Differences and Samenesses: An Introduction PDF

1 Differences and samenesses An introduction Always remember that you are absolutely unique. Just like everyone else. (Margaret Mead) 1.1 Introduction Human beings have many features in common, some they share with so...

1 Differences and samenesses An introduction Always remember that you are absolutely unique. Just like everyone else. (Margaret Mead) 1.1 Introduction Human beings have many features in common, some they share with some others, and many are specific to themselves. It is this diversity that enriches our lives in countless ways every day. Yet, to some, diversity elicits contempt, even fear, and challenges their acceptance to the point where they may discriminate against those who are different, marginalize and even persecute them. At least in western countries, populations are becoming increasingly diverse. This reflects a range of factors, including the impact of globalization with the attendant mobility of labour; the upsurge of refugees fleeing conflict or the consequences of global warming, or seek- ing better economic futures; changing demographic profiles resulting from such factors as differential fertility rates among various groups; and independent choices of identity exer- cised by free citizens. With reference to Britain (but with wider application), Steven Vertovec, Professor of Transnational Anthropology at the University of Oxford, has termed this trend ‘superdiversity’, which he defined as a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scat- tered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants who have arrived over the last decade.1 Unfortunately, diversity – and superdiversity – often creates intolerance and conflict at macro (societal) and micro (individual) levels, creating vulnerabilities in children. By addressing issues to do with diversity, schools can and should do much to create more peaceful, just and equitable societies (and world) based on mutual respect and tolerance. I hope this book contributes to this goal. 1.2 What we mean by ‘different’ and ‘diverse’ Typical dictionary definitions of different are not the same as another or each other; unlike in nature, form, or quality. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘different’ has its origins in Middle English differren, meaning to distinguish, and Latin differre, meaning to bear apart, put off. The definition of diversity is a range of many people or things that are very different 2 Differences and samenesses from each other. It is derived from Old French diversite, from Latin diversitas, and diversus. Diverse is the past participle of divertere, meaning ‘to turn aside’. With respect to human beings, ‘difference’ and ‘diversity’ both typically refer to the dimen- sions of sex and gender; socio-economic status; race, ethnicity and culture; beliefs and reli- gion; and special needs. These constitute the ‘big five’, which are the focus of this book. In a challenging paper, Nicholas Burbules itemized several different ways of thinking about differences, in what he referred to as ‘a grammar of difference’.2 Briefly, these include: (1) difference of variety, as in different kinds within a particular category, e.g., different national identities; (2) difference in degree, as in differences along a continuum of qualities, e.g., skin colour; (3) difference as variation, as in different combinations of and emphases upon certain elements, e.g., different body types or different states of ability or disability; (4) difference as a version, as in a familiar standard that is altered through interpretation, but, unlike a varia- tion, it leaves the key elements of the standard unchanged, simply giving to them a different sense of meaning and tone; e.g., differences of sexual identity; and (5) difference as an anal- ogy, when differences are identified as relative, not to common standards, but to comparable, parallel standards, e.g., different moral distinctions. 1.3 Differences fascinate us The media and, presumably, we, its consumers, are attracted to stories portraying human differences. Some differences we admire, even envy; others repulse us or engender fear; all seem to fascinate us. This range is illustrated in a selection of stories I have seen in newspa- pers in the course of a week: Gender differences: An item discusses civil unions and same sex marriage; a columnist stated that it was ‘quite hard being a woman’, as there are ‘lots of rules’ that ‘turn up implicitly in editorials, popular commentary and casual conversation’. Socio-economic status differences: A report indicated that the 85 richest people on the planet have accumulated as much wealth between them as half of the world’s popula- tion. Another report noted that the richest 1% currently own 48% of all ­global wealth. The International Organization for Migration was reported as saying that more than 1 million migrants and refugees had crossed into Europe in 2015, amid the fallout of war, poverty and persecution in Africa and the Middle East. This represented more than a four-fold increase from 2014. Religious differences: The European Court of Human Rights has upheld France’s law ban- ning face-covering Muslim veils from the streets, in a case brought by a woman who claimed her freedom of religion was violated; forces from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Mosul warned Christians to leave, convert to Islam or face execution; in my city of Christchurch, New Zealand, a mother protested about the law that permits the teaching of religion in state schools under some circumstances. Intellectual differences: An item described how outstanding creative design formed the basis of sustainable business opportunities. Physical differences: An Australian study showed that children as young as eight are dissatisfied with their bodies and that the majority of 10- and 11-year-olds are trying to  Differences and samenesses 3 control their weight; under a provocative headline, ‘Talking about an awkward issue’, an article raises the question – should disabled athletes be competing at the Common- wealth Games in Glasgow? Personality differences: A woman in an abusive relationship is found guilty of stabbing her partner; a man with the intriguing name of All Means All in prison for threatening to kill the prime minister, gave up his hunger strike. Age differences: A research report showed that first-born children are more likely to be the most ambitious and well-qualified of their siblings. Family structure differences: A correspondent’s column described her experiences with a woman who had 11 children. 1.4 Differences can have serious consequences Throughout the centuries and across the world, many people who are different have suffered from the effects of xenophobia, discrimination, segregation and marginalization. In the most serious of circumstances, their differences have led to them losing their lives in wars and other conflicts. According to the United Nations, during the 1990s a total of 53 armed con- flicts resulted in 3.9 million deaths, nearly 90% of whom were civilians,3 numbers that equate roughly to the entire populations of the city of Los Angeles or to the countries of Ireland and New Zealand. In addition, in 2002, there were approximately 22 million international refu- gees in the world and another 20-25 million internally displaced people.4 Being different has led to many individuals or groups being excluded from meaningful par- ticipation in education and society more generally. In its most extreme form, difference has resulted in attempts to exterminate whole classes of people, for example in Nazi Germany and, more recently, in Rwanda and Iraq/Syria. Even in modern, ‘advanced’ societies children who don’t conform to dominant discourses are vulnerable to stigmatization and alienation. 1.5 Some education systems discriminate against those who are different Unfortunately, education systems, both historically and contemporaneously, are replete with examples of active or passive discrimination against various groups of people – those of col- our, those with disabilities, those with certain religious beliefs, immigrants, the poor, females … Sometimes this discrimination has been benevolent and motivated by a wish to do the best for children as, for example, in the setting up of special schools or special classes for children with disabilities; at other times, the discrimination is overt and hostile, reflecting broader social values as, for example, apartheid-era education of blacks and coloured children in South Africa. 1.6 Goals and perspectives This book is underpinned by two goals and 19 cross-cutting perspectives relating to how edu- cation and society should respond to diversity. The two goals are: A. to respect and enhance the human rights of diverse people, and B. to develop an inclusive society and global community. 4 Differences and samenesses The cross-cutting perspectives comprise the following: 1 Theories of distributive justice should underpin our approach to diversity 2 Diversities must be seen from an ecological perspective 3 Perceptions of diversity vary across time and space 4 Finding the right balance between sameness and diversity is a challenge 5 Interest convergence helps to explain shifts in behaviour and policies 6 Diversities intersect with each other 7 There are multiple causes of diversities 8 Human beings are genetically similar 9 Consideration should be given to an evolutionary perspective on diversity 10 Many differences are quite small, even if they are statistically significant 11 Economics play a major role in catering for diversities 12 Education is multi-level and multi-faceted 13 There can be a mismatch between children’s and schools’ cultural and social ­capital 14 Reason and evidence should determine educational policies and practices 15 Account should be taken of the impact of disruptive technologies on job prospects 16 Technology has the potential to transform education 17 The focus should be on the uniqueness of individuals 18 Universal design for learning provides fair opportunities for learning 19 Early prevention and intervention programmes should be developed. 1.7 Goal A: To respect and enhance the human rights of diverse people Quite simply, it is important that we recognize that people who are different have human rights. Consideration of society’s responsibilities towards children who are disadvantaged for whatever reason must be predicated on the broad concept of human rights.5 These rights inform us as to what we may, must, and must not do to others and what we may expect of others in their behaviours towards us. In 1948, the United Nations agreed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948, it was the result of the experi- ence of World War II. With the end of that war, the international community vowed never again to allow atrocities like those of that conflict to happen again. The preamble to the UDHR thus included the following: Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all mem- bers of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, [and] Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. In terms of the theme of this book, three Articles are of particular relevance: Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.  Differences and samenesses 5 Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Dec- laration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status … Article 7: All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimina- tion in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination. According to Israeli scholar, Frances Raday,6 the rights articulated in the UDHR had their origins in the shift from a religious to a secular state culture at the time of the ­eighteenth-century European Enlightenment. This was accompanied by the replacement of communitarianism by individualism, by the shift from status to contract, and by rationalism instead of faith. As we shall see in Chapters 3 and 5, although these shifts have been uni- versally accepted, they are not always honoured and continue to give rise to conflict. While human rights covenants set normative frameworks, they don’t provide answers as to how conflicts should be resolved.7 Since 1948, the commitment articulated in the UDHR has been translated into law – whether in the forms of treaties, customary international law, general principles, regional agreements and domestic law – through which human rights are expressed and guaranteed. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, it has formed the basis of a wide range of Conven- tions or other instruments relating to the rights of women; children; indigenous people; peo- ple with mental illness; national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities; migrant workers and their families; refugees; and, recently, people with disabilities. The right to education is explicitly defined in three international instruments. The first of these is the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. This Convention included Article 29, which requires that education should be directed to: (a) The development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential; (b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations; (c) The development of respect for the child’s parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is liv- ing, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own; (d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of un- derstanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin. Even though every country except Somalia and the United States has ratified this Con- vention, at least 57.8 million children of primary school age around the world were out of school in 2012.8 Although this is a striking improvement on the 2000 figure of 99.7 million, it is still a cause for major concern. The second instrument is the 1999 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul- tural Rights.9 The preamble to Article 13, which is concerned with the right to education, included the following: 6 Differences and samenesses Education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing other human rights. As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle by which eco- nomically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities … But the importance of education is not just practical: a well-educated, enlightened and active mind, able to wan- der freely and widely, is one of the joys and rewards of human existence. In keeping with the last point, Article 13(1) of the Covenant asserts that ‘education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality’. Article 13(2) goes on to specify that education in all its forms and at all levels shall exhibit the following interrelated and essen- tial features: availability of functioning educational institutions and programmes in suf- ficient quantity; accessibility of educational institutions and programmes to all, without discrimination, and including physical and economic accessibility; acceptability of the form and substance of education, including curricula, teaching methods and cultural appropri- ateness; and adaptability of education to the needs of changing societies and communi- ties, and to the needs of students within their diverse social and cultural settings. The third international instrument concerning the right to education is UNESCO’s 1960 Convention against Discrimination in Education. It included the following articles: 3(b) To ensure, by legislation where necessary, that there is no discrimination in the admission of pupils to educational institutions; 4(a) To make primary education free and compulsory; make secondary education in its different forms generally available and accessible to all; make higher education equally accessible to all on the basis of individual capacity; assure compliance by all with the obligation to attend school prescribed by law; 4(b) To ensure that the standards of education are equivalent in all public educational institutions of the same level, and that the conditions relating to the quality of the edu- cation provided are also equivalent; 5(a) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; it shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations. 5(b) It is essential to respect the liberty of parents and, where applicable, of legal guardians, firstly to choose for their children institutions other than those maintained by the public authorities but conforming to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent authorities … Many countries and regional entities have taken the lead from the UDHR and its associated covenants and committed themselves to their principles. For example, in my own country, New Zealand, it is against the law to discriminate against individuals in many areas of public life, including in work, education, official practice and policy and the provision of goods and services. The prohibited grounds of discrimination are set out in section 21 of the Human Rights Act of 1993. They are: age (from age 16), colour, disability, employment status, ethical  Differences and samenesses 7 belief (including lack of religious belief), ethnic or national origins, family status, marital sta- tus, political opinion, race, religious belief, sex and sexual orientation. Similarly, the Canadian Human Rights Act of 1977 has the express goal of ensuring equal opportunity to individuals who may be victims of discriminatory practices based on a set of prohibited grounds such as sex, disability or religion. This Act applies through- out Canada, but only to federally regulated activities; each province and territory has its own anti-discrimination law that applies to activities that are not federally regulated. In one such province, Alberta, it is recognized that all persons are ‘equal in dignity, rights and responsibilities without regard to race, religious beliefs, colour, gender, physical disability, mental disability, age, ancestry, place of origin, marital status, source of income, family status or sexual orientation’. In the United Kingdom, the Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on a wide range of grounds including ‘sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’. The European Convention on Human Rights, which came into force in 1953, prohibits dis- crimination based on ‘sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’. A final example is the American Convention on Human Rights (the Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica). This Convention, which covers the Organization of American States, came into force in 1978. Its preamble includes the recognition that states will recognize specified rights and freedoms ‘without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, politi- cal or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition’. For the most part these human rights Acts or Conventions aim at proscribing discrimina- tion; as such, they focus on the negative claims rights that I outline below. The school curricula in many countries’ education systems reflect human rights principles, frequently including strong references to diversity. For example, the New Zealand Curriculum requires schools to, inter alia: (a) acknowledge the bicultural foundations of New Zealand, (b) reflect New Zealand’s cultural diversity and value the histories and traditions of all its people, and (c) be non-sexist, non-racist and non-discriminatory, ensuring that students’ identities, languages, abilities and talents are recognized and affirmed and that their learning needs are addressed. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, in an attempt to encourage diversity, the National Curriculum in 1999 identified ‘diversity’ as including: boys and girls, pupils with special edu- cational needs, pupils with disabilities, pupils from all social and cultural backgrounds, pupils of different ethnic groups including Travellers, refugees and asylum seekers and those from diverse linguistic, religious backgrounds.10 Essential elements in valuing pupil diversity were to ensure that pupils learned to appreciate and view positively differences in others, whether arising from race, gender, ability or disability, and that all forms of bullying, harassment and stereotypical views are challenged. At a wider level, teachers were encouraged to use mate- rials and images in their teaching that reflect social, religious and cultural diversity.11 At an international level, UNESCO has done much to promote the valuing of diversity through its advocacy of an inclusive curriculum. For example, in the Foreword to its influential publication, Policy guidelines on inclusion in education,12 Nicholas Burnett emphasized that 8 Differences and samenesses Inclusive education is a process that involves the transformation of schools and other centres of learning to cater for all children – including boys and girls, students from ethnic and linguistic minorities, rural populations, those affected by HIV and AIDS, and those with disabilities and difficulties in learning … Its aim is to eliminate exclusion that is a consequence of negative attitudes and a lack of response to diversity in race, economic status, social class, ethnicity, language, religion, gender, sexual orientation and ability.13 In this book, I shall also address the problem of how to reconcile competing rights, for exam- ple in Chapter 5, I will discuss children’s vs their parents’ rights with regard to freedom of religion and females’ rights to be treated equally vs religious norms and cultural practices which might argue otherwise. These dilemmas draw attention to the distinction between individual and group rights. Why should we value diversity and respect human rights? At a biological level, Charles Darwin saw in the diversity of species the principles of evolution that operated to gener- ate the species. This occurs through genetic diversity serving as a way for populations to adapt to changing environments. With more variation, it is more likely that some individu- als will possess genes that are suited to particular environments if they come under stress. Such individuals are more likely to survive to produce offspring bearing those genes. This is what has occurred as modern humans evolved in Africa and spread across the world, adapt- ing locally to the selective pressures of the climates, food sources and pathogens that they encountered. Thus, diversity evolved. At a social level, there is an instrumental argument for valuing diversity. If societies in general and schools in particular value diversity, this can bring about several desirable out- comes. These include: (a) enhancing social development by expanding the pool of people with whom individuals can associate and develop relationships; (b) preparing students for future career success by becoming sensitive to human differences and able to relate to people of different abilities, nationalities and cultural backgrounds; (c) increasing individuals’ knowl- edge base and creative thinking by interacting with a diverse group of people; (d) enhancing self-awareness by students comparing and contrasting their life experiences with others who differ sharply. Respect for diversity includes knowing how to relate to qualities and condi- tions that are different from our own and outside the groups to which we belong, yet are present in other individuals and groups.14 This is the challenge facing educators at all levels of the education system in all countries. Morally, there is a strong argument for valuing diversity, arising from the doctrine of human rights.15 In a nutshell, it aims at identifying the fundamental prerequisites for each human being to lead a minimally good life and to enjoy the full rights of citizenship. It rests upon belief in the existence of a truly universal moral community comprising all human beings. Within Europe, the origins of moral universalism as a basis for human rights are typi- cally associated with the writings of Aristotle. The contemporary idea of human rights most clearly emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the so-called ‘doc- trine of natural law’, which argued that individuals possess rights independently of society or polity. The seventeenth-century philosopher, John Locke, argued that natural rights flowed from natural law, which originated from God. However, the eighteenth-century German phi- losopher, Immanuel Kant, argued that an appeal to the authority of some super-human entity  Differences and samenesses 9 was not necessary in justifying human beings’ claims to certain, fundamental rights. Instead, he argued for the ideal of a potentially universal community of rational individuals autono- mously determining the moral principles for securing rights. For him, the basis of moral rea- soning must rest upon a condition to which all rational individuals are bound to assent. A related position on human rights argues that each individual owes a basic and general duty to respect the rights of every other individual because, by doing so, one’s individual self-interest is furthered. From this perspective, individuals accept and comply with human rights because this is the best means for protecting one’s interests against actions and omissions that might endanger themselves. When considering human rights, it is useful to distinguish between ‘positive claims rights’ and ‘negative claims rights’.16 The former enjoins us to treat individuals in a positive manner by, for example, providing medical treatment in the case of illness or injury and providing appropriate education, irrespective of an individual’s degree of disability. Negative claims rights evoke the second part of the Hippocratic Oath, namely that ‘I will use treatments for the benefit of the ill in accordance with my ability and my judgment, but from what is to their harm and injustice I will keep them.’ In other words, the guiding principle is that we should do no harm to people who are different. Another distinction can be made between ‘absolute rights’ and ‘conditional rights’. Else- where, I discussed this distinction with respect to providing medical treatment for seriously ill persons with disabilities.17 I noted that although one of the fundamental moral and legal principles held by western societies is that human life has a value that exceeds all other con- siderations (i.e., an absolute right), there are exceptions, for example, killing in self defence and sacrificing one’s life to save the lives of others (i.e., a conditional right). The sanctity of life position has been justified from several perspectives. A theistic view argues that since all humans are created in God’s image, or that since all humans are God’s property, or that since life is the gift of God, it would be contrary to divine will to take our own or someone’s life. As I noted above, this would be the position of John Locke. In contrast, a Kantian view would have us believe that, from a natural law perspective, comes the obligation that, quite apart from any religious consideration, the duty to respect life rises from human beings’ natural ends as entities. This view was argued by Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth-century Italian philosopher and theologian and, more recently, by the twentieth-century French philosopher, Jacques Maritain, who held that, according to natural law, when a thing is looked at in terms of ‘the normality of its functioning’, it ‘should achieve fullness of being either in its growth or in its behaviour’.18 While I will not be considering issues to do with capital punishment and warfare in this book, the distinction between absolute and conditional rights is worth bearing in mind when we come to consider the individuals whose behaviours may jeopardize the welfare and rights of others. In considering the rights of children, a question arises as to what extent should parents/ caregivers have a right to determine what kind of education their child should receive? Is this an absolute right or a conditional right? Are parents the sole arbiter in determining what is in their children’s interests or does the state, too, have an interest in the develop- ment of its citizenry? How can these interests be reconciled when they come into con- flict? These questions come into prominence when it comes to school choice: single-sex vs coeducational schools (see Chapter 2), the local school vs any other school, public (state) 10 Differences and samenesses schools vs private vs charter schools vs home schooling (see Chapter 3), schools catering for particular cultural/ethnic groups vs multicultural schools (see Chapter 4), faith-based schools vs secular schools (see Chapter 5) and inclusive education vs segregated educa- tion for children with special needs (see ­Chapter 6). 1.8 Goal B: To develop inclusivist societies and global community With the impetus of the UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, inclusive edu- cation is an idea whose time has arrived around the world. In almost every country, inclusive education has emerged as one of the most dominant issues in the education of students with dis- abilities/special educational needs. In the past 40-50 years this field has moved from a segrega- tion paradigm through integration to a point where inclusion is central to contemporary discourse. In this book, however, I wish to extend the scope of inclusive education from its focus on special educational needs arising from disabilities to encompass all learners. In particular, I will be giving consideration to other potential sources of disadvantage and marginalization, such as gender (in some countries), poverty, language, ethnicity and religious minority status. The complex inter-relationships that exist among these factors will also be a focus of attention. I first broached this broadened interpretation of inclusive education in Contextualizing Inclusive Education, a book I edited in 2005, when I stated: Inclusive education extends beyond special needs arising from disabilities, and includes consideration of other sources of disadvantage and marginalization, such as gender, poverty, language, ethnicity, and geographic isolation. The complex inter-relationships that exist among these factors and their interactions with disability must also be the focus of attention.19 This broadened conceptualization of inclusive education was articulated in the meeting at the 48th session of the UNESCO International Conference on Education, held in Geneva in Novem- ber 2008, where it was acknowledged that ‘inclusive education is an ongoing process aimed at offering quality education for all while respecting diversity and the different needs and abili- ties, characteristics and learning expectations of the students and communities, eliminating all forms of discrimination’.20 A broadened definition has also been advocated in the United States by Susan Baglieri and her colleagues21 and by Shelley Zion and Wanda Blanchett.22 By taking this track, it is necessary to examine such questions as the following: Is there any justification for single-sex schools? Can faith-based schools be justified? Should schools for particular cultural groups/races be tolerated? What should be done about schools that are de facto special schools catering for low socio-economic students? More widely, we must give consideration to how societies and the global community can be made more inclusive. So, why is inclusiveness important? Advocacy for inclusive education revolves around four main arguments. First, some writers claim that any exclusion or segregation of students with special needs is a violation of their human rights and represents an unfair distribution of educational resources.23 Second, others see inclusive education as contributing significantly to a democratic society.24 The third argument revolves around the Intergroup Contact Theory, advanced by US psychologist, Gordon Allport, who suggested that contact between mem- bers of different groups can work to reduce prejudice and intergroup conflict.25 He claimed  Differences and samenesses 11 that prejudice is a direct result of generalizations and oversimplifications made about an entire group of people based on incomplete or mistaken information. Such prejudice may be reduced if there is greater contact, enabling one to learn more about a category of people different from oneself. Ideally, such contact situations should be characterized by four key conditions: equal status, intergroup cooperation, common goals, and support by social and institutional authorities. The fourth argument has to do with the important role played by social interconnectivity, which is seen by many writers as being one of human beings’ basic human needs – an orientation that likely can be traced to its survival benefit.26 In 2008, the Council of Europe put forward a persuasive approach to managing Europe’s increasing cultural diversity that builds on the concept of inclusion.27 A White Paper asked, ‘how shall we respond to diversity and what is our vision of the society of the future?’ It sug- gested two alternatives, favouring the one focusing on inclusion: Is it a society of segregated communities, marked at best by the coexistence of majori- ties and minorities with differentiated rights and responsibilities, loosely bound together by mutual ignorance and stereotypes? Or is it a vibrant and open society without dis- crimination, benefiting us all, marked by the inclusion of all residents in full respect of their human rights?28 In keeping with its inclusivist approach, the White Paper further argued that Europe’s com- mon future depends on its ability to safeguard and develop human rights, democracy and the rule of law and to promote mutual understanding. To achieve these goals, it reasoned that an ‘intercultural approach’, as distinct from a ‘multicultural approach’, offered the best model for managing ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural diversity.29 I will elaborate on this model in Chapters 4 and 5, but at this point it is worth mentioning what is involved in intercultural dia- logue. Briefly, it is understood as ‘an open and respectful exchange of views between individu- als, groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and respect’.30 What do we mean by inclusive education? Quite simply, I define inclusive education as ‘education that fits’, i.e., education that fits the abilities, interests, values and experiences of learners – and their needs to relate to their peers in all their diversity. As I have written elsewhere,31 it is no longer appropriate for policy-makers and researchers to define inclusive education solely, or even mainly, in terms of placement – although that, too, is important. Rather, I see it as being a multi-faceted concept that requires educators at all levels of a system to attend to vision, placement, curriculum, assessment, teaching, acceptance, access, support, resources and leadership. 1.9 Perspective 1: Theories of distributive justice should underpin our approach to diversity In understanding the basis of human rights, we must also consider arguments about which economic framework and which resulting distribution of wealth is morally preferable. Decid- ing on the principles of ‘distributive justice’ that should apply is extremely significant for determining how societies respond to differences among its citizens, particularly how they behave towards those who are disadvantaged – and especially towards children. 12 Differences and samenesses Various notions of distributive justice have been advanced. This issue is a complex one to explore, involving the intersection of philosophy and economics. Nevertheless, it is one that underpins our approach to the education of people who are different and must be addressed. The following is but a brief summary of what I consider to be the five main approaches to distributive justice.32 Strict egalitarianism This is perhaps the simplest idea of distributive justice. It calls for the allocation of equal material goods to all members of society, on the grounds that people are morally equal. As noted by Harvard philosopher Michael Sandel,33 Kurt Vonnegut portrayed an extreme inter- pretation of this principle in his short story, ‘Harrison Bergeron’. In the year 2081, goes the story, ‘everybody was finally equal … Nobody was smarter than anybody else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else. Nobody was stronger and quicker than anybody else.’ To enforce this equality, a ‘United States Handicapper General’ had wide powers to penalize individuals who did not conform to reduce them to the desired norm. Two matters need to be resolved in egalitarianism: how to index any distribution and the time frame for any distribution. Using money is the most common way of indexing distribu- tive principles. The timeframe problem cannot be solved as simply. One version requires that all people should have the same wealth at some initial point, after which they would be free to use it in whatever way they choose, with the consequence that future outcomes are bound to be unequal. The most common form of strict equality principle specifies that income should be equal in successive timeframes, though even this may lead to significant disparities in wealth if variations in savings are permitted. It is not surprising, perhaps, that the strict egalitarian principle of distributive justice has been criticized as being untenable and that it conflicts, for example, with what people might deserve and their freedom rights (see below). Partly as an attempt to avoid some of the pitfalls of strict egalitarianism, some economists design distributive principles that are sensitive to considerations of responsibil- ity and luck in economic life; unsurprisingly, this approach is known as luck egalitarianism. Although it is superficially attractive, I am not advancing strict egalitarianism as the moral basis for educating children from diverse backgrounds. I do recognize, however, that the cur- rent trend in many countries to move away from the principles of egalitarianism carries risks for people from disadvantaged backgrounds. Libertarianism This approach centres on the moral demands of liberty or self-ownership. Advocates of such libertarian principles argue for unrestricted markets and limited government regulation or interference, not in pursuit of economic efficiency, but in the name of human freedom. We have a right to do whatever we want with what we own (including our own bodies, our own self), provided we respect the rights of others to do the same. Just distribution of wealth arises in the free exchange of goods and services in an unfettered market. Persons should not be required to ensure the welfare of others for this would violate their right of self-ownership. Libertarians such as Robert Nozick,34 thus believe in a minimal state, which is restricted to  Differences and samenesses 13 enforcing contracts, protecting private property and keeping the peace. Consequently, they reject any interference by the state to achieve any egalitarian redistribution of wealth, as out- lined above. This view was promulgated, for example, by Milton Friedman, the American econo- mist.35 However, Nozick does concede that if it can be shown that one’s advantages have been derived from past injustices (e.g., through the enslavement of others or the illegal confiscation of property), then some redistribution of one’s wealth is acceptable. As well, libertarians reject paternalism (e.g., requiring people in vehicles to wear seatbelts or cyclists to wear helmets) and morals legislation (e.g., laws controlling prostitution). Libertarianism, I believe, is part of the problem, not the solution, in addressing the needs of disadvantaged children. Neoliberalism, with its emphasis upon individualism, managerial- ism and competition within education, is not a strong philosophical basis for achieving equity for such children. Utilitarianism Classical utilitarianism’s two most influential contributors are Jeremy Bentham, an eight- eenth- to nineteenth-century British philosopher and social reformer, and, later, John Stuart Mill, another nineteenth-century British philosopher. The doctrine they promulgated was that actions are right if they are useful or for the benefit of a majority. In other words, actions are to be judged according to their consequences.36 Only those actions that maximize utility (i.e., produce pleasure or happiness and prevent pain or suffering) are deemed to be morally right. Further, the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people should guide our con- duct. This principle has led to utilitarianism being described as a welfare-based credo since distributive justice rests on determining what will maximize the welfare, or the collective hap- piness, of society as a whole. To quote Bentham, ‘it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong’.37 In subsequent revisions of Bentham’s theory by John Stuart Mill, he mounted the clas- sic defence of individual freedom, arguing that people should be free to do whatever they wanted, provided they did no harm to others. As he wrote, ‘Independence is, of right, abso- lute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.’38 Mill couched this notion in utilitarian terms, arguing that, over time, respecting individual liberty will lead to the greatest human happiness overall. For example, a dissenting view may turn out to be true and so offer some correction to the prevailing view. At first glance, utilitarianism, applied to disadvantaged children is inappropriate simply because these children constitute a minority and are not part of the ‘greatest number of peo- ple’. However, I do concede that it could be argued that by allocating extra resources to such children and reducing the gaps I will be describing later in this chapter, the collective hap- piness of society as a whole could result. If equalization policies succeed, we could well see improved educational, social and health outcomes – to the benefit of all members of society. Kant’s view of rationally determined moral principles Immanuel Kant, an eighteenth-century German philosopher, argued for the ideal of a potentially universal community of rational individuals autonomously determining the moral principles for 14 Differences and samenesses securing rights. Michael Sandel describes Kant as providing ‘one of the most powerful and influ- ential accounts [of duties and rights] any philosopher has produced’39 and that Kant’s emphasis on human dignity ‘informs present-day notions of universal human rights’.40 Kant saw people as having three essential qualities. First, we are rational beings, capable of reason. Second, we are each of us worthy of dignity and respect. Third, we are autonomous beings, capable of acting freely. Together, these features set us apart from a mere animal existence. For Kant, the basis of moral reasoning must rest upon a condition to which all rational individuals are bound to assent. He believed that we can arrive at such principles of morality through ‘pure practical reason’ and through acting autonomously. This means acting accord- ing to laws we give ourselves, not according to the dictates of nature or social convention. When we act in this way, we do something for its own sake, as an end in itself, or, in the case of others, treating persons as ends in themselves. As Michael Sandel expresses it: ‘What mat- ters is doing the right thing because it is right, not for some ulterior motive.’41 This is Kant’s ‘motive of duty’. While it may also bring one pleasure, this should not be the prime motive for an action toward others. As Kant expressed it, ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.’42 Moral law, he asserted, can rest neither on the inter- ests and desires of individuals, nor on the interests or desires of a community. It can readily be seen how this principle underpins the modern-day concept of universal human rights and of our obligations towards those who are disadvantaged. Kant also referred to a ‘universal law’ which, briefly, refers to the principle that one should ‘Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a uni- versal law.’43 In a nutshell: what if everyone did or did not do something? This is a good test of whether one’s actions put one’s own interests ahead of everyone else’s. Rawls’s difference principle I turn now to a theory of distributive justice that is most pertinent to defining our obligations towards those who are disadvantaged. American philosopher, John Rawls,44 suggested that we should determine principles of justice by choosing behind ‘a veil of ignorance’, in which we imagine we don’t know anything about who we are – whether we are rich or poor, what our gender or ethnicity is and so on. He asserted that if no one knew any of those things, we would make choices from an original position of equality and the principles we would agree to would be just. Rawls claimed that this process would lead to two essential principles of justice. The first is that each person has equal basic rights and liberties, such as freedom of speech and reli- gion. The second he referred to as the difference principle, in which he argued that divergence from strict equality is permitted so long as the inequalities in question would make the least advantaged in society materially better off than they would be under strict equality. If these two rules conflict in practice, however, Rawls argued that basic liberties should not be sacrificed in order to generate greater equality of opportunity or a higher level of material goods, even for the worst off. Rawls was not opposed in principle to a system of strict equality per se, but nor was he arguing that he was seeking it; rather his concern was about the absolute position of the least  Differences and samenesses 15 advantaged group rather than their relative position. Further, Rawls believed that it was pos- sible to correct for the unequal distribution of talents without handicapping the talented, as in the case of Kurt Vonnegut’s ‘Harrison Bergeron’. How to do this is rather controversial and, some would say, unrealistic. For example, he argued that gifts and talents should be allowed, even encouraged, to flourish, but the rewards accruing to those who possess them should belong to the community as a whole, with some redistribution to the least advantaged. As he stated: ‘Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out.’45 Libertarians, of course, object to the difference principle on the grounds that it involves unacceptable infringements on liberty, property rights or self-ownership. It is also criticized on the grounds that it ignores claims that people deserve certain economic benefits because of their hard work or contributions. Utilitarians object to it because it is does not maximize utility. And, finally, advocates of luck egalitarianism argue that the principle does not fully capture the moral roles they believe luck and responsibility should play in principles of dis- tributive justice. Overall, in his review of theories of justice, Michael Sandel concluded that even when all criticisms have been taken into account, Rawls’s theory ‘represents the most compelling case for a more equal society that American political philosophy has yet produced’.46 I see no reason to disagree with this summation. It forms a substantial basis for determining our obligations towards children who are disadvantaged by their SES or cultural backgrounds, level of ability, and, in some circumstances, by their gender or religion. 1.10 Perspective 2: Diversities must be seen from an ecological perspective All living creatures live in environments, or ecosystems, of varying degrees of complexity. The diversities outlined in this book will be considered from a behavioural ecology perspective by focusing on how the child is influenced by complex interactions among societal, community, fam- ily, school and classroom factors. This means giving consideration to how human behaviour varies with, and adapts to, ecological contexts.47 It also involves understanding what Mel Ainscow and his Manchester University colleagues refer to as the ‘ecology of equity’. By this they mean that: the extent to which students’ experiences and outcomes are equitable is not depend- ent only on the educational practices of their teachers, or even their schools. Instead, it depends on a whole range of interacting processes that reach into the school from outside. These include the demographics of the area served by the schools, the histories and cultures of the populations who send (or fail to send) their children to the school, and the economic realities faced by those populations. Beyond this, they involve the underlying socio-economic processes that make some areas poor and others affluent, and that draw different migrant groups into some places rather than others.48 Elsewhere, I have presented a comprehensive, ecological, ‘wraparound’ model for portraying the relationships among the various elements that impinge on children.49 I portrayed this model in the form of a spiral system embracing both macro and micro components (Figure 1.1). In part, it is based on Urie Bronfenbrenner’s ‘ecological systems theory’.50 Here are the main principles underlying the model: 16 Differences and samenesses Figure 1.1 A comprehensive ecological model Individual children are at the heart of the system. Children are embedded in families, which, in turn, interact with a series of other ­systems – classrooms, schools, communities and the broader society. Family factors include interaction patterns, language, cultural capital and perceptions of the value of education. Classroom factors include the curriculum, assessment, pedagogy, peer group influences and classroom climate. School factors include policies, leadership, school culture and the deployment of human and capital resources. Community factors include demographic features, economic resources and cultural values. Societal factors include educational policies, resourcing and accountability mechanisms. Such systems should be ‘joined up’, which involves both horizontal and vertical ­integration. Horizontal integration requires linking systems at the same level to ­ensure consistency and compatibility of approach (e.g., among teachers in a school). Vertical integration re- quires linking more immediate, or proximal, systems with the more distal systems in which they are embedded (e.g., schools, communities and the wider society). Influences between systems are bi-directional. Just as families influence children, so too do children influence their families and just as schools influence families, so too do families influence schools and so on. In particular, I believe that children themselves sig- nificantly contribute to their own learning processes. They learn from their experiences, select what they attend to, and work out their own ‘rules of the game’. Increasingly, with the ubiquitous Internet, children are independently choosing what, how and from whom to learn. They are active participants in their own development and are not mere clay being shaped by forces around them.  Differences and samenesses 17 Complexity theory draws attention to wholes rather than parts, multi-dimensional rela- tionships and dynamic interactions among components of a system, rather than linear models of cause and effect. With complex systems such as we are dealing with in this book, wholes are much more than the sums of their parts. Further, they change and de- velop through feedback loops that exist among their components.51 1.11 Perspective 3: Perceptions of diversity vary across time and space Although I am writing this book in 2015–2016 from my New Zealand base, I am acutely aware that differences are perceived differently in different countries and at different times in his- tory. Contexts of time and space matter for how various domains of difference are socially constructed and the nature of the competing social forces that may operate in such struggles. 1.12 Perspective 4: Finding the right balance between sameness and diversity is a challenge Striking a balance between recognizing the rights of diverse peoples and the need to estab- lish social cohesion constitutes a major challenge to societies around the globe. Inevitably, this challenge falls to a significant extent upon educators. When does tolerating or encour- aging diversity threaten the fabric of a cohesive society? Conversely, does the aspiration for social cohesion have the intended or unintended consequence of marginalizing those who are different? To what extent should educators seek to achieve homogeneity of values, achievement and behaviour among students? To what extent should they attempt to assimi- late those who are perceived to differ from the mainstream of society? What differences should they celebrate and enhance? Which ones should they seek to reduce, even eliminate? I hope this book goes some way towards answering these questions. Clearly, all differences are not of equal value. Some, such as exceptional intelligence and physical prowess, would receive widespread approval and are deemed worthy of encourage- ment. Others, such as deviant personality traits resulting in criminal behaviour, are generally seen as repugnant and should be eliminated or reduced. However, even these two categories are not universally defined and different societies have different perceptions of giftedness and criminality, both contemporaneously and in the past. Indeed, each of the categories of difference I explore in this book probably elicits different reactions in different societies and at different times in their history. The challenge to educators is to interpret the value their society places on various categories of difference. This challenge becomes a dilemma when a particular society might be oppressive, as in Nazi Germany, for example: how should teachers there have handled critical thinking in their students in the 1930s? At the broad political level, these questions are framed by the ongoing tensions that exist between what political geographer, Richard Hartshorne, described as centrifugal and centripetal forces.52 He argued that the integration of a state’s territory involves the equilibrium achieved at any one time between centrifugal forces that push populations apart, and centripetal forces that pull populations together. If centrifugal forces are stronger than centripetal forces, there may be fragmentation, instability, internal discord and challenges to the state’s authority – to the extent that its very existence may be threatened. These two forces are portrayed in Figure 1.2. 18 Differences and samenesses Centripetal force Centrifugal force (toward the centre) (away from centre) Figure 1.2 Centrifugal and centripetal forces Examples of the centrifugal forces include wide differences in religious belief, culture, language and economic activity. These forces can limit interactions, produce regionalism and create dissimilarity among groups of citizens within a state. Instances here include (a) religious tensions (e.g., between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, between Buddhists and Hindus in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, and between Sunnis and Shiites in many Middle East countries); (b) ethnic tensions (e.g., between various groups in the Balkans around the time of World War I and, more recently, when Yugoslavia broke into seven sepa- rate countries); (c) class differences (e.g., in the events leading up to the French revolution and the Russian working class overthrowing the monarchy); and (d) language differences (e.g., Francophones in Quebec wanting independence from the rest of predominantly English- speaking Canada, and Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine wanting to secede from the rest of the country). Centripetal forces are those that tend to unify people and create solidarity, thus enhanc- ing support for the state. These include (a) similarities in religion (e.g., Hinduism in Nepal and India, Islam in Bangladesh, Buddhism in Thailand, Roman Catholicism in Mexico and the Republic of Ireland), (b) a common language (e.g., Indonesia created a national language, Bahasa Indonesia; Israel made Hebrew its official language; and nineteenth- and twentieth- century immigrants to the United States were expected to learn American English); (c) nationalism, i.e. the acceptance of national goals based on allegiance to a single country and the ideals and ways of life it represents, sometimes accompanied by a common enemy (e.g., Israel); and (d) unifying institutions (e.g., schools – the focus of this book). How to reconcile the tension between sameness and diversity is an ongoing challenge to educational policy-makers and practitioners around the globe. Educational philosopher, Nich- olas Burbules, whom I have already cited, has eloquently addressed this issue in a thoughtful essay.53 He suggested that his own country, the United States, seemed to be fundamentally torn between, on the one hand, a desire to use education to make peo- ple more alike (whether this is in regards to a ‘melting pot’ of citizenship values and beliefs; the essential texts of ‘cultural literacy’; the factual knowledge and skills that can be measured by standardized tests; or the establishment of uniform national standards across the curriculum) – and, on the other hand, a desire to serve the different learning  Differences and samenesses 19 styles and needs, the different cultural orientations, and the different aspirations toward work and living represented by the diverse population of students in public schools. Burbules went on to argue that, until relatively recently, the dominant discourse of educa- tional policy in the United States has emphasized the common: what every educated person should learn, should know, and should be able to do. He felt that the kind of community that has typically been promoted is one either based on explicit homogeneity, or on a tolerant pluralism across a range of differences, under which it is assumed that people are all basi- cally the same. In recent years, however, Burbules observed the development of powerful reactions against these traditional emphases. He stated that ‘From feminist, multicultural, postcolonial, and generally postmodern theoretical positions, the postulates of a universal human nature, of canonical texts, of generalizable norms, of a common knowledge base, of shared traditions, of a common standard of citizenship, have all been challenged.’ He pointed to the potential for harm when differences are defined from within the perspective of a given framework of understanding, without due regard to the very different meaning of those dif- ferences from within the perspective of those being talked about. Further, when these judg- ments are wrapped up with a high-stakes endeavour such as education, the choice presented to those who are different is to abandon or suppress their differences for the sake of con- formity and ‘fitting in’; or to accept the characterization of one’s own differences from the dominant perspective, becoming alienated from one’s self; or to reject the standards and norms others have set, and so lose out on the opportunity education represents. Finally, Burbules pointed out that tolerance of difference, or celebrations of difference, are not the ultimate educational outcomes we should be after; rather, what matters is ‘the critical re-­ examination of difference, the questioning of our own systems of difference, and what they mean for ourselves and for other people’. Importantly, he asserts that ‘education should not simply be about transmitting an existing system of belief and value, unchanged, from one generation to the next; there must be some room for questioning, re-interpreting, and modifying that system in light of a broadened understanding of where it fits in the context of a diverse, rapidly changing world’. 1.13 Perspective 5: Interest convergence helps to explain shifts in behaviour and policies In 1980, Derek Bell, late of New York University Law School, put forward the principle of ‘inter- est convergence’. He explained it with reference to the US situation regarding racial equality, claiming that ‘the interest of Blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of Whites’.54 An example of the application of this princi- ple is the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education which struck down the earlier ruling of ‘separate but equal’ school segregation. Bell argued that this occurred because it served the United States’ cold war agenda of supporting human rights. Another more recent example can be found in German Chancellor, Angela Merkel’s decision to accept up to 800,000 asy- lum seekers in 2015. In part at least, this was driven by economic considerations in a country experiencing labour shortages and low fertility levels. Thus, the interests of refugees and German society converged. In the remaining chapters, I will present other examples of this 20 Differences and samenesses ‘enormously influential’55 interest convergence principle and how it can be used to increase equality for various categories of diversity. Questions that arise when applying this principle include the following: (1) Whose interests are served by perpetuating inequalities? (2) What are those interests? (3) Where are there opportunities to seek convergence? (4) What do we need to do to get to convergence?56 Before leaving the interest convergence perspective, some criticisms that have been lev- elled at it by Justin Driver should be noted. First, he argued that the theory’s overly broad conceptualization of ‘black interests’ and ‘white interests’ obscures the intensely contested disputes regarding what those terms actually mean. Second, the interest-convergence the- ory incorrectly suggests that the racial status of blacks and whites over the course of US his- tory is notable more for continuity than for change. Third, the interest-convergence theory accords insufficient agency to two groups of actors – black citizens and white judges – who have played, and continue to play, significant roles in shaping racial realities.57 Three other caveats regarding interest convergence should be considered. The first one is that policies and practices arising from interest convergence can be reversed. This occurred, for example, when women’s services in the workforce were needed during World War II, but were no longer required when men returned from the war. The second caveat is that while interest convergence might be perceived at the macro political level, it might not be so accepted at the grassroots of a society. At the time of writing, for example, we are seeing resistance to Angela Merkel’s open door approach to asylum seekers. Third, since interest convergence depends largely on those with power relinquishing some or much of it, this will have repercussions not only at the personal level but also at the institutional level as schools and education systems adjust to new realities. Nevertheless, as Driver concluded, the theory ‘contains at least some persuasive force’.58 As he said, The interest-convergence theory can offer valuable and formidable insights into the way that change occurs; it should not, however, be viewed as either flawless or ­all-encompassing. Instead of adhering to any unified theory, reformers seeking change would do better to think of the interest-convergence thesis as but one weapon in the fight for progress rather than as the entire arsenal.59 1.14 Perspective 6: Diversities intersect with each other While I will be dealing with five major diversities in this book, it is essential to note that each one interacts with several others. This means that individuals’ identities are composed of vari- ous combinations and permutations of these major categories, a situation which becomes even more complex when we throw other diversities such as age, family background, location and so on into the mix. For example, there is clear evidence of intersections between ethnic- ity, gender and class in influencing achievement (see Chapter 3). Similarly, abilities/disabilities interact with gender, class and ethnicity (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6) and so it goes on …This ‘inter- sectional approach’ arose from feminist scholarship, which recognized that since there were important differences among women and men rather than simply between them, gender, race and class were interconnected as ‘intersecting oppressions’.60  Differences and samenesses 21 In a similar vein, Amartya Sen, the Nobel prize-winning economist, pointed out that while religion is important to a person’s identity, it is never more than one aspect of it. There are serious problems created by the assumption that religion is, for everyone, the single most important aspect that overrides all others. I would take this a step further and argue that, just like religion, gender, ability (and disability), culture and social class should not become sole markers of a person’s identity. As Sen insisted, we are diversely different. The hope of harmony in the contemporary world lies to a great extent in a clearer understanding of the pluralities of human identity, and in the appreciation that they cut across each other and work against a sharp separation along one single hardened line of impenetrable division.61 1.15 Perspective 7: There are multiple causes of diversities In all of the chapters in this book, I will be drawing attention to low achievement and social problems experienced by various groups of children. To what or whom should we attribute these occurrences? The child? The parents/caregivers? The school? Society? Globalization? Often, the debate hinges on efforts to determine the relative influence of schools vs societal structural features such as socio-economic constraints. My compatriot, Martin Thrupp, has presented a good analysis of this debate, pointing out that those who ‘blame’ the latter are often accused of engaging in ‘deficit thinking’ and would, instead, want to put the responsi- bility for student achievement and behaviour on schools and teachers.62 He claims that ‘the problem with this kind of blanket, anti-­deficit thinking stance is that, naively or knowingly, it contributes to teachers and schools becoming scapegoats for the effects on student achieve- ment of an unequal society’.63 The position I take in this book is that it is unprofitable to look for causation solely among societal or school factors. Rather, I believe that there are multiple causes of differences among human beings. These include, singly and in combination, such factors as: evolution, globalization, poverty, geographic location, genetics, neuroscience, environmental degra- dation, cultural values, conflict, disasters, socialization, politics, neo-liberalism, technology, resources, parenting, diet, xenophobia and education. 1.16 Perspective 8: Human beings are genetically similar across major identity markers, but genetically divergent individually What genetic variation does the human population actually possess? Across groups of people, it is surprisingly small, according to Richard Dawkins.64 For example, only 6–15% of genetic variation can be accounted for by race. Thus, if the total variation in the human species is par- titioned into between-race and within-race components, the former is a very small fraction of the total. Further, notes Dawkins, ‘People are individually different, far more different from other members of their group than their groups are from each other.’65 Somewhat provoca- tively, he also notes that ‘If you take blood and compare protein molecules, or if you sequence genes themselves, you will find there is less difference between two human beings living anywhere in the world than there is between two African chimpanzees.’66 This within-human species similarity Dawkins explains by our ancestors passing through a genetic bottleneck 22 Differences and samenesses some 70,000 years ago, when the population of the world was perhaps only 15,000 people, caused by a volcanic winter and a thousand-year ice age. Even though the relatively recent worldwide diaspora out of Africa has taken us to an extraordinarily wide variety of habitats, climates and ways of life, where ‘different conditions have exerted strong selection pres- sures, particularly on externally visible parts, such as the skin, which has to bear the brunt of the sun and the cold’, most of our genomes have remained intact and uniform.67 However, culture seems to over-ride genomes. As Dawkins pointed out, because our mating decisions are so heavily influenced by cultural traditions, and because our cultures, and sometimes our religions, encourage us to discriminate against outsiders, especially in choosing mates, these superficial differences that helped our ancestors to prefer insiders over outsiders have been enhanced out of all proportion to the real genetic differences between us.68 Even though we may differ in trivial, superficial features, these may be conspicuous enough to serve as discrimination fodder, not just in mate choice but also in choice of enemies and leading to individuals becoming victims of xenophobic or religious prejudice. But there are somewhat contrary views of the contribution of genetics to human behav- iour, including educational attainment. For example, estimates suggest that around 40% of the variance in educational attainment is explained by genetic factors.69 Furthermore, edu- cational attainment is moderately correlated with other heritable characteristics including cognitive functioning.70 Recent developments in this field reflect the rapid and far-reaching advances in the Human Genome Project, which have yielded tools to investigate human DNA and its relationships to various human traits and diseases. For example, a US study by Cornelius Rietveld and his col- leagues analyzed data from more than 100,000 individuals. It identified several genome-wide factors that were associated with educational attainment even when other factors were con- trolled for.71 More specifically, the researchers reported on a genome-wide ‘polygenic score’ that predicted how far individuals were likely to progress in their educational careers.72 A second US study, carried out by Benjamin Domingue and his colleagues, took Rietveld et al.’s study further by investigating polygenic influences on length of schooling among pairs of siblings.73 By focusing on siblings, the researchers were able to control for circumstances into which children are born (e.g., socio-economic status). In brief, these researchers showed that individuals with higher polygenic scores went on to complete more years of schooling than their lower-scored siblings. However, these effects were quite small, comprising 0.41 years of additional schooling for every standard deviation in polygenic scores. This compared with an additional 1.7 years of schooling if their mother graduated from college. Although the research holds out promise for improving our understanding of the genetic influences on educational attainment, it is important to recognize that, as I have just noted, polygenic scores have only a small level of predictive power apropos educational attain- ment. Certainly, they do not have the precision of, say, predicting human height, where poly- genic scores have predicted nearly 30% of population variance.74 However, future studies with larger samples and developments in the specification of polygenic factors may well see improvements in their predictive power. For example, Rietveld et al. estimated that 15% of  Differences and samenesses 23 the variance in educational attainment might eventually be predicted from polygenic scores derived from one million respondents.75 As Daniel Belsky and Salomon Israel said, ‘now is the time for social scientists to bring genetics into their research programs’.76 They pointed out that ‘the sequencing of the human genome and the advent of low-cost genome-wide assays that generate millions of observa- tions of individual genomes in a matter of hours constitute a disruptive innovation for social science’. As an example of research already carried out, Belsky and Israel noted findings that children at high-genetic risk for obesity were born at similar weights to their low-genetic risk peers but subsequently grew more rapidly. In turn, this rapid growth mediated genetic influ- ence on obesity during adolescence through midlife. Building on this finding, other research- ers then showed that increased appetite beginning early in childhood was one path through which genetic influences contributed to accelerated weight gain, suggesting a potential inter- vention target.77 1.17 Perspective 9: Consideration should be given to an evolutionary perspective on diversity In 1859, Charles Darwin, arguably the father of evolutionary psychology, claimed that ‘Psy- chology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation.’78 Adaptation and natural selection, he suggested, would become the foundation for the field of psychology.79 In a nutshell, evolutionary psy- chology argues that much human behaviour is the result of psychological adaptations that evolved to solve recurrent problems in past environments. According to American psy- chologist, David Buss,80 it is based on a series of premises: (1) evolutionary processes have influenced not merely the body, but also the brain, the psychological mechanisms it houses, and the behaviour it produces; (2) many of those mechanisms are best conceptualized as psychological adaptations designed to solve problems that historically contributed to survival and reproduction; (3) psychological adaptations are activated in modern environ- ments that differ in some important ways from ancestral environments; and (4) critically, the notion that psychological mechanisms have adaptive functions is a necessary, not an optional, ingredient for a comprehensive psychological science. Further, as noted by another evolutionary psychologist, Stephen Pinker, ‘In the study of humans, there are major spheres of human experience – beauty, motherhood, kinship, morality, cooperation, sexuality, violence – in which evolutionary psychology provides the only coherent theory.’81 In a nut- shell, evolutionary psychology argues that much human behaviour is the result of psy- chological adaptations that evolved to solve recurrent problems in past environments. According to some writers, evolution by selection is the only known causal process capable of creating such complex adaptations.82 Human variation is, at least in part, accounted for by the fact that as a species, we have colonized nearly every land area on the surface of the earth, and that each of these diverse ecologies has and is shaping our psychological design. I will return to this evolutionary psychology explanation of behaviour in several of the subsequent chapters as I continue to explore human diversity and, ultimately, what it means to be human. 24 Differences and samenesses 1.18 Perspective 10: Many differences are quite small, even if they are statistically significant While many of the findings I will be presenting in this book refer to statistically significant differ- ences within the various categories, it is important that we bear in mind the practical significance of any such differences. Here, I must describe what happens when meta-­analyses are carried out. This relatively recent statistical procedure collates the results from multiple studies and measures the distance between means of two groups (for example, between males and females), to arrive at what is referred to as a d statistic. The convention is that d values from 0.11 to 0.35 are considered to be small, while 0.36 to 0.65 are moderate and 0.66 to 1.00 are large. When I refer to research on gender differences in Chapter 2, for example, most of them are small, often no more than 0.20. What does this mean? Quite simply, in the case of d = 0.20, for example, only 54% of one gender exceeds the 50th percentile of the other. In other words, the two genders show an 85.3% overlap.83 In this case, it is much more likely that there is more variability within the two genders than there is between them. So one has to be very cautious in basing educa- tional policies and practices on presumed gender differences of such low magnitude as reported in the literature and often exaggerated in the media. Certainly, we must not ascribe character- istics that might occur more often in a particular gender to all members of that gender (e.g., ‘all girls are poor at mathematics’, or ‘all girls are good at reading’). Stereotyping must be avoided. 1.19 Perspective 11: Economics play a major role in catering for diversities In his successful 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton coined the phrase ‘it’s the economy, stupid’. Without wishing to insult the intelligence of my readers, I would agree with Clinton that the economy plays a large role in almost everything we do – and vice versa. Thus, in most of the chapters in this book, I will be drawing attention to the economic benefits of achieving greater equality for disadvantaged groups and I will examine various funding models aimed at redressing various perceived disadvantages. And, of course, one whole chapter (Chapter 3) centres on socio-economic status. Particular attention needs to be paid to those coun- tries that rely heavily on local property taxes for financing their schools. This is the case in the United States, where, a recent Commission bemoaned ‘the broken system of education funding’, with funding levels ranging from a low of $6,454 per student in Utah to $18,167 per student in New York in 2010.84 1.20 Perspective 12: Education is multi-level and multi-faceted In this book I will be examining education through the various prisms of human diversity. This involves giving consideration to education at multiple levels: national and district systems, schools and classrooms. In doing so, I recognize that education is multi-­faceted, comprising such features as the following: Control: To what extent does state vs private control influence how education systems ac- commodate to differences? What effects does central vs devolved control of education influence accommodation to differences? Are there differences in the ways in which non- formal vs formal education systems take account of children’s differences?  Differences and samenesses 25 Goals: To what extent do the goals of education systems recognize differences? Are the goals sufficiently comprehensive to reflect what schools should be teaching, beyond empha- sizing student test scores? For example, do they incorporate such goals as ‘civic re- sponsibility, democratic values, cultural competency and awareness, economic self suf- ficiency and social and economic mobility’?85 Organization: To what extent are education systems organized to take account of differences such as age, ability, gender, religion and language? Collaboration with other social agencies and support services: To what extent does the edu- cation system cooperate with other social agencies such as health and social welfare to better accommodate to differences in children and their families? Funding: Is there differential funding to take account of children’s differences? Choice: Do parents have a choice in the type of school they enrol their children in, for exam- ple through zoning policies? (See next section.) Curricula and materials: Do curricula and associated materials give consideration to differences? Assessment, examinations: Do assessment and examinations give consideration to differences? Pedagogy: How can/should pedagogy give consideration to differences? Parent involvement: What policies and practices are in place for involving parents in their children’s education? Teachers: How can teachers be prepared through initial teacher education and professional development to meet the needs of different students? Technology: How can technology enhance the education of children who are different? I also recognize that education systems are complex entities that reflect a host of differ- ent influences, both historically and contemporaneously: economic, philosophical, cultural and political. As a consequence, one approach to education cannot possibly fit all contexts. Therefore, while I shall take the bold step of recommending various approaches to accom- modating to diverse students in this book, I should like to emphasize that they should be examined critically to determine their degree of fit within given situations. In the course of the book, I will be focusing on the period of compulsory schooling, i.e. pri- mary/elementary education and secondary/high school education, although I will be making some references to early childhood/pre-school education and to higher/tertiary education. 1.21 Perspective 13: There can be a mismatch between children’s and schools’ cultural and social capital Children who come from class, gender, cultural and religious backgrounds that differ from the prevailing norms and expectations of schools can be seriously disadvantaged. This dis- junction leads us to consideration of ‘cultural capital’, a concept had its origins with French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, the idea of ‘hegemony’, given prominence by the Italian philoso- pher, Antonio Gramsci, and ‘critical pedagogy’, as put forward by Paulo Freire, the Brazilian educator and philosopher. Space permits only brief summaries of their contributions. First, let’s turn to Pierre Bourdieu. In 1979, he argued that children learn from their par- ents a ‘habitus’, which is an unconscious orientation towards ways of life that are appropriate to their class: it comprises deeply ingrained habits, skills and dispositions.86 Such learning 26 Differences and samenesses comprises the accumulated cultural knowledge and skills that confer varying degrees of power and status in society. More broadly, cultural capital is made up of non-financial social elements such as education, intellect, style of speech, tastes in food and art, posture, cloth- ing, mannerisms, material belongings, credentials, dress and physical appearance. Collec- tively, these elements form a person’s identity and group position and serve to reproduce social stratification. By providing their children with differing types of cultural capital, par- ents transmit different attitudes and knowledge, which are not always that which is needed to succeed in educational systems. According to Bourdieu, those who inherit the cultural cap- ital of the education system, which is generally that of the middle class, begin their schooling with an advantage they are likely to maintain.87 In other words, the culture of the home and the school correspond, while for other children there may be a disjunction of cultures. Certain forms of cultural capital are valued over others, and can help or hinder one’s social mobility just as much as financial capital. It can be a major source of social inequal- ity. Teachers, too, have absorbed the cultural capital of their own backgrounds and may not understand or be sympathetic to those of their students who come to school with dif- ferent cultural capital. As with other groups who hold positions of power in society, such as employers, teachers epitomize what is culturally valued and may consciously or uncon- sciously act to ‘reaffirm and reproduce social class and privilege by valuing the preferences, behaviours, and attitudes of the dominant class over those of the non-dominant groups’.88 In other words, there is often a disconnect between the cultural capital valued by schools and the cultural capital valued by many in their communities. This leads me to give consideration to the distinction between ‘single loop’ and ‘double- loop learning’, put forward by US business theorists, Chris Azgyris and Donald Schon, in the 1970s.89 In their analysis of ‘learning organizations’, these two writers described single-loop learning as what occurs when individuals, groups, or organizations modify their actions according to the difference between expected and obtained outcomes. In double-loop learn- ing, these entities question the values, assumptions and policies that led to the actions in the first place and modify them accordingly. The link with cultural capital that I would like to draw here is that by engaging in double-loop learning, we come to question our own habitus and examine our (often unconscious) biases and prejudices. Schon expressed this process as one involving ‘reflective practice’, which he defined as ‘the capacity to reflect on action so as to engage in a process of continuous learning’.90 I believe that this is not always an easy or comfortable process, but is necessary if we are fully to understand our and others’ perception of differences. A related concept to ‘cultural capital’ is the concept of ‘social capital’, which has extended the notion of an individual asset to communities and even nations. For example, writing from a US perspective, Robert Putnam argued that ‘what many high achieving school districts have in abundance is social capital, which is educationally more important than financial capital’.91 Putnam defined social capital as different kinds of connectedness, such as informal links to relatives, friends and acquaintances, as well as participation in communal functions such as churches, sports and volunteer activities. These bonds, he wrote, ‘have powerful affects on health, happiness, educational success, public safety, and child welfare’.92 However, like financial capital and human capital, social capital is distributed unevenly, and differences in social connections contribute to the opportunity gaps.  Differences and samenesses 27 The concept of social capital has been given prominence in the writings of James Cole- man,93 Alejandro Portes,94 and, recently, Bill Mulford.95 The latter defined it in terms of the groups, networks, norms and trust that people have available to them. With reference to edu- cation systems, he identifies three types of social capital: (a) ‘bonding social capital’, which concerns relationships among personnel within a school; (b) ‘bridging social capital’, which occurs between schools through collaboration; and (c) ‘linking social capital’, which relates to relationships between a school and the wider community. My recommendations will take account of all three levels of social capital. In my discussion of cultural capital, above, I referenced it to social class, but, as we shall see in this book, the concept is equally valid when applied to gender, culture, religion and, to a certain extent, variations in physical, intellectual and personality attributes. In general, those occupying minority positions are at risk for being marginalized, sometimes deliber- ately, at other times quite unconsciously. Many of them may well come to school with cultural capital that differs from their teachers. The challenge to schools (and to education systems more broadly) is to determine how far they can and should go in accommodating the cultural capital of diverse groups, those with different worldviews from their own.96 This will involve engaging in double-loop learning. At stake here is the comfort, even the feelings of safety, that children will experience in the school environments that they are (usually) compelled to attend. In turn, this will impact on their self-esteem, identities, sense of empowerment and, ultimately, their behaviour and achievement. Second, mention must be made of Antonio Gramsci. In the 1930s, Gramsci used the term hegemony to denote the dominance of one social class over others. He argued that hegem- ony represents not only political and economic control, but also the ability of the dominant class to project its own ways of seeing the world so that those who are subordinated by them accept them as ‘common sense’ and ‘natural’.97 Gramsci saw hegemony as the permeation throughout society of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs and morality that has the effect of supporting the status quo in power relations.98 He described this as a form of ‘consensual control’, as distinct from ‘coercive control’ through domination. He further argued that ruling groups devise educational structures aimed at reproducing society. For lower-class students, he claimed, this meant gearing their education toward technical and vocational training, thus denying them access to general or universal education necessary to attain positions of power in society. To address such imbalances, Gramsci introduced the notion of a ‘counter-hegemonic’ struggle aimed at advancing alternatives to the dominant ideas of what is normal and legitimate. This takes place through consciousness-raising aimed at changing the minds and hearts of people.99 Since hegemony is never stable, it is possible to disrupt it and to put forward alternative ways of looking at the world. Third, we turn to the challenging work of Paulo Freire. In his highly influential 1972 book, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire examined the balance of power between the colonizer (the oppressor) and the colonized (the oppressed), arguing that it remains relatively sta- ble.100 To disrupt this homeostasis, Freire stated that freedom ‘must be pursued constantly and responsibly’ for it is ‘the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion’. Further, freedom will be the result of ‘praxis’ – informed action – when a balance between theory and practice is achieved.101 To bring this about, according to Freire, requires respect, or, as he put it: 28 Differences and samenesses One cannot expect positive results from an educational or political action program which fails to respect the particular view of the world held by the people. Such a program con- stitutes cultural invasion, good intentions notwithstanding. According people respect may not always be a comfortable process for oppressors, ‘whose tranquillity rests on how well people fit the world the oppressors have created, and how little they question it’. In pursuing a liberation objective, Freire was critical of the ‘banking’ approach to education in which students are seen as empty bank accounts into which teachers make deposits – a pro- cess that he sees as dehumanizing both students and teachers and which stimulates oppres- sive attitudes and practices in society. Instead, he argued for a more ‘authentic’ approach to education through a process of ‘conscientization’. He also proposed ‘dialogics’ as a means of freeing the colonized through the use of cooperation, respect, unity, building social capital and cultural synthesis, thus leading to social justice. This is in contrast to ‘antidialogics’, which use conquest, manipulation, cultural invasion and the concept of divide and rule. According to one commentator, Freire consistently argued that a thorough understanding of oppression must always take a detour through some form of class analysis. However, he resisted any approach that reduced all analysis to one monolithic entity. 1.22 Perspective 14: Reason and evidence should determine educational policies and practices As I have pointed out in my recent book, What really works in special and inclusive ­education,102 increasingly around the world, educators are being expected to draw upon research-based evidence in planning, implementing and evaluating their teaching. In Europe, for example, since 2010 there has been a project, Evidence-informed Policy and Practice in Education in Europe, with 34 partner organizations from 24 countries, together with four affiliates from outside Europe.103 This project aims to broker knowledge using common reference tools and approaches, as well as exchanging good practices, data and evidence from relevant European agencies and national-level resources. In the United States, the 2001 No Child Left Behind (NCLB) law required teachers to use ‘scientific, research-based programs’, defined as: ‘(1) grounded in theory; (2) evaluated by third parties; (3) published in peer-reviewed journals; (4) sustainable; (5) replicable in schools with diverse settings; and (6) able to demonstrate evidence of effectiveness’. In 2015, the Every Stu- dent Succeeds Act (ESSA) replaced the NCLB Act and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Like the NCLB Act, ESSA emphasized the role of evidence, defining four categories of evi- dence based on their relative strength. Further, the recent establishment of centres specializing in gathering and disseminating evidence-based education policies and practices provides fur- ther support for the growing commitment to evidence-based education in the United States.104 Given this book’s focus on diversity, I should like to address the critical question of whether different categories of learners require distinctive teaching strategies? As I pointed out elsewhere,105 the answer to this question is both ‘Yes’ and a qualified ‘No’. First, yes: some students – especially those with severe disabilities – do require some significantly differ- ent teaching strategies from those that educators in regular classes might usually employ.  Differences and samenesses 29 For example, some students with visual impairments are reliant on their tactile and auditory senses for learning and will require specialized techniques such as Braille and orientation and mobility training. Similarly, those with major language difficulties may require augmented and alternative communication. Second, no: for the most part, all students, irrespective of their category of diversity, simply require good teaching. For example, some writers argue that there is little evidence to support the notion of disability-specific teaching strategies, but rather that all learners benefit from a common set of strategies, even if they have to be adapted to take account of varying cognitive, emotional and social capabilities and cultural backgrounds.106 In subsequent chapters, I will argue that this not only applies to learners with special educational needs, but also to those from different socio-economic backgrounds, genders, cultures and religions. What is required is the systematic, explicit and intensive application of a wide range of effective teaching strategies.107 As well as empirical, research-based evidence, educationists should also be basing their policies and practices on reasoning derived from philosophical and theoretical analyses. For example, in all of the chapters I will discuss the application