Judicial Department Notes PDF

**PART VIII: JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT\ 1.THE JUDICIAL POWER** **A. DEFINITION** ================= **i. *ART VIII, Section 1(2), 1987 Constitution****: Judicial power includes the **[duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable]**, and **[to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government]**.* **Tocao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127405, 20 September 2001.** ------------------------------------------------------------------ **FACTS:** On November 14, 2001, petitioners Marjorie Tocao and William T. Belo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision dated October 4, 2000. They maintain that there was no partnership between petitioner Belo, on the one hand, and respondent Nenita A. Anay, on the other hand; and that the latter being merely an employee of petitioner Tocao **ISSUE:** WON there is a partnership relation between Belo and Anay **HELD:** NO. After review of the evidence, the Court was convinced that Belo acted merely as guarantor of Geminesse Enterprise, not a partner thereof. It was petitioner Tocao and Anay who had an informal partnership occasionally participated by Belo but never in an official capacity. Further, Belo never participated in the profits. Hence, not being a partner in Geminesse Enterprise, Anay had no cause of action against Belo and the complaint against Belo should be dismissed. With regard to the stocks held by respondent Anay, failure to account for the same is not considered by the Court as bad faith and a bar to respondent\'s claim for damages to the extent of its value. It was justified as security for respondent\'s claims against the partnership that suddenly ousted her. The value of said stocks should be deducted from whatever amount is finally adjudged to respondent after formal accounting of the partnership affairs. **RATIO:** *The **inherent powers** of a Court to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice includes the **right to reverse itself**, especially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant.* **De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127182, 5 December 2001** ----------------------------------------------------------------- **FACTS**: Applying the case of *Achacoso v. Macaraig*, this Court, in its decision dated January 22, 2001, ruled that private respondent Jacob F. Montesa\'s appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV of the Ministry of Local Government was temporary for failure to possess the required Career Executive Service (CES) eligibility for the said position. Hence, he can be transferred or reassigned without violating his right to security of tenure. Thus, private respondent filed the instant motion for reconsideration by invoking *res judicata.* He contended that his appointment can no longer be passed upon and controverted in the present case considering that the said issue had already been settled in the Minute Resolution of this Court dated March 17, 1992 in *Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al*., when his appointment was first contested. In that case, the Court ruled that the Achacoso case was not applicable to him since he was appointed by virtue of Article III of the Freedom Constitution, and during that period there was no Career Executive Service Board. The only eligibility required was that of the first grader, and private respondent was a first grader. Therefore, having met all the requirements for the position to which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and due process. **ISSUE:** Can person who lacks the necessary qualifications for a public position be appointed to it in a permanent capacity? **HELD:** In this case, a reading of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which was adopted and declared part of the law of the land by Presidential Decree No. 1 clearly showed that a CES eligibility is indeed a requirement for a position embraced in the CES. The foregoing law and circular were never amended nor repealed by the Freedom Constitution, A CES eligibility is an existing and operative requirement at the time of private respondent\'s appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV. In fact, the Integrated Reorganization Plan allows the appointment of non-CES eligibles, like private respondent, provided they subsequently acquire the needed eligibility. Moreover, assuming ex gratia argumenti that a CES eligibility is not a requirement in the case of private respondent, the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of personnel in the CES, which allow transfer or reassignment of CES personnel to other positions of the same rank or salary, justify his transfer to other CES position without violating his right to security of tenure. **RATIO:** *The Court was not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality.* **Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R.No. 171947, 15 February 2011** -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **FACTS:** The Supreme Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution phase. In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. **ISSUE:** Whether the recommendation by the Committee is an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines. **RULING**: ***[The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court]***. None of the agencies ever questioned the power of the Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over executive functions. With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Courts orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment. While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. **Limketkai Sons Milling v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118509, 5 September 1996.** ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **Facts.** After the Court rendered a unanimous decision in favor of the petitioner, the Divisions of the Court underwent reorganization following the retirement of one of the Associate Justices. The private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was deliberated upon by the newly reorganized Third Division chaired by C.J. Narvasa. The previous decision was reversed by a majority vote. Petitioner now argues the case should be referred to the Court en banc alleging certain doctrines have been modified or reversed and challenging the present composition of the Third Division. It is asserted that the First Division should have been chaired by C.J. Narvasa, the Second by the next senior Justice and the Third by the third most senior Justice. **Issue.** May the petitioner validly challenge the reorganization of the SC? **Held.** No. ***[Reorganizations in the Supreme Court's Divisions are purely an internal matter to which parties have no business at all. With its new membership, the Court is not obliged to follow blindly a decision of upholding a party's case when, after its re-examination, the rectification appears proper and necessary.]*** B. WHERE VESTED =============== **i. ART VIII, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution***: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.* C. JURISDICTION =============== **i. *ART VIII, Secs. 2 and 5, 1987 Constitution*** **Section 2**. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members. **Section 5.** The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1. 2. a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. 3. 4. 5. 6. **ii. *ART VI, Sec. 30, 1987 Constitution****\ *Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence. **Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998 ̈** ----------------------------------------------------------- **FACTS:** The Ombudsman granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed as then Assistant Regional Director, of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The petitioner appeals to the Supreme Court the decision pursuant to Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)i which pertinently provides - In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. **ISSUE:** Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 is valid thus the court has appellate jurisdiction over administrative cases decided by the ombudsman. **HELD:** Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC is not valid. ***[Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencie]***s. **Villavert v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133715, 23 February 2000.** ------------------------------------------------------------- **Facts:** An administrative case was filed against petitioner, Villavert and that it claimed for his dismissal of the said administrative charges. Villavert was a sales and promotion supervisor of PCSO Cebu branch and that he was responsible for the sale and disposal of PCSO sweepstakes tickets withdrawn by him which were in fact already sold. **Issue:** Can the appeals of the Ombudsman be appealed to the Supreme Court? **Ruling:** No. *Sec.27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent*. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. **D. DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE** ===================================== **In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees, Notice, 14 February 2012** ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **SUMMARY** During the impeachment proceedings of Chief Justice Corona, the Prosecution Panel informed the court that they intended to present around 100 witnesses and nearly a thousand documents. These documents would be obtained from both private and public entities, and the proposed list included Supreme Court Justices, court officials, and employees, many of whom were associated with internal court matters. Letters were presented to examine the contents of these letters, which pertained to specific cases including the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Navarro v. Ermita (Dinagat case), Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, and League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC. **PROCEEDINGS** During the impeachment trial on February 7 and 8, 2012, the House Impeachment Panel requested the issuance of subpoenas to compel the production of case records and the presence of Justices, officials, and employees of the Supreme Court to testify regarding these cases. However, rather than issuing the requested subpoenas, Hon. Presiding Senator Judge Juan Ponce Enrile denied the Prosecution Panel\'s request for subpoenas ad testificandum for Justices Villarama, Sereno, Reyes, and Velasco on February 10, 2012. **ISSUE:** Does the presentation of these letters infringe upon the Right to Information? **RATIO:** The right to information, as per the Constitution and its inherent nature, is not without limitations. Similarly, the right to privacy of private individuals remains inviolable. Therefore, the court has adopted a policy that respects the confidentiality of documents within its possession or custody. This policy, known as transparency, is essential to uphold the court\'s sworn duty and maintain integrity. According to Section 11 Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, anyone can access court papers, records, orders, judgments, or entries for a fee and in compliance with the rules. While access is granted, it is not unlimited and must adhere to the constraints imposed by the law and the court\'s rules. To provide an overview of these regulations, the subsequent are classified as privileged documents or communications, thus exempt from disclosure: 1\. Court actions encompassing outcomes from case raffles and Court actions taken per the Court\'s session agenda, particularly those actions materially relevant to pending cases. However, this exclusion doesn\'t apply when a litigant requests details about the case raffle outcome, as indicated in Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC. 2\. Court deliberations and the discussions of Court Members during court sessions focusing on pending cases or matters before the Court 3\. Court records defined as \"predecisional\" and \"deliberative,\" including documents and communications linked to the deliberative process, such as notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, memoranda, records of internal debates. 4\. Confidential information acquired by justices, judges, court officials, and employees during their official duties, as mentioned in points (2) and (3) above, maintains its privileged status even after their term of office. 5\. Resolutions publicly accessible through the Court. 6\. The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy necessitates that the highest officials of each department are exempt from the mandatory processes of other departments. 7\. These privileges are vested in the Supreme Court as an institution, not attributed to any individual justice or judge in their personal capacity. As the Court surpasses individual justices or judges in authority, no active or retired justice or judge, including the Chief Justice, can assert an exception without collective agreement. **2. APPOINTMENT TO THE JUDICIARY** =================================== **a. QUALIFICATIONS** ===================== **i. *ART VIII, Section 7, 1987 Constitution:*** 1. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. 2. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar. 3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. **b. PROCEDURE FOR APPOINTMENT i. *ART VIII, Secs. 4(1) and 9, 1987 Constitution*** =================================================================================== **Sec 4 (1):** The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. **Section 9.** The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issued the appointment within ninety days from the submission of the list. ### **In Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent Appointments in the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC, 20 September 2010** **FACTS:** On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President transmitted the appointment papers of four newly appointed Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justices to the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The appointees were Myra G. Fernandez, Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., Ramon Paul L. Hernando, and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela. Their respective appointment papers bore the following dates: February 16, 2010, for Justices Fernandez, Peralta, Jr., and Hernando, and February 24, 2010, for Justice Antonio-Valenzuela. All four Justices took their oath before then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Renato C. Corona on March 10, 2010. The CA Committee on Rules initially listed their seniority based on the dates of their appointments, placing Justice Fernandez as the most senior and Justice Antonio-Valenzuela as the most junior. However, Justice Antonio-Valenzuela contested this ranking, arguing that the seniority should be based on the order of their appointments as transmitted to the Supreme Court. The matter was referred to the CA en banc, which adopted the opinion of the CA Rules Committee. This decision was later approved by the Supreme Court in a resolution dated July 20, 2010. Justice Antonio-Valenzuela sought reconsideration of this resolution, insisting that all four Justices were appointed on March 10, 2010, the date their appointments were transmitted to the SC. **ISSUE:** Whether the date of appointment is the date the appointments were transmitted to the SC **HELD:** ***[For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has been signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246]***. In other words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other subsequent appointees. *[It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material]*. This provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls over the provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules implementing a particular law cannot override but must give way to the law they seek to implement. ### **De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010.** *The ban on making presidential appointments around the time of presidential elections in Sec 15 is confined to appointments in the Executive Dept. It does NOT extend to the Judiciary.* *The filling of a vacancy in the SC within the 90-day period prescribed by Sec 4(1), Art VIII was made a true mandate for the President.* **Facts.** The 2010 presidential election is forthcoming. C.J. Puno is set to retire on 17 May 2010 or 7 days after the presidential election. January 2010, the JBC begun to take applications for the position of C.J. Meanwhile, strong objections to Pres. GMA's appointing C.J. Puno's successor arose. The instant petitions were thus filed questioning her authority to appoint a new C.J. in the light of the ban imposed on presidential appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections up to the end of the President's term under Sec 15, Art VII of the Constitution. This view however seemingly conflicts with Sec 4(1), Art VIII which provides that any vacancy in the SC shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and Sec 9, Art VIII which provides that the President shall issue appointments to the Judiciary within 90 days from submission by the JBC of the list of nominees. It is further argued that there is no imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice considering that Sec 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the next President appoint the successor. It provides that in case of a vacancy in the office of the C.J. or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another C.J. is appointed and duly qualified. It is also argued that there is no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of C.J. Puno because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Sec 4(1), Art VIII remaining (the period that remains of the 90 days counted from C.J. Puno's retirement after the end of GMA's term). **Issues.** \(1) Does the ban on making presidential appointments under Sec 15, Art VII extend to appointments to fill vacancies in the SC and in the rest of the Judiciary? \(2) Does Sec 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 dispel the imperative need to appoint a new C.J.? \(3) Does the fact that there will still be about 45 days after the prohibition period to comply with the mandate of the President to fill vacancies in the SC dispel the need for Pres. GMA to appoint C.J. Puno's successor? \(4) May the JBC be compelled by mandamus to submit to Pres. GMA a short list of nominees now? **Held.** \(1) No. We reverse Valenzuela. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Sec 15, Art VII to the appointment of Members of the SC, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission further show that the filling of a vacancy in the SC within the 90-day period was made a true mandate for the President. This was borne out of the fact that 30 years hitherto, the Court seldom had a complete complement. Further, the usage in Sec 4(1), Art VIII of the word "shall"---an imperative---should not be disregarded. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Sec 15, Art VII, undoubtedly, the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Dept.141 The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary and appointments to the Judiciary for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The fact that Secs 14 and 16 of Art VI142 refer only to appointments within the Executive Dept. renders conclusive that Sec 15 of the same also applies only to the Executive Dept. This is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. If the framers intended Sec 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments, they would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition. To hold that Sec 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Dept. for it will tie the Judiciary and the SC to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election.143 \(2) No. The express reference to a Chief Justice \[in Sec 4(1), Art VIII\] abhors the idea that the framers contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court. Otherwise, they would have simply written so in the Constitution. Consequently, to rely on Sec 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest is to defy the plain intent of the Constitution. Said Sec 12 only responds to a rare situation in which the new C.J. is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent C.J. is unable to perform the duties and powers of the office. \(3) No. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from C.J. Puno\'s retirement by 17 May 2010. It ignores the need to apply Sec 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the SC. \(4) No. For mandamus to lie, there should be unexplained delay on the part of JBC in performing its duty; and there has been no delay on the part of the JBC in submitting the list of nominees for C.J. to the President because the vacancy in the office has not yet occurred. The President is constitutionally mandated to fill vacancies in the SC within 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancies. Thus, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees on or before the occurrence of the vacancy in order to enable the President make the appointment within the 90-day period therefrom. This is a ministerial duty of the JBC.144 JBC therefore has until the date C.J. Puno retires, or 17 May 2010, to submit the list nominees to the President. **c. THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL** =================================== **i. Composition** ------------------ **1. *ART VIII, Section 8(1), 1987 Constitution:*** *A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.* ### **Francisco Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, 17 July 2012** **FACTS:** In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC -- one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase "a representative of Congress." It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of "Congress," such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of "a representative from Congress," it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no "real interest" in questioning the constitutionality of the JBC's current composition. The respondents also question petitioner's belated filing of the petition. **ISSUES:** 1\. Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this case; and 2\. Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. **RULING:** 1\. Yes. The Courts' power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co- equal branch of government is put in issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents' contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a "personal stake" on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC's duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court's ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders. 2\. Yes. The word "Congress" used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. It is evident that the definition of "Congress" as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government -- to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress' non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. *Hence, the term "Congress" must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, the inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote, or half of it, violates that constitutional mandate* Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. ### **Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, Francisco Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, 16 April 2013.** **FACTS:** From the moment of the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council OBC), Congress designates one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members. Each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation. In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered. An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. It has been the situation since then. Francisco Chavez, in his petition, asked the Supreme Court (SC) to determine whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one member of Congress to sit in the JBC. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. however argues that it would be absurd if there will only be one member from the Congress in the JBC despite the Congress\' bicameral nature. They added that the framers of the 1987 Constitution committed a plain oversight by not making the adjustments on the members of the JBC, in view of the Congress\' shift from unicameralism to bicameralism. **ISSUE:** Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than one member of Congress to sit in the JBC **RULING:** No. It is basic that what the Constitution clearly says, according to its plain text, compels acceptance. For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. In opting to use the singular letter \"a\" to describe \"representative of Congress,\" the Filipino people through the framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have so provided, as can be read in its other provisions. The rationale why the framers of the Constitution added a representative of Congress to sit in the JBC is to equally represent all three co-equal branches of the Government in the JBC. Despite the Congress\' bicameral nature, the framers did not adjust the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of the Congress\' primary function --- to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function. Moreover, the creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of Congress politics in the appointment of judges. As such, the interpretation that two representatives from Congress shall sit in the JBC runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. ii. Appointment --------------- **1. *ART VIII, Section 8(2), 1987 Constitution:*** *The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.* **iii. Powers and Functions ** ------------------------------ **1. ART VIII, Section 8(5), 1987 Constitution:** The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. ### **Francis Jardeleza v. Maria Lourdes Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, 19 August 2014** **FACTS:** To fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be a showing that the act complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of the person and not to his judgment as a professional. When an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes "unanimous" instead of the "majority vote". Before the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad, the Judicial Board Council (JBC) announced the opening of application or recommendation for the said vacated position. JBC received a nomination to Francis H. Jardeleza, then incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for the position. Jardeleza received telephone calls from Justice Aurora Santiago Lagman, who informed him that Chief Justice and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, CJ Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him. Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available before the JBC during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity. Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition praying that the Court, in the exercise of its constitutional power of supervision issue an order: (1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the public record of the JBC; (2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in public, under the same conditions that attend the public interviews held for all applicants; and (3) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the voting or at any adjournment thereof where such vote would be taken for the nominees for the position. Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. **ISSUE:** Was Francis Jardeleza invalidly excluded from the shortlist submitted to the President? **RULING:** **Yes.** The Court notes that the initial or original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was grounded on Jardeleza's "inability to discharge the duties of his office". The records bear that Chief Justice Sereno initially invoked the "unanimity rule" during the JBC meeting where she expressed her position that Jardeleza did not possess the integrity required to be a member of the Court. The Court cannot consider Chief Justice Sereno's invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation of the rule. What this disposition perceives, therefore, is the inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original ground of its invocation. When an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes "unanimous" instead of the "majority vote". Considering that JBC-009 employs the term "integrity" as an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that "integrity"as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. *[The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBC proceedings. The Court concludes that the right to due process is available and thereby demandable as a matter of right. The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. The fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is impressed with discretion, however, does not automatically denigrate an applicant's entitlement to due process. Disciplinary proceedings are actually aimed to verify and finally determine, if a lawyer charged is still qualified to benefit from the rights and privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.]* The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an applicant's qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfilment of the duty of JBC to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. Having been able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the shortlist submitted to the President. **3. THE SUPREME COURT** ======================== 1. COMPOSITION (ART VIII, Section 4(1), 1987 Constitution) ---------------------------------------------------------- The Supreme Court shall be composed of a ***Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices***. It may **sit en banc** or in its discretion**, in division of three, five, or seven Members**. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. **2. EN BANC/DIVISION CASES** ----------------------------- i\. *ART VIII, Section 4(2) and (3), 1987 Constitution* 2\) All cases involving the *constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law*, which shall be heard by the **Supreme Court en banc,** and all other cases which under the *Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc*, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. 3\) Cases or matters **heard by a division** shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc*.* ### Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, 19 August 1999 **FACTS:** The subject of the controversy is an agricultural land in Sumilao, Bukidnon, measuring 144 hectares. The municipality of Sumilao wanted to convert this into an agro-industrial land. In its Order dated March 29, 1996, Office of the President acceded to this conversion, and converted the whole 144 hectares to agro-industrial land in order to attract investors. This order became final and executory due to Administrative Order No. 18 Sec 7. Feeling aggrieve, farmers commenced a hunger-strike in protest of this ruling in front of the DAR compound in Quezon City October 9, 1997. The Office of the President (OP) wanted to appease the farmers, hence, the OP through Deputy Executive Secretary Corona, issued a new resolution dated November 7, 1997 which was called the Win-Win resolution. The Resolution modified the Order dated March 29, 1996 where instead of converting the entire 144 hectares of land, only 44 hectares will be converted into agro-industrial land and that the remaining 100 hectares will be distributed to the farmers. The petitioners cried foul and appealed. The Supreme Court held that the Win-Win Resolution is void since the Order of March 29, 1996 was final and executory and the OP had lost its jurisdiction to the case. According to AO No. 18 Sec 7, decisions of the OP shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration is filed within such period and that only one motion for reconsideration is allowed except for some meritorious cases. In this case, no one has seasonably filed such motion. Hence, the petition was granted and the Win-win resolutions was nullified on April 24, 1998. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) seeking reversal of the April 24, 1998 Decision nullifying the Win-Win Resolution. However, in the SC Resolution dated November 17, 1998, the justices voted 2-2 and there was no final result. They merely decided that the Decision dated April 24, 1998 was denied finality. In the present petition, the respondents wanted to refer the case to the Supreme Courten banc. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying on the provision of Article 8 Sec 4(3) of the Constitution. **ISSUE:** WON the aforementioned resolution of the court should be referred to the Court en banc **HELD:** Under Article 8, Sec. 4 (3) of the Constitution and the rule *reddendo singular singulis*, the Court differentiated CASES from MATTERS. CASES are to be DECIDED, while MATTERS are to be RESOLVED. An example of a MATTER is a motion for reconsideration, such as the one in this case. *[Only CASES which do not obtain the required number of votes are required to be elevated en banc.]* On the other hand, as regards MATTERS, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. If there is a tie in resolving a matter, the earlier decision of the Court is upheld. ### **Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration in Arturode Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, 20 April 2010** *In reversing the Valenzuela ruling, the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII is now deemed inapplicable to the appointments in the judiciary.* **Facts:** This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling. **Issue:** WON the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling. **HELD:** NO. The Supreme Court rejected the movants' contention that by abandoning In Re: Mateo Valenzuela, the Court violated the principle of stare decisis. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability. For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division. DOCTRINE: Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down ### **Limketkai Sons Milling v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118509, 5 September 1996.** **3. POWERS** ------------- **i. Original Jurisdiction** ---------------------------- **1. *ART VIII, Section 5(1), 1987 Constitution****: Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.* ### **Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 106910, 19 October 2010** **FACTS:** President Marcos issued PD 1112 authorizing the establishment of toll facilities on public improvements. It acknowledged the huge financial requirements and the need to tap the resources of the private sector to implement the government\'s infrastructure programs. PD 1112 allowed the collection of toll fees for the use of certain public improvements that would allow a reasonable rate of return on investments. The same decree created the Toll Regulatory Board, vesting it with the power to enter into contracts for the construction, maintenance, and operation of tollways, grant authority to operate a toll facility, issue the necessary Toll Operation Certificate (TOC) and fix initial toll rates, and adjust it from time to time after due notice and hearing. PD 1113 was issued granting the Philippine National Construction Corporation for a period of 30 years, a franchise to operate toll facilities in the North Luzon and South Luzon Expressways. Subsequently, PD 1894 was issued further granting the PNCC a franchise over the Metro Manila Expressway and the expanded delineated NLEX and SLEX. Then came the 1987 Constitution with its franchise provision. In 1993, the Government Corporate Counsel held that the PNCC may enter into a joint venture agreement with private entities without going into public bidding. On February 1994, the DPWH together with other private entities executed a MOU to open the door for entry of private capital in the Subic and Clark extension projects. PNCC entered into a financial and technical JVAs with entities for the toll operation of its franchised areas. Several Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOA) were entered for the South Metro Manila Skyway, NLEX Expansion, and South Luzon Expressway Projects. Petitioners seek to nullify the various STOAs and assail the constitutionality of Sections 3(a and d) of PD 1112 in relation to Section 8(b) of PD 1894. Insofar as they vested the TRB the power to issue, modify, and promulgate toll rate changes while given the ability to collect tolls. **Issue:** whether or not an actual case or controversy exists and, relevantly, whether petitioners in the first three petitions have locus standi **HELD**: YES. *[Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are, as here, appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.]* The present petitions allege that then President Ramos had exercised vis-à-vis an assignment of franchise, a function legislative in character. As alleged, too, the TRB, in the guise of entering into contracts or agreements with PNCC and other juridical entities, virtually enlarged, modified to the core and/or extended the statutory franchise of PNCC, thereby usurping a legislative prerogative. The usurpation came in the form of executing the assailed STOAs and the issuance of TOCs. Grave abuse of discretion is also laid on the doorstep of the TRB for its act of entering into these same contracts or agreements without the required public bidding mandated by law, specifically the BOT Law (R.A. 6957, as amended) and the Government Procurement Reform Act (R.A. 9184). In fine, the certiorari petitions impute on then President Ramos and the TRB, the commission of acts that translate inter alia into usurpation of the congressional authority to grant franchises and violation of extant statutes. The petitions make a prima facie case for certiorari and prohibition; an actual case or controversy ripe for judicial review exists. Verily, when an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In doing so, the judiciary merely defends the sanctity of its duties and powers under the Constitution. ### **Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 21381, 19 August 2014** **FACTS:** To fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be a showing that the act complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of the person and not to his judgment as a professional. When an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes "unanimous" instead of the "majority vote". Before the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad, the Judicial Board Council (JBC) announced the opening of application or recommendation for the said vacated position. JBC received a nomination to Francis H. Jardeleza, then incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for the position. Jardeleza received telephone calls from Justice Aurora Santiago Lagman, who informed him that Chief Justice and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, CJ Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him. Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available before the JBC during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity. Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition praying that the Court, in the exercise of its constitutional power of supervision issue an order: (1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the public record of the JBC; (2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in public, under the same conditions that attend the public interviews held for all applicants; and (3) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the voting or at any adjournment thereof where such vote would be taken for the nominees for the position. Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. **ISSUE:** WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUECOURSE TO THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS (WITH APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER). **HELD: The Court has constitutional bases to assume jurisdiction over the case.** As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardeleza's principal allegations in his petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority. The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available. \"Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. There is no question that the JBC's duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something. In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of votes in the JBC, it was negated by the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity in violation of his right to due process guaranteed not only by the Constitution but by the Council's own rules. For said reason, the Court is of the position that it can exercise the expanded judicial power of review vested upon it by the 1987 Constitution. x x x *[It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions]*. In a case like this, ***[where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the Court does not find passivity as an alternative]***. The impasse must be overcome. **ii. Appellate Jurisdiction** ------------------------------ **1. *ART VIII, Section 5(1), 1987 Constitution****: Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.* ### **People v. Redulosa, G.R. No. 94594, 29 March 1996.** *\ ***FACTS:** The case involves appellant Romeo Redulosa and his co-accused Roselo Carton who were charged with kidnapping for ransom with murder. The incident occurred on December 3, 1981, in Cebu City, Philippines. Redulosa proposed the kidnapping of Christopher Jason Tan, the son of Luisita and Tomas Tan. Redulosa and Carton attempted to kidnap the boy three times before succeeding on the third attempt. They demanded a ransom of P100,000 from the boy\'s parents, but when the parents failed to pay the full amount, the boy was killed. Redulosa and Carton were arrested and charged with the crime. **ISSUE:** WON APPELLANT HAS THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW HIS APPEAL FROM HIS PRISON CELL **HELD:** The Court ruled in favor of the appellant, Romeo Redulosa, and granted his motion to withdraw his appeal. To begin with the death penalty imposed on appellant was automatically reduced to *reclusion perpetua* in view of Art. III, Sesction 19(1) of the Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987. *[While this case was brought to this Court for automatic review as required by Rule 122, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, the case has ceased to be in this Court by virtue of such Rule. As a matter of fact appellant had to file a notice of appeal on August 20, 1990, otherwise he would be taken as having given his assent to his conviction on the basis of the reduced sentence and his case would be remanded to the trial court for execution of its decision as modified with respect to the penalty which is reduced to reclusion perpetua.]* ### **Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998.** **Facts:** The Ombudsman granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed as then Assistant Regional Director, of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The petitioner appeals to the Supreme Court the decision pursuant to Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)i which pertinently provides - In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. **ISSUE**: WON Rule 122, Sec. 9 of the Rules of Court is constitutional **HELD:** NO. The case provides that orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are appealable to the Supreme Court through Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, was declared unconstitutional, because it expands the Supreme Court's jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence. ### **Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135789, 31 January 2002.** **FACTS:** The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued a sequestration writ against all the assets, shares of stock, property records and bank deposits of Hans Menzi Holdings and Management, Inc. (HMHMI. The estate of Hans M. Menzi, in behalf of HMHMI, filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to lift freeze order which was granted by the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review assailing the resolution of the Sandiganbayan lifting the freeze order. The Court set aside the Sandiganbayan resolution and remanded the case back to the Sandiganbayan to resolve the issue of the issuance of the writ of sequestration. The Sandiganbayan lifted the writ of sequestration reasoning that there was no prima facie factual basis for its issuance. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner\'s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. **ISSUE:** whether there was prima facie factual basis for the issuance of a writ of sequestration over the assets, shares of stock, property records and bank deposits of HMHMI **HELD:** NO. The issue is factual. The Supreme Court ruled that the *[Sandiganbayan has full authority to decide on all incidents in the ill-gotten case, including the propriety of the writs of sequestration that the PCGG initially issued.]* In the absence of competent evidence showing thus far that President Marcos or his cronies ever acquired Bulletin shares of the late Hans M. Menzi or HMHMI that might be subject to sequestration, the Supreme Court may not void the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in question. **RATIO**: ***[It is well settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law.]*** A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. **NOTE:** 2. ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF FACT, DEFINED.- A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. **III. Temporary Assignment of Judges (ART VIII, Section 5(3), 1987 Constitution)** ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **IV. Order Change of Venue (ART VIII, Section 5(4), 1987 Constitution)** ------------------------------------------------------------------------- **V. Rule-Making Power** ------------------------ 1. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. 2. ### **First Lepanto Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, 10 March 1994.** **Rule-making Power** *Adjective laws operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner.* *Rule denying accused of his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him in a preliminary investigation held to be only an adjective law and therefore constitutional (preliminary investigation --- not essential part of due process).* **Facts.** The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended provided that appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a few months after the 1987 Constitution took effect (July 17, 1987), the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO 226) was promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that such appeals be directly filed with the SC. The SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power, Circular No. 1-91217 which confirmed the jurisdiction of the CA over appeals from the decisions of the BOI. SC's Second Division, relying on said Circular, accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present case. Petitioners now move to reconsider and question the Second Division's ruling which provided: "\....although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of \[EO 226\] is a substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of procedure which this Court has the power to regulate." They contend that Circular No. 1-91 (a rule of procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded Art 82 of EO 226 (a legislation).218 **Issue**. Does the CA have appellate jurisdiction over decisions from the BOI? **Held**. Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitution took effect (Feb 2, 1987). Thus, Art 82 of EO 226, which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is invalid and therefore never became effective for the concurrence of the Court was not sought in its enactment.219 Thus, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended still stands. The exclusive jurisdiction on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA. ### **In Re: Request for Creation of a Special Division, A.M. No. 02-1-09- SC, 21 January 2002.** FACTS: The case involved a request for the Supreme Court to create a Special Division within the Sandiganbayan to handle a specific high-profile case involving former President Joseph Estrada. The purpose of the request was to ensure the expeditious resolution of the case due to its complexity and public interest. Concerns were raised about whether the creation of such a special division was within the Supreme Court\'s rule-making powers under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. This constitutional provision empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. ISSUE: Can the Supreme Court create a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan under its rule-making power as provided in Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution? HELD: YES. it was held that it is within the competence OF the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its power to promulgate rules governing the enforcement and protection of constitutional rights and rules governing pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, to create a Special Division In the Sandiganbayan which will hear and decide the plunder case against former President Joseph Estrada. ### **In Re: Atty. Marcia Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 3 August 1978.** **FACTS:** The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously recommend to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for \"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues\" to the IBP since the latter\'s constitution notwithstanding due notice. The respondent stated that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate. **ISSUE:** Whether or not the non- payment of dues is a ground for the removal of the name from the Roll of Attorneys. **HELD: YES.** To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. The only compulsion (justified as exercise of Police power of the state) to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State\'s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. The enforcement of the penalty of removal does not amount to deprivation of property without due process of law. *[The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities]* ### **Atty. Aileen Maglana v. Atty. Jose Vicente, B.M. No 2713, 10 June 2014** **FACTS** On May 25, 2013, delegates of the IBP Eastern Visayas Region gathered to elect the Governor of their region for the 2013-2015 term. Atty. Maglana, the incumbent President of IBP Samar Chapter, was nominated for the position of Governor. Atty. Maglana then moved that Governor Enage declare that only IBP Samar Chapter was qualified to be voted upon for the position of Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas, to the exclusion of all the other eight (8) chapters. Atty. Maglana cited the rotation rule under Bar Matter No. 491 and argued that since 1989 or the start of the implementation of the rotation rule, only IBP Samar Chapter had not served as Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas. Atty. Opinion, the candidate of the IBP Eastern Samar Chapter, thereafter, took the floor and manifested that before he decided to run for Governor, he sought the opinion of the IBP if he was still qualified to run considering that he also ran for Governor and lost in the immediately preceding term. IBP Executive Committee stated that Atty. Opinion is qualified and that under the present set up, the IBP Chapters of Eastern Samar, Samar, and Biliran are qualified to field their respective candidate for the said election. Atty. Opinion also manifested that in the 2011 Regional Elections for IBP Eastern Visayas, the representative of IBP Samar Chapter, Judge Amanzar, waived the votes as he cannot pursue an election at that time. Instead, Atty. Opinion was asked to run. The Chapter President of Samar in 2011, however, categorically denied the waiver. Governor Enage eventually ruled that Atty. Opinion was disqualified from running for the position of Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas. Thereafter, Atty. Maglana was proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas in view of the disqualification of the other nominee, Atty. Opinion. Upon protest, the IBP BOG declared Atty. Opinion the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term, holding that IBP Samar waived its turn in the first rotation cycle, from 1989 to 2007. It also held that Atty. Opinion, who was actually a qualified candidate for Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas, should be declared the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term, considering that he garnered the majority six (6) votes, as opposed to the minority four (4) votes garnered by Atty. Maglana. **ISSUE** Whether Atty. Opinion should be declared the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term. **Held:** YES. It found that the Eastern Samar chapter waived its turn in the first rotation cycle from 1989 to 2007 when it failed to field a candidate. Thus, in the second rotation cycle for Governor of Eastern Visayas, Eastern Samar, along with five remaining chapters, is qualified to field a candidate; accordingly, Atty. Opinion, representing Eastern Samar, should be declared the duly elected Governor for he obtained the highest number of votes. *[Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates the Court's power of supervision over the IBP. In Garcia v. De Vera, the Court held that implicit in the constitutional grant to the Supreme Court of the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP (under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution) is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election of its officers.]* In administrative matters concerning the IBP, the Court can supervise the IBP by ensuring the legality and correctness of the exercise of its powers as to means and manner, and by interpreting for it the constitutional provisions, laws and regulations affecting the means and manner of the exercise of its powers. For this reason, the IBP By-Laws mandates that the Court has the plenary power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws in accordance with policies it deems, not only consistent with the Constitution, laws and regulations, but also as may be necessary, practicable and appropriate in light of prevailing circumstances. ### **Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, 19 January 1999.** **Facts:** On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve. Public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that \"it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation.\" **Issue** Whether the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case. **Held:** Yes. The finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. \... For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible. **vi. Power of Appointment (ART VIII, Section 5(6), 1987 Constitution*)*** -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law. **vii. Power of Administrative Supervision (ART VIII, Section 6, 1987 Constitution)** ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. ### **Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, 23 October 2001** **Facts:** The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao filed a criminal complaint charging Judge Renato A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e). The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through Graft Investigation Officer Il Marivic A. Trabajo-Daray issued an order directing petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit within ten days. Petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court. The Graft Investigation Officer, however, denied the motion of petitioner. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner maintained that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 \[e\]. According to petitioner, public respondent encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. **ISSUE:** WON public respondent encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel **Held**: YES. ***[According to the Court, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.]*** The Court stressed that Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers. ### Dolalas v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 118808, 24 December 1996*.* **FACTS:** Judge Ana Maria I. Dolalas and her staff, Evelyn K. Obido and Wilberto B. Carriedo, were administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao for alleged gross misconduct in office, stemming from complaints filed by Benjamin Villarante, Jr. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao acted on the complaint, leading to an investigation and subsequent resolution. The petitioners contended that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them because the Constitution vests administrative supervision over courts and their personnel exclusively in the Supreme Court under Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. **ISSUE:** Does the Office of the Ombudsman have the authority to exercise administrative jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and their personnel. **HELD:** The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding that the Constitution explicitly vests the power of administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel exclusively in the Supreme Court. Under Article VIII, Section 6, the judiciary's independence is safeguarded by ensuring that no external entity, including the Office of the Ombudsman, can exercise administrative control or supervision over its personnel. The Office of the Ombudsman may investigate complaints against members of the judiciary but must endorse such complaints to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. Public respondent Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary. **4. TENUREOFJUDGES/JUSTICES** ============================== 1. Supreme Court ---------------- ***ART XI, Section 2, 1987 Constitution**:* * *The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be **removed** from office on *[impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust]*. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment ### **In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, 15 April 1998.** **FACTS:** The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement from Gonzalez, \"Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor\" forwarding to Justice Fernan a complaint for comment within 10 days from receipt. Justice Fernan had brought this to the attention of the Court en banc. Said Indorsement contained an anonymous letter by \"Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court\" addressed to Hon. Gonzalez referring to charges for disbarment brought by Cuenco against Justice Fernan and asking Gonzalez to do something about it; and a telegram from Cuenco addressed Gonzalez, where Cuenco refers to pleadings he filed with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in the opinion of Cuenco, made improper any \"intervention\" by Gonzalez. Cuenco encouraged Mr. Gonzalez \"to file responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan\'s intervention. The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. Raul M Gonzales a Resolution of Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled \"Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan\" in which the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Justice Fernan. Court also Resolved to require Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making accusations against Justice Fernan. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. The Court denied with finality. Mr Cuenco\'s Motion for Reconsideration. **ISSUE:** Whether or not a sitting Justice of the Supreme Court may be disbarred. **RULING:** NO. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. ### **Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, 11 May 2018 and 19 June 2018.** ***Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.*** **FACTS:** In May 2018, Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Sereno) was found guilty of unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Chief Justice and was subsequently disqualified. Hence, Sereno file a motion for reconsideration. Sereno claims denial of due process because her case was allegedly not heard by an impartial tribunal. She reiterates that the six Justices ought to have inhibited themselves on the grounds of actual bias, of having personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, and of having acted as a material witness in the matter in controversy. Respondent also argues denial of due process when the Court supposedly took notice of extraneous matters as corroborative evidence and when the Court based its main Decision on facts without observing the mandatory procedure for reception of evidence. She reiterates her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo warranto; that the official acts of the Judicial and Bar Council UBC) and the President involves political questions that cannot be annulled absent any allegation of grave abuse of discretion; that the petition for quo warranto is time-barred; and that respondent was and is a person of proven integrity. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) reiterates that Sereno\'s repeated failure to file her Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) and her non-submission thereof to the JBC which the latter required to prove the integrity of an applicant affect respondent\'s integrity. The OSG concludes that respondent, not having possessed of proven integrity, failed to meet the constitutional requirement for appointment to the Judiciary. **Issue:** WON petitioner can only be removed through impeachment **HELD:** NO. The Supreme Court held that an elected impeachable official may not be removed from office exclusively through impeachment. While Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution provides for impeachment as a mode of removal for specific high-ranking officials, it does not preclude other remedies such as quo warranto, which questions the validity of a public officer\'s appointment or election. The permissive term \"may\" in the constitutional provision indicates that impeachment is not the sole remedy. The Court emphasized that quo warranto is a distinct remedy addressing defects in qualifications or appointment, unlike impeachment, which concerns acts committed while in office. This interpretation ensures that unqualified or ineligible officials cannot perpetuate their tenure in office, aligning with the principle that public office is a public trust. Moreover, allowing quo warranto petitions prevents absurdities, such as officials retaining positions despite clear ineligibility. The Court clarified that judicial review over the legality of appointments or elections, even of impeachable officials, is necessary to uphold the Constitution and protect the integrity of public office. **NOTES:** QUO WARRANTO AND IMPEACHMENT, DISTINGUISHED. **Aspect** **Quo Warranto** **Impeachment** ----------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- **Nature of Process** Judicial proceeding under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. Political process undertaken by the legislature. **Purpose** Determines the legality of a public officer\'s appointment or election and their eligibility for office. Determines whether a public officer committed impeachable offenses such as treason or graft and corruption. **Focus** Inquires into the right or title to the public office and whether the officer meets the qualifications. Examines acts or misconduct committed by the officer while in office. **Grounds** Lack of qualifications or invalidity of appointment or election. Culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. **Outcome** Ouster of the officer if found ineligible or unqualified. Removal from office if found guilty of impeachable offenses. **Function** Ensures only qualified individuals hold public office. Checks abuse of power and penalizes serious crimes or misconduct. **Substitutability** Impeachment cannot substitute for quo warranto since the latter addresses eligibility and title to office. Quo warranto cannot substitute for impeachment as it does not address misconduct while in office. **2. Lower Courts** ------------------- ***ART VIII, Section 11, 1987 Constitution**:* The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall *[hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The]* Supreme Court en banc shall have the *[power to discipline judges of lower courts]*, or *[order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members]* who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in thereon ### **People v. Judge Gacott, Jr., G.R. No. 116049, 13 July 1995.** **Facts.** The Second Division of the SC resolved to reprimand Judge Gacott of the RTC and fine him with P10,000 for gross ignorance of the law. In this motion for reconsideration, he questions the competence of the Second Division to administratively discipline him. He claims that the clause "The SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges xxx or order their dismissal xxx" of Sec 11, Art VIII of the Constitution means that only the full Court, not a division thereof, can administratively punish him. **Issue.** Is it only the Court sitting en banc that can administratively discipline judges? **Held.** No. There are two situations envisaged in Art VIII, Sec 11. The first clause which states that "the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts" is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and a determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the Court en banc since it would result in an absurdity. To require the entire Court to participate in all administrative cases would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court. This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite decisions/resolutions and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions. The second clause declares that the Court en banc can "order the dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations xxx and voted thereon". Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself. Nonetheless, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of one year or a fine of P10,000 or both that the administrative matter may be decided in division. **RATIO:** The first clause of Sec 11, Art VIII only declares a grant of power to the SC to discipline judges. It does NOT mean ONLY the full Court can discipline judges. Divisions thereof CAN too. ### **Judge Caoibes v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, 17 July 2001.** **FACTS:** On May 20, 1997, petitioner Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. and respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres were involved in a fight within the court premises over a piece of furniture. Thereafter, the respondent judge lodged before the Office of the Ombudsman, a criminal complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainant\'s eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner judge. The respondent judge also filed an administrative complaint with the Supreme Court, praying for the dismissal of petitioner judge from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner judge filed an \"Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court,\" praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case in abeyance, and refer the same to the Supreme Court. The motion for referral was, however, denied by the Office of the Ombudsman. Invoking Section 15 of R.A. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman refused to refrain from taking cognizance of the cases in favor of the Supreme Court on the ground that, allegedly, the accusations therein against petitioner judge constitute simple criminal charges falling within the parameters of its constitutional power and duty to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The Office of the Ombudsman denied petitioner\'s motion for reconsideration and directed petitioner judge to submit a counter-affidavit. Petitioner sought recourse before the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari **ISSUE:** WON the Ombudsman has authority over cases against a judge or court personnel **HELD:** *[Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court, which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel]*. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. *[The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein]*. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns. Accordingly, the Court directed the Ombudsman to dismiss the complaint filed by the respondent Judge and to refer the same to the Court for appropriate action. ### **Dayot v. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1282, 1 March 2001.** ***FACTS:*** In the present case, Complainant alleges that respondent judge committed misconduct of office, abuse of authority and oppression when he issued the warrant of arrest and ordered complainant's detention despite the pendency of a motion for reconsideration as this Court had yet to resolve the petition with finality; that he filed a motion to lift the arrest warrant but up to this time the same remained unacted upon; that respondent Judge further issued an Order discrediting his service of sentence from May 6, 1998 up to November 6, 1998, the date of the order, after considering that his service of sentence was made outside the prison cell. After finding that complainant, who was convicted of Grave Slander, was provided with special sleeping quarters in the third floor of the municipal building instead of serving sentence inside the jail, respondent judge, without hearing and notice to complainant and/or his counsel, discredited the complainant\'s service of sentence from May 6, 1988 up to November 6, 1998, the date of the order. **ISSUE:** WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion **HELD:** YES. It appears that thereafter respondent Judge issued an order which decreed that such service of sentence be not credited as service by herein complainant. It is not disputed that the said order was issued without a hearing or notice to the accused or his counsel. As correctly pointed out by the Court Administrator, respondent Judge may have been prompted by his desire to get rid of corruption and special treatment extended to some prisoners, but that is not a license for him to abuse his judicial discretion by depriving the accused of his right to be heard. If indeed complainant was getting special treatment, being provided with special sleeping quarters in the third floor of the municipal building instead of serving sentence inside the jail, this matter is essentially the responsibility of the Jail Warden and the sanction impose

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