Analysing International Relations PDF

Analysing International Relations 8 – The design of international organizations Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  Today Continuing to explore the dynamics of global governance – i.e., how global problems are managed. Focusing on inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) –...

Analysing International Relations 8 – The design of international organizations Prof. dr. Daniel Thomas  Today Continuing to explore the dynamics of global governance – i.e., how global problems are managed. Focusing on inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) – int’l organizations whose members are states. The basics: What’s an IGO and how does it compare to an int’l regime? Form: How do IGOs vary in terms of membership, function, formality, and decision-making procedures? Design: What factors shape the design (and  The basics Int’l rules Int’l organizations (last lecture) (today & coming lectures) Formal International law Formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs) International regimes Informal International norms Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) Inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) Organizations with states as members that govern a cross-border geographic area (regional or global) or issue area (trade, environment, etc.) or both. The conventional building blocks of regional or global governance and problem-solving.  3 faces of IGOs IGOs as forums – places where states meet and negotiate IGOs as instruments – tools that states use to achieve their interests IGOs as actors – independent bodies with their own interests, policy preferences, and ability to act  International regimes Sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and organizations that govern behaviour within a region or issue-area. Often involve a formal treaty and/or a formal IGO, but not necessarily. 2 examples: Antarctica regime (to govern activities in Antarctica) Antarctic Treaty + 200 other agreements Since 2014: Secretariat in Buenos Aires Ozone regime (to protect the atmospheric ozone layer) Montreal Protocol & Vienna Convention Multilateral Fund IGO’s relationship to international regimes 1. A single IGO may be active in multiple regimes. Ex. United Nations is active in: int’l human rights regime nuclear non-proliferation regime int’l refugee regime and many more… 2. A single regime may include multiple IGOs. Ex. Nuclear non-proliferation regime includes: Int’l Atomic Energy Agency (monitoring) London Suppliers Group (export controls) UN Security Council (sanctions)  Different forms of IGO IOs differ in various ways, including: Membership Function Formality Decision-making  Membership Limited – open to states with a given character (regional, cultural, etc.) European Union – limited by geography and political, economic, administrative criteria OPEC – limited to petroleum-exporting countries Universal – open to all states United Nations – open to all states (with UNSC approval)  Function to govern an issue-area WTO for trade, WHO for health… to govern a geographic space African Union, European Union… to promote a particular culture or set of values Org. Int’l de la Francophonie, Org. of Islamic Cooperation, Community of Democracies… mixed -- to govern an issue-area within a geographic space Asian Development Bank, Council of Europe…  Formality Formal Informal Organizing Written and Explicitly shared principle formally adopted expectations Membership Defined by legal Explicit but non- agreement legal Structure Regular meetings, Regular meetings, formal budget, rotating chair, secretariat no secretariat (more discussion after the break)  Decision-making, policy-making Supranational: Decisions/policies are made by an executive, legislative, or judicial body that is not (directly) controlled by member-states. Inter-governmental: Decisions/policies are made collectively by member states. Consensus unanimity (every member has a veto but can abstain) or consensus-minus-one (to prevent veto by a single state) Majority 50%-plus-one super majority (more than 50%-plus-one) weighted majority (based on size, contribution, etc.) Mixed  Today’s core question If IGOs can take such different forms… … then how can we explain the creation, design and reform of IGOs?  Design of IGOs What factors shape the creation, design and reform of inter-governmental organizations? Power Shared interests Shared normative aims Past choices  Power and IO design Lloyd Gruber (2000). Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions Strong states design and promote IOs that maximise their self-interests. Weak states accept these IOs when rejecting them would be more costly. When new great powers emerge, they create & impose new IOs.  Shared interests and IO design: the basic logic Robert O. Keohane (1982). The Demand for International Regimes. International Organization 36:2, 325-56 Interdependence exposes states to external risks (economic, environmental, etc.) and creates opportunities to achieve joint gains. Int’l institutions help states to manage interdependence through mutually-beneficial agreements. Which IO design will states ‘demand’ (i.e., support)? Demand for various IO designs “will vary directly with the desirability of agreements to states and with the ability of [each design] actually to facilitate the making of such agreements.”(152)  Shared interests and IO design: hypotheses Barbara Koremenos et al. (2001). The Rational Design of International Institutions. International Organization 55:4, 761- 99 States design international institutions in order to overcome cooperation problems and achieve joint gains. Assumptions: 1. The shared interests of states shape the design of int’l institutions. 2. States behave rationally – they make choices based on costs and benefits. Argument: Nature of cooperation problem faced by Koremenos et al. 2001 – some findings More uncertainty about the preferences of other states  More restrictive membership rule. More difficult distribution of gains  Broader issue scope. More actors  More centralization of tasks.  Normative aims and IO design John Gerard Ruggie (1982). International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. Int’l Org 36:2, 379-415 The design of IOs is shaped by the shared normative aims of the states that create them, not just by state power or shared interests. Post-WW2: Govts wanted an int’l economic order that would advance social welfare. Result: GATT was designed to balance growth (via tariff reductions) and welfare (via domestic social protections) – ‘embedded liberalism.’ Post-Cold War: Govts wanted an int’l economic order that would maximise economic growth. Result: WTO was designed to promote tariff reductions and to limit  Past choices and IO re-design Tine Hanrieder (2014). Gradual Change in International Organisations: Agency Theory and Historical Institutionalism. Politics 34:4, 324–333 Past choices on IO design shape current options and decisions. Ex. An IO’s treaty may enable a minority of member states to block re-design, even when change would be advantageous for most states. Ex. UNSC reform is blocked by P-5 veto power.  ‘Irrational’ responses to functional incentives for IO change: Layering: IO gains new functions despite not fulfilling old functions. Ex. Int’l Labour Org adopts new conventions even though many old conventions aren’t ratified or Today’s reading: Medina de Souza 2015 What questions or puzzles motivate this article? What is Medina de Souza’s answer or argument? Critical reflections on Medina de Souza 2015 How persuasive is Medina de Souza’s argument? What do you think led the Global South to accept the WTO? – the exercise of state power under anarchy? – problem-solving under interdependence? – shared normative aims? – the dynamics of global capitalism? – something else? Is Medina de Souza right to argue that Global South suffers from the WTO & free trade? What is Philip Golub’s argument (lecture 3) on this? Break time  On formal vs. informal IGOs What is an informal IGO? How do informal IGOs differ from formal IGOs? So what? Why does this matter? When do states prefer IIGO vs FIGO?  Informal intergovernmental orgs Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal (2013). Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements. Review of International Organizations 8:2, 193-220 Formal IGOs Informal IGOs Organizing Written and formally Explicitly shared principle adopted expectations expectations Membership Legal membership Explicit but non-legal Structure Regular meetings, formal Regular meetings, budget, secretariat rotating chair, little or no secretariat Delegation Yes No of authority to IGO Examples UN, WHO, WTO, EU G-7, G-20, G-77, BRICS, ASEAN+3, Visegrad 4  Example of IIGO: ‘Proliferation Security Initiative’ 107 states Shared goal: to prohibit the illicit transfer of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials to and from states and non-state actors. No legal status or permanent staff. Military and law enforcement personnel from PSI states convene periodically for training exercises. So what? The implications of IIGOs vs FIGOs Formal IGOs Informal IGOs Flexibility Low High Rules & Legally binding, hard to Non-binding, easy to commitm change change ents Policy High Uncertain continuity Autonomy Low: centralised High: decentralised of states oversight oversight Autonomy Some -> High None of IGO Expertise Centralised, available Decentralised, & to all uneven capacity Costs Low re-negotiation Low set-up costs costs What determines whether states prefer IIGO vs FIGO? 2 arguments (from Vabulas and Snidal 2013): Functional efficiency “States opt for… IIGOs when the advantages of lower sovereignty and negotiation costs, flexibility and speed outweigh the need for enforcement, commitment, consensus, and bureaucratic centralization.” (219) Relative power Status quo states are likely to prefer FIGOs (to lock in their power & policy preferences). Rising states are likely to prefer IIGOs (to avoid binding commitments that they may regret later, when they’re stronger). Rising states won’t challenge FIGOs (they’re hard & costly to reform) until the gap between institutionalized power and actual power is large.  Next class: The autonomy of IGOs How independent (‘autonomous’) are IGOs from the interests and preferences of member states?