Summary

These notes cover different aspects of security studies, including traditional and broadened perspectives, focusing on topics like traditionalists, wideners, and securitization.

Full Transcript

Lecture 1 Security studies -​ Human security, Feminist security studies, Peace studies, Strategic studies Overbranching: -​ International law, Economics and Finance, Psychology Security → Essentially a contested concept, no neutral definition possible Etymology → freedom from anxiety Key de...

Lecture 1 Security studies -​ Human security, Feminist security studies, Peace studies, Strategic studies Overbranching: -​ International law, Economics and Finance, Psychology Security → Essentially a contested concept, no neutral definition possible Etymology → freedom from anxiety Key debates: -​ Traditionalists vs wideners/deepeners 1.​ Traditionalists -​ Studies is defined as the study of the threat, use and control of military force -​ State centric, Military, Realists, Positivists -​ Moving beyond the state as the referent object of security towards non military concerns 2.​ Wideners/deepeners -​ You need to widen and deepen it a little bit. Move beyond the state as the referent object of security toward non military concerns -​ Peace studies, post structural, copenhagen school, post colonial, feminism, constructivism -​ Non-military threats, individual groups -​ The discipline is now more willing to consider the security of individuals and groups, rather than focusing narrowly on external threats to states. Traditionalists: Strategic studies Core focus: nuclear weapons, study strategies Main stream in security studies -​ First/second strike capabilities -​ Nuclear proliferation -​ Other capabilities are only relevant in light of military capabilities. -​ Focus on military threats to state -​ State as referent object of study Realism Core elements -​ Focus on states -​ Every state is fighting for own survival -​ In an anarchic environment -​ Anarchy → Lack of overarching power -​ If a state wants to survive they have no choice but to act selfishly. Fundamental laws of realist politics. Human security → a critical project aimed at interrogating the sources of people's insecurity and the roles of state and other global governance structures in this regard -​ Shifts focus from state to individual Constructivism → Social reality is socially constructed -​ Ideas (and norms) are more important than material factors -​ The way we talk about (define) things impacts the world we live in -​ Norms: international law does impact states behavior -​ Otherwise: why would they spend so much time and effort in negotiating treaties -​ Human security as a new norm Securitization → Concerned with how some issue becomes a security issue/existential threat. E.g. climate change has been known about for decades, how did it only become a security issue later? -​ Speech act. Saying = doing -​ What does language do? -​ Security threats are not objective, but depend on successful ‘securitization’ by elite actors. -​ Something is a security threat (threat to state survival) if policymakers treat it as such -​ Securitization enables a specific kind of policy: existential threats require and justify emergency measures outside the normal realm of political deliberation. -​ Easier to get on the public policy agenda. It is an existential threat. 3 steps: 1.​ Securitizing move 2.​ Audience acceptance 3.​ External context = Successful securitization Securitization theory -​ Objective, material, validity of security threat irrelevant -​ Audience acceptance is all that counts -​ Though: acceptance may depend on external context -​ And the narrative it is being presented -​ And legitimacy of the securitizing actor Reading 1: An Introduction to Security Studies (Chapter 1) -​ Definition 1.​ Security studies -​ No consensus to its meaning -​ IR: The alleviation of threats to cherished values -​ The struggle over the allocations of resources 2.​ Security -​ A powerful political tool in claiming attention for priority items in the competition for government attention -​ Who decides what it means, what makes it onto the agenda and how it it dealt with -​ Security studies -​ The 4 ss: 1.​ States → most important agents and referents for IP 2.​ Strategy → core intellectual and practical concerns for military force 3.​ Scientific → objective knowledge to adopt methods 4.​ Status quo → How to preserve as much of the status quo -​ 5 types of security 1.​ Military S Interplay between the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and their perspectives of other intentions 2.​ Political S Organizational stability of states and their legitimacy 3.​ Economic S Access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power 4.​ Societal S Sustainability and evolution of languages, cultures, religion and national identity + custom 5.​ Environmental S The maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere on which we support/depent -​ 4 Fundamental questions 1.​ What is security? -​ The alleviation of threats to cherished values -​ Survival vs Security -​ Survival: Existential condition -​ Security: The ability to pursue political and social ambitions (freedom) -​ Power is the route to security -​ The more power actors can accumulate, the more secure they will be -​ Security flows from power -​ It is based on emancipation; relationship between actors rather than a commodity -​ “International security must rely on a commitment to joint survival rather than on the threat of mutual destruction” -​ Promoting emancipatory politics which consider justice and human rights 2.​ Whose security? -​ Who is the referent object in the analysis? -​ Used to be focused on with the state/national interest (national security) -​ Which humans do we prioritize? → human security -​ Greater focus on the security of the earth; without a livable environment we cannot protect anyone 3.​ What is a security issue? -​ Pay attention to how representative of particular groups and organizations construct threat agendas -​ 2 perspectives -​ Efforts on matters related to armed conflict and the threat and use of military force -​ The lack of effective systems of health care is at least as important as the threat of armed conflicts 4.​ How can security be achieved? -​ No such thing as total security -​ All human life involves insecurities and risks of one sort or another Reading 2: Securitization (Chapter 7) Securitization → The process by which issues become part of the security agenda Wideners vs Traditionalists 1.​ Wideners -​ Call for expanding the concept of security beyond military political threats to the state and take on new threats in areas such as environmental security 2.​ Traditionalists -​ Studies is defined as the study of the threat, use and control of military force -​ Feared that endless expansion of the concept of security would potentially make it meaningless Copenhagen School -​ Argues that security treats are created when actors label something as a security threat and relevant audiences accept this designation -​ Security has a special quality: Speech act -​ By saying the words, something is done -​ The success of securitization ultimately lies with the relevant audience for the speech act -​ Securitization move + audience acceptance = successful securitization -​ What matters is not whether or not a threat is real, but that “when states of nations securitize and issue it is a political fact that has consequences -​ Because this securitization will cause the actor to operate in a different mode than he or she would have done otherwise; whether or not the securitization we correct or not -​ Security is equated with survival and thus essential -​ In security discourse and issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority -​ By labeling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means -​ Securitization enables emergency measures and tends to lead to threat defense and other state centered solutions -​ Facilitating conditions affecting the success of securitization 1.​ Internal -​ Internal, linguistic grammatical -​ Creating a narrative that includes a clear existential threat 2.​ External -​ Contextual and social -​ The general circumstance of the act Key Terms and Concepts Copenhagen VS Paris School -​ Paris School -​ Emphasizes securitization as a process that happens over time -​ Which can include but is not limited to speech acts and the emphasis is less on the drama of the exception and extraordinary measures, but more on the reproduction of unease and insecurity in everyday life. -​ Copenhagen School -​ It does not matter if there is an actual existential threat, only that the issue is represented and accepted as such -​ Neglects other kinds of acts that might bring security into being -​ E.g. Visual media Audience -​ Audience acceptance is the defining feature of successful securitization -​ Need the ability to identify with the audience’s feelings, need ans interests -​ Roles of elites -​ Wester-centrism Lecture 2 Recap: -​ Traditionalists vs wideners/deepeners -​ Traditional ss: military threats to states -​ Widening: non military threats -​ Deepening: threats to individuals and groups -​ How to securitize? -​ Copenhagen School: speech act - public acceptance - emergency measure -​ + various ways to expand analysis -​ Beyond speech acts, who is the public, slow process Fundamental insight: theories -​ Theories goal: point out that reality is always more complex besides the theory -​ Critical theory (feminism, post colonialism) -​ Criticize traditionalist approach -​ Security is way more complex than that (just state based) -​ Feminism: where are the women in the security dilemma? (their perspectives and rules) -​ Critique: does not formulates constructivist alternatives Situating feminism in security studies -​ Feminist security studies -​ Sub field of international relations -​ Challenges fundamental debates about security/insecurity by asking: -​ Where are the women? -​ What role do gendered and other binaries play here? -​ Their perspective can be valuable -​ Challenging central role of the state as a protector -​ State is seen as a fatherly protector -​ Fathers fail to do their job, states do as well (career over protection) -​ Lack of communication between ‘mainstream’ and feminist scholars -​ Despite growth in the real world policy that takes gender seriously interdisciplinary -​ Contribute to fostering conversations across disciplines Gendered binaries? → Either one thing or another (2 options) Binaries structures our thinking about the world into (often interconnected pairs) That (re)produce hierarchies of power -​ Males are naturally better leaders -​ Strong male protectors vs weak female victims How does feminist critique work? e.g. Feminist critique of the public/private divide -​ Public: economic, political, civil life, rationally organized -​ Private: domestic, familial, emotionally organized -​ Divide is gendered -​ Public life depend on, but also valued higher than private life -​ How do we measure GDP? -​ Public thing, but if an action at home (private life) is done it is not seen as a higher value (especially monetary). -​ Without someone at home doing extra tasks to keep men running, the system would fall apart. -​ Why is it so difficult to make rape in marriage a crime? -​ Speech act: you said “I do” so this is now a private problem rather than a public one. -​ Distinction impacts economic, physical and psychological security. -​ e.g. domestic abuse: public issue and so a female security is threatened Readings: 1.​ True and Tanyag 2019 -​ Show how feminist questions mainstream security studies -​ Offers and alternative understandings -​ “Observe and connect violence at the micro level of the family, household, and community with violence at the macro level in production relations, vis-à-vis states and non-state actors” -​ Feminists deepen our understanding of violence (including domestic violence) -​ Interconnection between war and domestic violence (public and private) -​ After war there is an increase in domestic violence -​ Make visible the relationship among different forms of violence such as physical, psychological, and economic violence with structural discrimination and symbolic harms.” -​ Widents the idea of violence and so extends to: economical, physical, psychological violence. -​ Economic violence (poverty) → inequality due to public private divide and gender. Causes economic insecurity. Insufficient resources to exist. 2.​ Khalid 2019 -​ Typical example of feminist approach -​ Focus on lots of binary understandings and how they legitimize certain Western policies (and criticizing those) -​ Adding intersectionality: gender is racialized and race is gendered -​ Gender and race intersect to provide ways of ordering the world in binary oppositions that create, legitimize and naturalize certain (oppressive) practices -​ ‘Us’ (white, rational, strong, masculine Westerners) vs -​ ‘Them’ (non-white, emotional, weak/vulnerable,feminine non-Westerners) -​ Or: civilized West vs. backward (but threatening!) East (Orientalism) -​ Often implicit understandings of the world, but feministpost-colonial analysis uncovers these hidden binary understandings and the work they do in international politics Feminist scholar of security Cockburn 2004 -​ “Violence is a continuum stretching across different layers (/levels), different phases of conflict and different domains. And women suffer disproportionately in all of these -​ War doesn't end with a peace agreement (non binary, especially for women) -​ Interconnected insecurity risks on all levels, disproportionate effects -​ Gender links violence at different points on a scale reaching from the personal to the international, from the tank column -​ War/peace distinction arbitrary and meaningless for women Continuum of violence Gendered phenomena persist from pre conflict into conflict and post conflict phases: -​ Pre-conflict: glorification of war, military- industrial complex, construction of masculinities/femininities -​ Post-conflict: rise in sexual and gender based violence, destruction of health/welfare/education infrastructure Runs through economic, legal, psychological and political relations → different kinds of violence (direct, cultural, structural) all linked. The political economy of insecurity (Jacqui True) -​ Nowhere in the world do women share equal social and economic rights with men (economic inequality) -​ World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes disproportionately affected women in developing/ post-conflict countries -​ Women don't have the same access as men to productive resources (legal inequality) -​ Women rely on the an -​ Land inheritance laws -​ How does this unequal access to resources impact risk or exposure to insecurity? -​ Less opportunities to move away from contexts of (domestic) violence -​ Higher risk of insecurity of any sort Example of feminist work: Sexual and gender-based Violence -​ Not just an attack on an individual woman, but used as a weapon of (psychological) was against nations or ethnic groups -​ Mass rape, psychological warfare -​ Societal problem rather than a private problem -​ Led to recognition of rape as constitutive of genocide, ethnic clearnins in ICC statue -​ Crimes against humanity include rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization. -​ It has become a more recognized problem (feminist activists) -​ Not just public rape, but also rape by people supposed to protect women (e.g. peacekeepers) → Public/private divide is subject to debate (dichotomy) Ending sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) -​ Not by making war safe for women -​ But by addressing the root causes -​ Economic and legal inequality -​ Addressing masculine cultures (including armed forces) -​ Breaking taboos on talking about/remember mass rape -​ Justice beyond criminal prosecution -​ Psychological help to victims Gender and race (Khalid) What kind of policies do these binary understanding legitimize: -​ Development aid as ‘white man’s burden’ : help those poor underdeveloped, failed states to become (economically) rational and hence developed -​ Their development increases our security -​ White man's burden: it is our job to safe the world (e.g. colonial times) -​ We are strong able West -​ Military intervention in ‘failed’ states -​ Who decides that a state is a failed state -​ But what about unwanted help? Or adverse effects of Structural Adjustment Policies or Western military intervention to ‘protect’ the Global South? What if that protection fails? Why is this problematic? -​ Silences non- Western security concerns -​ Legitimizes western intervention in the Global South -​ For ‘western security’ reasons -​ Obscure structural inequalities that may also account for underdevelopment -​ e.g. peacekeepers who then abuse who they are supposed to protect Main takeaways -​ Feminist security studies (FSS) is part of the widening and deepening agenda of Human Security -​ Focus more on gender rather than just humans as a whole -​ FSS shows how our thinking is shaped by binaries that (re)produce hierarchies of power. -​ And proposes an alternative: interconnectedness: Between public/private, economic/political, security/development, etc. -​ Critical approach (like securitization): questioning what security entails, for whom, critiquing how security discourse is used to defend status quo and continue marginalization of (especially non-Western) women and girls -​ Race and gender intersect Reading 3: Violence against Women/Violence in the World (Chapter 1) -​ Feminist analysts observe and connect violence: 1.​ Micro level; family, household, community 2.​ Macro level; production relations, states and non-state actors -​ Different forms of violence have structural discrimination and symbolic harms -​ Physical, psychological and economical -​ Highlights how violence in times of crisis and transition is rooted in pre-existing gender inequalities that cut across and often reinforce hierarchies of class/race/ethnicity, nationality/citizenship, religion and sexuality -​ 3 key components to the reconceptualization of violence in a crisis world 1.​ Layers -​ Drawing attention to mutual constitution of insecurities occurring at household, community, state and global levels -​ multiple and overlapping hierarchical relationships of power that undermine their human dignity and capabilities -​ Binary logics/thinking -​ Private sphere domestic violence is a form of political violence and a precondition for more visible violence against women in the public sphere -​ Intra-community conflicts are not securitized owing to their typical exclusion form national peace negotiations -​ Interpersonal violence, and implicitly denies its relevance to international security -​ Continuum of violence: by showing how macro level non-recognition of socially reproductive work is intimately connected to how it is seen in everyday depletion. -​ Lack of economic opportunities; reinforce the conditions that deplete the health and well being of women. Including the households and communities that depend on their unpaid labour -​ Ultimately undervalued and not being paid for labour 2.​ Forms -​ The equal importance and interconnectedness of violence as psychical, structural and symbolic harms -​ Power operates not only through direct coercion but also through the structured relations of production and reproduction that govern the distribution and use of resources, benefits, privileges and authority within the home and transnational society at large -​ Women, Peace and Security agenda (UN) 3.​ Bridging gaps -​ Need to bridge the gaps in attention and resource allocation between immediate or emergency humanitarian assistance and long term socio economic development for crisis situations -​ A disproportionate focus on allocating state and international resources for military power in order to protect/secure ‘victims’ of global violence ultimately fails when the health and well being of individuals, families, and communities are fundamentally neglected due to long term human development taking a ‘backseat’ in security agenda Reading 4: Gender, Race and the insecurity of security (Chapter 3) -​ Core assumptions/concern of dominant approaches to SS -​ Realism -​ State is the referent object of security -​ Large focus on war as the main threat to security of the state -​ Liberalism -​ Also overlooks individuals as actors -​ Politics is posited as centered around competition for power among states, with power exerted through coercive capability largely focused on military and economic power -​ Overlooks the varied human experiences in which states could be understood -​ Need: The idea of security as more than the study of the treat and control of military force -​ Other approaches: Copenhagen School, Feminism and Postcolonialism 1.​ Copenhagen School -​ Moving away from a normative approach to security by using the concept of securitization. -​ Identify where the concept of security is deployed 2.​ Feminism -​ Challenge the idea of gender as biologically determined -​ Gender is a set of socially constructed characteristics describing what men and women ought to be -​ Perpetuate the violence that they seek to prevent -​ Binary understandings of men and women, the roles they play -​ The idea of security have material impacts that perpetuate dominant discourses of gender and security 3.​ Post colonialism -​ Look at race and want to expose the Western centric nature of security studies -​ Very little insight into non-western insecurities -​ Enacting and enabling particular events and privileging the rights of some over others -​ Critique the idea of the state as a central actor in relation to security, but also the provider of security 4.​ Feminism and postcolonialism -​ Move away from the narrowness of the field by seeking to develop non-state-centric approaches to security and understanding and interrogating the function of gender and race in IP -​ Security is an encompassing myriad (great number) political, economic and social relationships as well as processes and practices -​ Security is linked to broader dominant discourses -​ Understanding security as gendered and racialized means understanding gender and race as ways of ordering the world that are imbued with power to create, legitimize and naturalize knowledge -​ Intersection of development and interventionism -​ Security s linked to dominant discourses of development -​ Is racialized, gendered and rooted in imperialism -​ e.g. failed states -​ Based on a political-economic structure that has set them up to fail -​ Failed to perform to the western and masculine traits of rationality, wealth and power -​ Intervention in the name of global security and order -​ Encourage Eastern other to subscribe to western order to make the word safe for ‘capitalism’ -​ Linked to the assertion of western identity in the racialized and gendered hierarchy of GP -​ Democratization as a security concern Tutorial 1 -​ Carbon budget → The amount of carbon emissions that can be emitted before it is not sustainable anymore. IPCC WGII AR6 (2022) 1.​ Vulnerability → risks 2.​ Adaptation → Solutions 3.​ Resilience → Transformations Task a.​ Vulnerability → The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. It encompasses a variety of concepts and elements, including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt ​ ​ ​ ​ b.​ Economic dimensions, state related, social dimensions, power structures, risk assessments, discourse. c.​ 1. Politics: power structures: north vs south, feminism/postcolonialism state related: realism, anarchy, self interest 2. Economics Economic dimensions: transactional mindset, self interest, positivist mindset (measured in numbers), material vulnerability, economic inequality 3. Psychology Social dimensions: Binaries and dichotomies, post structuralism, the role discourse 4. Law Legislative dimensions: legislative inequality, binaries, complexity of the issue, legislative institutions are western focussed and located, Law tradition is Western d.​ How do we make space for and listen to the voices of vulnerable individuals, groups and states without patronizing them in the climate security crisis? Focus on tackling the structural root issues ​ ​ Lecture 3 Securitization theory -​ Speech act (by someone with legitimate power) + acceptance by audience = emergency measures possible -​ Speech act/physical action -​ Slow process -​ Today: More nuanced understanding of securitization and its consequences in 2 ways 1.​ Securitization actor → National/local government declaring a climate emergency, but only after local activists pressure them to do so. Who is the securitizing actor here? -​ Multilayered process -​ Activists practicing civil disobedience/going beyond ‘regular political action’ because they convince each other of the severity of the threat → Internal securitization -​ Movement as a whole trying to convince politicians to declare ‘formal’ climate emergency and drastic action 2.​ Emergency measures → Securitizing not to uphold status quo in face of external threat, but ‘disrupting systems of rule’ -​ Are emergency measures always a form of dictatorial rule by state actors to uphold the current status quo? -​ Or is there potential for ‘transformative action’ by ‘self organized insurgent publics’ in ‘a process of openness and self-determination with democratic potential’? What do climate emergency movements want? -​ For governments (local and national) to declare a climate emergency to make people (psychologically) ready for drastic action. → Discursive strategy influencing the way we think about climate change, in order to gather public support. -​ Get (national) gov’ts to follow up with drastic measures limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees → policy change! (halt fossil fuel subsidies, tripling investment in renewables, global carbon pricing system, increase circular economy, replace GDP/ degrowth, energy ‘rationing’) Risks -​ Strategy may backfire -​ e.g. European Green deals as 'Diktat From Brussels.’ -​ Focus on carbon emissions obscure other issues -​ e.g. poverty, biodiversity loss etc. -​ Facilitate a multi-dimensional platform for political-economic change that targets intersecting global challenges. -​ Risk of authoritarianism -​ Chinese road to sustainability -​ Marginalize local community concerns about mining/wind turbines Predicament: We cannot simultaneously: -​ Transform Western economies -​ Uphold democratic decision making procedures (they are slow) -​ Eradicate poverty and environmental pollution in the Global South -​ Pay climate reparations to the Global South Discourse → a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices through which meaning is given to physical and social realities. 4 discourses of climate change security 1.​ National security threat -​ Views climate change as a threat to the extent that it precipitates military threats, undermines economic growth/the national way of life. -​ Indirect threats -​ People displaced by environmental disasters/stress may be positioned as threats to the security of the state rather than those in need of being secured. -​ Take to the extreme: states relatively well placed to adapt to the effects of climate change might seek to protect themself from those unable to do so. 2.​ International security threat -​ Climate change as threat to international norms and rules -​ advanced by international organizations such as the UN -​ Therefore strengthen global governance institutions -​ What is the role of the UN Security Council? -​ The SC should join the general assembly in recognizing climate change as a threat to international peace and security. 3.​ Human security threat -​ Climate change threatens human life and dignity -​ Ambiguity creates space for co-option of human security into state security 4.​ Ecological security threat -​ Less prominent discourse -​ Mostly NGO/academic sphere -​ Taking future generations and non humans into account: most morally defensible approach -​ Need to go beyond mitigation and adaptation: Change damaging social, political and economic practices/structures -​ Restructure relationship between society and environment -​ Primary responsibility of the Global West to act Main argument: Slow increase of support for ecological security discourse (McDonald) Alternative approaches 1.​ Psychology -​ More an more people get anxious about the climate change -​ Also because of natural disasters -​ For some this can lead to direct action/global mass movement 2.​ Economic -​ Renewable energy is now cheaper than fossil -​ Spike in energy prices forced people to be more interested in renewable energy 3.​ Legal -​ International Court of Justice growing impact on climate change negotiations (international forums) -​ Increase in international corporations based on the international law -​ States cause others to suffer, lack of responsibility Main takeaways -​ Securitization of climate change leads to 3 new questions: 1.​ Can non-elite actors like social movements also successfully securitize an issue? 2.​ Is it possible to reconcile emergency measures with improving/reinventing democracy? 3.​ How to get out of the tragic predicament that you can't reach all your lofty goals at once? -​ Even if states accept that climate change is a security risk, there are 4 different ways (discourses) to do so -​ Beyond politics, rely on psychological anxiety driving individual action,economic mechanisms or court cases to deal with climate change Reading 5: Climate change, security and the institutional prospects for ecological security (M.McDonald) -​ Different perspectives of climate change and security -​ National, international, human and ecological 1.​ National security -​ Focus on the states’ protection from the effects of climate change or sovereignty due to direct or indirect threats 2.​ International security -​ Climate change is a contributor to instability among nations 3.​ Human security -​ Prioritize protecting human lives, livelihoods and cultural expressions from the direct effects of climate change 4.​ Ecological security -​ Protecting the resilience of ecosystems in the face of climate change ​ -​ Agency -​ While actors and influence climate change, those with greater capacity bear a greater responsibility -​ Responsibility -​ Those who are most capable of addressing climate change, should bare the most responsibility -​ Particular burden on developed states -​ Power -​ Limitations of assuming the role of agency falls solely to states -​ States are not the only actors -​ Corporations, IGOs, individuals etc. -​ States are not always acting in the best interest of ecological security -​ Prioritize self-interest -​ A shift to ecological security requires a more inclusive approach ​ ​ -​ Institutional engagement -​ International level -​ e.g. UN, think tanks -​ National level -​ Nation-state policies -​ Majority of states acknowledge the role of climate change in national security -​ Military engagement -​ Militaries are increasingly involved in addressing climate change -​ e.g. emission reduction, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, promoting international cooperation -​ Challenges and opportunities -​ Dominance of traditional security framework -​ National frameworks still dominate in most countries, often focussing on protecting states/institutions from secondary effects of climate change -​ Neglecting the direct threats to ecosystems and vulnerable populations -​ Limited public and political support -​ Lacks widespread support, seen as less urgent/relevant compared to traditional security concerns -​ Lack of traction -​ Increasing focus on direct impacts -​ Growing recognition -​ Shift in narratives from traditional national security towards a more holistic understanding of the threats -​ Grassroots activism -​ Promote action to mitigate and protect -​ Can influence public opinion -​ Pressure policy makers Reading 6: Climate emergency and securitization politics: towards a climate politics of the extraordinary (Michael Albert) -​ Climate emergency and securitization -​ Securitization → When a threat is presented as an existential danger, requiring urgent action -​ Framing: -​ Needs to be portrayed so severe that it justifies exceptional measures beyond normal procedures -​ Legitimization: -​ Legitimizes measure that might otherwise be viewed as excessive -​ Actors: -​ e.g. governments, military or security agencies -​ Climate emergency -​ a from of securitization (referent object) -​ The threat of securitization -​ Climate emergency mobilizations can have the same potential dangers as other forms of securitization, such as the erosion of democratic norms and the suppression of dissent. -​ Climate emergency mobilization → Refers to the actions taken by activists and movements to push for immediate and transformative climate action -​ Beyond traditional lobbying and campaigning -​ Large scale protests, civil disobedience and public pressure campaigns to push governments and corporations to act -​ Key characteristics -​ Grassroots driven -​ Focus on urgency -​ Demanding radical change -​ Debates about climate emergency -​ Arguments for declaring a climate emergency -​ Urgency -​ Mobilisation -​ Societal shift beyond normal, requiring a mobilization of resources and significant political changes -​ Symbolic importance -​ The politics of the extraordinary → Moments of radical transformation where citizens challenge existic political and social structures 1.​ Mass mobilization → A situation where large groups of people come together in organized efforts to demand change -​ Goal: Shifting public opinions, pressuring the government, challenging the status quo etc. 2.​ New political spaces → Areas/ways of organizing that emerge outside of traditional, formal politics -​ Traditional politics often involves formal institutions like parliaments, political parties, and elections. "New political spaces" are ways of doing politics outside of these formal structures -​ e.g. Informal gatherings, online communities, political movements etc. 3.​ Anti-statist movements → Challenge the authority and power of the state -​ While some may see the state as essential for providing order and public services, anti-statist movements believe the state can also become a source of oppression and limit individual freedom -​ Question the role of the state, advocate for individual liberty etc. -​ Potential risks and limitations -​ Failed securitization -​ Climate emergency declarations might not successfully motivate governments to take significant action, leading to ineffective policies -​ Over-reliance on the 'state of exception’ -​ Extreme focus might overshadow other pressing issues -​ Authoritarian tendencies -​ Climate emergency policies could be leveraged to expand state power and control over citizens -​ Lack of accountability and transparency -​ Climate emergency programmes might be implemented without sufficient democratic oversight and input from affected communities -​ Geopolitical risks -​ Future directions for climate emergency movements 1.​ Broader mobilization -​ Climate emergency movements need to involve labor unions, anti-racist movements, and other social justice groups to build a broader coalition 2.​ Inclusivity and transparency -​ Ensuring that climate emergency policies are created and implemented with fair representation from all affected communities, prioritizing marginalized groups 3.​ Combatting “Green sacrifice zones” -​ "Green Sacrifice Zones" (GSZs) represent areas often in the Global South targeted for resource extraction (like mining for minerals needed for renewable energy) to address climate change in the Global North. -​ Embrace a just transition: Ensure that the transition to a low-carbon economy is fair and equitable, by addressing the effects of resource extraction and providing just compensation and support to impacted communities -​ Promote alternative strategies: Invest in cleaner, less destructive alternatives like energy efficiency, recycling, and decentralized renewables to reduce the need for new mining and resource extraction -​ Champion a global approach: Urge for international cooperation to ensure fair trade practices in the extraction and processing of raw materials, with stronger regulations and protections for workers and vulnerable communities. 4.​ Addressing global climate justice -​ Implementing "climate reparations” to help disproportionately impacted by climate change Lecture 4 What are Autonomous Weapons Systems? (AWS) → Systems which select and apply force to targets without human intervention, and where an AWS self-initiates or triggers a strike in response to information from the environment. Received through sensors and on the basis of a generalized “target profile” -​ Systems that use machine analysis of information acquire from sensors to automatically select and engage targets, such that a human operator does not determine specifically where, when or against what force is applied -​ Use of algorithms -​ Engage a target based on the data that it gets from sensors, instead of a human making this decisions -​ It is the victim that triggers the strike, not the user -​ Those who configure and deploy an autonomous weapon will not necessarily know the exact targets, location, timing or circumstances of the resulting use of force Problems with AWS -​ Legal -​ Who needs to be held accountable -​ Ethical issues -​ Security -​ Unpredictability/algorithmic Treaty possibilities Reading 7: A Diplomat's Guide to Autonomous Weapons Systems -​ The Basics -​ Autonomous weapons -​ Select and apply force to targets without human control -​ Use of algorithms to make decisions independently -​ Pre programmed to recognize and kill based sensor data of a specific target profile -​ Why are they problematic -​ Accountability gap -​ Global instability -​ Ethics -​ Vulnerability to cyber attack -​ Unpredictability -​ What can be done? -​ A legally binding treaty 1.​ Prohibiting legally/ethically unacceptable systems 2.​ Regulating all other systems with time, spatial and geographical limits -​ Myths and Misconceptions 1.​ We must first agree on a definition before starting negotiations This is not necessarily true, as historical examples show successful negotiations on complex topics proceeded with the definition being created later. 2.​ Geopolitical tensions are too great to attempt negotiations This is not accurate, as many significant treaties were negotiated during periods of high geopolitical tension. 3.​ The CCW is the appropriate forum The CCW has limitations due to its member states and limitations on its scope, making it an insufficient forum for addressing the complex issues of autonomous weapons. 4.​ Autonomous weapons will lead to fewer civilian deaths This is a dangerous misunderstanding, as the speed and scale of autonomous weapons deployment make civilian casualties more likely 5.​ Autonomous weapons do not currently abide by international humanitarian law, but in the future they might This is a problematic assumption, as autonomous weapons could be used for genocide and targeted killings -​ Political Landscape -​ Worldwide support: The vast majority of states (119) favor a legally binding treaty on autonomous weapons, while 59 are undecided, and 10 oppose it. -​ Africa: The African Group strongly supports a binding treaty, calling for a prohibition on autonomous weapons. -​ Europe: Many European countries, such as Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany, support a legally binding instrument and are actively pushing for it. -​ Latin America and the Caribbean: Over 30 Latin American and Caribbean states support a legally binding instrument, as evidenced by the adoption of the Belén Communiqué. -​ North America: Canada has not yet declared its position, while the U.S. opposes a legally binding instrument. -​ Asia: Pakistan, Türkiye, and Sri Lanka support a legally binding instrument, while China and India oppose it. -​ Oceania: Aotearoa New Zealand supports a legally binding instrument. -​ Opposition: A small group of countries, including Australia, Estonia, India, Israel, Japan, Poland, South Korea, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, oppose a legally binding instrument. -​ Relevant Forums -​ United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) The HRC has been discussing the human rights implications of autonomous weapons since 2013 and is a significant forum for addressing ethical concerns. -​ Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) The CCW has been focusing on autonomous weapons since 2014, but its consensus-based decision-making process has been a hurdle for progress. -​ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) UNESCO has been actively discussing AI, including its military applications, since 2019. -​ Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) This forum has been discussing AI in the military since 2019 but has not yet produced concrete agreements. -​ United Nations Security Council (UNSC) The UNSC has been discussing the potential impact of AI on international security since 2023. -​ United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) The UNGA is seen as a promising forum for potentially creating a legally binding treaty on autonomous weapons. Reading 8: Autonomous Weapons Systems and Meaningful Human Control: Ethical and Legal Issues -​ AWS and MHC -​ AWS (Autonomous Weapons Systems) -​ Can autonomously choose targets and engage them -​ Able to operate without any human intervention after activation -​ Different types e.g.: -​ Air Defence Systems -​ Active protection systems -​ MHC (Meaningful Human Control) -​ Emphasis the need for human control over all weapons systems -​ Including autonomous ones -​ All weapons systems should remain under human control to be ethically acceptable and lawfully employed -​ MHC implementation should be considered in relation to specific contexts -​ Type of weapon system, intended us, surrounding environment -​ Ethical and legal concerns AWS -​ Respect for the Laws of War (International Humanitarian Law, IHL) → Rules designed to protect civilians and limit harmful effects in war -​ Human shortcomings People who are fighting in war are often driven by emotions. It is easy to lose sight of what is right and wrong; soldiers might do things that break the rules of war -​ Potential for more ethical decisions Robots are free from emotions; can be more ethical and rational Adhering more closely to IHL -​ Challenges of implementation Significant difficulties ensure that AWS actually comply with IHL in real world scenarios which are complex and unpredictable -​ Responsibility Ascription Issues -​ The “Chain of Command” Problem -​ AWS would make it difficult to assign responsibility for actions taken by the system if there is no human operator involved -​ Potential for shifting Responsibility -​ AWS might lead to a shift in responsibility away from human operators creating gaps in responsibility ascriptions -​ Ethical and legal concerns MHC -​ Defining “meaningful” human control → How much human involvement is truly necessary to ensure ethical and legal use of AWS 1.​ Fail safe -​ How to make sure that a human can always intervene and override an AWS if it is about to violate IHL -​ Humans need to actively be involved in steering the AWS before it reaches a point where it poses a risk 2.​ Accountability attractor -​ Human control should ensure accountability for the actions of weapons systems. If a weapon system violates IHL, humans must be identifiable and held responsible for those actions -​ This prevents gaps in responsibility, which can happen when autonomous systems act without clear human oversight 3.​ More agency Enactor -​ Human control should operate as a moral agency, ensuring that decisions affecting human lives and dignities are ultimately made by humans, rather than autonomous machines -​ prevent the dehumanization of warfare and prioritize the ethical aspect of using weapons systems. -​ Fail-safe concerns How to make sure that a human can always intervene and override an AWS if it is about to violate IHL -​ Humans need to actively be involved in steering the AWS before it reaches a point where it poses a risk -​ Transparency in decision making -​ Uniform policies for MHC 1.​ Boxed Autonomy → AWS actions with a pre-defined operational box, setting boundaries for targeting decisions -​ The human operator decides the overall mission parameters, but the AWS can autonomously select and engage targets within those constraints 2.​ Denied Autonomy → his policy restricts autonomy as much as possible, denying the AWS the ability to autonomously make any target selection or engagement decisions -​ The human operator maintains complete control over all aspects of the weapon's use. 3.​ Supervised Autonomy → allowing for a limited degree of autonomy while still keeping humans in the loop. -​ The AWS can act autonomously within certain parameters, but a human operator can override any decisions made by the system, ensuring human oversight. -​ Differentiated policies for MHC -​ Levels of human control 1.​ L1 - Human control 2.​ L2 - Program suggests, human chooses 3.​ L3 - Program selects, human approves 4.​ L4 - Supervised autonomy 5.​ L5 - Fully autonomous -​ Flexible approach → Not all AWS are the same -​ Different levels of autonomy and human control might be appropriate for different types of weapons systems, based on their capabilities and intended uses. -​ Matching control to context → The idea is to tailor the level of human control to the specific context, rather than imposing a single system on all AWS -​ certain types of weapons systems that are highly structured and predictable might require less stringent human oversight than those operating in more complex and dynamic environments -​ Balancing autonomy and control → the need to find a balance between allowing some degree of autonomy in AWS while also maintaining sufficient human control. -​ Carefully considering the level of risk associated with different AWS and establishing the appropriate level of human involvement based on those risks