Intelligence and Tasking Policy PDF
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Summary
This document is an intelligence and tasking policy for a police force. It details various procedures, processes, and sections to be followed by police officers.
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**INTELLIGENCE AND TASKING POLICY** **TABLE OF DOCUMENT DETAILS** +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Title | | +===================================+===================================+ | Referenc...
**INTELLIGENCE AND TASKING POLICY** **TABLE OF DOCUMENT DETAILS** +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Title | | +===================================+===================================+ | Reference No | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Relevant Department or Group | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Ownership | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Document Author | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Approved by | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Approval Date | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Implementation Date | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | To be Reviewed Date | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Last Revised Date | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Quality Assured by | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Protective Marking | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Linked to other | | | | | | Standing Order | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Relevant Legislation | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ | Pages | | | | | | (including this page) | | +-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+ **TABLE OF CONTENTS** [Forward](#Section1) [Page 1](#ChiefConstablePolicyStatement) [Section 1](%5Cl) ------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------- -------------------------- [Introduction](#Section2)f [Page 1] [Section 2](%5Cl) [Background](#Section3) [Page 2](#EquipmentCareResponsibilities) [Section 3](#Section3) [The OIU/TCU interaction](#Section4) [Page 2](#MaintenanceProcedures) [Section 4](#Section4) [Police Information/Intelligence](#Section5) [Page 3](#FaultReportingProcedures) [Section 5](#Section5) [The intelligence process](#Section6) [Page4](#WeaponManagement) [Section 6](#Section6) [The intelligence cycle](#Section7) [Page 4](#CalibrationandLiftingEquipment) [Section 7](#Section7) [Intelligence products](%5Cl) [Page 5] [Section 8](#Section8) [Tasking and co ordinating meeting](#Section9) [Page 8] [Section 9](%5Cl) [The role of the operational Intelligence unit OIU)](#Section10) [Page 9] [Section 10](#Section10) [The 3x5x2 information report form](#Section11) [Page 10] [Section 11](#Section11) [Internal request report(computer)](#Section12) [Page 14] [Section 12](#Section12) [Diary of events/Tension indicators](#Section13) [Page 14] [Section 13](#Section13) [Antecedents of accused](#Section14) [Page 15] [Section 14](#Section14) [Bulletins](#Section15) [Page 15] [Section15](#Section15) [Contact with criminals](#Section16) [Page 15] [Section 16](#Section16) [Building/house searches](#Section17) [Page 15] [Section 17](#Section17) [Sources of information](#Section18) [Page 15] [Section 18](#Section18) [Dealing with human resources](#Section19) [Page 16] [Section 19](#Section19) [Disclosure](#Section20) [Page 17] [Section20](#Section20) [Human Rights](#Section21) [Page 17] [Section 21](#Section21) [Conclusion](#Section22) [Page 18] [Section 22](#Section22) **INDEX OF APPENDICES** [Appendix A](#appendixA) [Strategic Assessment](%5Cl) [Page](#_Toc393867597) -------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------- [Appendix B](#appendixB) [Force control strategy](%5Cl) [Page](#EquipmentManagersChecks) [Appendix C](#appendixC) [Tactical Assessment](#appendixC) [Page](#MonitoringInspectiononEquipmentDocum) [Appendix D](#appendixD) [Subject profile](#appendixD) [Page](#SummaryofEquipmentInspection) [Appendix E](#appendixE) [Problem profile](#appendixE) [Page](#VehicleFaultFlowchart) [Appendix F](#appendixF) [IRR (computer form)](#appendixF) [Page](#VehicleFaultReportBook) [Appendix G](#appendixG) [Crime pattern analysis](#appendixG) [Page](#VehicleInspectionForm) [Appendix H](#appendixH) [Network Analysis](#appendixH) [Page](#WeaponFaultReportingFlowchart) [Appendix I](#appendixI) [3x5x2 electronic format](#appendixI) [Page](#DivisionalWeaponsRegister) [Appendix J](#appendixJ) [3x5x2 manual format](#appendixJ) [Page](#GLOCKWeaponFaultReportSheet) [Appendix K](#appendixK) [3x5x2 grading and source evaluation](#appendixK) [Page](#NonTaskWorthyWeaponsTag) [Appendix L](#appendixL) [3x5x2 information and intelligence grading](#appendixL) [Page](#EquipmentandInstrumentsFaultFlowchar) [Appendix M](#appendixM) [Antecedents of accused form](#appendixM) [Page](#EquipmentFaultReportRegister) [Appendix N](#appendixN) [Bulletins](#appendixN) [Page](#EquipmentFaultReportRegister) **1. Forward** 1.1 As pressure increases on police resources and the public demand for high quality of service grows, it is more important than ever that we develop ways of working "smarter". The gathering, analysis and use of intelligence are the most important means of realising our strategic intention of reducing crime. Just as we have identified that the term "crime" must embrace broader areas such as anti-social behaviour and nuisance, it is important to recognise that intelligence goes beyond conventional information about crime and criminals. Working with our partners we must look to aggregate and analyse all available information that has an influence on police activity. It is important that our response to public order incidents, road traffic collisions and anti-social behaviour is also "Intelligence-Led". Legal and ethical considerations demand that we have robust systems for the storage and transfer of intelligence. In a world where criminals are more mobile and intelligent, we also need ways in which the products of our intelligence systems can be aggregated and used as a weapon against "cross border" crime both within and beyond the SBA's. []{#Section2.anchor}**2.** **Introduction** 2.1 **The Concept of Intelligence Community Policing (ILCP)** The Concept of intelligence-led policing underpins all aspects of policing, from community policing and partnership work to the investigation of crime. Within the framework of Intelligence Led Community Policing (ILCP), the effective and efficient collection, recording, dissemination and retention of information allows for the identification of material which can be assessed for intelligence value and enables decision-making about priorities and tactical options. Intelligence-led policing is a system or model, which enables managers to make informed decisions and deploy resources in support of pre-determined priorities. It facilitates not only the proactive targeting of criminals, crime series and hotspots, but also proactive deployments to achieve crime reduction and community safety. It is a system in which managers give direction to the Intelligence Cycle and Task resources in line with a business plan (policing plan and control strategy priorities). In this way the police "set the agenda" for intelligence collection, rather than accepting only that intelligence that presents itself in the course of reactive policing. 2.2 **The Benefits and Requirements of ILCP** Intelligence-led policing enables more effective use of resources, activity to be aligned to control strategy priorities, a reduction in the demand for reactive deployments, and integration of crime detection with crime reduction, the development of a systematic problem-solving approach and audit trailing of decision-making and deployment in support of European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) principles. Intelligence Led Community Policing requires the police and citizens to join as partners in identifying and effectively addressing the underlying conditions that give rise to crime and disorder. It can roughly be divided into three inter-related elements: organisational change, problem solving and external partnerships. ILCP mainly has the following three requirements: a\) the consistent presence of dedicated community teams capable of working with the community to establish and maintain control to be visible, accessible, skilled, knowledgeable and familiar to the community, b\) intelligence-led identification of community concerns -- prompt, effective, targeted action against those concerns, and c\) joint action and problem solving with the community and other local partners to improve the local environment and quality of life within the community. When their requirements are met, the Police Service can address the expectations of the community to have: Access (point of contact, Influence (over community priorities), Interventions (joint actions with the communities and the partners to solve problems) and Answers (sustainable solutions to problems and feedback on results). 2.3 **The Intelligence and Tasking Policy** This Intelligence and Tasking Policy assumes no previous knowledge or experience of intelligence-led policing. It is designed as a reference guide for staff, especially for those who are not intelligence specialists, but require an understanding of intelligence-led policing processes as part of their day-to-day duties. This policy also aims at providing an understanding of the interaction of the Intelligence and tasking processes within the SBA Police and at the same time provide guidance to all Officers as to how to receive better tasking and direction and how to contribute to effective policing by collecting, recording and submitting information. []{#Section3.anchor}**3. BACKGROUND** 3.1 **ILCP in the SBA Police** The Force is structured into two Divisions which in turn are divided into three geographical sectors. Each Sector is policed by an Inspector and dedicated team of officers. 3.2 **The Tasking and Co-ordination Unit** The Tasking and Coordination Unit (TCU) deals with the tasking function, by issuing and monitoring of tasks arising from daily management meetings and the tasking and coordination process. The Operational Intelligence Unit (OIU) and TCU are led by an Inspector who manages and coordinates the tasking and intelligences processes. []{#Section4.anchor}**4. THE OIU/TCU INTERACTION** 4.1 **The Functioning of OIU/TCU** The functioning of the two Departments relies on the provision of accurate, up to date information and intelligence. When a Police Officer submits information -- either electronically or otherwise - it is recorded, evaluated and if appropriate researched and developed by the staff of the divisional OIU, before actioning. If the content of the information is assessed as requiring the deployment of resources in order to tackle a specific problem, the information is forwarded to the Chief Inspector Operations and Crime through the Daily Management Meeting (DMM) where a decision is made as to how and who will be tasked to address the problem, in other words as to who will be the owner. The DMM ensures that the conduct of each day's business is linked to the Divisional priorities and objectives. This is done by a review of the previous 24 hours business and looking ahead at the next 24 hours business **4.2 The Tasking Process** Tasking of resources, which can be to departments or individual officers is done electronically upon the written direction of the Divisional Intelligence Manager, through the Divisional TCU Sergeant. Recipients of the tasking respond to the requirements of the task electronically (Replies to task). The 'Replies' are assessed by the TCU Sergeant who in turn, decides that the reply is of intelligence value forwards it to the OIU for further action, retaining at the same time a copy. Replies with no OIU value are retained by the TCU for monitoring purposes. Replies must be originated by the Officers executing the task. Tasks as reviewed with new tasks issued as appropriate during the Tasking and Co-ordination Group (TCG) meeting, which is held every Month. []{#Section5.anchor}**5. POLICE INFORMATION / INTELLIGENCE** **5.1 Police Information** Collection of the appropriate information, its accurate assessment and timely exploitation, are core to efficient policing. Information that is collected for one policing purpose may have a value to another. For this to happen, all police information must be treated as a corporate resource. It is therefore, important that information can be collected, recorded and evaluated in a consistent manner. Police information is collected in a number of different ways but the majority is passed to the Police Service through traditional methods, for example, the public reporting an incident or crime. All police information is evaluated to determine its provenance, accuracy and what action should be taken. Provenance is the ability to determine the reliability and credibility of the source, and the value of the content of the information. For the SBA Police information is defined to be the information, which refers to one or a combination of the following: - Protecting life and property; - Preserving order; - Preventing and detecting offences; - Bringing offenders to justice; - Contributing to the security of the SBA's These five policing purposes provide the legal basis for collecting, recording, evaluating, sharing and retaining police information. **5.2 Intelligence** Intelligence is defined as information that has been subject to an evaluation and risk assessment process in order to assist with police decision-making. In addition to being evaluated, information is analysed. []{#Section6.anchor}**6. THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS** **6.1 The Three Levels of Police Activity** The intelligence process is designed to drive activity, not just in relation to crime and criminals, but all policing issues from organised crime to road safety. Whilst acknowledging the practical and jurisdictional difficulties faced by the SBA Police, it recognises three levels of activity: Level 1 Divisional Level -- deals with local issues affecting the division Level 2 Force Level -- addresses "cross-border" issues where criminal and other problems affect both divisions Level 3 National and International Level- deals with serious and organised crime operating within or outside the SBA's and requiring a specialist response The SBA Police contribution to each level may be described by using the Intelligence Cycle. []{#Section7.anchor}**7. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE** **7.1 The Intelligence Cycle Process** The Intelligence Cycle is the process of developing raw information into finished intelligence for policymakers to use in decision-making and action. There are five steps, which constitute the Intelligence Cycle. **THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE** **7.2 Stage One -- Planning and Direction** This is management of the entire effort, from identifying the need for data to delivering an intelligence product to a customer. It is the beginning and the end of the cycle; the beginning because it involves drawing up specific collection requirements and the end because finished intelligence, generates new requirements. Control at this stage is exercised through the tasking and co-ordination process, which operates at divisional level. **7.3 Stage Two -- Collection/Gathering** This stage involves the gathering of the raw information needed to produce finished intelligence. There are many sources of information, as seen in the previous section. Although much valuable information will present itself as a by-product of normal policing activity there will often be the need to actively seek information and intelligence relating to particular people or location. **7.4 Stage Three -- Evaluation** This stage involves converting the vast amount of information collected to a form usable by analysts through decryption, language translations, and data reduction. The 3x5x2 process (seen further down) which is being developed encourages such evaluation to take place within an objective framework that balance policing objectives against the broader risks to parties directly and indirectly involved. **7.5 Stage Four -- Analysis** This stage is the conversion of basic information into finished intelligence. It includes integrating, evaluating, and analysing all available data, which is often fragmentary an even contradictory. Analysts, who are subject-matter specialists, consider the information's reliability, validity and relevance. They integrate data into a coherent whole, put the evaluated information into context, and produce finished intelligence that includes assessments of events and judgments about the implications of the information. **7.6 Stage Five - Dissemination** The last step, which logically feeds into the first, is the distribution of the finished intelligence to its appropriate recipient. In some cases, information/intelligence must be sanitised by the Operational Intelligence Divisional Manager before it is passed on, in order to protect the source or the sensitive method of collection. The great skill in the use of intelligence is selecting the method and timing of dissemination. To differentiate between those operations, which require a rapid turnaround for immediate action and those that need greater resources, can make the difference between success and failure. The process of dissemination must make use of verbal and written briefings (i.e Taskings). **8. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS** **8.1 The Four Key Intelligence Products** The Intelligence Model is not a model, which asks for intelligence for its own sake. Its design reflects the principle that intelligence work is of no value if it does not result in intelligence products for managers and others; products that help decision-making and guide investigations or deployments in the law enforcement effort. At the heart of the tasking and co-ordination process at all levels of the model are the key intelligence products. Intelligence Products are the "deliverables" produced by the Intelligence Unit for the Tasking and Co-ordinating Group. They provide the information, interpretation and options, which inform tactical and strategic decision-making. Analysis plays a vital part in producing these, by the use of standard analytical disciplines including crime pattern analysis and risk analysis. These techniques are used to build the four key intelligence products namely: Strategic Assessments, Tactical Assessments, Subject Profile and Problem Profiles. **TASKING AND CO-ORDINATING PROCESS** **8.2 Strategic Assessment** The main purpose of the Strategic Assessment ***(see Annex A)*** is to give the tasking and co-ordination group an accurate picture of the situation in its area of responsibility, how that picture is changing and how it may change in the future. It is by definition a longer term, high level look at the law enforcement issues and it will, therefore, not only consider current activities but also try to provide a forecast of likely developments. The purpose of the strategic assessments is to establish law enforcement priorities, determine resource allocation, support business planning and inform senior managers and policy makers and to set a control strategy; priorities for intelligence, prevention and enforcement. During the Strategic Assessment meetings, the Force Control Strategy Priorities are set, which articulate those measures that we intend to put into action to ensure that the Force meets the challenges identified within the Strategic Assessment over a given timescale to the best of its ability. The data that the Senior Management Team examines and decides on the issues/priorities that should be included in the Force's Control Strategy ***(see Annex B)*** derive from the Tactical Assessments of both Divisions over the given period under review. The strategic assessment and the control strategy priorities are reviewed at three or latest six months intervals. The Chairman of these meetings is the Chief Constable. **8.3 Tactical Assessment** The Tactical Assessment ***(see Annex C)*** forms the basis for the work of the tactical tasking and co-ordinating group. The assessment identifies shorter term emerging patterns and trends requiring attention, including further analysis. Progress in investigations or preventive initiatives can be addressed, as can immediate needs for changes in resourcing tactical options. If used effectively the tactical assessment gives an early indication of deteriorating performance in, for example, committed crime rates. Tactical Assessments. Tactical Assessments are carried out on monthly intervals at both divisions. The Chairman of these meetings is the Divisional Commander. **8.4 Subject Profile** A Subject Profile ***(see Annex D)*** is person(s) specific and contains sufficient detail to initiate a target operation or support an ongoing operation against an individual or networked group of individuals. It comprises as much information as possible in the light of the available intelligence. It also shows links to other investigations and may include risk profiles of potentially dangerous offenders. Based on the intelligence revealed, the subject profile includes an interpretation of the best course of action and proposals to fill the gaps in the intelligence picture. These profiles are prepared by the Divisional Intelligence Analyst. **8.5 Problem Profile** A Problem Profile ***(see Annex E)*** identifies established and emerging crime or incident series. It also identifies established or emerging crime and incident "hot spots" together with the opportunities for preventive work revealed by the intelligence. In the case of crime series identification where Modus Operandis (MOs) are confirmed and links to potential offenders established, the profile supports targeting and reactive investigation, as well as preventive initiatives. In the case of hot spots, the identification of levels and patterns of offending offers direction for the setting and execution of hot spot management plans which may incorporate partnership in crime reduction initiatives. Hot spot profiles will also usually contain profiles or identified offenders and known suspects within the hot spot. These profiles are prepared by the Divisional Intelligence Analyst. These four key intelligence products are designed to enable the tasking and co-ordination group to set effective priorities and taskings. They are the drivers of the business in the tasking and co-ordinating meeting, taking into consideration the control strategy priorities and the divisional objectives. **9. TASKING AND CO-ORDINATING MEETING** **9.1 The Divisional Tasking and Co-ordinating Meetings** There are three key related meetings that take place at Divisional Level to assist the Senior Management Team in running the Divisional Tasking and Co-ordinating Processes. **9.2 Intelligence Unit Meetings (IUM)** Operational Intelligence Unit (OIU) staff meet daily, prior to the Daily Management Meeting (DMM) and consider issues as crime patterns, new intelligence, results from taskings and demands for intelligence support. These meetings enable the Divisional Intelligence Manager to provide accurate and reliable information to the DMM, for proper allocation of priorities and resources. **9.3 Daily Management Meeting (DMM)** The purpose of the daily management meeting is to ensure the conduct of each day's business is linked to the priorities and objectives set by the Tasking and Co-ordination Group. Every day at these meetings a review of the last 24 hours is takes place, by looking through the Daily Occurrence Report Entries (DORs), Reported Crime Investigations (RCIs), and Intelligence Reports. A forecast of the next 24 hours is given, in relation to issues affecting the control strategy priorities, current crime trends/patterns and potential threats to business. The purpose is again to identify appropriate action to be taken and allocation of appropriate resources according to the needs and requirements identified. The Chairman of this meeting is the Chief Inspector of Operations of each division and all departmental, sector and response team supervisors/members on duty take part. **9.4 Tasking and Co-ordination Group Authorisation (T&CG Authorisation)** This meeting takes part on monthly basis and all departments, units and response teams are represented by their supervisors. The meeting considers the tactical assessment together with a short report from each departmental supervisor before allocating business priorities and specific tasking for the following monthly period. Also in this meeting a review of taskings and re allocation of such takes place. []{#Section10.anchor}**10. THE ROLE OF THE OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT (OIU)** **10.1 The Current Formation of the OIU** The Divisional Operational Intelligence Unit (OIU) at each Division consists of the Divisional Intelligence Manager, supported by a Deputy Intelligence Manager, Field officers and an Intelligence Analyst. The Chief Inspector of the respective Division is responsible for overseeing the functions and operations of the Tasking and Co-ordinating Unit. **10.2 The Role of the Divisional Intelligence Manager** The Divisional Intelligence Manager is responsible for all aspects of information and intelligence management in line with force policy. The Intelligence Manager leads the delivery of intelligence driven policing within the division by ensuring understanding of intelligence, implementation of the Intelligence Led Community Policing and development of appropriate intelligence strategies and policies. **10.3 The Role of the Divisional Deputy Intelligence Manager** The Divisional Deputy Intelligence Manager ensures that all aspects of information and intelligence management are in line with the force policy. The Deputy Intelligence Manager is responsible to supervise field intelligence work and assist in the development of information and intelligence and the production of Target Profiles, Problem Profiles and Action packages in support of Divisional force objectives. **10.4 The Role of the Divisional Intelligence Field officer** The Divisional Intelligence Field Officers responsibility is to gather and manage information and intelligence in line with the force policy. They are responsible to research and develop information and intelligence in order to assist the Analyst to produce Subject/Problem Profiles, etc, in support of the Divisional and Force objectives. **10.5 The Role of the Divisional Intelligence Analyst** The Divisional Intelligence Analyst carries out research and analysis into criminal activity, road safety and community reassurance in support to the divisional and force objectives. He/She is responsible to analyse intelligence and illustrate the results of the analysis to support operational planning, ensuring that the results are non-discriminatory and are in accordance to relevant legislation and force policy. The services of analysts are available to all Officers, subject to the approval of the Divisional Intelligence Manager. To that effect, requesting Officers should complete the 'Internal Request Register'(IRR) computer form ***(see Annex F)*** and submit it to the OIU. Analysts in the SBA Police are trained to produce except from the Tactical Assessment, Subject and Problem Profiles that have already been explained above, the following products: **Crime Pattern Analysis *(see Annex G)*:** What, where and when crime occurs. It can be the same crime in different locations or different crime in the same location. **Network Analysis *(See Annex H)*:** It describes the relationships between people within criminal networks. []{#Section11.anchor}**11. THE 3x5x2 INFORMATION REPORT FORM** **11.1 The 3x5x2 Information Report Form** All Police information must be recorded on the 3x5x2 information/intelligence report. This can be done either electronically ***(see Annex I),*** through SBAPS or manually *(**See Annex J**)*. The naming of the 3x5x2 derives from the fact that the source, the information and the dissemination evaluations comprise five different gradings which are outlined further down. The 3x5x2 is the Information/Intelligence Report which allows the Police Service and other agencies to record, evaluate and disseminate information. A 3x5x2 can also be used to assess the risk of exposure to the source of the information or to the use of the material and, therefore, protect the individual or police operation to which the information relates. The use of a 3x5x2 also starts an audit trail and ensures consistency between forces, thus enabling them to share intelligence more easily. **11.2 WHEN TO USE THE ELECTRONIC 3x5x2 FORM** Police Officers should use the electronic 3x5x2 in the following instances: - Information which is not in confidence and which is obtained by police officers during their duties, for example patrol officers, front desk staff and interviewing officers - Information from members of the public, - Sanitised information (Information in which sensitive details such as the identity of the source are not disclosed) inserted in the system by the Intelligence Manager. In this case, the Officer will forward a 3x5x2 in a hard copy including the sensitive information/source and it will be the responsibility of the Intelligence Manager to sanitise the information and insert it in the system. - Information from other law enforcement agencies which is not in confidence The information in electronic version is accessible by all members of the OIU Force wide. **11.3 HOW TO COMPLETE THE ELECTRONIC 3x5x2 FORM** The Intelligence application is in the SBAP system. Reporting Officers should follow the process outlined below when dealing with the electronic 3x5x2: The following fields must be completed: - The **'Report'** field in simple language. He/she will record the information as reported to him/her from the source or the incident as witnessed by him/her. Information reported by a member of the Public -- should not normally be recorded electronically by the reporting Officer (See 'When to use the hard copy 3x5x2') unless the nature of information is such not requiring the protection of the details of the person who reported the information to the Police. In these circumstances the details of the Source will be included in this field. - The **Government Security Classification model (GSC -- Official / Official -- Sensitive / and Secret)** field is located on the top of the form. - The **Evaluation** fields. In these fields the Officer will evaluate the Source (S) and the information (I) but not the handling (H). The details of the reporting Officer as well as the date the report was made are inserted automatically. Explanation as what each evaluation grading and protective marking means is made further down in this Policy. **11.4 WHEN TO USE THE HARD COPY 3x5x2 FORM** - Information given to the police, in confidence, by a member of the public who does not wish his/her name to be disclosed; - Information of a personal or confidential nature received from someone who has access to it because of their occupation, for example, hotel, airline; - Information from other law enforcement agencies that is supplied in confidence. - Any other information of sensitive nature This information is viewed only by the divisional OIU manager. The hard copy 3x5x2 consists of three Parts: **Part A** Information/Intelligence Report which covers the three elements of: - Source evaluation; - Information/intelligence evaluation; - Handling code. **Part B** Information/Intelligence Report continuation form. (In case required) **Part C** A further risk assessment process. This is a more comprehensive risk assessment record that is used where the handling codes alone are not sufficient to manage the risk of dissemination of the information. **11.5 HOW TO COMPLETE THE HARD COPY 3x5x2 FORM** Reporting Officers should follow the process outlined below when completing a 3x5x2 form. It is stressed out that each document will contain information deriving from **one source only**. If that same Source gives information concerning two or more completely different issues then the two or more pieces of information should be put on separate sheets. The following fields must be completed: - The **Government Security Classification model (GSC -- Official / Official -- Sensitive / and Secret)** field is located on the top of the form. - **Officer** field in which the Officer states his/her name and - **Department** field in which the Officer states his/her Department - The **date and time** field which refers to the Date/Time the report was made - **Information / Intelligence source Reference (ISR)** field where the Officer gives details of the person who gave the information to the reporting Officer. Whenever the reporting Officer gives information which he/she witnessed, this field should remain blank. - **Title** field in which the Officer states what the information relates to (i.e. Drugs / Housebreakings etc) - **Operation Name / No.** field in which the Officer states if the information was as a result of a specific operation or if the information may be related to a forthcoming operation - The **blank** field below the Title, is the field where the Officer in plain language will put in writing the information as that came to his knowledge from the source or the details of the occurrence that the Officer witnessed. Unlimited space allows the officer to provide details and continue on additional page(s). - The **evaluation** field which is located next to the information/intelligence field. In this field the Officer will evaluate the Source (S) and the information (I) but not the handling (H). Explanation as what each evaluation grading and protective marking means is made further down in this Policy. **11.6 SUBMISSION OF A 3x5x2 FORM -- ELECTRONIC OR MANUAL** The timely submission of recorded information will ensure that intelligence systems are kept up to date. Once information has been recorded on a **3x5x2** -- electronic or manual - the report will be submitted to the intelligence Manager by secure electronic or manual means. It will then be considered for its intelligence value based on research, source reliability and the content of the information. **11.7 SOURCE EVALUATION** Source reliability refers to the assessment made of the person, agency or technical equipment providing the information. The source reliability is initially evaluated by the person receiving the information. A second evaluation of the source -- if appropriate -- is carried out by the OIU Manager at a later stage. The source evaluation, however, is not a static process and must be subject to constant review. The **3x5x2** provides three gradings for source evaluation. ***(see Annex K)*** **11.8 INFORMATION EVALUATION** It is essential that the accuracy and reliability of any information received is evaluated. The evaluation will involve an objective professional judgement, and the value of the information must not be exaggerated to encourage action to be taken. The assessment of the reliability of the information will be based on the person recording it and their knowledge of the circumstances at that time. A second evaluation of the information -- if appropriate -- is carried out by the OIU Manager at a later stage. The 3x5x2 provides five information/intelligence evaluation gradings. ***(see Annex L)*** **11.9 HANDLING CODES** To be completed by the evaluator (Intelligence Manager) on receipt and prior to entry onto the intelligence system. 1 - **P** -- Lawful sharing permitted. 2 - **C** -- Lawful sharing permitted with conditions. Following the evaluation of the Handling Codes, the Intelligence Managers are to proceed with the classification of the Action and the Sanitisation of the information as follows: **[Action]** A1 -- Covert development. Intelligence may be combined or corroborated with other intelligence but action cannot be taken directly. Permission must be sought from the originator before action is taken on any derived intelligence. A2 -- Covert use. Covert action may be taken on this intelligence although the source, technique and any wider investigative effectiveness must be protected. This intelligence may not be used in isolation as evidence, in judicial proceedings or to support arrest. A3 -- Overt use. Overt action is permitted on this intelligence, to be specified by source intelligence owner. **[Sanitisation]** S1 -- Delegated authority. The originator of the intelligence permits the unsupervised sanitisation of the material in order to allow dissemination to a wider audience. S2 -- Consult originator. The originator of the intelligence does not permit the sanitisation of the material for wider dissemination without consultation being sought. **GOVERNMENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (GSC) Model** The blank 3x5x2 form does not require any government security classification and is marked headed **NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED UNTIL COMPLETED**. However, once the report contains information it needs to be allocated with an appropriate protective marking. There are four levels of this marking, depending on the degree of sensitivity involved: **OFFICIAL, OFFICIAL -- SENSITIVE, SECRET, TOP SECRET**. The majority of information/intelligence the Police Service holds contains personal or sensitive data. This data, therefore, must have a level of protective marking and normally this will be **OFFICIAL or OFFICIAL -- SENSITIVE**. **SECRET** classifications should be used where information disclosure may compromise and seriously damage military capabilities, international relations, the investigation of serious organised crime or may directly or indirectly affect the security of the Sovereign Base Areas. []{#Section12.anchor}**12. INTERNAL REQUEST REGISTER (COMPUTER)** **12.1 The function of Internal request register Form** The Intelligence function is available for use by all staff to assist them in the prevention and detection of crime. Staff during their duty, may request the development of information or simply retrieve existing information which is stored in the OIU database. The services of the OIU can be accessed by any member of the staff in person having completed an electronic **Internal request register Form,** that is submitted to the Divisional OIU and approved by the Divisional Intelligence Manager. Completion of the **Internal request register Form (IRR)** is straightforward. Attention must be paid by the Officers filling in the electronic form. - Complete the **required** date. - Select an **Officer, department** and or **Division.** - Go to field **type** and select **Intel/Tasks** - Proceed to **Sub type** and **select Analyst request** - Proceed to the field under **title** and **give name** - In the **details** field write the 1. **Reason for Request'** the Officer is to put in writing what he/she wishes to achieve by submitting the application. This will enable the Research and Development Officer (R&D Officer) to focus on the desired outcome. 2. The **'Details of Intelligence Required'** where the Officer will explain accurately the nature of the information requested. An accurate description helps the staff of the Unit to be specific about the information they will provide to the Investigating Officer. Field officers or Analyst will respond to the requesting officer, either by IRR or providing a sanitised 3x5x2 from the intelligence manager, having completed their request. []{#Section13.anchor}**13. DIARY OF EVENTS/TENSION INDICATOR** **13.1 The importance of Tension Indicator** The Intelligence Field Officers at each Division play a key role in keeping the Senior Management Team aware and informed about significant events likely to take place or events that might create tension in the communities. []{#Section14.anchor}**14. ANTECEDENTS OF ACCUSED** **14.1 Completion and Submission of Antecedents of Accused to OIU** Following the arrest of a person, the Investigating Officer must complete the Antecedents of Accused Form ***(see Annex M)***, these are in electronic form and should be completed without delay and submitted electronically to OIU. []{#Section15.anchor}**15. BULLETINS** **15.1 The Preparation and Distribution of Bulletins** Bulletins ***([see Annex N](#appendixN))*** are prepared and distributed by the OIU for informing Police Officers of certain matters that need immediate consideration and attention (i.e wanted person(s), new crime trends, suspicious person, etc). []{#Section16.anchor}**16. CONTACTS WITH CRIMINALS** **16.1 Personal and Professional Contact with Criminals** Any personal or professional contact with known criminals must be reported as soon as possible on a 3x5x2 Intelligence Report irrespective if the contact occurs on or off duty. []{#Section17.anchor}**17. BUILDING/HOUSE SEARCHES** **17.1 Submission of 3x5x2 Intelligence or OIU information Report at the conclusion of a Search.** Following the search of a building structure mainly of a dwelling house, the Officer in charge of such search must complete a **3x5x2 Intelligence** Report in relation to the search and attach to it the sketch plan of the building structure that was searched. []{#Section18.anchor}**18. SOURCES OF INFORMATION** **18.1 Types of Sources of Information** Before searching for and obtaining information, staff should consider the type of information that may be available and the likelihood of it having value as intelligence. Sources of information available to the SBA Police Service include: - Members of the public; - Victims and witnesses; - Prisoners; - CCTV systems - Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR); - Commercial agencies, e.g. banks; - Police databases; - Internet; - Media; - Social Media; - Police IT systems; - Other law enforcement agencies; - Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS); []{#Section19.anchor}**19. DEALING WITH HUMAN RESOURCES** **19.1 Engagement with Human Resources** It is the duty of the Police Service to engage openly with the community to gather information about policing issues. Effective community engagement promotes public confidence and encourages them to contribute to the policing of the community. The police have, in turn, a duty of care to protect the confidentiality of an individual who provides information. However, some individuals may be at additional risk because of their personal or professional circumstances. The Human Rights Act 1998 provide for the proper handling of human sources. Asking a member of the public to provide information that is within their knowledge is lawful and legitimate. However, tasking a member of the public to carry out a research on behalf of the Police for a specific issue, or tasking a member of the public to find supplementary information to what he/she has already provided must not be carried out by members of the Service without the approval of the Senior Management. RIPO 2012 **19.2 The Public Interest Immunity (PII)** For the purposes of the same Ordinance information which the prosecutor proposes to use against the accused which in the opinion of the prosecutor may be relevant to the proceedings is considered to be 'Prosecution material', and as such, is made available normally subject to disclosure to the defence either through service at the prosecution case or disclosure of accused material. However, prosecution material -- including intelligence - may not be disclosed if upon an application by the Prosecution the Court concludes that it is not in the public interest to disclose it. Public Interest Immunity (PII) means that special care must be taken before deciding whether disclosure is determined. In any case where the Court concludes it would not be in the public interest to make disclosure of any information or object in its entirety, it must consider whether a limited form of disclosure is possible and if so, will make an order for disclosure in such terms. []{#Section20.anchor}**20. DISCLOSURE** **20.1 Compliance with The Disclosure Ordinance** Compliance with the rules relating to disclosure under The Criminal Procedure Disclosure Ordinance 16/2007 is vital to maintaining the integrity of intelligence-led policing. Police Officers must ensure information disseminated on a "need to know basis" according to the 3x5x2 grading including intelligence material. The Dissemination of Information or intelligence material is restricted to those that absolutely need it for the efficient conduct of police business. **20.2 The Public Interest Immunity (PII)** For the purposes of the same Ordinance information which the prosecutor proposes to use against the accused which in the opinion of the prosecutor may be relevant to the proceedings is considered to be 'Prosecution material', and as such, is made available normally subject to disclosure to the defence either through service at the prosecution case or disclosure of accused material. However, prosecution material -- including intelligence - may not be disclosed if upon an application by the Prosecution the Court concludes that it is not in the public interest to disclose it. Public Interest Immunity (PII) means that special care must be taken before deciding whether disclosure is determined. In any case where the Court concludes it would not be in the public interest to make disclosure of any information or object in its entirety, it must consider whether a limited form of disclosure is possible and if so, will make an order for disclosure in such terms. []{#Section21.anchor}**21. HUMAN RIGHTS** **21.1 The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) & Human Rights Act** The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) sets out a framework of fundamental Rights, including the right to individual's privacy and family life. Human Article 8 of the ECHR protects an individual's right to privacy and family life. ***1 - Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.*** ***2 - There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.*** This right is not absolute but may not be interfered with except 'in accordance of the law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim'. This places a responsibility on Police Forces to set a clear aim for obtaining personal information (a policing purpose) and a test of proportionality of how they meet this aim. Police Forces are obliged to ensure that whenever the private life of an individual is intruded, that action complies with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 1998, and that the actions of the Police Force comply with the principle of 'proportionality'. At present there is no lawful authority to enable the SBA Police to interfere with Citizens' Right to Privacy. **21.2 The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) & Human Rights Act** At present, because there is no lawful authority enabling SBA Police to interfere with Citizens' Right to Privacy, we cannot carry out specific activities, in relation to covert activity/surveillance and tasking of informants. To clarify things and better understand the things permitted to do and the restrictions imposed, the following Dos and Don'ts list has been prepared and apply to SBA Police Force: ***Do's*** - Engage with the Community to gather information about policing issues - Asking a member of the public to provide information that is within their knowledge is lawful and legitimate - Enquiring into a crime case and asking members of the public if they know anything about it is lawful and legitimate - Carrying out of house to house enquiries in relation to a crime offence is lawful and legitimate ***Dont\'s*** - Tasking a member of the public to carry out a research on behalf of the Police for a specific issue - Tasking a member of the public to find supplementary information to what already provided - Covert Activity/Surveillance In case of queries in relation to the restrictions imposed to the SBA Police relating to Human Rights please do not hesitate to contact the OIU Supervisors for directions. []{#Section22.anchor}**22. CONCLUSION** 22.1 All officers must always, whether on or off duty be vigilant and aware of their environment in order to gather and pass on relevant information to the OIU. Teamworking and community awareness is the key to success in our business. It is easy to forget or miss out certain points of the information received if the Police Officer who has received such information does not record the information in writing immediately or as soon as practicable. Remember that every little piece of information can help to solve the big puzzle. **Abbreviations and Glossary** **ILCP** = Intelligence Led Community policing **ECHR** = European convention of human rights **TCU** = Tasking and Co-ordinating Unit **OIU** = Operational Intelligence Unit **DMM** = Daily Management Meeting **MO** = Modus Operandis **DOR** = Daily Occurrence Report **IRR** = Internal request Register []{#SummaryofEquipmentInspection.anchor}APPENDIX A []{#_Toc393867597.anchor}**STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT** APPENDIX B []{#EquipmentManagersChecks.anchor}**FORCE CONTROL STRATEGY** []{#appendixC.anchor}APPENDIX C []{#MonitoringInspectiononEquipmentDocum.anchor}**TACTICAL ASSESSMENT** []{#appendixD.anchor}APPENDIX D **SUBJECT PROFILE** []{#appendixE.anchor}APPENDIX E **PROBLEM PROFILE** []{#appendixF.anchor}APPENDIX F **IRR** []{#appendixG.anchor}APPENDIX G **CRIME PATTERN** []{#appendixH.anchor}APPENDIX H **NETWORK ANALYSIS** []{#appendixI.anchor}APPENDIX I **3x5x2 ELECTRONIC FORMAT** []{#appendixJ.anchor}APPENDIX J **3x5x2 MANUAL FORMAT** 21 []{#appendixK.anchor}APPENDIX K **3x5x2 GRADING AND EVALUATION** []{#appendixL.anchor}APPENDIX L **3x5x2 INFORMATION & INTELLIGENCE GRADING** []{#appendixM.anchor}APPENDIX M **ANTECEDENTD OF ACCUSED FORM** []{#appendixN.anchor}APPENDIX N [**BULLETINS**](https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/teams/1860/INTRANET%20new%20items%20LTD/POLICIES/SPECIMEN%20Bulletin.pdf)
