Persons and Personal Identity PDF

Persons and Personal Identity Introduction to Philosophy Dr. Akiko Frischhut [email protected] Plan for today’s lecture 1. The Problem of Personal Identity and why it matters 2. The Body Theory 3. The Memory Theory 4. The Modified Memory Theory 5. The Relevance of Thoug...

Persons and Personal Identity Introduction to Philosophy Dr. Akiko Frischhut [email protected] Plan for today’s lecture 1. The Problem of Personal Identity and why it matters 2. The Body Theory 3. The Memory Theory 4. The Modified Memory Theory 5. The Relevance of Thought Experiments 6. Split Brain Case 7. Parfit’s solution  What makes you you? By virtue of what are you identical with your younger self? What constitutes personal identity? Our concepts of self vary not only between persons and cultures, but also for each of us from time to time and context to context Think about a description of yourself on a job application, on a first date, on your fb page, in talking with your parents, in trial with you as defendant, as the ‘I’ in Descartes ‘I think therefore I am’ Two Questions About You (1) What is your essential self? (synchronic) (2)What makes you you? (diachronic) The essential self We still have an undeniable sense of a “real self’” in us, a self that does not vary from context to context. Let’s call this the real or essential self: the set of characteristics that defines a particular person. Ego theory and bundle theory Ego theory: person’s continued existence is due to existence of a particular ego or subject of experiences. What unifies my consciousness at a time (listening to the ticking of the clock and seeing what I type) and over time is that all these experiences are had by ME, this person at this time or during this particular period in time. David Hume’s bundle theory of the self David Hume (1711-1776): When we reflect on the contents of our minds, we only find memories, thoughts, emotions etc, but no self. (Contra Descartes who thought we have a ‘clear and distinct idea’ of our self). David Hume’s bundle theory of the self Empiricist: what we do not encounter in experience, we have no right to assert. Thus, self is nothing but an aggregate of experiences and relations between them. Thomas Reid’s criticism of Hume’s bundle theory of the self In a sense, the bundle theory denies persons. ‘I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling: I am something which thinks, acts and feels’ I am not a series of events but a person.’ David Hume’s bundle theory of the self Bundle theory admits this but claims it to be a fact about LANGUAGE. There is nothing ‘over and above, nothing EXTRA apart from our brains, bodies and various mental states and events. We just CALL this a person. What makes you you over time? If (some form of the) Ego theory holds then we get questions of PERSONAL IDENTITY: By virtue of what are you identical with your younger/older self?  Question about personal identity matter when it comes to guilt, responsibility, punishment, reward, and care for the future. You are only responsible for the actions of some person in the past if you are identical with that person. You care differently for a future person if that person is yourself. The ambiguity of ‘same’ (1) ‘I have the same ears as my brother’ - my ears look like my brother’s. (2) ‘Batman and Bruce Wayne are the same’ - names refer to one person. The ambiguity of ‘same’ Qualitative identity - ‘exactly similar’ versus Numerical identity - ‘one and the same’ Problem of personal identity What makes a person A (at one time) one and the same person as (i.e. numerically identical with) a person B (at a later time) ? We are writing the year 2054. You and your friend are kidnapped. You wake up in a clinic, a mad professor tells you she is going to swap your brains. After the operation, two people wake up. Which one are you? 1. Brain swap case A’s brain B’s brain A B 1. Brain swap case B’s brain A’s brain A-body B- body Say you were A before. WHICH ONE ARE YOU? Stand up if you think you wake up with YOUR BRAIN and a DIFFERENT (B’s) BODY. Stay seated if you think you wake up with YOUR BODY BUT B”S BRAIN. Brain criterion You have one and the same brain, but could have a different body, then you think that one and the same brain is a sufficient criterion for personal identity. Everyone who is now standing! Body criterion Everyone who is sitting: You have one and the same body (not just the brain) over time. Can you think of a problem for this criterion?  Some change is fine but not all change: Body criterion different hair organ transplant new face… artificial body parts artificial brain parts… How much change is too much change? When do you cease to be the same person? Imagine a series of operations which replaces a different proportion of your brain and body with exact duplicates. At each stage you can ask yourself: Will I survive? Will the resulting person be me?  Will the resulting person be me? In other words, will I survive? There must be an answer to this question. Either you survive or you die. The answer must be ‘all or nothing’, yes or no. So at what percentage do you cease to be you? Perhaps for example, it would be you if only 49% were replaced. But if just a few cells more were replaced, someone else would wake up from the operation! But how can a few cells make such a difference? Everyone who was standing before, please stand up again. These are the people who think that they could wake up in a different body, as long as they keep their brain (brain criterion). DON’T SIT DOWN PLEASE We are writing the year 2312. You and your friend are kidnapped. You wake up in a clinic, a mad professor tells you she is going to scan and “download” the entire contents of your brain on a computer and do the same with your friend. Afterwards, he says he will “upload” your brain content onto your friend’s brain and her brain content onto your’s. She gives you something to drink and you fall asleep… After the procedure, two people wake up.  2. Memory swap case B- A’ A- A’ Memories memories A-body B-body Before the operation you were A. Which one are If you think you are the person with YOUR BRAIN, YOUR BODY BUT YOUR FRIEND’S MEMORIES, STAND. If you think you are the person with YOUR FRIEND’S BODY AND BRAIN BUT YOUR OWN MEMORIES, SIT. Everyone who is sitting now is in favour of the Psychological criterion Personal identity depends on psychological continuity. Psychological continuity is (brought about by) memory and/or beliefs and /or character traits and/or a flow of perceptual experiences. Memory criterion John Locke: ‘An Essay Concerning H Human Understanding’ (1689) Memory theory of personal identity Memory criterion Locke: Human beings ≠ persons Memory criterion Locke: Human beings ≠ persons Human beings are identical over time by virtue of having one and the same continuously existing body. Memory criterion Locke: Human beings ≠ persons Person: ‘a thinking intelligent being that can know itself as the same thinking thing in different times and places.’ Memory criterion Locke: Personal identity, the identity of a thinking intelligent thing over time, depends on psychological continuity. Psychological continuity is (brought about by) memory. Memory criterion Memory Theory: If x and y are persons, then x = y just in case x has memories of y (or vice versa). Memory criterion Thomas Reid: ‘Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man’ (1785): Problem with Locke’s theory LITTLE BOY  SOLDIER  GENERAL SOLDIER = LITTLE BOY GENERAL = SOLDIER GENERAL ≠ LITTLE BOY What is the problem? Explain to each other and then to me. Memory criterion Identity is a transitive relation: If a=b and b=c, then a=c! Memory criterion If the soldier = the little boy, and the general = soldier, then the general = little boy. General has no memories of the little boy. Therefore, general ≠ little boy. CONTRADICTION! Memory criterion Solution: Continuity of memory is what counts! remembers remembers General  Soldier  young boy indirectly remembers Memory criterion Modified Memory Theory: If x and y are persons, then x = y just in case x has direct or indirect memories of y (or vice versa). 4. The teletransporter case 4. The teletransporter case A teletransporter scans the position and physical state of every single atom in your body. Your original body is destroyed, the information sent, and an indistinguishable copy that is psychological continuous with you (has all your memories, dreams, secret desires, plans etc) rematerializes almost instantly at the chosen destination. Will you step into the beamer??? 4. The teletransporter case Please stand up if you would go into the beamer. Do not sit down. As usual, you step into the beamer to go to work, but… 4. The teletransporter case Derek Parfit: ‘Reasons and Persons.’ (1984) The transporter failed to destroy your original body. ‘Would you please enter the machine again so we can finish procedures? 4. The teletransporter case Please sit down if you are ready to enter the machine to “finish procedures”. If not, keep standing. Why did you change your mind? The defect teletransporter case William Thomas Riker Tom Will Riker Riker 1) What is the problem? 2) For which view is this a problem?  The defect teletransporter is a problem for those who think that psychological continuity is most important for personal identity over time. Both, Will and Tom are psychologically continuous with William Thomas, thus, according to this approach, both are numerically identical with him. However, Will is not one and the same as Tom. This violates the TRANSITIVITY OF IDENTITY. What’s the solution for the body criterion of identity in the defect teletransporter case? undle Theory and the teletransporter problem Bundle theory solution: It is an empty question whether any or none of the resulting persons is/are you. We can call the resulting person you or a replica of you- it is a mere choice of words. How can it be a choice of words whether I die or not?? undle Theory and the teletransporter problem Suppose a club exists for a few years holding regular meetings. Then the meetings stop. Some years later, some people form a club with the same name and the same rules. undle Theory and the teletransporter problem Did they revive the same club? Or start another club which is exactly similar? This is an empty question. If someone said ‘But there must be an answer. The club meeting later must either be, or not be, the very same club.’ This would show they didn’t understand the nature of clubs. undle Theory and the teletransporter problem Similarly, the bundle theory says, if we have worries about above cases, we don’t understand the nature of persons. In each case we would know that the resulting person would be psychologically and physically exactly like you. That is all you need to know. undle Theory and the teletransporter problem The question what happens to YOU only makes sense if we believe in an ego/self distinct from brain, body, mental states and events. undle Theory and the teletransporter problem But accepting the bundle theory is hard: suppose you are about to be destroyed and will have a later replica on Mars. You would naturally believe that this is just as bad as ordinary death since the replica is not YOU! undle Theory and the teletransporter problem But on the bundle theory, the only difference is that although the replica is psychological continuous, the continuity has the wrong cause. undle Theory and the teletransporter problem But when you object to teletransportation you are not just protesting against the wrong cause of psychological continuity! You are protesting that the replica isn’t you! undle Theory and the teletransporter problem Note however, that on the bundle theory psychological continuity is all you ever get. Thus on the bundle theory, ordinary survival and being destroyed and having a replica is just the same. Split brain cases 1.10213 http://www.nature.com/news/the-split-brain-a-tale-of-two-halves- Picture from ‘nature International weekly journal of science’ After the right and left half of the brain are separated, each hemisphere will have its own separate perception, concepts, and impulses to act. Split brain cases http://www.nature.com/news/the-split-brain-a-tale-of-two-halves-1.10213 Picture from ‘nature International weekly journal of science’ Split brain cases I don’t want to put on my blue I want to put on trousers ! my blue trousers The two hemispheres have different experiences  different memories Split brain cases: Severed brain hemispheres: two different streams of consciousness with two independent series of thoughts and sensations, in having each of which they are unaware of having the other. Transitivity problem! A quick recap 1. Brain swap case 2. Memory swap case 3. The torture test 4. The defect teletransporter case 5. Split brain cases What is the solution? Parfit: What is important about personal identity is not numerical identity but with whom we will be especially concerned about when we think about the future. Thinking about tomorrow, which one do you care about? Left y Righty Monda Tuesda y y Parfit’s solution What counts for personal identity is survival. Survival ≠ numerical identity. I can survive in two persons without being identical to either of them! Numerical identity is an “all or nothing” matter. Survival is a matter of degree..com www.Idrawterriblethings Too weird? Picture by Randrawll Maybe technological advances will force us to abandon or rethink many of the concepts we have today. Personal identity might be one of them. Why is all this important? Questions about personal identity matter: You are only responsible for the actions of some person in the past if you are identical with that person! You care differently for a future person if that person is yourself! Parfit: “The early Buddhist view is that much or most of the misery of human life resulted from the false view of self.” And this is why this is important! THANK YOU