; & 2. Believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not the motivating factor. Coach was also unable to establish hostile work environment, where ∏ must show: 1. He suffered intentional race-based discrimination; 2. Discrimination was pervasive and regular; 3. Detrimentally affected him; 4. Would have detrimentally affected a reasonable person of same class and position; and 5. Basis for vicarious liability. Chapter 9 - Discipline Kelley v. Metro. Cnty. Board of Education (p.624) basketball tournament, harassing, 1 year ban. The court held that due process was denied when a school board suspended the interscholastic sports program of an all-black high school for one year, without a formal charge or hearing. Whenever a governmental body acts to injure an individual, 8  the Constitution requires that the act by consonant with due process of law. Minimum proceedings required depend on the circumstances. Right to notice and hearing. Punished guilty and innocent alike. Group punishment is not prohibited but a closer adherence to procedural standards of due process is required. Individual notice is not required but notice to a principal or person in a position to represent and speak for the entire group is. Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Board of Education (p. 629) Metal Weight Lock, Fighting, Blind in one eye. An individual student athlete claimed that his due process rights were violated when his coach allegedly used excessive corporal punishment against him. Appellate reversed dismissal. Substantive due process rights protect a student from corporal punishment that is intentional, obv excessive, creates a foreseeable risk of serious injury. Not within valid school policy authorizing corporal punishment. Univ. of Colorado v. Derdeyn (p. 673) CO S.Ct. found that the university’s random, suspicionless urinalysis drug testing of student-athletes was an unconstitutional search. Absent voluntary consents. Made locker room mentality argument. “clearly significant intrusion.” Todd v. Rush Cnty. Schools (p. 674) Four parents as next friends for their four children filed suit against a school board program that prohibited students from participating in any high school extracurricular activity or driving to and from school unless the student and parent consented to a test for drugs, alcohol, or tobacco in random, unannounced urine tests. The court held that the drug testing program was consistent with the 4th Amendment. Can retest if have a reasonable suspicion (two or more failed test), if retest with reasonable suspicion can be subject to discipline. Hill v. NCAA (p. 677) Plaintiffs argue that the NCAA’s urine drug testing program WAS an invasion of the student’s right to privacy. The CA S.Ct found that the NCAA’s drug testing program did not violate the athlete’s constitutional right to privacy. On review, the court reversed the decision to uphold the permanent injunction against defendant athletic association and directed entry of a final judgment for defendant, determining that defendant's drug testing program did not violate plaintiff student athletes' state constitutional right to privacy. The court found that although defendant, a private organization, was properly subject to a claim for invasion of privacy, defendant was not required to justify its drug testing program through proof of a "compelling state interest" and the absence of any alternative means of accomplishing that interest. The court noted that plaintiffs had no right to participate in intercollegiate athletic competition and that plaintiffs' reasonable expectation of privacy had been diminished by the notice and consent elements of defendant's testing program. The court concluded that defendant's decision to enforce a ban on the use of drugs by means of drug testing as its information-gathering procedure had been reasonably calculated to further its legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of intercollegiate athletic competition and in protecting plaintiffs' health and safety. Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton (p. 690) Oregon, Locker Room, Suiting Up &Showers The Supreme Court continued the reasoning of the CA S.Ct in Hill and the 7th Cir. in Shaill by holding that a public high school’s student-athlete drug testing policy did not violate the student’s right to be free from unreasonable searches. Lessened expectation of privacy because of locker room mentality. Athletes are role models and must be held to a higher standard. “reasonableness inquiry cannot disregard a schools custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.” Brennan v. Board of Trustees for Univ. of LA Systems (p. 691) 9  Right of privacy claim against a school’s board of trustees for requiring him to submit to drug tests. The court held that the student-athlete expectation of privacy was diminished because of the locker room environment. This was NCAA drug testing. He was warned. Used sex and nutritional supplements as an excuse. Trinidad School Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez (p. 694) The CO S.Ct found that suspicionless urine tests were unconstitutional when applied to band members. Court took issue with the voluntariness and that the communal undressing was more common with student athletes and not band members. No demonstrated risk physical injury could occur. Also tested students in for-credit classes. Schaill v. Tippecanoe Cnty. School Corp. (p. 697) Each student who wished to participate in interscholastic athletics would be subject to random drug testing. Administrators and coaches would assign a number to each student and randomly select a number out of a box for testing. The 7th Cir. Found that random urine tests of high school athletes are reasonable under the 4th Amendment and that the school board’s procedures for challenging positive test results satisfied due process, retest and possibility of an explanation. Urinating is a search, but a warrant or probable cause are not needed. Closed stall, already give one to a doctor for required physical. NCAA Consent Form: The NCAA requires that all athletes annually sign a consent to a drug testing as part of their three-part statement and consent form on eligibility, recruitment, financial aid, amateur status, an involvement in organized gambling. Those who fail to adhere to this three-part statement and consent form are declared ineligible to participate. Chapter 10 – The NCAA NCAA Constitution, Art. 4, Organization (p. 714) NCAA Eligibility Rules Rules to know are: General Power to Discipline; No agents; Drug Tests; GPA Requirements Gaines v. NCAA (p. 725) Plaintiff is a football player and seeks to enjoin NCAA from enforcing certain rules that deem him ineligible to compete during the 1990-91 season. Plaintiff declared to the draft in 1990. He did not receive compensation or enter into any contracts with teams but hired an agent. Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempts to use antitrust analysis (NCAA rules not subject to anti-trust scrutiny) to challenge the NCAA’s no-draft and no-agent rules. The court denies the TRO and preliminary injunction. An athlete loses his amateur status when he enters a professional draft or enters into an agreement with an agent to negotiate a professional contract. Applies even if you receive no money or financial benefit from the agent, and even if the agent doesn’t charge. Hall v. NCAA (p. 730) St. Mel, Bradley College, Clearinghouse Basketball player entering college. Schools must only give scholarships and eligibility to “qualified” student-athletes. Student must complete certain core courses, obtain a certain GPA, and receive a minimum SAT or ACT score to be qualified. Scores are on a sliding scale. Student-athlete didn’t meet the requirements. The court refused to grant a preliminary injunction so as to allow a student to receive an athletic scholarship for his freshman year. Cureton v. NCAA (p. 737) The 3rd Cir. held that the alleged disparate impact on African American student-athletes was inapplicable to the freshman eligibility rules under Title VI. Even so, ∏’s claims failed because the disparate impact regulations implementing § 601 of Title VI applied only to the specific program receiving financial assistance. The funds over which the 10  court assumed defendant had control were not implicated in the lawsuit, and defendant did not exercise control over its member institutions, which did receive financial assistance for their athletic programs. NCAA v. Jones (p. 756) Texas Tech, Restitution, Moot Appeal TX S.Ct. reinforced the NCAA’s ability to issue retroactive penalties under its “restitution rule.” Just because eligibility has been used up, doesn’t mean the appeal is moot because of the retroactive penalty. Allowing for forfeiture of wins, individual achievements, awards. NCAA v. Lasege (p. 759) Louisville, Nigeria, Sports Agent and Professional Team The Supreme Court of KY held that the trial court was unable to enjoin the NCAA from imposing restitution sanctions against a university and student-athlete on the basis that the university voluntarily agreed to abide by the rules and regulations of the NCAA. Arbitrary and Capricious only when clearly erroneous. Cant have risk free injunction. The risk should be weighed by the court when considering whether to issue an injunction. Bloom v. NCAA (p. 769) Professional skier is also a talented college football player. NCAA draws a clear line between amateurs and professional athletes. Did not want to slide down the slope by allowing endorsement income from skiing, while the athlete is an amateur. Opens the door to other athletes receiving endorsements. On appeal, the court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to fault the NCAA for refusing to waive its rules, as requested by the university, to permit the student to pursue television and film opportunities while he was a student athlete at the university. The student failed to demonstrate any inconsistency in application that would lead the court to conclude that the NCAA was arbitrarily applying its rules. Death Penalty (p. 778) SMU is most known victim. Numerous rule violations. Specifically for repeat offenders. Most serious. Can be for one or two seasons, eliminates recruiting and grants in aid, staff members on committees must resign (ineligible for 4 years) Smith v. NCAA (p.747 n. 4) SCOTUS allowed the continuation of the NCAA rule that prohibits students from participation while enrolled in graduate programs other than their undergraduate institution. Here, law student tried to continue her eligibility. Ct. held that the NCAA isn’t subject to the requirements of Title IX on the grounds that it receives federal financial assistance. Chapter 11 – Women and Sports Israel v. WV Sec. School Activities Comm. (p. 782) The court held that the skilled female baseball player had the right to at least try out for the high school team, even though that school did have softball as an alleged option. Under gender-based discrimination claims, it is permissible in certain circumstances for public schools to have separate sports teams for men & girls so long as they’re substantially equivalent. Here, baseball and softball are not substantially equivalent. Violated equal protection. Croteau v. Fair (p. 785) A female high school student was cut from the boy’s baseball team. Alleges she was cut b/c she’s a girl. ∏ must prove that the discrimination was intentional. Intent can be shown by 4 factors: 1) historical background of decision; 2) specific sequence of events; 3) departure from normal procedures; & 4) contemporary statements by the individual(s) making the decision. ∏ need only show that the underlying discriminatory purpose is a motivating factor; it need not be the dominant factor. ∏ was unable to prove that decision to cut her from boys’ team was tainted or motivated by gender bias. 11  Wynn v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist. (p. 786) A female physical education teacher sued the school district that denied her application to the position of athletic director. The Board appointed a male, who was qualified as a head football coach. Their reasoning was that, because football was the major revenue producing and costly sport, the Athletic Director should be a football coach. For sex discrimination ∏ must prove: that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified; but, that she was rejected under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. ∏ failed to prove disparate impact because the combined job also impacts male track coaches or other positions not football related regardless of sex. However, ∏ successfully proved disparate treatment; court held that the defendants discriminated against the teacher on the basis of gender by refusing to appoint her. Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education (p. 798) SCOTUS held that a male coach who claims sexual discrimination on behalf of others is protected from firing under Title IX. The teacher served as a physical education teacher and girls' basketball coach. After he discovered that the girls' team was not receiving equal funding and equal access to athletic equipment and facilities, he complained to his supervisors but to no avail. He began to receive negative work evaluations and ultimately was removed as the girls' coach. He was still employed as a teacher, but he no longer received supplemental pay for coaching. The court reasoned that retaliation against a person because that person has complained of sex discrimination was another form of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by Title IX's private cause of action. concluded that if the school board had retaliated against the teacher because he had complained of sex discrimination, this would have constituted intentional discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. Ct also held Title IX itself supplied sufficient notice to the board that it could not retaliate against the teacher after he complained of discrimination against the girls' basketball team; therefore, pvt. damages might become appropriate. Education Amendments of 1972 – “Title IX” (p. 809) Applies to private schools if the take direct financial aid for students. Education Dept. Regulations Accompanying Title IX (p. 811) Rewrote Groves through legislation. Extended the definition of “program” or “activity” Grove City College v. Bell (p. 809; 811) The Supreme Court ruled that only those programs within an institution that receives federal direct financial assistance from the federal government should be subject to Title IX. Since this decision was not Congress’ intent, it then passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, which rewrote the definition of “program” or “activity.” NCAA v. Smith (p. 812) volleyball, post graduate eligibility, Pennsylvania The NCAA is not subject to the requirements of Title IX on the grounds that it receives dues from its members, which receive federal financial assistance. Haffer v. Temple Univ. (p. 837 n. 1) The court agreed to a settlement that outlined changes in Temple’s athletic program. Although applied to only one school, it has been viewed as the paradigm for collegiate compliance with Title IX. Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Assoc. (p. 839) six on six, different than boys The court held that half-court basketball for girls violated equal protection. Defendants lack any reasoning to why there is a difference between boy’s full court and girl’s half court, other than “it’s always been this way in AR.” Current standard is important governmental objective and substantially related to that objective. Chapter 12 – International Law 12  International Olympic Committee (IOC) Charter (p. 852) The supreme authority of the Olympic movement. Under the IOC charter, it has legal status under int’l law & perpetual succession. The Olympic charter forms the basis of int’l sports law. DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee (p. 854) In 1980, USOC decided not to send Americans to the Moscow Olympics, b/c Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Carter Administration said this posed a threat to American lives & urged them to boycott. Players sued. USOC, by charter, has authority to decide not to send an American team to the Olympics & it could do so for reasons not directly related to sports. In addition, the players don’t have a statutory right to compete in the Olympics. Next, the court found the USOC's decision not to send an American team was not a state action & didn’t give rise to an actionable claim for the infringement of the constitutional rights alleged. Finally, even if there was a state action, the right to compete in amateur athletics had been found not to be a deprivation of constitutionally protected rights. National Olympic Committees (p. 853) Mission – to develop and protect the Olympic Movement in their respective countries. Diffusion of Olympics in the teaching programs of physical education and sport in schools and university establishments. Blood Packing & Blood Doping (p. 875) a/k/a Blood Doctoring A technique aimed at increasing an athlete’s red blood cell count and oxygen level by administering transfusions of the athlete’s own blood (packing) or someone else’s blood (doping). Believed to increase stamina. Very difficult to enforce without self-confession. Met with the strictest penalties. Charter of the Int’l Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) (p. 877-78) A court of international JRD for international sports. Two divisions ordinary arbitration division and appeals arbitration division. Chapter 13 – Intellectual Property Patents (p. 883) A patent confers on the owner the right to exclude others from selling or using the product or process. May sue those who directly infringe. Covers golf balls, helmets, skates, rackets, trampolines, lawn darts. BUT does not cover divots. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore Football Club Limited Part’ship (p. 902) The Indy Colts and the NFL brought suit against the CFL’s (Canadian Football League) Baltimore franchise in their attempt to call itself “Baltimore CFL Colts.” The court granted preliminary injunction against the Baltimore football team’s use of “Colts” or “CFL Colts.” 7th Cir. Found for Indy Colts (formerly Baltimore Colts), on the basis that the name “Baltimore CFL Colts” was likely to confuse a substantial number of consumers, thus warranting issuance of a preliminary injunction. Trademark under Lanham act. Johnny Unitas, Irsay, Baltimore Callaway Golf Co. v. Golf Clean, Inc. (p. 908) A golf club manufacturer successfully used trade dress protection to enjoin a knock-off of its Big Bertha irons. Likely to cause confusion between Big Bertha and knockoffs. The manufacturer's irons were entitled to trade dress protection and were inherently distinctive and acquired secondary meaning. The trade dress was primarily nonfunctional. The competitor's clubs were likely to be confused with the manufacturers. Although the manufacturer had not met its burden of proving advertising in similar markets, all other relevant factors favored the manufacturer. The trade dress was strong, the similarity of design weighed heavily in its favor, the trade channels were similar, and the proof of competitor's intent to derive benefit from its reputation was significant. 13